Freethought & Rationalism Archive

owleye · 03-22-2002, 04:32 PM

Hans...

The naturalist view can be summed up by the view that "every event has a natural cause" where, in some sense the cause so determining the event is its explanation. Thus, for you to say that there is a desire in back of every action or judgement (assuming you would translate fear so that it becomes the desire to avoid), I would understand this to mean that whenever an action is taken or a judgment is made, it is because a desire preceded it. Without the desire there would have been no action or judgment.

However, things are more complicated than that, because desires are but one ingredient to action. Belief must accompany it. For example, if I get up to close the window, on the basis of the need of my body to return to a more desireable temperature range, it is because I believe (or have learned) that closing the window will serve that end. It is a mere locution to say I have a desire to close the window and inappropriately represents the complicated state of affairs.

If there were only one ingredient associated with an action or a judgment, we could never say it was the result of a decision (from choices available). From the way you present it, the choices presented are all phantoms. But if you add 'belief' to the picture we have at least something to talk about. "Deliberation over a set of choices" then comes down to deciding which among them serves my interest best and this depends on some cognitive assessment beyond the mere desire to do one or another of them. Desires relate to some inner state about which beliefs are directed as to the means of carrying them out.

There are other problems as well with your theory, but let me close for now.

owleye

Hans · 03-22-2002, 05:59 PM

owleye,

You have pointed out well my discrempancy regarding desire. In the very least it is subject to a wide range of misinterpretations.

Perhaps stating the following would be more accurate and easier to interpret: Wherever the volition of ones will can be deduced, that volition is always self serving. "Always" being the key word. Would you agree? Barring other problems you have seen, I think that if the above is true it will still "fit" into my proposition.

I appreciate your input and hope you and others will continue.

John Page · 03-22-2002, 07:45 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Kachana:

For example, a fair definition of my making a choice would be 'my doing what I desire', which would mean that I do have free will, even though there was only one option open to me.

I don't think this means you have free will at all! First you need to establish how your "desire" is determined/created.

Cheers!

dostf · 03-22-2002, 08:56 PM

Hans:

You might find it interesting to read Gurdjieff,-also sometimes called (the fourth way)- as much of his work centered around the free will issue. He basically stated man is machine who cannot "do" ie. no free will of his own. He offered a practical method of study to break down this machine and develop the will. Please note I do not endorse his teachings in any way and mention it here only as I am somewhat familiar with them and it relates to your inquiry.
Also I am wondering how you would relate the idea of no free will to the idea of "fate" or "destiny" (predetermined events whos outcome is fixed in advance regardless of our efforts)
Is there a connection? Just came to my mind so I put it out there.

Vorkosigan · 03-22-2002, 09:56 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Detached9:
Simply because on a quantum level there are no observable causes does not logically preclude that human behavior is not caused by antecedent factors.

The converse is also true: simply because there are antecedent factors does not imply a complete lack of agency on the part of actors with minds.

Michael

tronvillain · 03-23-2002, 12:00 AM

I suggest reading Dennett's Elbow Room - it's one of the best discussions of free will that I've ever read. While I used to deny the existence of "free will", I have since changed my mind. Of course, my idea of free will is unlikely to satisfy most free will proponents as it is totally compatible with causality.

Occasionally proponents of free will say "I chose to do x, but I could have chosen to do y." The only apparent way to accomplish this is to indroduce some random element, which if you think about it is exactly the opposite of what people seem to want out of their will. That we "couldn't have chosen otherwise" is not something to be afraid of; rather, it is exactly what we should want.

[ March 23, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]

Hans · 03-23-2002, 07:44 AM

dostf,

Your question on relating free will and fate is a worthy one. For me to answer that question would be pure supposition at this point given that I haven't established whether or not there is free will, although I must admit I'm leaning in the direction of no free will.

Your definition of fate - predetermined events whos outcome is fixed in advance regardless of our efforts. I can't help but wonder if our fate is the same as that of the weather. While I think most of us would agree that the weather is determined by factors outside of itself one still has to ask, is it determinable today that it will rain in Boston on February 6, 2361. If my proposition that the volition of our will is always self serving is correct, and, if we could successfully argue that what is self serving is always the product of our beliefs which are determined by biological, social, genetic, and environmental influences then our fate would seem to be the same as the weather. They are both very complex systems that lack undetermined actions but at the same time their future is always subject to a wide variety of external influences, making their more distant fate indeterminable.

