DavidHouston

Consider the following definition: When a course of action, C, an individual, x, and a proposition, P, are such that (1) x intends to take C, (2) x wishes to take C on the assumption that P is true, and (3) x wishes to take C on the assumption that P is false, we shall say that C is secure for x with respect to P.

Let us take an example in which a course of action is secure for an individual with respect to a proposition. Continuing to associate with my friends and loved ones is secure for me with respect to the proposition that God exists, for (1) I intend to take that course of action, (2) I wish to take that course of action on the assumption that the proposition that God exists is true, and (3) I wish to take that course of action on the assumption that the proposition that God exists is false. Let us take an example in which a course of action is not secure for an individual with respect to a proposition. As this is being written, I intend to take the course of working at my desk for the next thirty or so minutes. I don’t wish to take that course of action on the assumption that the proposition that a bomb has been placed in the room in which I am working and will soon be detonated is true. (At the following address I’ve provided an appendix that discusses instances in which an individual wishes to take a course of action on an assumption: <a href="http://www.geocities.com/essaysbydavidhouston/Appendix1.htm" target="_blank">http://www.geocities.com/essaysbydavidhouston/Appendix1.htm</A> . If the meaning I intend for phrases I employ in this message that contain the word ‘wish’ or the word ‘wishes’ isn’t clear to you, please read the appendix.)

Some of the discussions in this message are drawn from my book, “An Essay on the Conduct of Life.” I have placed a copy of “An Essay on the Conduct of Life” at the following site: <a href="http://www.geocities.com/essaysbydavidhouston" target="_blank">http://www.geocities.com/essaysbydavidhouston</A> . In “An Essay on the Conduct of Life” you will find more detailed developments of some ideas sketched here. In the book I provide a stipulative definition for ‘God’. In this message I let the term ‘God’ take the meaning it has in ordinary, everyday discourse. (If, as some maintain, there is no such meaning, then occurrences of ‘God’ in this message will fail to possess a meaning. The best way for me to deal with issues concerning the meaning of ‘God’ is the one I adopt in my book: provide a stipulative definition for ‘God’ that serves my purposes.)

Below I employ the notion of secure courses of action to formulate three additional concepts. Those concepts can be utilized for a variety of purposes. One of the reasons they are of interest is that they can be utilized to express appropriate forms of indifference to the question of whether or not God exists and to certain questions in metaethics.

Courses of action secure with respect to noncognitivism regarding the basic moral terms

By ‘basic moral terms’, I shall mean ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’. By ‘basic moral sentences’, I shall mean simple sentences in English which have as their predicates one of the following: ‘is morally right’; ‘is morally wrong’; ‘would be morally right’; ‘would be morally wrong’; ‘was morally right’; ‘was morally wrong’. Some examples of basic moral sentences are ‘Murder is morally wrong’, ‘Blasphemy is morally wrong’, ‘John’s refusal to help Nancy is morally wrong’, ‘What you did last Thursday was morally right’, and ‘Killing John would be morally wrong’.

By ‘a use of a basic moral sentence’, I shall mean any utterance of a basic moral sentence or any written instance of a basic moral sentence.

By ‘noncognitivism regarding the basic moral terms’, I shall mean the proposition that no use of a basic moral sentence is ever true and no use of a basic moral sentence is ever false. On the noncognitivist theory, when someone says, “Blashpemy is morally wrong,” she has not said something true, and she likewise has not said something false. Her utterance is neither true nor false.

A course of action, C, is secure for an individual, x, with respect to noncognitivism regarding the basic moral terms if and only if (1) x intends to take C, (2) x wishes to take C on the assumption that noncognitivism regarding the basic moral terms is true, and (3) x wishes to take C on the assumption that noncognitivism regarding the basic moral terms is false.

Courses of action secure with respect to the confusion theory

Let us call the proposition that the basic moral terms have no meaning and basic moral sentences have no meaning ‘the confusion theory’. One way in which the confusion theory could be true is this: The use of the basic moral terms exhibited by speakers of the English language could be confused in various ways and inconsistent in various ways, and in consequence of widespread forms of confusion and inconsistency in the use of those terms, those terms could have no meaning and basic moral sentences could have no meaning. (In “An Essay on the Conduct of Life” I set forth arguments a proponent of the confusion theory can cite in favor of that theory. I also set forth a way in which the confusion theory could be false and discuss other matters concerning the confusion theory.)

A course of action, C, is secure for an individual, x, with respect to the confusion theory if and only if (1) x intends to take C, (2) x wishes to take C on the assumption that the confusion theory is true, and (3) x wishes to take C on the assumption that the confusion theory is false.

Metaphysically secure courses of action

Let us say that a course of action, C, is metaphysically secure for an individual, x, if and only if (1) C is secure for x with respect to the proposition that God exists, (2) C is secure for x with respect to noncognitivism regarding the basic moral terms, and (3) C is secure for x with respect to the confusion theory.

Some uses for concepts set forth in this message

Concepts I have set forth in this message have a variety of uses. They can, as I noted above, be utilized to express appropriate forms of indifference to the question of whether or not God exists and to certain questions in metaethics. They can be utilized to answer challenges to a chosen course of action that stem from skepticism concerning the coherence of sentences which have as their predicates ‘is morally right’ and ‘is morally wrong’. They can be utilized to express strong forms of commitment to certain courses of action.

Some of the attitudes, desires, and intentions of the typical adult human being are in appropriate senses independent of the individual’s views concerning metaethics and are in appropriate senses independent of the individual’s belief or lack of belief in the proposition that God exists. The concepts I have displayed in this message are part of a larger set of concepts I exhibit in “An Essay on the Conduct of Life” that can be utilized to discuss such attitudes, desires, and intentions in perspicuous ways.

Another use for concepts set forth in this message is that of depicting types of persons and ways of life. In “An Essay on the Conduct of Life” I utilize concepts I have exhibited here and some additional concepts to depict ways of life and types of persons never before depicted in a written work.

[ February 11, 2002: Message edited by: DavidHouston ]</p>

abe smith

UH. Just offhand,Guy, this long passage, I mean post, seems a way-outside sort of concern t' me. I infer that you don't have any babies's nappies to change; nor bills to mail payment for; nor kids nor husbands to go pick-up at their pick-up sites.... Guess maybe it's true that heavy thinkers, mathematicians, philosophers, ,,,, tend to be celibate male bachelors. Hey that , if it were a fact [certainly not asserting it as one! ] might indicate that those life-roles are deleterious to their doers's genetic survival ; Lethal characters. Surely these comments are neither here-nor-there w/ your initial post.... Abe