Thomas Metcalf

Introduction

In a <a href="http://examinedlifejournal.com/archives/vol3ed10/drange.shtml" target="_blank">recent article</a>, Shandon Guthrie takes issue with two of Theodore Drange's premises in his Argument from Evil. To Guthrie, there are good reasons to doubt the truth of each of them, and therefore, not to accept Drange's conclusion that God does not exist. In this post, I will argue that Drange's original premises are in fact defensible from Guthrie's attack, and therefore, Drange's argument stands.

Guthrie denies these two premises:

And the situation L in question is:

Can God bring about L?

Guthrie argues that while situation L is certainly logically possible, it is not feasible for God to bring it about. His argument turns on the supposition that certain logically possible states of affairs are not bring-about-able by an agent, a fairly commonly accepted stipulation in current definitions of omnipotence. He offers the example of Ivan, an unfortunate student who (because of, say, the antecedent aversion to philosophy in his character) will never freely choose to enroll in Philosophy 101. It is not feasible for God to bring about the state of affairs in which Ivan freely chooses to enroll in Philosophy 101, so God will not be able to bring such a state of affairs about.

This is an explanation for why evil choices exist in the world, to be sure, but I believe it fails to establish the falsity of (1) for three reasons.

First. It is not clear why God values free will in the way He is purported to value it. The atheologian need not ask that God cause humans always freely to choose good, but rather, that God prevent the actualization of some free will choices by a standard that makes sense. For as things stand now, God quite commonly chooses not to allow certain morally salient free will decisions to come to fruition, but stands by and allows the results other morally salient free will decisions to obtain. Consider these three events:

(E1) Jane chooses to point her finger at Jen and zap Jen with a moderately painful jolt of electricity.
(E2) Jane chooses to torture a baby, and her choice succeeds.
(E3) Jane chooses to wave her hands and cause every conscious organism except herself to suffer enormous amounts of pain for all eternity.

I trust it will be uncontroversial that all three of these events express a state of affairs in which Jane chooses evil, but to radically variant degrees. Now, as God has set the universe up, (E1) and (E3) will probably fail to obtain almost all the time. It is simply against the laws of nature for such states of affairs to come about. (E2) will obtain with some frequency, but it is not clear why God has neglected this facet of reality when He was dictating the laws of nature. Surely laws of nature that caused (E2) to fail to obtain slightly more often would not preclude humanity from having significant free will, especially if God's prohibition of (E1) and (E3) does not. My point is that a world with significantly fewer morally evil choices would bring about situation L, even though the expression of morally evil free will choices is limited a bit more than it is already -- I believe I have shown that this limitation would not clearly make L less good.

Second. The atheologian may reply that God, when observing the formation of Ivan's character, might to have rearranged Ivan's neurons somewhat so that he would be more charitable towards ideas of taking Philosophy 101. Guthrie has committed himself to quite a bit when he says that Ivan's character prohibits him from taking Philosophy 101. Apparently, it is an essential property of Ivan that he will never take Philosophy 101, because otherwise, there would certainly seem to be possible worlds in which Ivan does just that. If that's so, God might have influenced the development of Ivan as a baby so that he turned out to be a different person, one more open to and appreciative of the joys of philosophy. (Would that God provide the same service to everyone!) God does not seem to be prohibiting some being's free will when He chooses Person A over Person B to exist in His world. So again, God could bring about situation L, simply by populating His world with a few different people than He has chosen to populate it.

Third. Guthrie mentions natural disasters in his preliminary remarks, but unfortunately, he does not return to tie these events to his free will defense. I can think of two ways by which worlds without as much naturally-produced suffering might be thought to be less good; (A) maybe naturally produced suffering is all actually the result of free will choices, or (B) maybe naturally-produced suffering makes certain morally salient free will decisions possible in the first place.

