Malaclypse the Younger

Introduction

I am a moral subjectivist, so I will offer an ethical analysis using a subjectivist methodology. I make no claim whatsoever that a subjectivist methodology is "right", I merely present it for the readers' examination.

Since I am myself a citizen and life-long resident of the United States, my analysis will presume the general anthropological, economic, cultural and legal environment of that nation.

The analysis of begins by inclusively observing various values that people hold that relate to drug use. The existence of these values are accepted as fact. One of two possibilities will occur. Either all values are in concert or in conflict with the activity, or there are some values that are in concert and some in conflict. It the first case, the subjectivist analysis is trivial: Go with the where the values point.

If some values are in concert and some in conflict, one must examine the values and the scientific facts as they relate to those values to try to find points of negotiation to arrive at a mutually agreeable strategy for maximizing the long-term fulfillment of everyone's values. Because people will disagree even on the relative importants on this values, the subjectivist will not arrive at a single "correct" answer, but will rather suggest efficient strategies for actually conducting the negotiations.

As to whether some individual should or should not use drugs, personally and without regard to the social and ethical issues, the subjectivist leaves as a matter of personal taste. The discussion revolves around which and to what extent of coercive prohibitions or compulsions should be implemented. If no prohibitions or compulusions are determined, the subjectivist leaves the choice to the individual.


Values Analysis

Those values that tend (on superficial analysis--we are trying to be inclusive here) to conflict with drug use are (in no particular order):

• Direct Disapproval
• Self-endangerment
• Endangerment of others
• Endangerment of children
• Effects on economic productivity
• Religious prohibition

The values that tend to be in concert with drug use are:

• Direct Approval
• Personal Freedom
• Recreation
• Medicinal use
• Cognitive Experimentation
• Economic Activity
• Objectionable Law-Enforcement Tactics

Since they appear to be in conflict, we must examine both these values and the scientific facts as they relate to these values and arrive at some efficient strategies for negotiating actual social prohibitions and compulsions for maximizing everyone's values.

Generally, the meta-values of consensuality and reciprocity are predominantly held; nonconsensual and nonreciprocal acts are predominantly disapproved. A more thorough analysis of these meta-values does bear closer examination, but I trust I won't lose too many readers by simply assuming this assertion as fact for the sake of brevity.

Scientific Facts

Note: Alcohol and marijuana will appear prominently in this analysis. They are convenient examples: Alcohol is a drug that is fairly dangerous, addictive, and legal; marijuana is a drug that is fairly safe, nonaddictive and illegal.

It is a fact that using drugs appears to affect peoples values; either directly (deontically)--some people have direct approval and some a direct disapproval for using drugs--or indirectly (pragmatically)--drug use negatively or positively affects the fulfillment of other values. This is merely a restatement of the position that the subjectivist accepts the existence of values as facts.

It is a fact that most drugs entail a degree of self-endangerment and endangerment to others, varying both with the drug and the circumstances of use. Smoking marijuana at home entails very little self- or other-endangerment; operating a motor vehicle while severely intoxicated on alcohol or heroin is very dangerous to both oneself and others. The precise nature of the various risks is fairly well-documented; it is assumed (for the purpose of this discussion) that specific risk factors can be assesed by scientific means.

It it true that drugs, including alcohol and marijuana, have negative effects on economic productivity. Keep in mind, however, that that the US economy is $~1 trillion ($1e12)/year; an economic effect in the $hundreds of millions ($1e8), a factor of a tenths of a percent. In other words, $100,000,000 is not a particularly large number compared to the US economy--about the price of creating one expensive motion picture. Again, it is assumed that one can answer detailed questions about the precise economic effect by a careful examination of the scientific econometric literature. Particular attention should be paid, however, to methodology and inherent bias--we are seeking to determine scientific facts to come to rational conclusions, not seeking to manufacture factoids to rationalize a preexisting conclusion.

It is a fact that many drugs, including marijuana and narcotic (in the scientific sense) drugs have scientifically proven medicinal use.

It is a fact that the prohibition of drugs has led to objectionable law-enforcement tactics, including erosion of Fourth- and Sixth- Amendment and other Constitutional rights, which are specifically deontically valued by explicit inclusion in the Constitution.

Shared Values

The people in the cultural environment of the US is known by experience to give a rough estimate on the relative importance of specific values.

