luvluv

I've recently read the essay and most of the book The Will to Believe by American psychologist and philosopher William James. The titular essay (I love that word) was written largely in response to W.K. Clifford's essay entitled "The Ethics of Belief". It was within that essay that Clifford made the following quote:

James wrote the essay "The Will to Believe" in part as a refutation of that notion.

James' thesis, in response to Clifford's, was basically this:

To James, it was not only impractical but impossible to truly eliminate what one wants from one's philosophy. From the essay "The Sentiment of Rationality":




It being that, in James' view, it is neither desirable nor possible that the human will, our subjective desires, can be divorced from the ultimate questions he suggests that there are two desires that often express themselves in our desire to find ultimate truth:

I must not miss this, if it is true.

or

I must not be taken by this, if it is false.

Neither inclination can by any means suppose itself superior to the other. A person cannot hold that the former is morally or philosophically superior to the latter EXCEPT by previously accepting the former and vice versa. There is no independent rule to which we can appeal to answer which priority we "ought" to have. Some of us primarily would not want to miss ultimate meaning if it is available, even if there is insufficient evidence of it. Some of us primarily would rather not believe in something that is false.

James says that for those in whose heart, primarily, is the priority I must not be taken by this, if it is false. Clifford's rule of evidence is an appropriate epistemic method.

But, James says, there is no independent reason why a person guided by the priority I must not miss this, if it is true. should submit himself to Clifford's evidentialism:

James' argument further assumes that it is possible and likely that evidentialism regularly fails. There are things that are true that we do not have evidence for, and it is further possible that there are things for which there is no evidence (or at least, no evidence available to us) and are nonetheless true. If it be possible to gain from knowing such truths presently, and in this lifetime, James' believes it is absolute insanity to forbid their belief.

James further assumes that there are realities which we cannot possibly attain unless we believe they exist beforehand:

James thus says that there are instances in which a person is rational in believing ahead of the evidence, so long as the object of the faith fits three criteria. The option must be live, forced, and momentous.

By live, James means that it must actually be possible for the questioner to believe that which he would desire to put his faith in. If it is not possible for a particular person to believe in, say, the invisible pink unicorn, then precursive faith of the kind James advocates could never bring a person to believe in the pink unicorn. But if the questioner finds the God of Christianity something he or she can actually believe, then this option is live.

By forced, James means that of the given question to not choose entails the same results as to choose in the negative. To the question of whether or not there is ultimate meaning in the universe, to not choose is in the end the same as to choose to believe that it has no meaning. In either case you miss the meaning if the meaning is there. Though he never mentioned it, I take James to hold that the option is only forced if the risks of believing it or not believing it obtain in this life, in this state of affairs, not a state of affairs said to obtain in the afterlife or a set of affairs which ONLY obtain if what we are questioning is true.

By momentous, James means simply that much is to be gained and much is to be lost given over a certain question. If it is true, the rewards in this life which we gain are enormous if we believe it, and what we miss in this life is equally enormous if we fail to believe it.

James' precursive faith allows that if an option is live, forced, and momentous, someone with the priority I must not miss this, if it is true would be completely rational in holding that this option is true ahead of the evidence. He offered this not as Pascal offered his wager, as an invitation to believe, but as a validation of those who believe, and a validation of the choice to do so.

Pre-emptively, James' notion is not a version of Pascal's Wager. In the titular essay, James himself says of the Wager:

James was known for being contemptuous of the Wager, so if the notion of precursive faith is taken by anyone to be "just another version of Pascal's Wager" that person would be mistaken. James did not mean to say that a person should believe in the Christian God for these reasons (indeed, his framework would work for any deity or belief system) but that they are being perfectly rational if it happens that they do.

Jobar

Very scholarly, luvluv.

James' argument further assumes that it is possible and likely that evidentialism regularly fails. *There are things that are true that we do not have evidence for, and it is further possible that there are things for which there is no evidence (or at least, no evidence available to us) and are nonetheless true.* If it be possible to gain from knowing such truths presently, and in this lifetime, James' believes it is absolute insanity to forbid their belief.

OK, granted that there are truths which we do not have evidence for. This seems to me another way of saying we don't know everything.

But until we *have* evidence for some idea, we cannot call it truth! It can only be termed a hypothesis until there is at least some evidence indicating its truth- at which point we may call our idea a theory. And if enough evidence accumulates that the idea seems incontrovertible, it may come to be called a law.

By forced, James means that of the given question to not choose entails the same results as to choose in the negative. To the question of whether or not there is ultimate meaning in the universe, to not choose is in the end the same as to choose to believe that it has no meaning. In either case you miss the meaning if the meaning is there. Though he never mentioned it, I take James to hold that the option is only forced if the risks of believing it or not believing it obtain in this life, in this state of affairs, not a state of affairs said to obtain in the afterlife or a set of affairs which ONLY obtain if what we are questioning is true.

