Clutch

Jamie, yes, that's right.

It's also what strikes me as weird about entirely a priori arguments like the Ontological Argument. In a world -- movie trailer voice -- where life is torture from birth to death, the OA purports to prove the existence of a being that unites the perfections of power, goodness, knowledge, and so forth. Huh? As if we needed one, that's a cue that something very dodgy is going on.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"The theist is only claiming that this scenario is possible, and it is quite clear that it is."

I'd be happy to grant that God is possible for the purposes of this argument. My position is that more likely than not, God does not exist, and this is consistent with God being possible. If I had reason to believe that, more likely than not, to lower our free will in certain areas would lower the total goodness in the world, that would be something else entirely. But I feel no support for that proposition, especially because our free will is so carefully constrained already.

"...you cannot conclude that because Ivan* is possible that, therefore, Ivan* is feasible."

Neither of us can think of any reason that Ivan* wouldn't serve God's purposes just as well as Ivan, or wouldn't be as feasible. Again, it's possible that Ivan* wouldn't serve God's purposes as well as Ivan would, but prima facie, it's just as possible that Ivan* would serve God's purposes better. I can provide some evidence that He would; viz., there would be fewer evil choices in the world. Now it's up to you to make up the difference and tip the scales in the other direction.

Maybe it would help for you to give a deeper description of what you think it means for Ivan* to be feasible or infeasible. I assume Ivan* is infeasible just because he might not serve God's purposes as well as Ivan would. My response is, well, sure, he might not, but there's more reason to believe he would.

"The possibility of counterfactuals still remains unaddressed and is crucial to the problem of the compossible states of Situations L and S for the broadly logical possibility of Situation L+S does not corroborate the feasibility of Situation L+S."

Again, I have no reason to believe the conjunction of situations L plus S is infeasible. It's possible that they are, but mere possibility won't answer the evidential argument from evil.

"Since the atheologian is proposing that the inductive/probabalistic argument from evil is successful because Situation L is feasible for God then it is incumbent upon the claimant to provide reasons why this is so."

Again, I await your version of "feasible." There are good reasons to think that by default, a situation is feasible for God, based upon His omnipotence.

Silent Dave

Clutch and Jamie--

I mostly understand what you're saying; let me see if I can express myself correctly here. Let P = the world which presently obtains, and Q = a possible world which contains more "turps" of suffering than P by several orders of magnitude. Now, we're talking about counter-arguments that are made in P, but would apply with equal force to Q; thus it does not apply to a specific world, but to a general set of worlds.

Where I'm confused is, how does that general application weaken or invalidate the argument as it applies to P? Does the argument's probability decrease w/r/t P because it now applies to an infinitely long conjunction? Or is it that it has equal force here as it does in a world where it would make no intuitive sense whatsoever? Or am I just too darned analytical for my own good?


Dave

mattbballman

carr and clutch,

(i) This reversal of the burden of proof is disturbing. In logic, anyone who makes a claim to know something about the world shoulders some burden of proof for their proposition -- unless special circumstances circumvent that (i.e. being the defense in a crimina case). What Dr. Drange and Thomas are doing is making the claim that God can feasibly create a world with less evil (or diminished free will) and the same amount of good as the actual world. As I have already articulated, it is not true by default. The theist does not have to begin by proving it false, that is backwards! David Lund, a philosopher at Bemidji State University, writes:
The truth-tracking method of effective philosophic inquiry
would lead us to believe a proposition when the evidence
available to us justifies our believing it, to reject a
proposition when our evidence disconfirms it, and to
suspend judgment about it when our evidence neither
confirms nor disconfirms it.
(David H. Lund, Making Sense of It All: An Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003 -- forthcoming), pp. 15-16.)
For the theist to deflect an unproven statement, she is within her epistemic rights to suspend judgment about the problem of evil having no reason provided to her for believing it. In Guthrie's exchange, he provided a scenario that is possibly true to show why the proponent of the argument from evil must prove her position. I am not saying that a mere possibility of a statement makes it actually true, that's a mischaracterization of what I said. Now, if the atheist desparately doesn't want to prove it and would rather inappropriately and obviously shift the burden of proof then that shall forever make the argument from evil unproven.

(ii) You also are making the same egregious error Drange and Metcaf make: Arguing for the feasibility of a state of affairs from its mere possibility. And what is interesting is that this is what you accuse me of doing, and then in the same post it becomes the basis for your statement, "Guthrie cannot complain if atheists say God can create an Ivan, who had free will, and who under all circumstances, would freely choose not to do evil."! This is at best a tu quoque. And since it's false in the first place, it's false in the second place.