I think we can discount (B) immediately. When God sets up the way the natural universe works, He must preclude the possibility of some free will decisions. If He were simply to add more people, there would be more morally salient free will decisions happening, so it does not appear obvious that God is using natural events to allow for free will choices. Further, the argument Guthrie presents concerning Ivan above does not speak to this criticism of the free will defense; He claims that some logically possible states of affairs are unfeasible to God to bring about, but this is only because of necessarily true propositions that depend upon Ivan's character, which have nothing to do with whether, say, large numbers of animals are in pain because of forest fires.

As for (A), it just seems highly doubtful. God has apparently allowed some being's free will decisions for natural disasters to happen to come to fruition, but allows thousands of other beings' free will decisions to avoid these natural disasters to fail. We have no reason to believe that there exists a being who would be powerful enough to influence the would-be-natural course of events in this way, and it seems rather doubtful that God would choose to create such a being. Again, we face a problem with how much free will God is allowing, where He is allowing it, and from whom He allows it. God could have rearranged the laws of nature slightly to preclude these specific free will decisions more often, the way He has arranged the laws of nature to preclude other, less intense evil free choice situations.

Does God want to bring about L?

At this point, Guthrie relies on the supposition that God is not always concerned with the bringing about of L. To Guthrie, God values all humans' salvation (call this situation "S") over the existence of situation L. Therefore, Guthrie argues, God might have two conflicting desires, one for S and one for L. Not both can be satisfied, so God chooses to try to satisfy His desire for S. But it is not so clear that S and L are incompatible, and it is not obvious that an omnibenevolent being would desire S over L.

To advance the claim that S and L are incompatible is quite an ambitious undertaking. Guthrie must claim, for example, that to arrange the laws of nature so that Jane fails to torture a baby more often than she fails now would prevent the degree to which S comes about. This does not seem at all intuitively plausible; in fact, it seems just as likely that the prevention of the torture would lead more people to salvation. Likely, if the baby were tortured, she would grow up to feel the desire to cause other people to suffer and to feel as if God had abandoned her. I have provided some reason to think that L would not preclude the degree to which S is satisfied, and so it is up to the theist to respond with stronger reasons to think L would indeed prohibit S. Further, the way salvation is described by the Christian, it seems as if God could bring everyone to salvation by His own omnipotent choice; if this is indeed God's paramount desire, as Guthrie argues it is, then He ought not worry about how people come to salvation as long as they do eventually.

Conclusion

I do not think Guthrie has provided an adequate defense against Drange's arguments. His attack on Drange's (1) requires more support, and his attack on (2) requires an implausible description of the connection between situation L and salvation. If God can bring about L, and God wants to bring about L, then, by God's omnipotence, L should have obtained. It has not. I conclude that Drange's argument remains sound and continues to present a serious challenge to believers.

Bill Snedden

Nicely done, Thomas. Although I'm in general agreement with your assessment and arguments, what's to stop a theist from responding to this counterargument:

by arguing that the current state of affairs already represents one in which (E2) fails to obtain slightly more often than it otherwise would? Sort of a "Candide defense", if you will. I don't find it particularly compelling, but there wouldn't seem to be any way of showing that it's not the case. But then, the apologist doesn't have to prove that this is, in fact, the best of all possible worlds, merely argue that it's a possibility.

As you've apparently given this some thought, I'd be interested in knowing how you would respond.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Bill Snedden:

"...what's to stop a theist from responding to this counterargument...by arguing that the current state of affairs already represents one in which (E2) fails to obtain slightly more often than it otherwise would?" (Emphasis original.)

I should have been clearer here in the original post. This world is, by definition, one in which (E2) fails to obtain slightly more often than it does now, not slightly more often than it otherwise would. My counter-argument requires only that the fact that the world could be better if (E2) failed to obtain more often than it does now, rather than that God is already preventing some instances of (E2) obtaining. Does this answer your question? I'm not completely sure I'm reading you correctly.

"But then, the apologist doesn't have to prove that this is, in fact, the best of all possible worlds, merely argue that it's a possibility." (Italics original.)

Contemporary apologists will actually usually shy away from the idea that this is the best of all possible worlds, because it entails a sort of very unpalatable fatalism. If this is always the best of all possible worlds, then anything I do is required for it to be the best. Therefore, I can commit "evil" all I want, because it's making the world better.

