Clutch

Taffy Lewis,

Please explain why evolutionary theory is committed to a theory of mental representation on which the content of a belief is individuated without any reference to its causes, nor to a principle of charity, nor to projective "analytical hypotheses", nor...

The point is, the question of what (if anything) determines the content of a belief is deeply fraught. Plantinga's argument assumes that belief contents are determinate, that they are determined *independent* of their functional role and causal origins, and that concept-possession and acquisition (the building-blocks of belief contents) are similarly independent of such functional-causal constraints.

Once you assume that the contents of mental states are constitutively severed from the agent's environment, of course you open up room for radical scepticism. That's what the empiricist tradition from Hume through Russell was greatly concerned with. On what grounds, exactly, does Plantinga saddle evolutionary theory with such a view?

Pomp

Taffy Lewis,

Plantinga doesn't deny any of this. He denies that natural selection would insure that our senses/cognition are generally reliable.

And Platinga is demonstrably wrong, as I've already explained in my most recent post to LinuxPup. Natural selection very easily weeds out individuals whose senses and cognitive facilites are not generally reliable if, by "generally reliable," we mean "sufficiently modeled on the real world." And, as I've already pointed out, "sufficiently modeled on the real world" does not mean "true" in any ultimate sense. Selection favors individuals with the ability to build faithful cognitive models of the real world, not individuals with the ability to discern true beliefs from false ones. It's a fine distinction, but a real one.

This isn't true. In the example, the person (call him Smith) does not perceive a tiger. He perceives a kitten. But he could as easily perceived a chocolate cake. Maybe he thinks chocolate cakes should be kissed. And maybe he thinks the best way to kiss a chocolate cake is to strongly avoid it.

Providing that Smith's beliefs about chocolate cakes and the best way to kiss them are a faithful model of the real world (that is, he always represents what we call tigers as chocolate cakes, he always holds that chocolate cakes ought to be kissed, and he consistently maintains that running away from something is the best way to kiss it), his cognitive facilites wll operate efficiently without hindrance from his presumably false beliefs. In fact, I'd like you to offer a compelling proof that what we perceive as tigers are not actually chocolate cakes and that avoiding is not actually kissing. For all we know, our false beliefs that tigers are something to be avoided actually confers a survival advantage to us by helping us kiss more chocolate cakes then we would otherwise. While kissing chocolate cakes may not seem, to us, to confer any survival advantage, Smith finds it ludicrous to imagine that avoiding tigers could confer survival advantage. Can you show that he is wrong?

The point is, either belief system works equally well, provided that it is modeled consistently on the real world. Further, asking whether or not our beliefs are "true" in any other sense is, as I have already noted, an epistemic dead end. We don't know if our beliefs or Smith's (or neither) are correct and, more importantly, we can't know. Now, as a pragmatic matter, we usually assume that our beliefs are true, but it is by no means a proven matter. One who believes in a supernatural designer is on no firmer ground because, as also noted, (s)he has no compelling reason to believe that the hypothetical designer is not a supernatural trickster intent on deceiving us. Yes, you may certainly assume that the designer is honest, but this assumption is no less unfounded than the naturalist's assumption that the world revealed by our sense and cognitive abilities is "real."

I might go on to argue that it is more likely that we were created by an evolutionary process than in intelligent designer because we know that an evolutionary process will create beings with the ability to model the real world in some way. We have no compelling reason to suspect that an intelligent designer would do so. I don't find this a particularly compelling argument, but it's better than Platinga's, IMO.

Your argument, if expressed as a syllogism, would read something like:

P1: An intelligent designer is more likely than an evolutionary process to create beings with the ability to discern the "truth" in an ultimate sense.
P2: We are able to discern the "truth" in an ultimate sense.
C1: It is more likely that we were created by an intelligent designer than an evolutionary process.

Both P1 and P2 are questionable, for reasons already discussed. As noted, we have no compelling reason to suspect that an intelligent designer would not create beings with flawed sensory or cognitive abilities, so P1 remains unproven. More importantly, P2 is a completely baseless assertion. We simply have no way of knowing whether or not our beliefs are true. It is equally possible that Smith is right, and our ancestors survived because of their skillful kissing of chocolate cakes.

