mattbballman

An article by philosopher Shandon L. Guthrie, on his site www.sguthrie.net has just put an article on his site with the title QUALITATIVE OMNIPOTENCE. I find it convincing and am open to discussing it with various volunteering posters.

It is located here: http://sguthrie.net/qualitative_omnipotence.htm

matt

Jamie_L

I'm not one of the "power philosophers" of these boards, but a couple of comments:

First: It seems like Guthrie uses two different definitions of "logically possible omnipotence" when he talks about "McEar". First, his definition is:

But later, it becomes:

These seem to be two separate things: X doing anything logically possible for any being to do, and X doing anything logically possible for X to do". Yet Guthrie uses these two definitions interchangeably.

Second: While Guthrie's definition of Omnipotent may be internally consistent and logically valid (though I'm not saying it is, necessarily), I think this definition is significantly different from what most people mean, or are trying to mean, when they use the term "omnipotent". Gurthrie has changed the word "omnipotent" from a morally neutral term to a moral term.

He seems to be making up a new term, rather than clarifying the existing term "omnipotent".

Jamie

mattbballman

Yo Yo!!

Thank you for your input. Although unintentional, you have probably correctly noted a flaw in how Guthrie communicated a definition. He was using "any" in the sense of "whoever is in question" rather than "everybody." This is probably a defect in his transmission of logical possibility. What he probably wants to communicate is that some definitions of omnipotence concentrate on saying that "X is omnipotent if and only if X can do anything logically possible for X." While this is a necessary feature, it is not sufficient (in mine or his opinion) to make one omnipotent -- a la McEar.

Regarding making omnipotent a "new" term, there is probably some truth to that. In fact, it is certainly attempting to be a moral term for I see omnipotence linked to great-making properties. That this "new" concept would perturb earlier definitions of omnipotence is unfounded. It embraces all standard views (specifically Anslelmnian) as necessary components to omnipotence and then, per his analysis, adds one additional feature: acting toward a balance of good over evil.

Keep the input coming.

matt

mattbballman

Anyone else out there willing to discuss this article?

matt

Thomas Metcalf

I don't think power has anything at all to do with ethics. If I have my finger on the button of a nuclear device planted in a major city, and my identical twin is holding a flower seed above a pit in the earth where the flower will grow, and we're otherwise equal, I'm more powerful than he.

Here's what Guthrie says about the point:

Huh? What does "linked" mean here? And we're not seeking "omnipotence in the context of the greatest conceivable being"; we're seeking omnipotence per se. Yes, the greatest conceivable being will be omnipotent and omnibenevolent, but it doesn't follow that an omnibenevolent being is more powerful than an omnineutral being. This part of his paper seems to be the crux, and extremely thin.

I don't read any more support in the rest of his paper.

Finally, I'm not even sure what motivates his paper. Flint and Freddoso solved a bunch of problems with omnipotence in "Maximal Power," and Hoffman and Rosencrantz settled a few more in The Divine Attributes. I still believe Morriston has shown an incompatibility between omnipotence and necessary moral perfection in "Omnipotence and necessary moral perfection: are they compatible?" (Religious Studies) and "Omnipotence and the Anselmian God" (Philo), but these aren't problems with Hoffman and Rosencrantz's definition.

sandlewood

I’m also not one of the power philosophers here. But his argument has some problems the way I see it.

How do you define what is the maximal moral good? As far as I know, Christianity includes the idea of absolute morality (as opposed to relative morality). That absolute morality is not a standard that God needs to adhere to. It’s a standard that God sets. Whatever Gods wants, or whatever God does is morally good by definition. So to say that omnipotence is defined by that which brings about the maximal moral good is a tautology in the case of God. I think Guthrie either needs to concede that there is an objective moral standard apart from God, or give up his proposition.

Guthrie seems to leave himself a back door. He says that even though something might not seem to bring about the maximal moral good now, or may seem only neutral now, it may eventually lead to the maximal moral good. This makes his proposition unfalsifiable.

Guthrie has changed the definition, and the meaning, of omnipotence. If you change the definition of omnipotence enough, sure you eventually get to say that God is omnipotent. But that doesn’t matter if “omnipotent” doesn’t mean the same thing anymore.