(iii) I'm not sure to which created beings you refer when you say that God has created some beings with free will who have never exercised evil. That's not Christian theology. In Christian theology, all persons are guitly to some extent of rebelling against God in their sinful proclivities. And neither is this relevant. For the actual state of affairs does not inform us how an improved possible world can feasibly be created.

matt

[ December 17, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]

[ December 17, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]</p>

mattbballman

Dear Mr. Metcaf,

There isn't more I can add here so I'll concentrate on what a feasible world is.

You say, "Neither of us can think of any reason that Ivan* wouldn't serve God's purposes just as well as Ivan, or wouldn't be as feasible." But I've reminded you several times of the counterfactual "Under no circumstances would Ivan* freely enroll in Phi 101." So, neither can anyone think of any reason why Ivan* would serve God's purposes just as well. Your responses have strangely been silent on this most salient feature of feasible worlds. So now you ask me what "feasible" means -- the purpose of the Ivan illustration. Guthrie has defined this in his article, but here's an example used by Alvin Plantinga. Suppose that there is some state of affairs (S) such that if they obtain then Peter would sell his prized aardvark. That is a possible world. It is also a possible world that if that same state of affairs obtains then Peter would not sell his prized aardvark. Both of these scenarios are possible worlds. So, we have the following in both worlds under consideration:

(a) S obtains.

and what divides the two possible worlds in this case are the options:

(b) Peter accepts an offer for the aardvark
(c) Peter does not accept any offers for the aardvark

These are counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Either scenario entails a possible world God could not have actualized. If God created (a) which resulted in (b) then (c) could not be actualized by God. If God created (a) which resulted in (c) then (b) could not be actualized by God. Both are contingent on the same set of circumstances (S) and are not compossible. And if you say, "Well, just make different circumstances that will lead to Peter accepting the offer" then we have the same possible worlds situation all over again: Given S* either Peter will accept an offer for the aardvark or Peter does not accept any offers for the aardvark. Because of such counterfactuals, it may not be feasible for God to bring about a specific result. Feasibility rests on the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. And if someone says, "Well, it is possible that God can actualize a world where fewer people freely choose evil under circumstances S." Of course. But is it feasible for we have the counterfactual, Fewer people will not freely choose evil under circumstances S. With respect to the problem of evil, you and Drange both declare the possibility of this state of affairs. Fine. But then both conclude that it is feasible for God to do so. Why should I think that "Peter accepts the offer" is any more of a "default" than "Peter does not accept any offers"? You have to argue your case if you are going to convince anyone that your proposition is more likely true than its negation. And none have been provided yet.
As the professor of philosophy at Bemidji University observes:
The truth-tracking method of effective philosophic inquiry
would lead us to believe a proposition when the evidence
available to us justifies our believing it, to reject a
proposition when our evidence disconfirms it, and to
suspend judgment about it when our evidence neither
confirms nor disconfirms it.
(David H. Lund, Making Sense of It All: An Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003 -- forthcoming), pp. 15-16.)

[ December 17, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]</p>

mattbballman

Dear Mr. Metcaf,

There isn't more I can add here so I'll concentrate on what a feasible world is.

You say, "Neither of us can think of any reason that Ivan* wouldn't serve God's purposes just as well as Ivan, or wouldn't be as feasible." But I've reminded you several times of the counterfactual "Under no circumstances would Ivan* freely enroll in Phi 101." So, neither can anyone think of any reason why Ivan* would serve God's purposes just as well. Your responses have strangely been silent on this most salient feature of feasible worlds. So now you ask me what "feasible" means -- the purpose of the Ivan illustration. Guthrie has defined this in his article, but here's an example used by Alvin Plantinga. Suppose that there is some state of affairs (S) such that if they obtain then Peter would sell his prized aardvark. That is a possible world. It is also a possible world that if that same state of affairs obtains then Peter would not sell his prized aardvark. Both of these scenarios are possible worlds. So, we have the following in both worlds under consideration:

(a) S obtains.

and what divides the two possible worlds in this case are the options:

(b) Peter accepts an offer for the aardvark
(c) Peter does not accept any offers for the aardvark

