bd-from-kg

Jon Curry:

But you have offered no reason to believe this other than Lewis’s Rule, which I had already discussed at length well before your first post here.

You’re confusing several questions:

(1) Do I have RCF?
(2) Does metaphysical naturalism (MN) provide grounds for doubting that I have RCF?
(3) Are there rational grounds for believing that I have RCF?

My answers to these questions are as follows:

(1) I take it as a metaphysical axiom that I have RCF.
(2) No.
(3) No.

I “admitted” in my last post that my answer to (3) was “no”. But then, I had said the same thing in a number of other posts (not to mention on other threads). You seem to be overlooking the crucial point that there are no rational grounds for believing that one has RCF regardless of what metaphysical system one adopts. This is an inescapable aspect of the human condition. I discussed this at length in my last post.

But the claim that scilvr and others were making on this thread is that the correct answer to (2) is “yes”: MN itself provides grounds for doubting that I have RCF. This also seems to be the point of your arguments. If true, this would imply that MN is effectively self-refuting. All of my arguments have been directed at refuting this claim.

So do I. In fact, my worldview accounts for the kind of cognitive function that actually exists better than yours.

The theistic account of why we have RCF is something like this:

(1) God exists.
(2) God loves us and wants us to be “in His image” in some sense. This includes being “like” him with respect to having the capacity for rational thought.
(3) Since God is omnipotent, He can give us this capacity.
(4) Therefore He has given us RCF.
(5) Therefore we have RCF.

The problem with this account is that it “accounts” for too much. It leads naturally to the conclusion or expectation that everyone should have perfectly reliable cognitive function. But what we actually find is that no one has perfectly reliable cognitive function (to put it mildly) and many people have extremely defective cognitive function. This is very difficult to account for on the basis of the theistic account.

The naturalistic account of why we have RCF, on the other hand, leads naturally (i.e. without any special ad hoc assumptions) to the conclusion that most people should have reasonably reliable cognitive function, which is exactly what is actually observed.

Wrong, and I can prove it: I affirm naturalism and also trust my reasoning. Q.E.D.

True, but you will have no rational grounds for doing so.

You arrived at this conclusion by using your reasoning capabilities. If these capabilities are defective (or entirely illusory) there is no reason to trust the conclusion.

Theism does not provide an escape from the basic epistemological dilemma. We’re all in the same boat.

If I understand you correctly, you’re asking whether I can give an example of a process other than evolution that has produced RCF. Of course I can’t. If you read my argument carefully you should understand why it would be surprising if there were any other known examples of such processes. (There might, of course, have been a similar evolutionary process elsewhere or a process unlike anything of which we have had any experience which might have produced RCF.) My point was that, while Lewis’s Rule is valid for ordinary, everyday processes, there are no rational grounds for supposing it to be applicable to processes that are completely unlike anything that we have any experience of.

[ March 18, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

Jon Curry

Whether or not I've offered reasons for my position, I just want you to recognize what I'm trying to establish. I am not trying to "argue" that we have RCF. I'm claiming that if naturalism is true we don't have them. It seems to me that you are misunderstanding me to be claiming that I can argue that we have RCF. I just want to be clear that I am not arguing that. But more on your discussion of Lewis' rule below.

Don't forget though that the Christian claims that sin has resulted in depravity which has affected the mind, though it hasn't destroyed our ability to think. I believe we will have perfectly reliable cognitive function once the effects of sin are removed. This is probably a separate topic.

Again, don't confuse my claim. This is what I'm trying to say. Start by assuming we have RCF. If the theistic worldview is correct, then we have a worldview that can account for RCF. Our cognitive capabilities are not the result of a long chain of irrational causes. Our reasoning is a tool given to us by God that allows us to come to draw true conclusions about reality. I agree that I can't prove that this is the true state of affairs. I'm claiming that my worldview is consistent with that belief. More on my claim that your worldview cannot account for that below.

I don't think you are understanding me right, but maybe I'm misunderstanding you. I'm certainly not asking for another irrational process that could lead to RCF. I'm asking for a belief that you hold to be true that is fully explained by irrational causes. Anything. I used the example of a roadsign placed where it is by the wind. Or suppose my belief in God is fully explained by my need for a father figure. There is no other grounds. Or your rejection of the existence of God because you have a problem with authority. Suppose you have no other grounds for rejecting the existence of God. Should you trust your belief in the non-existence of God?