These values are strongly held, in a rough order of relative importance and predominance (e.g. one might disagree on the relative position of two adjacent values, but I would be surprised if there were major differences in re-ordering)

• Disapprove of endangerment of children
• Disapprove of endangerment of others
• Approve of personal freedom
• Disapprove of objectionable law-enforcement tactics
• Approve of medicinal use
• Disapprove of drug use directly
• Approve of recreation
• Disapprove of endangerment to self
• Disapprove of effects on economic productivity
• Disapprove of violations to religious proscriptions
• Approve of drug use directly
• Approve of cognitive experimentation

We can apply some first-level filters. First, the United States specifically and explicitly forbids the direct imposition of religious doctrine in law. Unless one is performing this analysis in the context of a free association of people of a specific religion (which I am not), a religious objection per se is irrelevant. Note that one may adopt the personal disapproval for religious reasons, but it is the existence of the personal disapproval (which is noted separately) that is relevant, not the religious source.

Secondly, some values are directly contradictory. In these cases the more important and prevalent value can supersede the less important and prevalent. For this reason, we can exclude both personal approval (in terms of establishing the compulsion to use drugs) and personal disapproval on the basis that it conflicts with the more important value of personal freedom, which is directly held.

Note that for reasons which will be explained below, personal freedom does not necessarily contradict disapproval of self-endangerement.

We are then left with:

• Disapprove of endangerment of children
• Disapprove of endangerment of others
• Approve of personal freedom
• Disapprove of objectionable law-enforcement tactics
• Approve of medicinal use
• Approve of recreation
• Disapprove of endangerment to self
• Disapprove of effects on economic productivity
• Approve of cognitive experimentation

By examining how we have resolved similar non-drug related situations in the past offers us some guidance on what might be considered acceptable negotiated strategies.

There is no serious disagreement about the desirability of protecting children from the risk of harm. This value can be efficiently and uncontroversially maximized by severely punishing the provision of drugs to children.

There is no serious disagreement about the desirability of protecting others from harm; given that a certain degree of risk to others is routinely tolerated. Again, this value can be efficiently and uncontroversially maximized by prohibiting drug use under circumstances (such as driving) where the risk of harm is unacceptable high, as well as prohibiting drugs (such as PCP) that inherently create a risk of harm.

There is some disagreement about tolerance of self-endangerment. It is generally considered that personal freedom outweighs ordinary self-endangerment, but that at a certain level of self-endangerment the risk to oneself becomes so great that it is evidence of that individual's ability to rationally consent. We have guidance from such negotiations as safety regulations to negotiate an acceptable risk of self-endangerment.

It is difficult to determine negative economic effects of drug use with any degree of precision. However, it seems that the effects cannot exceed ~$1 billion/year (~1e9), most of that from alcohol, which is already permitted. It is probably easier to estimate the economic benefits of permitting drug use, both in the positive sense of enabling a recreational economy and in the economic savings of no longer having to pay for prohibition (which is entirely nonproductive).

Were drug use to be permitted, it seems unobjectionable to carefully measure the economic effects and renegotiate in the presence of better data.

The effects of objectionable law-enforcement and other effects deriving directly from legal prohibition are especially troubling. Prohibition of alcohol was repealed in no small part due to the effects directly stemming from law enforcement activities. Web sites such as the <a href="http://www.november.org/" target="_blank">November Coalition</a> document the severely negative effects of law enforcement tactics on our ordinary values of justice and fairness, as well as our explicitly declared constitutional rights. It seems obvious to me that regardless of one's ethical status on drugs, these law enforcement tactics must in and of themselves shock the conscience of the ordinary American.

Conclusion

A subjectivist analysis cannot, by itself, precisely determine how the negotiations should proceed or what they might specifically conclude. However it is possible to rationally analyze the situation to identify how negotiations might most efficiently proceed, by explicitly identifying the actual hierarchy of values and rational effects of various strategies on fulfilling and maximizing those values.

[ March 14, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

jpbrooks

I don't even pretend to comprehend this issue.
But I'm not sure why the issue of the legalization of drug use has to be so complex. Why can't the whole issue be reduced to a decision either to make all drugs legal for recreational use or to restrict the use of all drugs (including alcohol) to medicinal use (obtainable only by a doctor's prescription)?
This is not meant to trivialize the process of determining policies to govern drug use. It is just difficult (and I can only speak for myself about the degree of difficulty) to determine how to rank the values
pertinent to this issue to allow for a more subtle evaluation of which specific drugs should be legalized.

