Hans

I recently rediscovered the idea that we lack free will. I say rediscovered because:

1) I have intuitively believed such but under a slightly different perspective. I have argued to myself that we are always self serving in our choices, even when those choices are to the benefit of others. It seems inescapable to me that even if we choose to, say, give a needy person help at some expense to ourselves, we do so because we find the reward of good feelings better than what we sacrifice.

2) I then read the following Tenet of Naturalism:
Naturalism takes the position that since everything is the product of causality so too are our choices. But I wonder if Naturalism's dependency on causality can be reinforced by observation.

It seems apparent to me that we are subject to the desires of our mind. An example would be selecting an item from a menu. Lets say there are 9 chicken items on the menu that Jack doesn't like and 1 beef item that he does. And then defy Jack to select an item he doesn't desire. While one might argue he could simply select anyone of the 9 chicken items we know he doesn't like, but if he did isn't he doing so because he desires to? Isn't any selection the product of his desires?

Although I can offer no element of predictability to our will I do offer the proposition that an observable manifestation of our lack of free will is found not in our ability to choose what we desire but in our ability to only choose what we desire. Thoughts?

Malaclypse the Younger

Well, I tend to disagree with the philosophical position that causality is necessary. There do appear to be both statistically and fundamentally random events, especially in QM. It certainly appears to be the case that causality is important, and randomness is actually statistically predictable.

More importantly "free will" can be defined as nonpredictable rather than nondeterministic; chaos theory shows that there are simple systems that are impossible, even in principle to predict. Even though my mind might be absolutely deterministic, there is no way to predict what I will do short of actually being me and experiencing all of the causal mechanisms that I experience with the actual neurology I have. Even then, even a little bit of randomness will render me nonduplicable as well as nonpredictable.

Jayhawker Soule

At the same time, items such as <a href="http://www.naturalism.org/naturali.htm" target="_blank">This Offering</a> from their site seems more than a bit strange -- somewhat equivalent to walking into a pharmacy and buying a bottle of pills labelled "placebo".

John Page

Malaclypse:

I agree with your philosophical postion that causality is not proven in all events. However, I also think there is an argument that random events appear when cause and effect are not yet understood.

Your comments do stimulate me to mention that humans appear less deterministic than, say, bicycles. I suggest this is due to the phenomenon of mind allowing us a certain amount of "freedom" in our decision. This points to a deterministic mechanism that "cancels out" physical mechanics to put us in the realm of metaphysics. Perhaps those bosons are just a lot smarter than we give them credit for..

Cheers!

Kachana

If my actions are non-predictable and/or non-deterministic, by what definition of 'free will' does it make sense to say I have free will?

If free will is defined along the lines of doing/ thinking something that is not predictable and or not deterministic, then yes, I have free will. But then it would seem that all sorts of sub-atomic particles can be said to have free will too.

Hans

The "freedom in our decisions' that you mention is exactly what I'm trying to determine. The naturalist argument has merit. But if I understand it correctly their position is that since no evidence of a causally privileged agent exists then our decisions must be caused. They even label it as a "natualistic perspective."

I'm wondering if our lack of a free will is right under our noses so to speak. I'm wondering if claiming that our inability to make a choice that is not what we desire demonstrates that we infact have no free will. In every choice we make we seem to be able to choose only what we desire. If we had a free will we would seem to be able to do otherwise. If my perception on this is accurate, even while having no free will we still always choose what we want. The very last sentence may also be the reason that what may be very obvious is also so hard to see.

Hans

I would define free will as being able to choose. And I offer for everyone's digestion that there is only one possible choice that can be made, the choice we desire. If there is only one possibility then there is no free will. We are in essence slaves to our desires.

Try to choose something you don't want to choose. Go to the store or stay home. What else will your choice be based on except for what you desire.

If my perception is correct so far then all one would seem to need to argue is that our desires are the product of biological and environmental influences and one will have successfully wiped out free will.

Kachana

I tend to concur. Although the definition you give as 'the ability to choose' could do, I think, with being refined. For example, a fair definition of my making a choice would be 'my doing what I desire', which would mean that I do have free will, even though there was only one option open to me.

Perhaps you could say free will is: 'being able to act in a way that cannot in principle be predicted from past events, and that, further, is due to an aspect of my consciousness rather than due to chance quantum fluctuations'.

Hans

Kachana,

Thank you. Your definition seems to hit my intended definition right on the nose. I guess I have a lot of catching up to do.

Detached9

Simply because on a quantum level there are no observable causes does not logically preclude that human behavior is not caused by antecedent factors.