First of all, while I agree that belief in the laws of logic is in some ways different from other beliefs we have, I don't see why you would think they are completely unlike anything we have experience of. I have a belief in the law of non-contradiction. I have a belief that I'm staring at a computer screen. I have some beliefs that are the result of irrational causes probably. Perhaps I believe Toledo is 10 miles from where I'm standing because I see a sign that says that. These are all beliefs. They are similar in this way. For any belief that I have, if I discover that it is the result of irrational causes, I call my belief into question and usually jettison it. If I discover that the wind placed that sign there, I modify my prior beliefs and reject the conclusion that Toledo is 10 miles from where I'm standing. You seem to be saying that while this is true of every belief that we can think of, we are going to make an exception for our beliefs in the laws of logic. I see no grounds for doing that. You offer nothing but "It's different in the case of this belief." You act as if I'm begging the question because I affirm that what is true with regards to every other belief is also true with regards to this belief. Well, I think I'm on pretty solid ground until you can show me a good reason to make this exception.

You may be interested in Bill_C's comments on the question "Can the ability to manipulate syntax ever result in consciousness?" This relates to your comments about computers and knowledge. You can view that at the link below if you are interested. He discusses John Searle's "Chinese Room" analogy. It's fairly brief, and he follows it with some answers to objections. The link is below:

<a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=21&t=000144" target="_blank">http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=21&t=000144</a>

madmax2976

The theistic worldview doesn't "account" for anything. It speculates in the face of a mystery and leaps to the conclusion that its speculations are the correct answer, without actually demonstrating they are the correct answer. Anyone can play the speculation game, although I fail to see what purpose it serves.

You've yet to actually demonstrate either is true. Your ability to resort to conjecture does not solve the problem, nor do you win by default. You must show your hypothesis to solve the mystery of the mind-body problem superior over other hypotheses such as: property dualism, emergent properties, functionalism, and supervenience.

What are these "irrational" causes and why are they irrational?

Since the evidence is strong that we would not have our reasoning faculties were it not for determinism, this leads me conclude that your quite wrong and that there is something about volition/obtaining of knowledge that we have yet to understand.

Just a note: Attempting a negative only argument is problematic at best. In this case it would require you disprove all natural possibilities, known or unknown, in order to acheive your goal. A difficult task I think.

Jon Curry

Like BD, you are failing to recognize my claim. I am not trying to demonstrate that my view is the correct answer. I am testing the coherence of the naturalistic system. I find that the view that knowledge is possible is inconsistent with the naturalistic worldview. I find that the view that knowledge is possible is NOT inconsistent with the theistic worldview. Again, this does not show that the theistic worldview is true. But it does show that the naturalistic system is false if knowledge is possible. Coherence is a test for falsity. It is not a test for truth. Truth is what corresponds to reality, not necessarily what coheres.

Yes, conjecture does solve the problem. I'm merely asking for a possible solution from the naturalistic perspective that can show that it is not inconsistent to think we have justified belief and that naturalism is true. Evolution is widely believed, but it isn't regarded as a fact. It is a theory. You can feel free to appeal to evolution. Just give me a possible scenario from the naturalistic perspective that can solve the problem. I can do the same.

Feel free to attempt to answer the question using any system you like. The question is being asked of you. You are just hand waving, saying that there are a bunch of different systems. Maybe one of them can answer the question. Make an attempt.

An example of an irrational cause would be something like the wind placing a roadsign at a location. Or our other beliefs being fully explained by the physical processes set in motion at the beginning of creation.

Knowledge is impossible with the pure physical form of determinism that I have been discussing.

Yes, but I'm very reasonable to hold to my position if I am not aware of any satisfactory explanations to the question. For instance, I believe George W. Bush is the president of the United States. There are some other possible explanations of my belief that I haven't considered (maybe Bush is a space alien, maybe there is a big conspiracy to deceive the public, maybe the universe revolves around me and everybody is trying to trick me) but I'm pretty reasonable to believe it, despite the fact that I have examined EVERY possibility, known or unknown.

bd-from-kg

Jon Curry:

This is just a restatement of the opening of your previous post. Was my last post that unclear? Have we made no progress at all?

Not so. I understand you to be arguing that MN provides grounds for doubting that we have RCF, and thus is self-defeating in a sense in which theism is not.

Yes. But leaving aside the total absurdity of this doctrine (it is one of the major reasons that I am absolutely convinced that Christianity cannot be true), it is clearly ad hoc. It’s an add-on; one of many such that are needed by theists to “explain” why what we observe is radically different in many ways from what one would naturally expect there were an omnimax God. That’s what I mean when I say that MN provides a better account of the existence of the kind of RCF actually observed: it’s what one would naturally expect if MN is true. No ad hoc hypotheses like Original Sin are needed to explain away the actual observed state of things.