Anyway, this is an interesting topic, and (hopefully) someone else may have something to say about it.

Malaclypse the Younger

There are two legitimate subjectivist ways to rank values.

One is the personal. How do you rank the values? Are there any you would add to the list?

The other is the sociological, an extension of the personal. Ask a lot of people to rank their values and do statistics on them.

A good place to start when discussing any ethical position: What are your own values? How do you rank them? No one can answer this question for you.

If you don't understand your own values, you can't rationally determine personal action and interpersonal negotiation strategies to maximize those values.

jpbrooks

This certainly makes sense.
But isn't the ranking of values dependent on the meta-values that one holds? If so, then once one has agreed to hold a certain set of meta-values, the ranking of values becomes a matter of finding the ranking that is consistent with those meta-values.

Also, in the example above concerning drug use, wouldn't there be a conflict between the value of protecting people from harm and the value of personal freedom?

[ March 17, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>

Malaclypse the Younger

The consideration and comparison of values (values about behaviors and outcomes) and meta-values (values about values) is an interest case of self-referentiality. Because values and meta-values are are properly basic (they are known directly), they are not necessarily self-referentially incoherent.

However it is possible that they are self-referentially incoherent. For instance, I am intolerant of intolerance. Without careful formulation of values and meta-values, it is possible to hold inconsistent values.

However, this does not present a problem for the subjectivist, because it is factually true that people hold (or at least express) inconsistent values; moral subjectivism is essentially descriptive of how human beings actually resolve ethical issues. Human brains appear to use <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/" target="_blank">paraconsistent</a> logic; contradictions, while irrational, do not appear to be explosively debilitating.

Because values and meta-values (and meta-meta-values, ad infinitum) are known directly, it is still possible to compare and rank them "on the same list" on the basis of direct knowledge. A fortiori it is possible to detect when values and meta-values (etc.) are self-referentially incoherehent, and adjust one's own thinking to remove the contradiction or at least recognize the contradiction and deal with it paraconsistently.

By way of example, it is possible to directly compare my enjoyment of ice cream with the enjoyment of my health that might be compromised by eating ice cream. I can deal with it consistently, by recognizing that my enjoyment of ice cream is either more or less important than my enjoyment of health and act accordingly. Alternatively I can deal with the contradiction paraconsistently, by realizing that my values are inconsistent and simply not considering them (and risking explosiveness) when evaluating questions that don't appear to be related to the contradiction.

[ March 17, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

Malaclypse the Younger

jpbrooks

As noted, both values and meta-values are known directly.

Naturally. And this conflict has two forms.

In one sense, different people hold different rankings. This state of affairs is in no way contradictory under subjectivism; since values are seen as subjective, statements about values are objectively true only when the holder is specifically referenced. In such a case, holders of different values must either negotate agreements about implementation (specific behaviors) or come into conflict. Again, the subjectivist notes that both these situations (negotiation and conflict) obtain in reality, so subjectivism does not predict anything false-to-fact.

Secondly, it is possible for one's own values to be in conflict (again, this prediction of subjectivism is evidenced in reality). One might highly value freedom and also highly value the protection of others. In such a case, to remain rational, the individual must rationalize that conflict; she must come to a decision about their relative importance, or add additional criteria to distinguish between when she chooses to maximize the fulfillment of one or another.

In my case, I rationalize them (in the case when the action causes me no direct inconvenience) by evaluating the stupidity of the action in question. If the action appears to me to be so utterly stupid as to compromise my confidence in the actor's ability to evaluate risk, I will tend to come down on the side of protection. If the action does not appear to compromise that confidence, I come down on the side of freedom.

For instance, motorcycles are dangerous. However, if a person chooses to wear a helmet, I am confident in his ability to evaluate the risks/rewards of riding motorcycles. OTOH, I see the choice to not wear a helmet when riding a motorcycle as inexusably stupid; such a choice undermines my confidence in his ability, and I am inclined to coercively protect that person. However, it logically possible for a person to persuade me that he does understand the risks/rewards of riding motorcycles, and possibly persuade me that I should not object to his not wearing a helmet (however, this argument has not yet actually succeeded).

As a subjectivist, these are my personal values. I make no claim that these values are "objectively true" (only that it is objectively true that I hold them). They are "rational" in the sense that, given my values, I come to conclusions that are noncontradictory. However my values are not "true" in that I don't believe they correspond to anything in objective reality, other than the fact of their existence in my own mind.

[ March 17, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>