Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattbballman :

This does not answer my point that a maximally powerful being must have maximal qual-omnipotence and maximal quant-omnipotence. If you wish to abandon God's maximal power as a criterion for maximal greatness, then do so.

Here's what Guthrie writes about said link:

To be "linked" is not the same as to be interderivable or interdefinable. Further, as I have mentioned earlier, we are not seeking "omnipotence in the context of the greatest conceivable being." We are seeking omnipotence per se, and omnipotence is maximal power. Guthrie's entire paragraph, in fact, seems to proceed with the supposition that omnipotence and omnibenevolence are distinct. Certainly, the greatest conceivable being will be omnipotent and omnibenevolent, but this is no guarantee that it makes sense to speak of omnipotence having to do with performing good actions.

I guess I still have to conclude that Guthrie will have to do a lot more argumentative work to move me from my strong intuition that people who only do evil are powerful, too.

Morriston doesn't accept the first statement. Rather, he would say there is no possible world in which God brings about malicious evil. This statement does imply to me that God is not omnipotent, both by F & F's analysis (someone actualizes "malicious torture" in neighboring possible worlds all the time) and by Hoffman and Rosenkrantz's ("malicious torture" is unrestrictedly repeatable, and bring-about-able), which I regard as superior.

Say more about this. Morriston's position doesn't require that God's existence is ever sufficient to bring about the current state of the world, as far as I read him in "Omnipotence and necessary moral perfection: are they compatible?"

mattbballman

Hey tom,

On this, I'm not sure if you paid too much attention to the essay itself for his criteria for qualitative omnipotence requires the quantitative element (which is why his view may not be a re-definition but an addendum; a securing rider that vouchsafes God's omnipotence from the likes of Mr. McEar).

Omnipotence being maximal power a priori is vacuously true. The contention in the debate over omnipotence in general is whether or not God has such maximal power in a superlative context (that is, can we conceive of a being with more maximal power than any rival beings?). Someone may say "Yes" for one can conceive of a being that does not only all good actions but all evil ones as well. Much ink has been spilled on this subject already and I can't do it justice to summarize the evidence here. But Guthrie's article bypasses or short-circuits this complex debate by shunting quantitative omnipotence (the traditional view) with qualitative omnipotence (the addendum). In this context, to ask who has more power entails who has more great-making results in their actions in addition to the number or quantity of actions. Regarding the analytical difference between omnibenevolence and omnipotence (for the two are certainly distinct), I'm not sure how to process your query except to say that one who acts morally superior in their arsenal of possible actions could be considered more omnipotent than one who does not. Here's how. It is a greater feat to say that one can perform all actions but only acts out of a benevolent intent than someone who can perform all actions and acts from both benevolence and malevolence. The total sum of actions for X1 who is omnibenevolent and "omnipotent" (I use quotes to say that one is alleged to be omnipotent) may be quantitatively identical to X2 who is amoral and "omnipotent" since both can enact the exact same number of actions. But, the objector says, how can this be? X1 cannot murder, right? That's one thing X1 can't do that the amoral X2 can! And I can think of a host of other examples! Alas! The problem here is not that X1 cannot perform the same action (the taking of a life per the specific example) but that the same moral intention would not be present for X1 as it is for X2. Thus X2 may do it with malevolent intentions (and so becomes murder) while X1 does the exact same act but under different circumstances so that it is justifiable killing. So it may actually be incorrect to say that an amoral being's omnipotence (a being with no regard or dependence on what is morally benevolent) can do more than a being that has omnibenevolence and omnipotence linked. Guthrie's article simply adds that omnibenevolence ensures that the omnipotent one acts qualitatively greater than a morally naked "omnipotent" being. Since the qualitative omnipotence is greater in God than any other conceivable being, it follows that God maintains omnipotence and others do not. Therein lies the necessary link between omnipotence and omnibenevolence. Perhaps this explanation is what is lacking in the article. Granted. But that is why I open his and others research up to criticism.

"Malicious" evil is the "uncontroversial example" of "any evil" which he represents as "E." He uses the specific example of maliciously torturing infants for fun as an uncontroversial representation of E. So I think "malicious" is a subset of what he means by E and not the set itself. I use "any evil" because, to an Anselmnian, all evil (which I specified in the strong sense) is contradictory to God's nature. Plantinga and I would agree that in the weak sense the statement could be false. Morriston says:

"Let E be some possible state of affairs that God's moral perfection prevents him from actualizing . . . In this paper, I take a close look at various attempts by Anselmian philosophers to provide such a rationale. In the first section, I consider an objection to P1 ['If God is necessarily morally perfect, then there is no possible world in which he actualizes E'], . . . In the final section of the paper, I briefly consider the implications of accepting P1 - P3 for the Anselmian conception of God."