If the naturalistic worldview is correct, then we have a worldview that can account for RCF. Our cognitive capabilities are the result of a long chain of irrational causes.

Well, since your question was ambiguous, I interpreted it in such a way as to make it relevant to the discussion. If I interpreted it literally, I could cite any number of things (say the fact that the earth goes around the Sun) as something I believe to be true that is fully explained by irrational causes. If I interpreted it as asking to cite a belief that is “fully explained by irrational causes”, any belief at all would do, since (IMO) all beliefs can be fully explained by such causes. So I interpreted it as asking for an example of a belief that was rationally justified and was not the product of RCF that was produced by the evolutionary process. But any rationally justified belief must be the product of RCF. So It would seem that, assuming that you were asking a sensible question, you were in effect asking me to give an example of a process other than evolution that has produced RCF.

As I said above, IMO all of my beliefs can be so explained, as can yours.

I agree that there are strong grounds for doubting that a tornado is a reliable cognitive process.

You’re misunderstanding me here. The process that I’m saying is completely unlike anything that we have any experience of is not belief in the laws of logic, but the process of evolution. This is an “irrational” process, but it is so unlike the processes of which we have actual experience (like tornadoes) that there is no good reason to believe that Lewis’s rule must apply to it. That is to say, there is no good reason to presuppose that it cannot produce reliable cognitive function, by which I mean (roughly) the capability of processing propositions in a way that tends to preserve truth with reasonable reliability.

That’s an interesting thread, but it doesn’t really relate to my remarks on computers. I was simply saying that computers can have “knowledge” and “beliefs” (even “justified” beliefs) provided that these terms are defined in a purely operational way. (I tried to indicate that I was using these terms in a nonstandard way by putting quotes around them whenever I used them in this sense.) Thus a computer might be said to “know” a lot about Duluth if it can answer the same percentage of questions about Duluth as a person who has lived there for some time. This implies nothing about whether such a computer might have “consciousness”. But it is the appropriate kind of definition in the context of this thread, since we were talking about RCF, not consciousness. It may or may not be possible to have RCF without being conscious, but it is certainly possible to define RCF and test an entity for it without talking about consciousness.

[ March 19, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Just a couple of side notes:

My last post was composed before I noticed the recent exchange between madmax and Jon. Jon’s reply makes it completely clear that I was interpreting him correctly regarding what he is trying to show.

madmax: In this thread the term “irrational” means the same thing as “nonrational”. The term “irrational causes” basically refers to material or physical causes that are simply (“blindly”) following natural laws. This terminology was used by C.S. Lewis in the passage from Miracles that I quoted early on, and it seems to have “stuck”.

Malaclypse the Younger

Jon Curry

Much depends, I guess, on how you define "knowledge".

I'm not sure as to your exact arguments. Let me try to restate them in my own words. If I get it wrong, you need but correct me.

Regardless of the definition of warrant, it is possible for the naturalist to have warranted beliefs that are not true. Therefore if knowledge is "certainly true belief", the naturalist cannot be certain that any belief is true.

This argument fails on three possible points.

First, it is possible that there is a definition of warrant that allows us to have certainly true beliefs. One possibility is to sacrifice definiteness or absolutism from certainty. For instance I can believe with certainty that if I see a sign that says "Toledo: 10 miles" that it is highly probable that is true that I am in truth 10 miles from Toledo.

Second, it is possible that certain knowledge is not attainable. However much we would like to to believe in certain knowledge, it indeed might not be possible, in which case, naturalism is not incoherent. You must prove that certain knowledge is not only desirable, but actually exists.

Third, because of the postulation of "sin", this argument does not distinguish between (at least your version of) theism and nontheism, it merely moves the uncertainty around. Under theism, we can have certain knowledge (granted by a god), but we cannot know which of our beliefs are certainly true! Or at least you have given us no means of distinguishing them. Note that the bible is of no help to us here; we are still unable to distinguish between a "good" interpretation and a "sinful" interpretation.

Sin is at least as (if not more!) fundamental a defeater for the theist as error is to the naturalist.


It is unreasonable for the naturalist to believe that rationalism can arise from irrational causes.

This is a fallacious argument, because causes are presumed to exist. Therefore, any mode of thought that purports to describe causes is by definition rational. Sinces causes are, by definition, rationally describable (indeed they can be described only rationally), it is a tautology that rational thought arises from rational (or rationally describable) causes.