The Other Michael

Hi Taffy Lewis,

Then what does he see when he looks at a kitten? And does he fear for his life from the kitten and therefor run to it to stroke it?

This seems pretty silly. You could set up one of those multi-column sentence generators:

I perceive a (x) and I want to (Y) it therefore I (Z)

x = flower, kitten, tiger, Fred
Y = hit, eat, pet, kick
Z = run away, run towards, say a poem, jump up and down.

You can substitute any combination of X, Y and Z, but if the Z response isn't the appropriate one, things won't work out optimally.

If that isn't clear (and I hold no great hopes of it) you might also look at it that it is the same type of thing as people arguing if the color they see is the same color. It really doesn't matter if you see a green light and I say it is a red light, as long as we both always stop our vehicles (appropriate behavior to the stimulus) behind the line at the intersection when we see that color.

cheers,
Michael

Clutch

Mad Bastard, I'm just guessing here, but I think Taffy has something like this in mind: If I believe that a tiger is a swimming pool, and I really like swimming pools, and I always want to jump into them, and I believe that the way to jump into them is to locate them 180 degrees behind me and run like hell, then natural selection rewards my perversion by seeing it passed onto my offspring. (While my conspecifics, who may form all the correct beliefs about tigers but just a bit too slowly, help to fatten the local predatory feline population.)

None of this is remotely original to Plantinga; it's a set of observations that find their home in the work of Quine, Dennett and Davidson. They argue in detail that you can explain any behaviour by positing any individual belief or desire, as long as you're willing to tell a weird enough story about all the other beliefs and desires involved. But this line of thought is typically offered in support of the view that representational content is *indeterminate* -- which would render Plantinga's challenge inert.

I dunno. This sceptical argument is hot stuff among the Alvin-o-philes these days, but I've yet to hear even one of them make a gesture towards the mass of contentious assumptions about intentional psychology upon which Plantinga's claim rests.

Pomp

Clutch,

But this line of thought is typically offered in support of the view that representational content is *indeterminate* -- which would render Plantinga's challenge inert.

Yes, that's exactly what I'm driving at. Of course, I cribbed quite a bit of my stance from Dennet.

Vorkosigan

Hi Clutch! We covered this on a thread already. There isn't much need to address Plantinga's simplistic views of human cognition in depth because his view of evolution is so simplistic. For the other poster...

Sure. All of this is rather silly from our point of view. But natural selection is indifferent to silliness. Our minds could have easily generated these beliefs and desires and we could survive just as well. Our beliefs and desires need only produce the necessary behavior to allow us to survive and reproduce. So we do not need largely true beliefs or "normal" desires in order to survive and reproduce.

Again, for the umpteenth time, beliefs do not evolve. They are ephemeral. It's the belief-forming machinery that evolves.

It is true our beliefs and desires need only produce the necessary behavior for us to survive and reproduce. But in order to do that, we need beliefs and desires that reflect the reality of the world around us, because that is the key to successful reproduction.

Yes, our minds could be generating a false/useless picture of the world. They could also be extensions of the universal uni-mind, or software programs running on a computer somewhere a la The Thirteenth Floor. "Could" is a worthless word.

First, no where in the example is Smith said to want to cuddle a tiger. He wants to cuddle a kitten.

The kitten, however, is really a tiger. One cuddle and it is all over.

Secondly, with regard to natural selection, insanity is irrelevant. The only important point is that his behavior is survival conducive and that he is capable of reproducing.

It is manifestly not survival conducive. The tiger will pounce on him instantly if he runs. Survival conducive behavior involves Smith sneaking stealthily away, climbing a tree, diving in the water, using a weapon, or summoning help. Running away will only attract the tiger's attention.

If insane behavior can allow someone to survive and reproduce then there is no reason to believe it will be selected against.