I am unable to imagine any volition of our will that is not ultimately self serving. All of our behavour, actions, and choices seem to be locked into following this course. What is or would be decidedly self serving will very greatly between circumstances and beliefs but with each context presented the course of action is always the same - that which is self serving. I can't help but feel this is an observable manifestation of our lack of free will.

Hans · 03-23-2002, 07:48 AM

tronvillain & dostf,

Thanks for the reading suggestions. I will look at those.

Bill · 03-23-2002, 08:39 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by tronvillain:
I suggest reading Dennett's Elbow Room - it's one of the best discussions of free will that I've ever read. While I used to deny the existence of "free will", I have since changed my mind. Of course, my idea of free will is unlikely to satisfy most free will proponents as it is totally compatible with causality.

As a "physicalist" I take the position that the human mind is entirely the product of its exact physical state; that there is nothing else other than that exact physical state which is required to explain the functioning of the human mind. This reductionist idea is not popular in Philosophy of Mind circles. For instance, <a href="http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/book/tcm.html" target="_blank">one critic says</a>:

Quote:

... I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible (alas!), and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework.

I guess that, being inured to "God of the gaps" arguments insulates me quite a bit from those who now claim that we do not and cannot ever understand the workings of the human mind. Frankly, unless you believe in the "supernatural," there is no way but the physicalist way for any mind to operate.

However, physicalism argues strongly for a lack of <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06259a.htm" target="_blank">Free Will</a>. But that lack is viewed with such horror by civilized people that they are willing to entertain virtually any fiction that allows them to maintain their idea of every person possessing a totally free will to act for good or evil, as they might so choose. To believe otherwise (they assert) is to deny any possibility of assigning moral blame to any act or omission. (Does this remind you of the argument that "without God, all things are permissible?")

Properly viewed, both the idea of "God" and the idea of "<a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06259a.htm" target="_blank">Free Will</a>" would seem to fall into the category of "necessary fictions." In other words, given the current state of human development, it seems to be necessary for most people to believe that "God" and "Free Will" are true concepts in order for those people to both behave morally and to pass moral judgment upon others. I would personally argue that it is the positive consequences of passing moral judgment upon others which acts as the true foundation of moral behavior. Thus, even if you decide that a criminal has no "Free Will" to decide to behave morally, it is still proper to execute whatever punishment the law imposes as a lesson to both the criminal and/or to others who might be dissuaded from future criminal acts through knowledge of the imposition of punishment.

I believe that people can choose to condition their own behavior to be either "good" or "bad" (from a moral perspective) through choosing the general sort of life that they prefer to lead. What causes people to make one choice instead of the other may be an accident of circumstance. But each of us does choose our overall "moral stance" in one way or another. And, each of us is capable of having our overall "moral stance" altered by counter-conditioning, if we are so motivated to change. <a href="http://www.naturalism.org/tenetsof.htm" target="_blank">That same web page</a> makes this additional point about naturalism:

Quote:

Responsibility and morality: From a naturalistic perspective, behavior arises out of the interaction between individuals with their environment, not from a freely willing self that produces behavior independently of causal connections (see above). Therefore individuals don�t bear originative responsibility for their actions, in the sense of being their first cause. Given the circumstances both inside and outside the body, they couldn�t have done other than what they did. Nevertheless, we still hold individuals responsible, in the sense of applying rewards and sanctions, so that their behavior stays more or less within the range of what we deem acceptable. This is how people learn to act ethically. Naturalism doesn�t undermine the need or possibility of responsibility and morality, but it places them within the world as understood by science. However, naturalism does call into question the basis for retributive attitudes, namely the idea that individuals could have done otherwise in the situation in which their behavior arose.

So, there is no such thing as "Free Will" as that term is usually conceived. At any given instant in time, I will choose to do that which has been set up in my brain beforehand. To argue otherwise would be to argue in favor of a non-physical "outside influence" on brain activity, and I personally deny that as a possibility.

== Bill

[ March 23, 2002: Message edited by: Bill ]

John Page · 03-23-2002, 07:25 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Bill:

I believe that people can choose to condition their own behavior to be either "good" or "bad" (from a moral perspective) through choosing the general sort of life that they prefer to lead. What causes people to make one choice instead of the other may be an accident of circumstance.....

Bill:

There appear to be a number of contradictions in your previous post. How can people choose anything if they don't have an element of Free Will? What data is there to support your view?

Cheers!