I also wanted to comment on the apparent limitation that God cannot do evil under Guthrie’s definition. If he is omnipotent, shouldn’t he be able to do evil, or at least something neutral if he wants? But I was not totally clear about his definition. He states,
So is it the case that an omnipotent being must act to produce the optimal moral good? Or must she only be capable of it? If the latter, then Guthrie hasn’t really added anything new. So I assume it’s the former. In that case, he precludes God from doing anything but the optimal good. I should think if he is omnipotent that he can do neutral things if he wants. After all, God did say, “I make peace, and create evil” in Isaiah 45:7. If we are to accept Guthrie’s definition, we need to contort our thinking so that creating evil results in the optimal good somewhere down the road. You would think that an omnipotent being could manage the optimal good without having to create evil.

mattbballman

tom,

I appreciate the critical comments that may help better define the article in future revisions. What I saw more of was a critique of the view rather than ways to enhance it. Guthrie does not contend that quantitative omnipotence entails maximizing great-making qualities, rather, he specifically discusses a qualitative omnipotence that would secure God as omnipotent and no other. That there exist quantitatively more actions from an "omnineutral" being is not in question. Perhaps this is just a misunderstanding on your part.

Morriston's critiques have been advanced in other forms and have not been successful contenders as adequate critiques of God's omnipotence vis-a-vis His omnibenevolence. But his criticism only works if the universe is the result of a state-state causation. As such, I'm (and perhaps Guthrie) not terribly concerned with his views here.

matt

mattbballman

sandlewood,

The Euthyphro Dilemma has been advanced in numerous articles dealing with the omnibenevolence of God. When one understands that the objective status of ethics is neither rooted in an external something nor in God's divine commands but, rather, in God's nature can one appreciate the dependence on God for the objectivity of moral values.

As far as omnipotence, he has not changed the definition per se but attached a "ryder" to it such that omnipotence could be viewed from another perspective as belonging to God and only God. As he notes in the essay, all other definitions of omnipotence (e.g., Freddoso and Flint) stand firm. He simply suggests an alternative route at reaching the same conclusion -- omnipotence, in the end, will only apply to God.

And his statement, "My view suggests that a being is omnipotent if and only if she is capable of doing what is logically possible for her to do and, at the same time, is also producing those actions that promote an optimal balance of moral good" entials both the capability and actuality/mandation of acting to optimize moral good over evil. These actions, as he notes, entail doing seemingly morally neutral things for they may lead to optimizing the moral goodness. And neither is Isa. 45:7 a defeater to this. Isaiah 45, when properly understood, refers to God creating calamity or disaster (Hebrew: ra'), not necessarily moral evil because it is contrasted to "peace" (shalowm or shalom). It would be odd if moral evil were the counterbalance to peace. It must mean natural evil.

matt

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattbballman :

Huh? When did I claim that? My position is that a person with her finger on the button to detonate a nuclear device is more powerful than a person with the ability to plant a flower, although the former action would be evil and the latter good.

Why? According to Flint and Freddoso's definition, and Hoffman and Rosencrantz's definition, God must be able to bring about S to be omnipotent. Please elaborate.

sandlewood

If ethics and morality (not the same things, but beside the point) are inherent in God’s nature, then you return to the original problem #2 in Guthrie’s page. Omnipotence is defined as anything God naturally does. As Guthrie says, “But, critics wonder, why would any definition for God’s omnipotence be crafted in such a way as to assume that whatever God is capable of is what omnipotence must be? It is clearly question-begging.”

Yes, I know. Again, the problem is that he is merely claiming that anything god does—neutral, evil, or good—will turn out to be optimal moral good. This is not known. He first defines omnipotence as doing only morally good actions, but then forbids us from being able to determine what morally good actions are, thereby protecting his theory from any possible criticism.

Plus, there is still the problem of God being unable to do anything that does not result in the greatest moral good, regardless of whether is appears neutral, good, or evil on the surface. That does not come close to resembling the meaning of omnipotence.

Natural evil? I don’t see how you can dissociate morality from evil. Morality is inherent in the word “evil”. (Merriam-Webster’s first definition or evil is “morally reprehensible”) I think if you want to interpret “evil” as the opposite of “peace” in this case, you’d need to interpret it as “war”. War is not an amoral thing. It sounds like quite a stretch to interpret evil as natural disasters.

I wish I had a dime for every time a Christian refers to Hebrew words to argue that the Bible is actually saying something entirely different than what it appears (quite plainly) to say. Will someone just please correctly re-translate the Bible to English once and for all.