The apologist may certainly claim it is possible that this is the best of all possible worlds, but this is rather an ambitious claim, and such a possibility, I think, will not serve as a plausible defeater for the justification inference to "God does not exist."

Steven Carr

Indeed, quite a bit.

Guthrie defines free will as free from causal determinism.

Yet he says Ivan has a free choice between X and not-X, yet he will under all circumstances freely choose one particular way, because his character is such that he will never choose the other way.

If this is not causal determinism, it will do until we find a better example :-)

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Steven Carr:

"Yet he says Ivan has a free choice between X and not-X, yet he will under all circumstances freely choose one particular way, because his character is such that he will never choose the other way."

Right, and this should indeed present a problem. It is not clear how we are supposed to interpret free will. Most libertarians about free will would say there need to be possible worlds in which Ivan chose to take 101, but as Guthrie has defined him, there are no possible worlds in which Ivan chooses to take 101; transworld identity fails to obtain because of the difference in essential properties of Ivan-candidates. And I think we can safely take Guthrie to be a libertarian about free will, because he finds antecedent causes so important. If he's more of a compatibilist about free will, it becomes much easier for God to influence Ivan while still letting him be free.

Now that I think about it, I should have stated these points more clearly in my original post.

Steven Carr

Your post was clear enough!

Guthrie has problems in saying that it is an essential property of Ivan that he will not enroll in Philosophy 101.

Guthrie is falling into the No True Ivan fallacy.

Of course, Guthrie can say that there is an Ivan, who will never enroll for Philosophy 101. If he sees an Ivan who does enrol, then he can just say that in this world, that Ivan was not created.

Transworld identity then becomes a mere tautology.

Steven Carr

Is all that the apologist has to do is prove that it is a possibility?

Many atheists try to argue that human beings have two legs.

The argument goes
1) In a world of one-legged people, we should expect to see fewer legs than we do.

But there is no Problem of Legs.

There is no logical contradiction between the statements
1) I can see that people have two legs
2) People only have one leg

It is possible that I live in a world where I am deluded about how many legs I can see (just as most people in this world are deluded about how many legs a millipede has)

Or, as I have not seen most people, it could logically be that the only people I have seen were wearing a prosthetic leg. (They do exist)

Or, my memories of seeing people with two legs are false, post-hypnotic delusions.

So, as all I need is to show a logical possibility, to refute the Problem of Legs, let us hope that atheists drop this belief that people have two legs.

mattbballman

G'day Thomas,

To aprise you of the current discussion board that was birthed from Guthrie’s article, see <a href="http://66.34.45.14/discus/messages/3/1338.html?TuesdayNovember1920021256pm." target="_blank">http://66.34.45.14/discus/messages/3/1338.html?TuesdayNovember1920021256pm.</a> Someone has started a thread of discussions concerning his interaction with Drange.

Regarding your first response, I perceive the same error many atheologians make in their assessment of the problem of evil. It is assumed that God can feasibly minimize the amount of evil, even if by re-writing the laws of physics, such that Situation L obtains. But this is pure speculation and an improper shifting of the burden of proof. What the atheologian has to prove is how the same good can exist but with lesser evils. Merely citing possible worlds where such a state of affairs is in the logical pool of options serves no warrant for adopting it. This makes the atheologian's position even more stressful because she must now consider all temporal and geographic ramifications about the causal interconnectivity of altering even one circumstance. Such an attack then appears to be inscrutable because the atheologian cannot explain how this alternative world subsists.

Secondly, and even more tenuous, is this idea that Ivan can be made to freely choose Philosophy 101. In his article, Guthrie does explain why it is self-contradictory to suggest that God (or anyone) can make Ivan freely do something. But if the counterargument is more modest (e.g., soft determinism) that Ivan can be heavily influenced to take Philosophy 101 on a given date then the atheologian is once again on the defense. For she must now address how God can guarantee that a free creature will freely do something simply by altering relevant circumstances.