Errr... no. One can keep an open mind about any proposition for which there is no way of determining its truth value, while seeking some way to determine it. To simply *decide* something is true without some means of proving it true, is to be gullible and intellectually dishonest.

James' precursive faith allows that if an option is live, forced, and momentous, someone with the priority I must not miss this, if it is true would be completely rational in holding that this option is true ahead of the evidence. He offered this not as Pascal offered his wager, as an invitation to believe, but as a validation of those who believe, and a validation of the choice to do so.

No, again. *IF* an idea is true, and seems to have important consequences, one must simply seek diligently for proof, i.e. evidence. Until you are certain of the truth or falsity of your idea, acting as if it were true is simply foolish. You may be acting on a falsehood.

added- In some cases, one can test an idea by acting as if it were true, to see if some proof or disproof arises from your action. However, this must be done with the possibility in mind that the idea *may not be true.*

K

luvluv:

There are many good points in what you've posted above. There are certainly decisions that must be made without full evidence. There is no question that gut reactions are things that humanity would have perished without. We'd clearly be paralyzed if we always waited for full evidence before making a decision. But making decisions based on limited evidence is not the same as making them based on no evidence.

James tries to pull a fast one when he claims that religious decisions are rational because they are simply based on the difference between the the two motivations:

I must not miss this, if it is true.

and

I must not be taken by this, if it is false.

This could clearly be used to claim that any belief is rational and at that point, the word loses its meaning.

"If I weal all black, castrate myself, and poison myself, I will be picked up by a UFO flying behind the Hale-Bopp comet and taken to a place where I will experience eternal bliss. I must not miss this if it is true."

"If I hijack this plane and fly it into the World Trade Center, I will make Allah very happy and he will give me 73 virgins and I will live in bliss forever. I must not miss this if it is true."

"God would be angry and punish me if I allowed my dying child to get medical attention. I must not miss this if it is true."

"There are aliens trying to read my mind. I can only stop them by refusing to bathe and by licking strangers faces and armpits. I must not miss this if it is true."

I doubt that even James would consider these rational beliefs - even though they meet all of the criteria he set out.

luvluv

Well, I'm glad at least two people bothered to read my little attempt at a book report!

Jobar:

This is kind of what James is talking about. You are smuggling scientific laws and processes into the domain of purely human subjective beliefs. What James was asking for, it seems to me, was a reason why a person who is not a scientist and whose primary motivation was to live for an ultimate meaning, if there is one, should proceed to find meaning by the scientific method. What proof is there that scientific methods are capable of determining meaning?

I think a person can believe that a certain proposition is true by faith, and on the basis of the evidence he has. That faith may turn out to be improperly placed, but certainly one is not irrational in hoping that one belief or another is true. At any rate, if it is irrational, we all nonetheless still do it. This reminds me of one of James' quotes that I forgot to put into the above essay:

In other words, since a person who disbelieves because of a lack of evidence is as likely to be wrong about certain issues as one who believes despite the lack of evidence, why is it so much more "wrong" to value hope that something may be true over caution that something may be false? James asks this question rhetorically, I imagine, but I am asking it seriously. If I am willing to risk my life on the hope that something beautiful and worthy may be true, and if I gain here on earth by so believing, and if this belief, while lacking in evidence, still has the possibility of being true, why should I not believe it?

But suppose the proposition is such that the evidence will, for your lifetime, be perpetually inconclusive. It is possible that the existence of God, for example, simply cannot be determined by an appraisal of the evidence. There is more than enough evidence for some very smart people to believe, and there is more than enough evidence for equally smart people to disbelieve, but there is not so much evidence as to settle the case once and for all amongst all intelligent people. What then? What if the case simply cannot be determined solely by human efforts to attain emprical evidence?

I think having faith in something is always a bit more tenuous of an action than simply deciding that a proposition is true. That is partially James' point. It is definitely a risk, and a risk often cautiously and consciously undertaken. I don't think it is dishonest if the person truly understands the risks and is willing to take them. What James asks is if a person is aware of the risk of being wrong and who nonetheless desires to risk being wrong in the quest for some momentous gain, why should this person withhold his belief? Is such a person merely intellectually dishonest or is he simply more honest than others of us about his non-intellectual desires. Is not the desire to act meaningfully in the world according to a concept or worldview that appeals to his deepest passions a legitimate reason for risking belief?

Right but that's his point. What if the person is willing to risk acting on a falsehood? What is wrong with that? You might be one of those I must not be taken with this, if it is false type of follks, but why should I limit what I may believe based on your inclinations if my inclination is I must not miss this, if it is true ?