But this is off track. I might deal with Morriston's questioning of linking omnibenevolence with omnipotence myself in a future work. I have collected more works from him where he matures his objections a bit more.

matt

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattbballman :

I did pay attention to his essay. Qual-omnipotence as Guthrie describes it does not gurantee quant-omnipotence. He does indeed have a place for quantity, but it's not the same as it is within quant-omnipotence. The role quantity plays in Guthrie's presentation, as far as I can see it, is just in the number of actions that have the right quality.

I think it provides a useful analysis because it allows us to perform the Maximal Power Test. Imagine a being just like Guthrie's God except that it has maximal quant-omnipotence. This being is more powerful than Guthrie's God. Therefore, Guthrie's God is not omnipotent.

Then I'm calling "ad hoc" on this move. But you attempt to provide more justification below, so I'll read on.

"More omnipotent" is incoherent. I wouldn't normally mention this point except that I think it shows how strange it is to require a qualitative element. But I'll read on...

True so far, but omnipotence isn't maximal greatness...

Indeed, but X2 has the power to have malevolent intentions and to perform actions borne out of malevolent intentions whereas X1 does not. This becomes most pressing when we think about states of affairs, because it is genuinely true that some states of affairs describe killings committed with malevolence and some describe killings committed without malevolence. The states of affairs just aren't the same.

Huh? This seems like a non sequitur to me. This is where I lose the thread of the argument. X2 can still do more -- she can bring about "malevolent killing" and "non-malevolent killing" -- whereas X1 can only bring about the latter. The quality of X2's actions is greater, but again, omnipotence isn't maximal greatness. The greatness of an action has no bearing on how power-granting it is, according to my intuitions.

Are you talking about weak actualization when you say "weak"? Or about something else? I'm looking forward to elucidation of your objection to Morriston, because I don't have much with which to work here.

rainbow walking

In my humble opinion Guthrie is shadow boxing mis-applied criticisms. Defining omnipotence/ all-power needn't be so complicated until you allow criticisms to creep in that can be more effectively defeated by invoking other attributes such as omni-benevolence or omniscience. The fact is raw power is useless without some measure of guidance in its usage, hence you have the other two omni's that cover the heart and mind of god. If I had the ability to do anything logically possible yet did not know how to use this power or had any motivation to do so, could I reasonably be said to be omnipotent?

It is my opinion that the degree of power any being has can only be measured in its utilization, that it is fundamentally useless to claim any degree of power until it has been demonstrated in action. From that point onward does the act come under scrutiny as to its moral and intellectual value. Thus Guthrie, in spite of his good intentions, appears to be trying to establish omnipotence as only those actions capable of producing a specific moral assessment. This hardly seems to cover the bases primarily because he appears to be assuming that man's good will always be the deciding moral benchmark guiding such a beings actions. But I do think he may be on to something by including timing in his formal statement.

Additionally, one wonders why such a being should even be concerned with morals and ethics at all. Morals and ethics are designed to guide finite beings community actions towards the continuance and furtherance of the community. Since this god is neither finite nor a community creature it begs the question whether any action undertaken by such a being can be said to render this being to be either good or evil.

Finally, as an aside, I am of the opinion that Thomas Metcalf has erred in his example of the greater power between one capable of destruction and one capable of planting a flower. To me he is saying that the power to destroy is greater than the power to create. I dis-agree. This power resides within us all to some degree or another, thus we have moral and ethical standards to hopefully guide us in our actions. Though the power to destroy has a more immediate emphasis, (being the optimist that I am), I believe that in the long run the power to create will prove to be the more formidable power...I hope.

mattbballman

tom,

(i) To imagine that a being is broadly more omnipotent than God is nothing short of simply denying that God is omnipotent. This is circular reasoning. But I do concur that my careless wording "more omnipotent" is incoherent which should have been stated as "more potent."

(ii) Your statement "True so far, but omnipotence isn't maximal greatness... " is the key here. That a naked view of omnipotence is not maximal greatness is not under dispute. But what is it about what both you and I agree on that it is a greater feat to say that one can perform all actions but only acts out of a benevolent intent than someone who can perform all actions and acts from both benevolence and malevolence? The only difference is their qualitative status.

(iii) An intent to do something malevolent is not part of a potency matrix. That is, one does not "have the power" to be malevolent. Rather, it is that one lacks the intent to be benevolent that one is called malevolent (or neutral) when they act. It is merely a definition of the quality of the action guided by the intent itself. Per example, there is no difference in "the quantity of power/potency" between a man who kills another in self-defense and a man who kills another because he enjoys to kill. The quantity of the potency/power is identical. It is the intent that modifies how we characterize one from the other As Thomas V. Morris elucidates,

[God] does not lack, or necessarily lack, a power to sin.
It is rather necessarily the case that he never uses his
perfect power to order to sin.".

