Taffy Lewis

I read this argument online but I can't remember where. Is anyone familiar with it:

1)With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods.

2)Whatever should be done can be done.

3)If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done.

4)I believe that sometimes I can choose between alternative courses of action (ie. free will)

From 1 and 2 we get:

5)With respect to the free will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods.

From 3 and 5 we get:

6)If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods.

From 6 and 4 we get:

7)If determinism is true, then I avoid a falsehood when I accept free will.

8)I have free will.


8 is supposed to follow from 7 because believing in determinism is supposed to lead to a contradiction (ie. determinism's truth coupled with my avoiding a falsehood while believing in free will)

The argument basically claims that determinism entails that one cannot rationally accept it.

One might claim that they never really accepted determinism but believe there is a certain amount of chance involved in human actions and experiences or that we can act randomly within a certain determined region. But it is hard to see how an appeal to chance can be the basis for rationality. For example, if one were to accept one's beliefs or perform one's actions on the basis of the roll of a die, one would hardly be considered rational.

Does anyone see anything wrong with this argument?

Liquidrage

Actually this doesn't even have the ground underneath to attempt to put a leg down to stand on.


1)With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods.


This has nothing to do with free will.

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2)Whatever should be done can be done.
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This is an ideal. It proves nothing and it not relevant.

3)If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done.

Semantics and Quantum uncertainty aside, I could consider this a truth.

4)I believe that sometimes I can choose between alternative courses of action (ie. free will)

Free will is not the ability to make a choice.
Free will does not meet the definition given.


From 1 and 2 we get:

5)With respect to the free will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods.


No, from 1 and 2 we get "1) and 2)". The points even if they weren't faulty were never shown to be capable of being truths when combined. Just because the author chooses to combine the 2 statements does not make it logical or truthfull.

The statement by it self shows nothing.


From 3 and 5 we get:

6)If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods.


Again, the author choose to add two statements.
The statement by itself is not true as determinism does not eliminate falsehoods.


From 6 and 4 we get:

7)If determinism is true, then I avoid a falsehood when I accept free will.


This is not true.

If determinism is true, then accepting freewill is still a falsehood.
Just as accepting determinism would be a falsehood if freewill is true.


8)I have free will.


Which was never shown to exist.


8 is supposed to follow from 7 because believing in determinism is supposed to lead to a contradiction (ie. determinism's truth coupled with my avoiding a falsehood while believing in free will)


The contradiction was never shown.


The argument basically claims that determinism entails that one cannot rationally accept it.


Never shown.

One might claim that they never really accepted determinism but believe there is a certain amount of chance involved in human actions and experiences or that we can act randomly within a certain determined region.


Not relevant.


But it is hard to see how an appeal to chance can be the basis for rationality.


Not relevant.

For example, if one were to accept one's beliefs or perform one's actions on the basis of the roll of a die, one would hardly be considered rational.

Does determinism now claim that the human brain is a single die?

Does anyone see anything wrong with this argument?

I saw lots.

Missuse of words and non-proven assertions as the foundations for futher assertions being the most blantent.

MaxMainspring

Actually I believe that this is intended to demonstrate the necessity of free will within a theististic worldview because it uses premises that would certainly only be agreed to by a non-theist.

If not, and it is meant to be also valid in a non-theistic context, then I think it is seriously misguided.

Hopefully it is meant only to be persuasive to other theists and as a theistic refutation of determinism.

In that context it seems, at least superficially, valid. But the difficulty for theists is that the doctrine of free will has even deeper problems of consistancy and reasonableness.

[ May 29, 2002: Message edited by: MaxMainspring ]</p>

tronvillain

On first glance, I see a lot of things wrong with it:

1)I assume this is simply a specific case of a more general principle like "We should refrain from believing falsehoods." While I agree with the principle in general, in that outcomes are usually better when I don't believe falsehoods, I can easily see exceptions to it. Perhaps we would be better off believing in "free will" even if it is false.

2)This appears to be an observation that in order to say that something should be done, it has to be physically possible, and as a result can be done (at least in principle).

3)Now, this is where the major problem with the argument comes in. The sense in which it uses "can" is entirely different than the sense in which it is used previously, but this is ignored. In this sense "what can happen" means "what is going to happen given the state of the world" which is far more restricted than what is physically possible.

4)There is no problem with this statement. In fact, I would go further and state that "I do choose between alternative courses of action." After all, we observe this being done all the time, so it's not really up for debate.

5)In order to refrain from believing falsehoods, we have to be able to determine what is true and what is false. Saying that we can refrain from believing falsehoods with respect to the free will implies that either we are able to determine whether free will does or does not exists or it is possible in principle to determine whether free will does or does not exist. The statement does not specify which of these two cases it refers to, but assuming the argument does not claim that we simply know whether free will exists or not, the second case seems likely. Now, is it possible in principle to determine whether or not free will does or does not exist? Perhaps.

6)As a result of the major problem mentioned earlier, this statement does not follow at all. If determinism is true, what is going to happen will happen, so we either will or will not believe falsehoods with respect to free will. Nothing more is implied by determinism being true, regardless of whether we should refrain from believing falsehoods or if it is possible in principle to determine whether or not free will does or does not exist.

7)Again, this statement does not follow. The truth of determism entails nothing more than that we either will or will not believe falsehoods with respect to free will.

8)I would say that I have free will, simply as a result of the fact that I choose between alternative courses of action, but it doesn't follow from this argument.

In the end, this argument is a huge piece of garbage. Bury it.

