scilvr

I have a question for the metaphysical naturalists in our midst. Why should a naturalist think that her Reason gives her any real insight into reality? In other words, why should a naturalist believe that her Reason is a reliable guide to truth? What naturalistic process has a high probability of producing cognitive faculties that reliably formulate true beliefs? Is there reason to think that a Darwinian process of random mutation and natural selection could get the job done? I think there are reasons to doubt that it could, but I could be wrong.

bd-from-kg

Why shouldn't he? It certainly seems self-evident to me that I have such insight, just as it seems self-evident to me that I'm sane. In the absence of serious evidence or argument to the contrary, what reason would I have to entertain serious doubts about such matters?

But actually there is a strong positive reason to believe these things. Namely, that if they're false it doesn't matter what we believe, whereas if they're true it matters very much. It would be tragic if I had real insight into the nature of reality, but failed to act accordingly because I mistakenly thought that I didn't.

Is there reason to think that it couldn't? It seems to me that the actual situation, where we find a species which is capable of thinking and behaving rationally, but fails to do so reliably (to put it mildly) is pretty much what one might expect at this point in the evolutionary process.

However, whether you're aware of it or not, this thread is almost certain to turn into a discussion of presuppositionalism.

[ January 09, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

Transworldly Depraved

scilver:

The sort of argument you seem to be suggesting can be found in Richard Taylor's book Metaphysics and Alvin Plantinga's book Warranted Christian Belief. I believe Plantinga's argument can also be found online under the title "An Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism"

Taylor uses an example to illustrate the intuitions his argument is based upon. His argument goes something like this:

Suppose you are riding on a train and see from a window what seems to be a group of flowers in the pattern "Welcome to Wales". Can you believe both the claim that you are about to enter Wales (with this belief based solely upon the pattern of flowers) and believe that the pattern of flowers was formed by a mindless (just natural law and/or chance) set of forces or processes such as the wind?

Taylor suggests that if you believe the pattern of flowers was formed by a mindless process then you would not consider it rational to form a belief on the basis of the flowers.

Taylor then points out that according to naturalism our sensory and cognitive faculties were formed by a mindless set of forces and processes. So if we do not trust the pattern of flowers to give us correct information about the world we should not trust our sensory and cognitive faculties. And since naturalism is a deliverance of our sensory and cognitive faculties then we should not accept that belief.

There is an interesting version of the argument in the Secular Web library by Victor Reppert called "The Argument from Reason".

[ January 09, 2002: Message edited by: Transworldly Depraved ]</p>

Kachana

Ah, but on what authority do you base your worldview to make that claim?

On the opening post, if you are in doubt that reason can be a reliable guide to truth, then how come you have returned to the thread? It appears that you have reasoned that your senses (the sight of the infidels board) is a reliable enough tool to reality that you have spent time posting a topic that you reasoned inductively, from the other posts, will garner a worthwile response.

Also, if we are to investigate whether naturalistic processes can have produced a capacity for human reason that reliably informs us about reality, then how should this investigation be conducted? It obviously cannot be conducted using rational arguments, since the conclusion would be that human rationality disproves the possibility of human rationality, a contradictory statement. If our reason actually doesn't inform us about reality, what method can we use to investigate this?

[ January 09, 2002: Message edited by: Kachana ]</p>

Bill Snedden

I think that Taylor's argument is flawed, although I'm not sure that I can put into words exactly why I believe it to be so. It seems to me that the analogy Taylor is attempting to draw, between flowers and the human mind, is false.

The evolved "purpose" of a flower is to serve as a facilitator in the organism's reproductive process. The evolved "purpose" of the human mind is to make sense out of reality.

The evolutionary process by which both developed is the same, however the end result of the development is a functionality well-suited toward a particular use. In the case of the human mind, that use is specifically one that hinges on an ability to perceive and make rational judgements based on those perceptions.

From an evolutionary standpoint, it would seem to me that such an ability could yield distinct survival advantage and therefore would have been a prime candidate for facilitating selection.

It would seem to me that the development of reason may therefore be understandable from an evolutionary standpoint and thus the metaphysical naturalist is justified in trusting reason as a tool for making sense of reality; in the same way as the flower's stamen and pistil are trustworthy tools of reproduction: they're made for it, it's why they exist.

Conversely, if it were to have been the case that an ability to make sense out of reality were not to have conferred distinct advantage to our ancestors, it would more likely have been the case that reason would not have developed and we wouldn't be having this conversation.

Anyway, those are my $.02 cents worth as I'm winding down after the day...

Regards,

Bill Snedden

scilvr

If it was in fact the case that we did have creatures that had minds geared towards, and capable of, formulating true beliefs, I fail to see how this would be expected given naturalism and Darwinian evolution. If anything, we should expect minds that formulate survival enhancing beliefs, not true ones.