And because it is a greater feat to say that one can perform all actions but only acts out of a benevolent intent than someone who can perform all actions and acts from both benevolence and malevolence, then perhaps God is the only (best) candidate for the description. But I could be wrong.

(iv) I don't want to sidetrack this with Morriston's views here. He'll be dealt with in an upcoming article I plan to write; and for you to critique if you are willing.

matt

mattbballman

rainbow,

This statement "The fact is raw power is useless without some measure of guidance in its usage, hence you have the other two omni's that cover the heart and mind of god. If I had the ability to do anything logically possible yet did not know how to use this power or had any motivation to do so, could I reasonably be said to be omnipotent?" is the crux of Guthrie's essay. It is to this end that I seek resolution (if possible).

The reason I want to include the ethical intent in omnipotence is because it is how we makes sense of statements such as "The pen is mightier than the sword" and such. Without a qualitative understanding behind the power, we can only consider quantitative factors (and this has been done in the literature -- even successfully by Flint and Freddoso). And I don't think Guthrie wants to minimize anyone else's research nor re-define omnipotence in and of itself. He probably simply wants to create a new attribute (qualitative omnipotence) that is an addendum to help explain why we should expect that a being that acts toward the maximization of benevolence is more powerful than one who acts toward either benevolence or malevolence. To me, this cannot be answered on the quantitative omnipotence views alone. And so I submit qualitative omnipotence.

matt

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattbballman :

I suspect I could train myself to behave malevolently more often. If I can, then "to be malevolent" requires an ability, or at least "to be malevolent more often than one is now" does.

But the quantity of bring-about-able states of affairs differs, and the genuine character of each state of affairs differs. Going purely by quantity, these two states of affairs are distinct:

(S1) Someone or other brings about intense suffering.
(S2) Someone or other malevolently brings about intense suffering.

And a being that can actualize only one of those is less powerful than a being that can actualize both, by quant-omnipotence and ceteris paribus. Unless you want to go back to task-omnipotence instead of state-of-affairs omnipotence?

That's true under an awfully strange definition of power. Suppose there were a person locked in a room without any books. Suppose she's permanently locked in there, and there is no TV link by which she can read a book, or anything like that. Suppose no one will ever put any books into the room. Suppose she cannot create books for herself. Does she have the power to perform "to read a book"? Does she have the power to bring about the state of affairs "someone or other freely reads a book"?

It's a greater feat, but not a more power-granting feat, is my position. To be limited only to good actions seems to be, well, a limitation, and that goes counter to our deep intuitions about what omnipotence is. Omnipotent beings aren't limited except by logical possibility.

As for the pen being mightier than the sort, I think you're misinterpreting. The point of that expression is to say that diplomacy and discourse are often more powerful than violence. No one's ever said, in my experience, that people who can only perform good actions are more powerful than people who can do either.

rainbow walking

rw: Then Guthrie's argument is that omnibenevolence is a qualitative improvement on omnipotence. Or perhaps that without omnibenevolence, omnipotence wouldn't obtain.

Hmmm...

From this we can also further reason that omniscience coupled with omnibenevolence further enhances omnipotence.

I suppose this goes towards showing the internal consistency when focusing on any particular attribute but I still fail to see why one can't simply point to his other attributes when one of them is brought under scrutiny.

mattbballman

Hey tom!

But the quantity of bring-about-able states of affairs differs, and the genuine character of each state of affairs differs. Going purely by quantity, these two states of affairs are distinct:

(S1) Someone or other brings about intense suffering.
(S2) Someone or other malevolently brings about intense suffering.

And a being that can actualize only one of those is less powerful than a being that can actualize both, by quant-omnipotence and ceteris paribus. Unless you want to go back to task-omnipotence instead of state-of-affairs omnipotence? "


-- I really don't see anything more or less quantitatively potent between S1 and S2. Both, all things being equal, are exercising the same amount of power. The only distinction is that S2 supplies the motive of the act. This is the failure of these Morriston-type objections: confusing intent/motive with the action itself. It's as if intent is some sort of power similar to riding a bicycle or cleaning the catbox. But intent is just a way of describing the quality of the event, it is not the event itself. S2 isn't evoking any additional powers except to answer why the action is occurring.