Note that chance is not "irrational"--if it exists, then it too is, by definition, rationally describable. And indeed statistics and statistical mechanics shows us that the results chance can indeed be rationally describable.

Therefore there is no contradiction between naturalism and rationality.

The naturalist does not provide an account for why reality is rationally describable. The theist does. Therefore theism is superior to naturalism.

First, we need a rigorous definition of "account" so that we can evaluate this argument. A provisional definition is "X is accounted for if and only if it is rigourously derived from an axiom set according to derivation rules."

I explicitly qualify the argument to reference "reality is rationally describable" rather rationality (a mode of thought) itself, because the second obviously follows from the first. If reality is indeed rationally describable, then it is unsurprising that we would eventually hit upon rationality (by definition the way to describe reality) by evolution, and it is difficult to believe that a true description of reality provides no reproductive advantage.

However, it is true that the naturalist does not account for why reality is rationally describable. It is merely accepted as a fact.

However, the theist really doesn't account for rational describability either. He merely accepts it as a fact. That this acceptance is derivative does not deny that it is primary. It is primary because there is nothing analytical in the definition of a god that compels one to derive that reality must be rationally describable. That rational describability is either a assumed property of this particular creation, or of a god itself; it is not derived.

An alternative definition of "account" merely states that the assumption is defined as an implicate predicate rather than a simple predicate. I.e. the theist holds the axiom that "god implies rational describability"; the naturalist just holds the axiom that "rational describability" is true directly. It is, however unclear how one form of this assumption is preferable to the other.

Malaclypse the Younger

If naturalism is true, then evolution is definitely possible. Therefore, merely the possibility the genesis of rational belief through evolution is a sufficient rebuttal to the assertion that if naturalism is true, it is impossible for us to have rational beliefs. At best one can say only that if naturalism is true, it is possibly the case that our beliefs are irrational or false. Of course if theism is true, it is possible for our beliefs to be false; a malevolent deity could implant false beliefs, even the false belief that such a deity must be benevolent.

Jon Curry

Apparently. If you'll look at your own post prior to what you're referring to as the opening to my previous post, you'll see that you argue against me in the following manner. You ask how I establish that I have RCF. You point out that if I run a self test I use the very faculties that are in question. I'm showing you that this doesn't matter to what I'm trying to establish. You reply "But you haven't given good reasons for what you're trying to establish." Fine. I know you think that. But that is not the point of my statement here. The point is, your discussion about self-testing is not relevant to what I'm trying to establish.

I don't think the doctrine of original sin was developed for the express purpose of solving this problem relating to our RCF. It's something that is simply taught in the Bible. Do you think the biblical authors invented it to solve this problem?

As are all of our conclusions. Fine. If naturalism is true than our RCF are the result of a long chain of irrational causes. But we have no reason to think that our RCF actually lead to true conclusions about reality. Yes, it's an assertion. More on it below.

Ouch.

This is what I am asking for. For example, here are some beliefs that are the result of irrational causes:

Suppose I believe that all blonde men are rapists, since the only three blonde men I know are rapists.
Suppose I believe that Toledo is 10 miles from my home because a tornado placed the road sign there.
Suppose I believe that the rooster brings the sun up.

All of these beliefs can be fully explained by irrational causes. Here are some beliefs that are not the result of irrational causes:

Suppose I believe that the earth goes around the sun because proper experimentation and inference has proved it.
Suppose I believe that God exists, because the Thomistic Cosmological Argument starts from undeniable premises and follows through transcendentally to the existence of God.
Suppose I believe that I am looking at a computer monitor because of sense experience and inference.

In my experience, I recognize that any belief that I hold that is the result of irrational causes is a belief I should doubt. It might be true, but if it is, that is mere coincidence. There are zero examples of beliefs that I hold that are the result of irrational causes that would be called "justified beliefs." Now you come along and tell me that in fact ALL of my beliefs really fall into the first category. And yet you also say that I can have justified beliefs. I should continue to believe things despite the fact that I know the beliefs are the result of irrational causes. My question is, can you give me an example of one belief that we both agree is the result of irrational causes that I shouldn't doubt? All of my experience says I should doubt such beliefs, and you are telling me that ALL of my beliefs are the result of irrational causes. Why shouldn't I doubt them?

How can you tell me that I shouldn't believe that all blonde men are rapists because my belief is completely the result of irrational causes, but I should believe that naturalism is true and that belief is also completely the result of irrational causes?