Transworldly Depraved

Bill Snedden:

Thank you for your response.

The role the flowers play in Taylor's argument is as a source of information about the world. Taylor asks whether or not the passenger on the train can believe that the pattern of flowers is presenting him with reliable information about the world and also believe that the pattern of flowers was generated by a process that had no end "in mind". Taylor thinks that no one would believe both of these claims. For example, if you believed the pattern of flowers was brought about by the wind you would not trust that it was accurate.

He then argues analogously that if our sensory and cognitive faculties were also brought about by a mindless process then we should not trust their deliverances either.

In the analogy, our sensory and cognitive faculties and the pattern of flowers are both supposed to be sources of information about the world. The pattern of flowers is supposed to give the passenger information about his location and our sensory and cognitive faculties are supposed to give us information about the general, immediate environment. Taylor thinks that in neither case can we believe that they were brought about by a mindless process and trust what they "tell" us.

Again, suppose that you knew for a fact that the pattern of flowers was caused by nothing but seeds blown by the wind. It is doubtful that you would think they were giving you reliable information about your location. Taylor thinks we should draw the same conclusion about any possible source of information about the world that is brought about by any mindless process.

However, the naturalist may be able to stress important differences between mindless processes in general and the mindless process of evolution. So an evolutionary explanation may be able to avoid Taylor's argument.

scilvr

Yeah, though I have not read Taylor, I saw Plantinga give an argument along these lines at a conference. It can also be found towards the end of his Warrant and Proper Function

A neat argument. Very neat. I would have to agree with it at this point. Do you know of any succesful responses that can save the naturalist from the epistemological skepticism this argument seems to drive her into?

scilvr

Well, I am not a metaphysical naturalist (nor do I play one on TV), and it is the metaphysical naturalists who have reason to be skeptical about the reliability of reason as a guide to truth.

That's the point. If metaphysical naturalism is true, then we would have little reason to trust the products of our reason. Metaphysical naturalism itself is a product of our reasoning, so we have little reason to think it true.

Kachana

Scilvr,

You say the metaphysical naturalist is the one to be skeptical as to whether they perceive the truth. How may I ask are you exempt from this criticism? How do you know that your reasoning leads you to the truth, or at least, nearer the truth then the metaphysical naturalist? Let me give an example, say both of us see a car coming towards us and jump out of the way so as not to get hit. According to you, I am not justified in believing my senses actually tell me that a car is coming, but how are you different such that you are justified? Is it because you believe that we were created by an intelligent designer, and so it is reasonable to conclude from this that this designer would make us in such a way that what we think is truth is actually truth, whereas the natural forces of physics would not lead to this? I'm trying to work out where exactly you are coming from here.

You said:

If it was in fact the case that we did have creatures that had minds geared towards, and capable of, formulating true beliefs, I fail to see how this would be expected given naturalism and Darwinian evolution. If anything, we should expect minds that formulate survival enhancing beliefs, not true ones.

You make the incorrect assumption here that survival enhancing beliefs and true beliefs are mutually incompatible. I can tell you exactly how the formulation of true beliefs would be expected given evolution: our survival depends on reality and how it impinges upon us, so by being able to formulate true beliefs about the world, we can thus react to reality in such a way as to enhance our survival. Hypothetical example: it is true that a tree is about to fall on my head, I have the true belief via my senses that this is about to happen, I consequently run out of the way and improve my survival chances.

Whereas you seem to think survival enhancing beliefs and true beliefs are mutually exclusive all of the time, actually, they are only incompatible some of the time. I think natural selection selected for survival enhancing beliefs that are at odds with the truth, and I would cite as an example beliefs in superstitions and religions, beliefs that contribute to an individuals happiness/ security/ motivation and thus survival, but which are untrue. You may wish to look at the discussion between Metacrock and Gurdur in the formal debates and discussion forum on this topic if you are interested (and have a great deal of time!).

You also said:

If metaphysical naturalism is true, then we would have little reason to trust the products of our reason. Metaphysical naturalism itself is a product of our reasoning, so we have little reason to think it true.

I disagree with you that if metaphysical naturalism (by which I assume you are referring to evolution) is true then we have little reason to trust the products of our reason. As I said above, there is every reason to think that if we evolved, then our senses would inform us reliably about reality so that we can enhance our survival which is influenced by reality. Furthermore, to increase our survival chances, we also need to make reasoned decisions as well as rely on our immediate senses (e.g. should I go and hunt now or is the lion likely to be outside waiting to eat me). Far from making it likely that our reasoning will not pertain to reality, natural selection actually predicts that organisms that have true beiefs about the world and can act on them and will have a greater survival advantage, I think you have it exactly backwards.