That's true under an awfully strange definition of power. Suppose there were a person locked in a room without any books. Suppose she's permanently locked in there, and there is no TV link by which she can read a book, or anything like that. Suppose no one will ever put any books into the room. Suppose she cannot create books for herself. Does she have the power to perform "to read a book"? Does she have the power to bring about the state of affairs "someone or other freely reads a book"? "

This is a good example of your misunderstanding. In this scenario, the action itself is unavailable for this isolated person. As such we are no longer concerned with the distinction between "someone or other reads a book" and "someone or other malevolently reads a book." In fact, this is a reversed case for it is conceivable that she could have the intent to read a book malevolently (whatever that might be) but cannot actually read a book regardless of purpose! Instead, neither intent is available because the action itself is unavailable and so there exists a limitation of power. There's nothing strange about this.

It's a greater feat, but not a more power-granting feat, is my position. To be limited only to good actions seems to be, well, a limitation, and that goes counter to our deep intuitions about what omnipotence is. Omnipotent beings aren't limited except by logical possibility. As for the pen being mightier than the sort, I think you're misinterpreting. The point of that _expression is to say that diplomacy and discourse are often more powerful than violence. No one's ever said, in my experience, that people who can only perform good actions are more powerful than people who can do either."


Only if one perceives the quality of good as being a limitation (as Morriston does) will this conclusion succeed. However, if acting in any sense malevolently in any degree is a privation of the good then surely any action that could conceivably be enacted toward the promotion of an optimal balance of good over evil would, in my estimation, be a greater "power-granting feat" (I will call this the Greater Benevolency Principle in my next draft). The pen-sword example is a good illustration. At first blush, one must wonder why a pen is mightier than a sword, figuratively speaking. And you are correct to point out that they are metaphors for diplomacy (of the contractual type) and force (or violence). But this smacks of the same situation you raised earlier about which situation had more potency: planting a flower or detonating a nuke. At face value, one thinks that detonating a nuke is far more powerful. Similarly, it appears that force is far more powerful than diplomacy. Yet the cliche is advocating precisely the opposite. Why? It seems that if I answer this question in terms of quantitative power, I can always conceive of a situation where diplomacy enacts the same damage or good as force does. What strikes me is the qualitative difference. I believe, and I could be wrong, that acting toward promoting the good is actually greater or mightier than acting with deficient motives (motives that are more deviant or a privation of the good). And maybe the cliche entails that using contractual diplomacy is typically a good whereas force is typically a bad (again, "typically" is the key since there are clearly exceptions here).

If I'm right, then not only is omnibenevolence not a hindrance to omnipotence but it may be necessary for omnipotence. Therefore, the intent or motive of the action is only taken into account if the behavior is malevolent or, more precisely, fails to promote an optimal balance of good over evil. It cannot be used to suggest that a failure to promote such good is itself a limitation against qualitatively lesser actions.

matt

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattbballman :

The quantitative difference is not within the power of each soa. It's the fact that some beings can bring about only one of those, and others can bring about both. Members of the latter set are more powerful, ceteris paribus, than members of the former. That's what quant-omnipotence means. So if you depart at all from that, you're departing from quant-omnipotence. You're either saying the two soas are identical (which is untenable) or that an omnipotent being might not be able to actualize the maximal quantity of distinct soas (which is abandonment of quant-omnipotence).

That's where I have to disagree. Suppose a person was completely unable to do any (non-consequentialistly) good actions. She could never benevolently help anyone. Could she be omnipotent? My intuitions say no. She could only perform some actions that happened to help people, but she could never do it out of the goodness of her heart. It just seems to me that the ability to have certain intentions is more power-granting than the lack of such an ability.

Imagine the familiar zombie example, but these zombies are such that they behave just like normal humans except that they don't have conscious intentions; they just act automatically, as it were. Are they really just as powerful as humans? And would zombie-God (who doesn't have conscious intentions) be just as powerful as intentional-God (who does things for intentional reasons sometimes and automatically other times)? Again, I don't think it would.

I think any libertarian, further, would have to accept that we choose what intentions to have. If that's so, then someone who was contingently prevented from actualizing a great many of her choices could still be omnipotent. That strikes me as absurd.



Really? That just strikes me as a monstrous non sequitur. Why couldn't I introduce an equally appealing Greater Malevolency Principle?

It's not that use of the pen is morally better than use of the sword. The idiom says nothing about that; it simply reports that diplomacy is often more powerful than violence. I think you'd be hard-pressed to find an idiom that actually claims that, say, the Happiness Bomb (which, when detonated, makes everyone in a 1-mile radius 10% happier) is more powerful than the Sadness Bomb (which, when detonated, makes everyone in a 1-mile radius 10% sadder).

True, but that shouldn't be surprising unless we already are accepting the supposition that the idiom means good-promoting actions are more power-granting than bad-promoting actions. If we don't accept that, the idiom makes just as much sense.

Again, true, but that just seems to be a way to recommend that people do good (via diplomacy), not an observation about how diplomacy is more powerful in virtue of being typically good. I think that's the key. No one thinks the pen is mightier than the sword because it's morally better to use the pen.