These are counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Either scenario entails a possible world God could not have actualized. If God created (a) which resulted in (b) then (c) could not be actualized by God. If God created (a) which resulted in (c) then (b) could not be actualized by God. Both are contingent on the same set of circumstances (S) and are not compossible. And if you say, "Well, just make different circumstances that will lead to Peter accepting the offer" then we have the same possible worlds situation all over again: Given S* either Peter will accept an offer for the aardvark or Peter does not accept any offers for the aardvark. Because of such counterfactuals, it may not be feasible for God to bring about a specific result. Feasibility rests on the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. And if someone says, "Well, it is possible that God can actualize a world where fewer people freely choose evil under circumstances S." Of course. But is it feasible for we have the counterfactual, Fewer people will not freely choose evil under circumstances S. With respect to the problem of evil, you and Drange both declare the possibility of this state of affairs. Fine. But then both conclude that it is feasible for God to do so. Why should I think that "Peter accepts the offer" is any more of a "default" than "Peter does not accept any offers"? You have to argue your case if you are going to convince anyone that your proposition is more likely true than its negation. And none have been provided yet.
As the professor of philosophy at Bemidji University observes:
The truth-tracking method of effective philosophic inquiry
would lead us to believe a proposition when the evidence
available to us justifies our believing it, to reject a
proposition when our evidence disconfirms it, and to
suspend judgment about it when our evidence neither
confirms nor disconfirms it.
(David H. Lund, Making Sense of It All: An Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003 -- forthcoming), pp. 15-16.)

Thomas Metcalf

mattbballman:

"So, neither can anyone think of any reason why Ivan* would serve God's purposes just as well."

Of course I can. God is omnipotent, so His purposes are easy to serve. Ivan* is different because he is more likely to take philosophy, and if we define "more people take philosophy" to be one of God's goals, then of course Ivan* would be better, ceteris paribus.

No one denies that it's possible that it's infeasible for God to bring about L. But in the presence of an omnipotent God, any situation is feasible until some reason is provided to show it isn't. As Dr. Retard pointed out in this thread, this free will defense is only potent against the deductive argument from evil. Drange has propounded an evidential argument from evil; he will not deny that, maybe, God cannot bring about L because it requires the actualization of some infeasible situations. But again, a "maybe" won't get anyone very far. The apologist must show that it is likely that to bring about L would require that God bring about some infeasible states of affairs.

If God intended that more people sell aardvarks, there is a possible person Peter* who is more inclined to sell aardvarks. Certainly, he could go either way -- there are counterfactuals of freedom with either he does or he doesn't in their consequents -- but he is still more likely to choose to sell his aardvark than Peter. And again, God is omnipotent, and therefore we ought to give Him the benefit of the doubt when we're trying to assess whether some situation is feasible.

"Why should I think that 'Peter accepts the offer' is any more of a 'default' than 'Peter does not accept any offers'?"

You shouldn't. But you should think that God, omnipotent, will have the ability to influence which obtains, to some degree. And remember, if it is impossible that Ivan take philosophy, then Ivan does not have libertarian free will with respect to that choice. It seems that God can produce humans with certain characters, without limiting their free will prohibitively.

I agree that there are certain situations that may simply be closed to God, because of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Free humans are undeterminable. But it need not be the case that for L to obtain, free humans need to have their actions determined by God, strongly or weakly. It just doesn't seem too likely that L would require that. Again, Drange's argument is an evidential argument, so you'll need to show more than possibility -- you'll have to show that probably, to bring about L would require that these humans be influenced to go a certain way. God is omnipotent, so requirements for states of affairs ought to be presumed meet-able until proven otherwise.

Finally, the point remains that God does not value free will in a way that makes sense. It seems quite clear that the world would be better for some reasons if God prohibited some of the torture of babies that goes unprohibited. So the apologist must provide reason to think that the value of the freedom of baby-torturers outweighs the value of the lessening in the frequency of baby-torture. Maybe it does; maybe freedom, to God, is paramount. Yet He constrains our freedom very carefully indeed; there are literally thousands of morally salient actions the laws of nature prohibit us from performing. I doubt any open-minded person will find intuitive support for the idea that to prohibit more baby-torture than is prohibited now would limit the expression of our free will to a damaging degree, while thousands of other prohibitions do not produce this situation.

Clutch

Dave, I don' t have much to add to what I've said. It's not a formal reductio -- maybe that's throwing you off. It's an embarrassment, which is all the PoE can be. The embarrassment is this: The theist is driven by his responses to the view that God's perfection is consistent with his having created the worst conceivable universe. And that's a revealing insight into what the theist takes divine perfection to amount to.

Clutch

matt, perhaps you could frame your concern in the form of an argument.

I'm afraid that quoting introductory texts with no obvious relevance to the specific points at issue is not a very useful or effective strategy. And yes, this is true even if the author is at Bemidji State.

Steven Carr

Of course, it is true by default. *We* can (and do) reduce the amount of suffering in the world, so clearly God can.

It is the theist who has to show that people only have one leg, even though we can see two (sorry, that God cannot reduce suffering, although we do it on a daily basis)

Perhaps I should remind you of what Christians believe. They believe God has created beings (Archangels Gabriel and Michael) who have free will, and have never chosen evil.

Surely the existence of these beings is totally relevant to a discussion of whether God can create beings with free will who never commit evil :-)