K:

Firstly, I don't think James's notion of precursive faith is an attempt to justify the content of a particular belief, but to justify the decision to risk believing them. Maybe I did not do a good job in my initial essay in making that distinction. The belief "Aliens are trying to read my mind" would not be rationally justified using James' method, but the decision to risk believing such a notion would be if the believer thought that the belief was live, forced, and momentous. James was not interested in a process that could differentiate true beliefs from those that were not true, but in saying that there were intellectually compelling grounds for not always limiting belief to evidence.

As for your examples, remember that James said that the belief must be LIVE and MOMENTOUS in this lifetime for a person to be rational in risking believing it. The momentous criteria thusly would eliminate your first, second, and third examples. The fourth examples could possibly slide in under this criteria if these concept was a live option for the person believing it. It would not be rational for us to hold, but if the person holding them finds himself able to believe them, and if he feels that there is more to be gained by not having his mind read by aliens than he would lose by licking strangers, then I guess such a person's decision to risk believing would be justified (consistently with his beliefs, anyway.)

I also want to make clear that the two statements "I must not miss this, if it is true" and "I must not be taken by this, if it is false" are terms of my own making. James' terms were "We must know the truth" and "We must avoid error." I substituted my own terms to make them a little more consistent with what I thought his point was. Maybe I'm wrong. At any rate, I'm fairly sure you can find the essay on-line somewhere and I would encourage you all to read it for yourself.

K

luvluv:

I would agree that a person can make a rational decision to behave irrationally. Someone could decide that a world without leprechauns would be horribly depressing and refuse to consider anything that suggests they don't exist. The decision was made based on evidence (thinking leprechauns exist feels good, thinking they don't feels bad). The underlying belief is irrational (there is very little evidence to suggest leprechauns exist).

I'm hesitant to call the decision to believe rational, though. Not because it isn't rational, but because some may think that it somehow implies that the underlying belief is rational. Also, as soon as the belief results in a behavior that is somehow detrimental in this lifetime the belief becomes irrational. For instance, the believer in leprechauns could turn down a job offer believing that finding a leprechaun's pot of gold was right around the corner.

Maybe this isn't a discussion of EOG since it is about the rationality of believing instead of the rationality of the underlying belief.

Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

Wow...great post luvluv.


It seems James has summoned to text thoughts and feelings I had but could not muster with pen and paper. I have long felt that man could not even survive without the occasional leveraging of the 'I must not miss this if it is true' strategy.

Leave people who are under the illusion that all life must be wrestled with 'I must not be had if this if false' alone to calculate, endlessly and piece-meal, what could be easily discerned by an honest heart.


Just desserts.



Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

K

SOMMS:

This could easily be an argument for strong atheism. There is no reason to wait for possible evidence of the existence of God when the there is currently a great deal of evidence that He doesn't exist. While an absolute proof of the non-existence of God may be impossible, there is no reason to "to calculate, endlessly and piece-meal" when there is clearly enough evidence to support the positive assertion that God does not exist. Be careful. That's a double edged blade your wielding.

Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

K,
This is a bit of a strawman though K. No one is making this argument.

Neither W.K. Clifford's essay The Ethics of Belief or William James' The Will to Believe were discussing the topic of strong atheism. Rather James' argument was intended to the majority of athiests and agnostics who justify their position by claiming 'I do not believe because I haven't sufficient evidence.'

This certainly is the prevalent viewpoint among the atheists/agnostics on this board...see here


Frankly, your miscasting of the thrust of James' argument seems clumsy and forced. No one I know of...not even strong athiests...would cast 'God does not exist' as an 'I must not miss this if it is true' kind of proposition. This should be obvious as 'God does not exist' is a negative affirmation while 'I must not miss this if it is true' most naturally pertains to positive affirmations.


If you wish to scramble James' intent to defend your world view then by all means do so. However, your skirting of this technicality doesn't buy you much (if any) philosophical ground.



Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

luvluv

And I'd still like an answer to this question, posed by James, for all those who do not believe because of a lack of evidence:

Since evidentialism is not infallible, why shouldn't a man believe that which he does not have complete evidence of? You may choose not to believe on the grounds of a lack of evidence, and be totally wrong, I may choose to believe despite the lack of evidence, and be totally right. This could be true of any concept. So why should a person yield more to his fear that a proposition might be false than to his hope that a proposition may be true?

luvluv

SOMMS:

In a way though, SOMMS, I see how this could work for them. If an atheist says of the benefits that come from not believing in God (unrestrained sexuality, freedom from certain constraining moral laws, etc.) I must not miss this, if it is true (this meaning free love, drug use, carnality, or whatever the percieved benefits of God not existing are) then he could probably use James' formula. I think a lot of atheists do in fact subscribe to atheism for reasons like these, at least on a subconcious level. The feeling of being free from external authority informs much of the decision to leave religion, IMHO. Some atheists may feel that feeling is worth the risk of God actually existing.

None of the atheists here will admit to that, though.