Thirdly, the notion of natural evils is not a problem for this theodicy either. Similar to his remarks about moral evil, such natural evils are contingently necessary to bring about the state of affairs of this actual world. Perhaps God desires that this particular world come about so that we should expect that certain natural evils would ensue to promote a greater good. And this is not idle speculation. Think of earthquakes for example. Although earthquakes cause great harm to many people, they are naturally necessary in that continental plate tectonics continue to work to avoid having the land masses erode into the ocean -- an even greater harm. For the theist, this solution merely needs to be possible and does not even have to be true. And so long as this is possible, the atheologian cannot appeal to such evils as gratuitous without committing the same inscrutability error evinced in your first response. It is now incumbent upon the atheologian to suggest how God can still promote the non-erosion of land masses but retain the same amount of good in the universe. In the end, your objection makes the same speculative plea: God could have reduced the natural evils whilest salvaging free will and the present amount of good. So once again the burden of proof is improperly shifted. Professor of philosophy William Alston comments: "The judgments required by the [probabilistic] argument from evil are of a very special and enormously ambitious type and our cognitive capacities are not equal to this . . . We are simply not in a position to justifiably assert that God would have no sufficient reason for permitting evil" (William Alston, "The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition," in Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy, of Religion, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview Publishing, 1991), pp. 65, 61).

Finally, does God want to bring about Situation L? I find your response interesting because no one is suggesting that Situation L and Situation S (representing the incommensurate good of salvation) are incompatible -- this is a restatement of the possible worlds scenario Guthrie enunciated in his essay. What the atheologian has to prove, to make the argument from evil effective, is to explain (or argue) how the reduced amount of evil in Situation L can still lead to the same amount of salvation recipients that exist in the actual world. And I can't imagine how anyone can do this!

In the end, pure speculation about how possible worlds make Situation L tenable in no wise explains how God can feasibly make such a possible world. If it is possible that Ivan will not, under any circumstances, freely choose to enroll in Philosophy 101 then it is vacuously true and irrelevant to suggest that in some possible world he could do so. The theodicy envisaged in his essay entails the truth of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, an element not debunked by these four objections.

matt

[ December 14, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]

[ December 14, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"Merely citing possible worlds where such a state of affairs is in the logical pool of options serves no warrant for adopting it."

Why not? God's power is limited by logical possibility, not by physical or nomological possibility. You assume a burden of proof by asserting that some state of affairs is logically impossible if it's not explicitly contradictory, and for God to prevent (E2) sometimes is not explicitly contradictory. I don't really see how your response has engaged my first point at all.

"Secondly, and even more tenuous, is this idea that Ivan can be made to freely choose Philosophy 101."

I claimed nothing of the sort in my response. Again, I'm not sure how your response here engages my original point. I claimed that God should have chosen a different person than Ivan to populate His world. This being would be like Ivan except that he would choose evil less often. If free choice is merely a matter of choosing something one's character allows one to choose, as it is with Ivan, then God has an obvious way to produce L.

"In the end, your objection makes the same speculative plea: God could have reduced the natural evils whilest salvaging free will and the present amount of good."

I argued specifically to this point in my original post (the second paragraph of this point), and I do not see how you have engaged it. You say, "Although earthquakes cause great harm to many people, they are naturally necessary..." but no one thinks God is constrained by natural necessity, only logical necessity. It is intuitively obvious to no one that humans' free will logically depends upon the degree of natural evil in the world, and therefore you assume a burden of proof if you make that claim.

"'We are simply not in a position to justifiably assert that God would have no sufficient reason for permitting evil...'"

Alston does not speak to the most convincing forms of the argument from suffering. The atheist need only say that some of the evil in the world is probably actually gratuitous. All the theist can offer as an attempted defeater for the justification inference is, "Maybe God exists," and I do not think anyone would view that as sufficient to be a defeater. "Probably God exists" would work, but I believe most theists and atheists agree that the apologist is nowhere near confirming that statement. Even if "Maybe God exists" were a defeater, it is not clear why it wouldn't be a defeater for a great many other justification inferences.

