NialScorva

What is materialism?
How can we distinguish it from any other ontology?
If materialism just describes what exists and the properties and interactions of that, then what is the alternative? That which doesn't exist and it's properties?

Why does ontology matter if we can't know the difference?

bluefugue

This discussion verges on being one of semantics. I have sometimes said that my belief in "materialism" constitutes a crashing tautology: that which is real, is real.

As you indicate, if "immaterial" things (like Mind as an irreducible force, or spirits, or Gods) could be shown to be demonstrably real, and moreover could interact with and impact "material" things, then why not just call them "material" as well?

There might have been a time when electromagnetic radiation would have been considered "non-material," yet we have since incorporated it into our "materialist" vision of reality. Although, admittedly, even in pre-technological days, the existence of light was quite obvious.

NialScorva

Very much true and insightful. I'm at a point that I'm convinced that materialism, naturalism, theism, and the whole kit-n-kaboodle of ontology is a purely semantic construct and reflects an aspect of our language, a side effect of our ability to communicate. Does materialism refer to "that which can be named and perceived"? The obvious opposite might be "that which can be named and not perceived", which does fit in with ghosts, gods, and gremlins being non-material. The material things have both a linguistic reality and an empirical reality. The non-material have a linguistic reality, but not a empirical reality. In this light, materialism seems to be an assertion about the definition of the word "reality" moreso than an assertion about what exists.

jpbrooks

While I am inclined to agree here, I'm still not certain how a complete account of subjective experience can ever be provided, even in principle. If it is possible to fully account for the origin and nature of experience on materialistic grounds then that would be great.
However, if not, then there would seem to be no way to rule out ontologies that posit an "immaterial" "realm". The "immaterialist" could always argue that the brain is more like a computer modem that transmits information back and forth between the material world and the "immaterial" one, than a computer.
So, in my view, a good question to start with would be, how could we (for example) come to know how brain processes generate mental experiences?

-John Phillip Brooks

[ January 24, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>

Vorkosigan

I think the problem is that one conceives of "material" as being "something." Really materialism is a belief about consciousness:

Materialism is the belief that consciousness cannot interfere in reality outside the body; one cannot Will things to happen.

With definitions like that, one can avoid the whole problem of "material" vs "immaterial."

Michael

Kharakov

It's circular: you are using the brain in order to understand the brain. The brain just has to understand the brain- for if it does not it will never be able to come to an understanding of itself (the brain) along the current line of inquiry (because that line of inquiry is wrong to begin with).

Nialscorva:

"I'm at a point that I'm convinced that materialism, naturalism, theism, and the whole kit-n-kaboodle of ontology is a purely semantic construct and reflects an aspect of our language, a side effect of our ability to communicate. "

I agree wholeheartedly. It comes down to semantics, which comes down to us agreeing upon definitions- although we never can know how a word is defined, except in its relation to other words.

In addition, i would like to state that i do not believe that words can ever communicate the exact experiences or ideas of one mind to another. When we get down to experiences (such as the color blue) we look for what is common between all the 'materials' that we hear the word blue associated with. We do not know if what we find in common between all of the 'materials' is the original commonality of all things blue.

read this: <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_vitzthum/materialism.html" target="_blank">http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_vitzthum/materialism.html</a>

A bit over a 3rd of the way through it introduces various ideas this thread is describing.

l8r

jpbrooks

Sorry. I forgot to check this thread for replies.

I'm coming to agree with Chalmers that perhaps subjective experience just has to be taken as a fundamental aspect of the world, much like "electromagnetism" in physics.
Since mental experience is subjective, any experiment that is set up to discover how the brain generates mental experiences would have to be done by the individual researcher on herself or himself. But how could such an experiment (that could rule out alternative explanations, like the brain as a communication channel between the material world and an "immaterial" one) be set up?
We could, of course, simply use Occam's razor to cut out such an "immaterial" world as being an "unnecessary" complication to the problem of understanding the connection between brain states and mental states. But in the absence of a reductionistic explanation for mental experience, the use of Occam's razor seems premature.

-John Phillip Brooks

[ January 26, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>

Kharakov

I don't believe we can rule out alternative explanations with any amount of certainty.

I am going to go way out there on this one, so please don't read this unless you want to see the products of my imagination.

I do believe that the brain is the mind without all of the flirting. All of your thoughts are already present and able to be triggered, but you have to find the right way to do it. While playing with thoughts directly can almost get you where you are trying to go (you can picture it)- you need to hit the right neural switch physically to go all the way.

Access to your brain is like access to the control panel of your mind: you just have to learn which switch does what. I think a brain is a greatly simplified view of the mind that allows us to hit certain switches in order to modify our mind.

Going way the hell out there now:

Why did the mind come up with the brain? Because it is lonely to be pure mind- to instantaneously have anything you desire. By attributing consciousness to a separate process, the mind has attempted to fool itself into thinking that it is not alone- for it has little control over this "physical" process, and many other minds must have been created by this process as well. The mind can still experience the things it wants- it just needs to find ways around the physical barriers that prevent it from getting what it wants (which are ecstacy, knowledge, power, etc..). Finding ways to regain the mind's control over its perceptions by discovering the secrets of the brain give the mind an excuse to grant itself what it desires, without actually admitting that it is alone (it requires many people to study and conquer the brain, to figure out how it works, to figure out how to manipulate the brain so that the mind believes it has what it wants). In the end, I think the brain is a bit of mental slight of hand.

jpbrooks

i agree that it is possible to view the "mind" as including the brain instead of simply being equivalent to it.
I don't want to get too far out into the "New Age" here, but I would agree that it would be reasonable to suppose that (at least) the rest of the nervous system could cooperate with the brain in "producing" mental experiences.

Kharakov

That is a very good way of putting it. It really simplifies things.

I usually go farther than that and view the mind as including all of the "physical" reality that I experience (which the brain is a part of).