Wrong. Because, although Smith might survive his encounter with the tiger, he will probably not reproduce. Remember, his behavior must also enhance his ability to find mates and have children who reproduce themselves. The insane are less likely to find mates and raise children successfully. Plantinga's simplistic view of evolution and natural selection emphasizes survival. But that is not the same as reproduction, which is the key to evolution. Humans are social animals, and the insane are not prized as mates. That is why Plantinga's approach fails. The belief must be assessed in light of the organism and its environment as a whole, not merely in particular circumstances.

That is one of the (many) problems with Plantinga's view. The moment one thinks about hypothetical instances taking place in the real world, like the tiger example above, it falls apart. Can you construct a viable hypothetical that consistently gives false beliefs that confer no fitness benefits in any other aspect of a creature's behavior, but nevertheless provides false beliefs in the hypothetical example? For example, Smith could very well hold his false belief about tigers, if the machinery that produces that belief in the presence of a tiger produces other beliefs whose benefits outweigh the occasional disasters with tigers.

Consider also, the trouble Smith is going to have domesticating animals, if he thinks the way to pet a kitten is to run away from it. Over the hill, Grog the Cro-Magnon is busy taming dogs. He correctly pets dogs, and kills tigers with his spear. Who is going to want to have kids with Smith the Neandertal, when Grog and his partnership with dogs is producing meat on a steady basis, as well as safety in the camp, and additional social reinforcement in the form of bonds with animals?

Any hypothetical is subject to this problem, because Plantinga is really thinking about faculties and sensory apparatus, but about beliefs. He fails to think about beliefs in the context of the organism's total behavior, and never bothers to really imagine cognitive machinery and how it might work at all.

The argument is framed in terms of sensory and cognitive faculties. Some can produce true beliefs and others can produce false beliefs.

The argument is not framed in terms of sensory and cognitive faculties. This is because Plantinga is interested in proving that some beliefs, like the belief in gods, are warranted. He's not interested in faculties. If it were truly framed in terms of sensory faculties, its error would be obvious. For example, are the senses of dogs, lizards and cockroaches equally dependent on divine intervention, or is it just ours that didn't evolve?

As I said above, if Plantinga were thinking about faculties, he'd have to show that his hypothetical example conferred no other benefits/problems in some other aspect of Smith's life -- as in my point about domesticating animals. But of course, he's not really thinking about faculties, he's thinking about beliefs. His primary purpose, after all, is propagandizing for belief in the Canaanite Sky God Ya.

Saying the beliefs are not relevant is like saying grasping motions are just ephemeral and what is relevant is the physiology of hands.

From the evolutionary point of view, particular beliefs are not relevant, any more than it matters whether one is gripping a spear or a bat or a branch, as our hands were originally intended to do.

The generation of beliefs just is one of the functions of our sensory and cognitive faculties.

True. So?

Vorkosigan

[ May 11, 2002: Message edited by: Vorkosigan ]</p>

Bill Snedden

Thank you, and goodnight Dr. Plantinga, et al...

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Taffy Lewis

Clutch:

The Plantinga-style argument we are discussing does not claim that evolution is committed to any theory of the mind. It merely says that one cannot believe our sensory and cognitive faculties represent the world as it is and believe they originated through a blind process. It is the joining of the two claims that is supposed to cause a problem. You could simply deny that truth means anything or deny a correspondence theory of truth. You might claim that truth is just "what works" with regard to integrating our experiences and has nothing to do with claims about a mind-independent reality. I am not aware of Plantinga or anyone else suggesting that evolutionary theory is committed to any particular theory of the mind.

But denying the common sense view of truth is certainly one way to avoid the argument.

Taffy Lewis

Vorkosigan:

What do you mean by 'ephemeral'? Do you mean 'epiphenomenal'? That's what I took you to mean.

SteveD

To LinuxPup and Taffy Lewis,
I've asked this question before but got no response.

If our ability to think rationally and therefore arrive at true beliefs was bestowed upon us by an intelligent designer (i.e. an omniscient omnipotent God), then why does humanity seem to arrive at consensus on so many things?

Just using religion as an example, there are countless variations of beliefs out there.

Did God purposely give us a flawed reasoning system or couldn't he do any better?

Steve