03-23-2002, 12:00 AM	#16
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	I suggest reading Dennett's Elbow Room - it's one of the best discussions of free will that I've ever read. While I used to deny the existence of "free will", I have since changed my mind. Of course, my idea of free will is unlikely to satisfy most free will proponents as it is totally compatible with causality. Occasionally proponents of free will say "I chose to do x, but I could have chosen to do y." The only apparent way to accomplish this is to indroduce some random element, which if you think about it is exactly the opposite of what people seem to want out of their will. That we "couldn't have chosen otherwise" is not something to be afraid of; rather, it is exactly what we should want. [ March 23, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]</p>

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03-22-2002, 04:32 PM	#11
owleye Regular Member Join Date: Feb 2002 Location: Home Posts: 229	Hans... The naturalist view can be summed up by the view that "every event has a natural cause" where, in some sense the cause so determining the event is its explanation. Thus, for you to say that there is a desire in back of every action or judgement (assuming you would translate fear so that it becomes the desire to avoid), I would understand this to mean that whenever an action is taken or a judgment is made, it is because a desire preceded it. Without the desire there would have been no action or judgment. However, things are more complicated than that, because desires are but one ingredient to action. Belief must accompany it. For example, if I get up to close the window, on the basis of the need of my body to return to a more desireable temperature range, it is because I believe (or have learned) that closing the window will serve that end. It is a mere locution to say I have a desire to close the window and inappropriately represents the complicated state of affairs. If there were only one ingredient associated with an action or a judgment, we could never say it was the result of a decision (from choices available). From the way you present it, the choices presented are all phantoms. But if you add 'belief' to the picture we have at least something to talk about. "Deliberation over a set of choices" then comes down to deciding which among them serves my interest best and this depends on some cognitive assessment beyond the mere desire to do one or another of them. Desires relate to some inner state about which beliefs are directed as to the means of carrying them out. There are other problems as well with your theory, but let me close for now. owleye

03-22-2002, 05:59 PM	#12
Hans Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2002 Location: Earth Posts: 247	owleye, You have pointed out well my discrempancy regarding desire. In the very least it is subject to a wide range of misinterpretations. Perhaps stating the following would be more accurate and easier to interpret: Wherever the volition of ones will can be deduced, that volition is always self serving. "Always" being the key word. Would you agree? Barring other problems you have seen, I think that if the above is true it will still "fit" into my proposition. I appreciate your input and hope you and others will continue.

03-22-2002, 08:56 PM	#14
dostf Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2002 Location: toronto canada Posts: 498	Hans: You might find it interesting to read Gurdjieff,-also sometimes called (the fourth way)- as much of his work centered around the free will issue. He basically stated man is machine who cannot "do" ie. no free will of his own. He offered a practical method of study to break down this machine and develop the will. Please note I do not endorse his teachings in any way and mention it here only as I am somewhat familiar with them and it relates to your inquiry. Also I am wondering how you would relate the idea of no free will to the idea of "fate" or "destiny" (predetermined events whos outcome is fixed in advance regardless of our efforts) Is there a connection? Just came to my mind so I put it out there.

03-23-2002, 07:44 AM	#17
Hans Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2002 Location: Earth Posts: 247	dostf, Your question on relating free will and fate is a worthy one. For me to answer that question would be pure supposition at this point given that I haven't established whether or not there is free will, although I must admit I'm leaning in the direction of no free will. Your definition of fate - predetermined events whos outcome is fixed in advance regardless of our efforts. I can't help but wonder if our fate is the same as that of the weather. While I think most of us would agree that the weather is determined by factors outside of itself one still has to ask, is it determinable today that it will rain in Boston on February 6, 2361. If my proposition that the volition of our will is always self serving is correct, and, if we could successfully argue that what is self serving is always the product of our beliefs which are determined by biological, social, genetic, and environmental influences then our fate would seem to be the same as the weather. They are both very complex systems that lack undetermined actions but at the same time their future is always subject to a wide variety of external influences, making their more distant fate indeterminable. I am unable to imagine any volition of our will that is not ultimately self serving. All of our behavour, actions, and choices seem to be locked into following this course. What is or would be decidedly self serving will very greatly between circumstances and beliefs but with each context presented the course of action is always the same - that which is self serving. I can't help but feel this is an observable manifestation of our lack of free will.

03-23-2002, 07:48 AM	#18
Hans Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2002 Location: Earth Posts: 247	tronvillain & dostf, Thanks for the reading suggestions. I will look at those.

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