[ May 29, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]</p>

Taffy Lewis

tronvillain:

The only premise of the argument which you question is number 3.

What is the difference between the two senses of "can" you claim are present?

If determinism is true then there is literally only one possible future state of affairs given any moment. If determinism is true then there are no alternative futures. So the only actions which are possible are the actions you will in fact perform. If determinism is true then the physical laws are deterministic and thus whatever is physically possible is in fact what will physically occur. So, if determinism is true, then whatever you literally can do (ie. what is possible for you to do) is that which you actually do.

This is just an admission that we have free will. But 4 does not entail that we have free will. It only states that someone believes it.

There are only 4 premises to the argument and the argument seems clearly valid. Thus in order to reject the argument one must find a premise that is either false or not justified.

One last point. You claim:

I can believe anything for any reason. Merely having a belief does not require that one be able to determine if it is true or false. Being rationally warrranted however DOES require that I have some basis that supports my belief.

tronvillain

Taffy Lewis, it's not really all that complex. Compare statements two and three:

2)Whatever should be done can be done.

3)If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done.

As I explained earlier, statement two asserts that anything that in order to say that something should be done, it has to be physically possible, and as a result can be done (at least in principle). On the other hand, statement three must be taken as asserting that what is going to be done is a small subset of what can be done - what is going to be done is set, so vast parts of what is physically possible are excluded. It is this confusing wording which permits one to go from two and three to "If determinism is true, then what should be done is done" which is simply not true.

Also, contrary to your claim that I only questioned statement three, I also questioned statement one. Now that I think about it, I question it not only on the basis that it is possible that the outcome would be better if we believed falsehoods with respect to the free will issue, but also on the basis that it is possible that we cannot know the truth about the issue.

Now, it should be obvious to almost everyone here that this is a terrible argument. It amounts to nothing more than sleight of hand with words - an attempt to sneak an invalid argument past the unwary reader disguised (rather poorly) as a valid argument.

[ May 30, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]</p>

Taffy Lewis

tronvillain:

Actually, premise 3 claims that what can be done is identical to what actually occurs. The premise does not entail that either is a subset of the other.

If determinism is true, then there are no alternative possible descriptions of how things could actually happen. There is only one. So if natural laws are deterministic, then there is only one possible future given any present state of affairs.

With regard to premise 1, it simply makes a claim about how we should draw conclusions or form beliefs. If you don't accept the claim that "We should avoid falsehoods." then either you accept its denial or you are agnostic about whether we should seek true beliefs. Surely if a person is judged to be rational they should accept the claim that a person should avoid falsehoods.

Taffy Lewis

I found the article that I referred to in my first post:

<a href="http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/fwill.htm" target="_blank">A Proof of Free Will</a>

tronvillain

Taffy Lewis:
That is exactly what I said, except that it uses a difference sense of the word "can." I used it in the sense of physical possibility - it is the difference between what can physically happen, and what will actually happen.\

I am aware of that, but that is not what the can in "Whatever should be done can be done" refers to. It refers to physical possibility, unless you wish to propose that unless something actually is done it was wrong to say that it should have been done. If you propose that, then you can't be sure that "With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods." You can't have you cake and eat it too.

I'll say it again: Now, it should be obvious to almost everyone here that this is a terrible argument. It amounts to nothing more than sleight of hand with words - an attempt to sneak an invalid argument past the unwary reader disguised (rather poorly) as a valid argument.

Liquidrage

The linked version is easiser to reply too.
However, it's still full of faulty logic.

The author uses MFT to refer to "minimal free will thesis" in the following.

1. With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods. (premise)

2. Whatever should be done can be done. (premise)

3. If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done. (premise)

4. I believe MFT. (premise)

5. With respect to the free-will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 1,2)

6. If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 3,5)

7. If determinism is true, then MFT is true. (from 6,4)

8. MFT is true. (from 7)


The author (on his site) makes a presupposition for us by claiming that steps 5-8 are uncontroversial.

He supports this claim with a statment
"In step 7, we see that, if determinism is true, then MFT is not a falsehood, since if it were, we would (step 6) refrain from believing it, whereas some in fact believe it (step 4)"

1. Determinism does not claim that falsehoods are avoided.
2. The author failed to show that determinism does not allow falsehoods.

The author points to step 6 to show that
"if determinism is true, then MFT is not a falsehood, since if it were, we would (step 6) refrain from believing it"

Step 6 states,
"6. If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods"

It is blantently false. Determinism does not prevent falsehoods.
The statement should read,
6. If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing in the falsehood of free-will if we believe in determinism

6 is built on the combination of 3 and 5.

3, semantics aside is correct as I have stated.

5 however is used incorrectly to create 6.
"5. With respect to the free-will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 1,2)"

The failure is when the author later uses this as if it read,
"With respect to the free-will issue, we always refrain from believing falsehoods.

This becomes obvious if the 3 statements are written together.

3. If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done. (premise)

5. With respect to the free-will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 1,2)

6. If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 3,5)

3 and 5 do not combine to make 6 outside of the author's delusions.

Not only is the logic faulty.
The author does not use a proper meaning of determinism for this little jaunt into insanity.

determinism (d-tûrm-nzm) n.
The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedent states of affairs

Does determinism rule out words like "should" "can" or "choice"?
No, it does not.
This is crucial to the author's writings since his is an arguement based on semantics (not to mention liguistic addition and subsitution).

Does determinism deny that falsehoods exist?
No, it does not.
Again, this is curcial as the author conclusions end up here.

My conclusion is that the author set out to prove free will exists with logic and came up short.