"What the atheologian has to prove, to make the argument from evil effective, is to explain (or argue) how the reduced amount of evil in Situation L can still lead to the same amount of salvation recipients that exist in the actual world."

Again, you seem to have a rather dim view of God's power. No one thinks L has to lead to S, only that L has to be compatible with S. L and S are not explicitly contradictory, so the burden of proof is yours to show that they are implicitly contradictory. Again, this should be intuitively obvious to no one.

I perceive no intuitive plausibility whatsoever to the thesis that all of the natural evil in the world is necessary for free will to obtain or for salvation to obtain; sure, this is possible, but I'd hope the apologist could offer more than that. If you ask me to explain how L would still allow for S, I must simply reply: Why wouldn't it? I just don't see the necessary, logical connection between S and L.

You also failed to answer my point about how it seems just as likely that L would lead to a greater expression of S, and that God, omnipotent, could bring about S and L together.

The "feasibility" relation seems to require the fact that some states of affairs are logically possible but not possible to be brought about. But it is certainly not the case that God can do anything "feasibly" possible -- this is not a useful description. God can do anything logically possible, and you seem to see a lot of logical impossibility where it must be most subtle.

[ December 13, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>

mattbballman

Dear Mr. Metcaf,
First, there is this faulty presupposition that is neither warranted explicitly nor tacitly. This assumption is that anything that is broadly logically possible is narrowly logically possible for God. The problem is that it fails to account for the feasibility of compossible states of affairs including "under no circumstances will Ivan freely enroll in Phi 101" and "it is possible that Ivan freely enroll in Phi 101." That it is logically possible does not make it feasible for God because of the possible stubborness of free will. So when certain possibilities are conjoined with others, contradictions can occur that make it infeasible for such a world to come about. This is why Drange's objections fail.
Secondly, I understand that instead of creating Ivan that God should create Ivan*. However, how does one address the consequences of replacing Ivan with Ivan*? Moreover, it still does not address how God can guarantee that Ivan* will not also fail to freely enroll at the appointed date. Maybe the newly fashioned Ivan* himself falls prey to the counterfactuals of his existence thereby making Ivan* freely reject Phi 101 at every turn.
Thirdly, the point of the earthquake analogy was to demonstrate how evils can retain greater goods whether known by us or not. The theist contends that God is sovereign over all space as well as time. What guarantee does the atheologian have that by re-writing the laws of physics or perturbing harmful results from the given natural laws maintains the same amount of good that currently exists?
Fourthly, the existence of God is surely a potential defeater to gratuitous evil. In fact, the atheist wants to maintain:
(1) If God exists then gratuitous evils do not exist.
(2) Gratuitous evils do exist (modus tollens).
(3) Therefore, God does not exist.
But the theist can be content with the first premise and likewise argue:
(1) If God exists then gratuitous evils do not exist.
(2*) God exists (modus ponens).
(3*) Therefore, gratuitous evils do not exist.
So you hit the nail on the head when you suggest that the real issue with respect to gratuitous evil is whether or not God exists.
Finally, your response to this issue of Situation L and Situation S being a possible world is a straw man of my critique. I had hoped that it was clear that Situation L and Situation S are logically possible worlds. But, much like the first objection, it fails to account for their compossibility. Consider an additional possible situation:
(a) Most people freely come to salvation via immense suffering and evil in the world.
If (a) is possibly true (and present demographics given by missiologists indicate that it is by and large true), then what guarantee do we have to think that (a) is feasible in Situation L? It is not clear to me that the two can both be actualized by God without trumping free will.
And I must say that shifting the burden of proof back to the theist is certainly unwarranted. The atheist wants to maintain, not the mere logical possibility of creating any possible world (as theists admit), but the feasibility of God creating compossible states of affairs. The theist has nothing to defend here until it can be shown how God can guarantee Situation S when conjoined with Situation L in the face of additional factors such as (a).

matt