Your current beliefs are ultimately caused by wind and rain. Your beliefs are not the result of a reliable cognitive process.

Is your argument basically that it is possibly in some unknown way different from other naturalistic processes that we know about and hence it is possible that Lewis's rule doesn't apply so maybe we're OK?

Well then your remarks just have nothing to do with my point regarding computers. Nobody disputes that computers can happen to output true information as a result of good programming. My point was, if we are just like computers (computers manipulate syntax, we simply respond in a physically determined way to our environment) then we don't have knowledge. And I mean knowledge in the ordinary sense, not your "operational" definition of knowledge where we might output information that another mind might interpret as "true." If you are a computer and you simply manipulate syntax, you do not know anything. If you are nothing but a physical organism that responds in a determined way to physical inputs (and your beliefs would be one of your responses to those physical inputs) then you ultimately would have no reason to think your beliefs are true. The computer's answers to questions about Duluth are only as good as the programmer. For all the computer "knows" the programmer could be playing a trick, and loading the computer with false information. We would be no better.

Jon Curry

Apparently. If you'll look at your own post prior to what you're referring to as the opening to my previous post, you'll see that you argue against me in the following manner. You ask how I establish that I have RCF. You point out that if I run a self test I use the very faculties that are in question. I'm showing you that this doesn't matter to what I'm trying to establish. You reply "But you haven't given good reasons for what you're trying to establish." Fine. I know you think that. But that is not the point of my statement here. The point is, your discussion about self-testing is not relevant to what I'm trying to establish.

I don't think the doctrine of original sin was developed for the express purpose of solving this problem relating to our RCF. It's something that is simply taught in the Bible. Do you think the biblical authors invented it to solve this problem?

As are all of our conclusions. Fine. If naturalism is true than our RCF are the result of a long chain of irrational causes. But we have no reason to think that our RCF actually lead to true conclusions about reality. Yes, it's an assertion. More on it below.

Ouch.

This is what I am asking for. For example, here are some beliefs that are the result of irrational causes:

Suppose I believe that all blonde men are rapists, since the only three blonde men I know are rapists.
Suppose I believe that Toledo is 10 miles from my home because a tornado placed the road sign there.
Suppose I believe that the rooster brings the sun up.

All of these beliefs can be fully explained by irrational causes. Here are some beliefs that are not the result of irrational causes:

Suppose I believe that the earth goes around the sun because proper experimentation and inference has proved it.
Suppose I believe that God exists, because the Thomistic Cosmological Argument starts from undeniable premises and follows through transcendentally to the existence of God.
Suppose I believe that I am looking at a computer monitor because of sense experience and inference.

In my experience, I recognize that any belief that I hold that is the result of irrational causes is a belief I should doubt. It might be true, but if it is, that is mere coincidence. There are zero examples of beliefs that I hold that are the result of irrational causes that would be called "justified beliefs." Now you come along and tell me that in fact ALL of my beliefs really fall into the first category. And yet you also say that I can have justified beliefs. I should continue to believe things despite the fact that I know the beliefs are the result of irrational causes. My question is, can you give me an example of one belief that we both agree is the result of irrational causes that I shouldn't doubt? All of my experience says I should doubt such beliefs, and you are telling me that ALL of my beliefs are the result of irrational causes. Why shouldn't I doubt them?

How can you tell me that I shouldn't believe that all blonde men are rapists because my belief is completely the result of irrational causes, but I should believe that naturalism is true and that belief is also completely the result of irrational causes?

Your current beliefs are ultimately caused by wind and rain. Your beliefs are not the result of a reliable cognitive process.

Is your argument basically that it is possibly in some unknown way different from other naturalistic processes that we know about and hence it is possible that Lewis's rule doesn't apply so maybe we're OK?

Well then your remarks just have nothing to do with my point regarding computers. Nobody disputes that computers can happen to output true information as a result of good programming. My point was, if we are just like computers (computers manipulate syntax, we simply respond in a physically determined way to our environment) then we don't have knowledge. And I mean knowledge in the ordinary sense, not your "operational" definition of knowledge where we might output information that another mind might interpret as "true." If you are a computer and you simply manipulate syntax, you do not know anything. If you are nothing but a physical organism that responds in a determined way to physical inputs (and your beliefs would be one of your responses to those physical inputs) then you ultimately would have no reason to think your beliefs are true. The computer's answers to questions about Duluth are only as good as the programmer. For all the computer "knows" the programmer could be playing a trick, and loading the computer with false information. We would be no better.