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Taffy Lewis

JB01:

It seems to me that it is implicit in every use of the word "should" that the person making the claim is assuming that the person they are talking to wishes to be rational. So the expression "if you wish to be rational, you should....." would always apply.

To me, it's very implausible to claim that when one is deliberating about or commending some moral behavior that one is not interested in being rational. So I doubt that there is such a thing as a "naked" should.

I think your conditional use of the word "should" is interesting. If I understand you correctly you want to say that whether one would claim that a person should do something is dependent on whether or not that person can. If they can then they should but if they cannot then the term "should" does not apply.

Is that right?

JB01

It's pretty close. I'm saying that whether one would claim that a person should do something is dependent on whether or not one believes that the person can. That's the closest I can come to agreeing with premise 2 of the original argument - and it's definitely not full agreement.

I think that either premise 1 of the argument can be rephrased "We should refrain from believing unjustified propositions, if we can" - in which case the word "should" is not being used consistently between this premise and the 2nd one; or else "should" is being used the same way in both, in which case it is by no means clear that premise 1 is true.

Do you see what I mean?

Taffy Lewis

JB01:

Your suggestion does seem to have force. For example, if you were to suggest that someone should take the bus then it does seem as though you are committed to the belief that they can in fact take the bus. It wouldn't make much sense to say "Well I know you can't take the bus but you should do it anyway."

Or you might make the weaker claim that you are suggesting: "I don't know if you can take the bus or not....but if you can then you should." (I believe this is closer to what you meant.)

However, this might make it impossible to criticize someone. The reason is that if you don't reasonably believe that they can refrain from believing falsehoods with regard to the free will issue then you can't suggest to them that they should.

So basically you have to say "I don't know if you should accept my arguments or not." because you don't know if any given person can accept your arguments. This seems extremely counter-intuitive and it seems to undercut your ability to debate such people. Maybe that's a consequence of determinism being self-defeating. (Assuming that it is self-defeating. I haven't decided yet.)

Normally we think normative considerations are unconditional. At least it seems that way to me.

DRFseven

You tell people they should accept your arguments because you know that sometimes your saying that causes them to be able to accept the argument.

Taffy Lewis

DRFseven:

That's a fascinating interpretation of what people mean when they say "should". They aren't really claiming someone should do something but rather are trying to bring about a certain effect by the mere act of telling someone they "should" do something.

The problem with saying "I don't know if they can perform act A or not but if they can they should perform act A." is that in any given case if you don't know if they can you can't really say they should. It seems to me that the should/can relation is still close enough for the proponent of the argument to say that determinism undermines its ability to be rationally defended.

DRFseven

When we argue, we are telling people what they should think. And it works! I don't know your age, but didn't you ever argue with your parents that they should trust you to use the car, go out of town, blah, blah, blah? Wasn't your hope that they would trust you, and weren't you rewarded at times by their acquiescence? We all (especially those of us on this forum!) do this all the time.

But we can or can't on a moment-by-moment basis, which changes everything. At any point in time, you may change from can to can't, so it behooves me to provide the impetus to that change.

Taffy Lewis

DRFseven:

The 2nd premise of the argument says that if we think someone should or ought to do something then we must presuppose that they can in fact do it. I don't see how this above quote suggests otherwise. In fact, it seems to support it. Implicit in the child's attempt to pursuade his parents is the belief that he can pursuade them.

tronvillain

Taffu Lewis:
Is it really that hard to understand? Say someone is chained to railroad tracks with a train bearing down on them - if they want to live they should get off of the railroad tracks. Of course, they can't get off of the railroad tracks since they are chained to them, but the fact remains that getting off of them is the way to stay alive. It is entirely possible that you wanting to be rational and accepting my argument is somewhat similar.

Now, if we use "should" in the narrow sense of the argument, then such statements cannot be made and we will frequently be completely wrong in making the should statements that we can still make. That is, actions that looked possible will turn out to have been impossible in retrospect, since they were not done. As I said before, all your argument shows is:
Now, you tried to get around this by claiming that I think you can avoid believing falsehoods, but I think nothing of the sort. I think it is possible that you can avoid believing falsehoods, but I expect that you will succeed in some cases and fail in others, and as I have mentioned, my use of "should" does not depend on "can."

Taffy Lewis

tronvillain:

If one of your friends were chained to railroad tracks and they asked you "What should I do?", am I really supposed to believe that you would tell them:

"You should get off the tracks but I know you can't."

They might respond by saying:

"But I can't do that."

Following your logic, you would have to reply:"

"Yeah, I know. But that's still what you should do."

This seems crazy. It would make much more sense for you to tell them that they should call for help or that they should try to get the attention of the engineer (assuming that you cannot help them). If they literally cannot get off the track then obviously they should do something else. "Getting off the track" is not what they should do. When you tell someone that they should do something then you are at least recommending that course of action. How can you genuinely recommend that someone do something if you don't think they can?

Also, it is interesting to note that there is literally an infinite number of things they cannot do in the case of your example. They cannot blink their eyes and cause the train to disappear. They cannot use telepathic powers to tell the engineer to stop. Etc. Also, there are perfectly mundane things they cannot do. They cannot call the engineer on his cell phone because he doesn't have one. But if this is a sense in which the term "should" is used then we should also say that they "should" call the engineer or blink their eyes or use their telepathic powers. All of these things would save them. So why suggest to them that they should get off the track if this is only one of an infinite number of ways they could be saved if only they could do those things???

The whole purpose of telling someone that they should do some particular act is to narrow down the field of possible courses of action. Yet, your "sense" of the term "should" multiplies the options of what they "should" do.

You might respond by saying that "If you could get off the track then that is what you should do." But this isn't a denial of the claim that "should implies can". Also, given this, whether or not you tell someone they should do something would depend on whether or not you believed they can do it. In the case of free will, if you don't believe I can accept your arguments, then you can't claim that I should. Is it reasonable to believe that I can accept your arguments? I'd say that either you don't know if I can or not or you really do think that I can.

Finally, you didn't actually give two distinct definitions of the word "should". Rather, you simply asserted that the term can be used whether you can do otherwise or not. Then you just labelled this a "wide"(?) and "narrow" sense. (It's interesting that you labelled the "sense" in which the argument uses the term as the "narrow" sense because it is doubtful that anyone ever uses the term in your "sense".)

[ June 25, 2002: Message edited by: Taffy Lewis ]</p>