Clutch

I'm having a hard time understanding just what phenomenon regarding the way we act, and the way we think about the way we act, requires explanation in Christian or otherwise theistic terms.

I don't have a positive settled view about the metaphysics of mind. But I also don't see any reason to believe that, say, non-reductive psycho-physicalism should face any special problem in explaining our common sense that we could do, or could have done, otherwise.

So maybe someone could help me out. Carefully explain where God has to be inserted.

The phenomenon to be explained: Our sense of volition.

Method: Examination of an arbitrarily chosen case. Consider Ted. Ted went for a haircut this morning, passing on his way a homeless man asking for spare change. Running a bit late, Ted pushed by the man with a small pang of conscience. When he reached the barber shop, Ted found there was a fifteen-minute wait anyhow. He thought to himself, “I could have stopped and given that man a few bucks after all.”

To be proven: That Ted is correct in his belief about his freedom to have acted differently, even assuming that Ted’s thoughts and actions are physically constituted entities fully embedded in the wider causal order of events (whatever that amounts to).

Ground rules:

(1) Ted is philosophically innocent. This doesn’t mean he’s stupid, of course. But we want to explain the content of his belief as true, without begging the question either way. So there’s no defining the contents of his belief as essentially involving reference to "contracausal possibilities" exclusive of all physico-causal aspects of a situation, or reference to the necessary "causal closure of the physical", or other sophisticated philosophical presuppositions. He just thinks, “I could have done otherwise”. All that’s needed is an account of how that is true, consistent with the physical constitution of his psychological states.

(2) I am not interested in defending anyone else's views about free will, nor generic labels, nor arguments from "All Xs must believe Y". Please engage what I'm actually saying here, whatever similarities you think it has to the views of Bill, Bob, or Mary.

Assume: Ted’s propositional attitudes – eg, his beliefs and desires – are physically constituted, and effect Ted’s behaviour through whatever processes (deterministic, stochastic, whatever) are characteristic of physical interrelations generally. (There is no need to decide whether a complete specification of their propositional contents requires allusion to Ted’s physical or social environment; that is, no need to choose between semantic internalism and semantic externalism for now.)

The account: Ted is correct in the most straightforward sense. He did what he actually did because of his actual beliefs and desires: their contents and their relative causal efficacy. And had he possessed either different desires, or had his desires been of different relative causal efficacies, he would have done otherwise. Hence it is true that he could have done otherwise: If he’d wanted to do otherwise, he would have. His wanting to do otherwise, however, would have entailed a physical variation in the situation. Ted may not know this, of course. But this is no more relevant than that Ted may not know what percentage of his body is water.

No problem.

rainbow walking

Hi Clutch,

So you're looking for a theistic explanation concerning Ted's decision as opposed to the physical variations that would have had to entail for him to have chosen otherwise?

Let's look at the pertinent facts in relation to the way a christian might.

1. Ted had an opportunity to do a good deed but chose not to due to personal concerns revolving around his schedule.

The christian would likely respond that Ted's choice would entail no further explanation. All physical and psychological variants you detailed would suffice, although some of the more dogmatic believers might tsk tsk Ted for putting his personal concerns above doing a good deed.

I'd say we'd have to modify your account somewhat to actually inculcate any supernatural intervention, before such an explanation could be embarked upon.

For instance: Let's say approximately one minute after Ted elects to pass on the opportunity, at just about the time he steps around the corner and out of sight of this stranger, a person across the street pulls up in their car and begins waving a twenty dollar bill at the stranger. The stranger, so intent on the money, steps off the sidewalk into on-coming traffic and becomes one with the bumper of a truck, dying instantly.

Now, even this isn't enough to invoke the intervention of a deity, even when we rewind the entire set of circumstances and have Ted make the alternate choice, stopping to pull change from his pocket, causing the benevolent donor with the twenty not to see the stranger and pass on by, thus saving the stranger's life.

However, let's say this particular stranger happens to be a person who, five years down the road, cleans up his act, gets a job, marries and has a son who goes on to become a significant figure in the world by doing something phenomenal.

Now you have a classic set up whereby theistic explanations may entail to compensate for Ted's circumstances that led him by the stranger without stopping. Under such circumstances as these, god's omniscience being what it is, a theist might argue that things remain the same except at the precise moment when Ted was contemplating his choice.

He might argue that this god would exorcise a very subtle psychological influence on Ted's conscience, just enough to persuade him to stop, thereby saving this would be father-of-a- great-man-whom-god-is-going-to-use fifty years later.

(shrug) I'm not sure if this is consistent with what you are seeking, but I am sure that if it isn't you'll let me know

Clutch

RW,

That wasn't quite what I had in mind.

What I'm on about is the claim that there is some phenomenon of free will, the explanation of which requires theism. So I've offered a non-theistic account of the phenomenon, neutrally described, and am wondering if that account has defects that I cannot see.

Thanks, though, for helping clarify my aim. Any further thoughts would be welcome.

SteveD

Clutch,

I'd like to try and restate what I think your position is in my own words to make sure I understand what you are saying.

Ted has the sense that he has free will on a macro level because at that level he percieves that his beliefs and desires have led to his choice. However, at a sub level his beliefs and desires have been formed as a result of physical processes that he is unable to perceive.

Is this an accurate representation?

Steve

Jobar

Clutch, does your question reduce to determinism vs. free will? Or are you assuming free will, and want to understand just how the theistic hypothesis is required for that?

I might say that it is often argued the other way around- free will explains theism (via its attempt to deflect the PoE) instead of vice versa.

Clutch

Steve, there were a bunch of physical states in and involving Ted when he first walked past the homeless man. Some of these physical states were his beliefs and desires, the actual ones that led him to do what he did.

In retrospect, he believes that he could have done otherwise. And this is true, because he might have had very slightly different psycho-physical states -- different beliefs and desires that would have caused him to act differently.

In the event, he did what he wanted. Had he wanted differently, he would have done differently. What Ted might not know, however, is that the situation in which he acts differently is one in which his psycho-physical states are very slightly different. But of course he needn't know this in order to correctly believe that he could have done otherwise.

Does that help?

Clutch

Jobar, I am assuming free will, to the extent that it's a fact. Ie, I'm offering neutral descriptions of what we pre-theoretically take freedom to consist in, and showing how those descriptions are true on psycho-physicalism.

I agree that there is no reason to think that some phenomenon here requires theistic explanation. But I've heard it claimed otherwise from time to time, most recently by Tercel. Since it is apparently impossible to induce anyone to give a positive argument for this claim, though, I thought I'd lay the situation out straightforwardly, and see if anyone could spot any defects in the psycho-physical account of freedom.

rainbow walking

It's my understanding that freewill is the mechanism by which theistic goals are attaned but the mechanism itself needn't have a supernatural explanation. It's quite plausible to assert a god who instilled matter with specific behavioral attributes such that things as they now are were inevitably destined to evolve as they have.

Clutch

RW,I think we agree, then. Thanks for your remarks.

Clutch

Sorry to bump my own thread, but I just wanted to make sure that I understand this situation.

More than a few people seemed to be saying that theism squares with observed data about free will, in a way that atheism, or naturalism, can't.

In fact, nobody here believes this -- is that right?