student739

In the absence of sufficient evidence to justify the belief that action A taken by agent X is fully determined and brought about by the state of the world immediately prior to the undertaking of A by X, concerning A we ought to take the position consistent with the statement, "We do not believe and are not justified in believing that action A was fully determined and brought about by the state of the world immediately prior to the undertaking of A by X."

In the case that A is an action described by the statement, "X exerts himself so as to raise his hand," what will constitute sufficient evidence to justify the belief that A is fully determined and brought about by the state of the world immediately prior to the undertaking of A by X?

It seems that all sides will agree that in a 'normal' case of A being undertaken by X, we are not justified in believing that causes external to X fully determine and bring about A being undertaken by X.

It seems further then that if we are to discover sufficient evidence to justify the belief that A is fully determined and brought about by the state of the world immediately prior to A being undertaken by X, that we must look additionally 'inside of' X.

There appear potentially to be two states of affairs, should either obtain, then and (perhaps) only then there is demonstrated to be sufficient evidence to justify this belief concerning A (answering the question of what will constitute sufficient evidence to justify this belief concerning A):
1) It has been demonstrated to a sufficient degree of certainty by study of sufficient number of events of sufficient distinct sorts internal to X that there are present no events which are uncaused such that X performing A potentially consists in any such events.
2) It has been demonstrated to a sufficient degree of certainty that internal to X there are present sufficient causes to fully determine and bring about the undertaking of A by X.

[mixed up an A and an X, oops]

student739

student739

I apologize for not indicating where I had intended to go with this.

Do you find both (1) and (2) to constitute sufficient evidence to justify the suggested belief concerning A?

I am somewhat concerned about (1) in so far as certain philosophers of action may say that in the case that A is an instance of irreducible agent causation, that A being undertaken by X is not an event at all, and therefore (1) is not a sufficient demonstration.

Additionally, has either (1) or (2) already been demonstrated to be the case?

[switched an A with a (1), sorry]

student739

John Page

Suggestion:

1. There are no absolute truths, only belief (even this one, for I could be wrong).
2. We may, however, using scientific and other methods, place a degree of certainty upon our beliefs.
3. That many phenomena are discovered to have places in causal chains is, some believe, sufficient evidence to justify that everything is determined in some way by other things.
4. For free will to exist, it can be argued that the will must be some kind of uncaused thing. If you choose () to believe this, you are subscribing to a belief that your belief is random - in which case there is no will to exert itself.

Hence, what X believes and whether X necessarily causes A are different things. We can take up belief based on the balance of evidence - this would seem to be more satisfactory from an evolutionary sense. Beliefs that accord with the nature of reality better enable survival in reality.

Cheers, John

student739

I am somewhat confused by your reply so far as what if anything of what I have stated you disagree with. I will reply to each statement so that we may be certain of what the other is suggesting.

John Page said, "1. There are no absolute truths, only belief (even this one, for I could be wrong)."

I did not mean to suggest otherwise, and I am not sure why, if you were, you were lead to think otherwise. I am raising an issue of "justified belief".

"2. We may, however, using scientific and other methods, place a degree of certainty upon our beliefs."

Yes, of course. This is the process of coming to hold justified beliefs.

"3. That many phenomena are discovered to have places in causal chains is, some believe, sufficient evidence to justify that everything is determined in some way by other things."

Yes, let's discuss this. Let's identify as precisely as we are able, what will constitute a sufficient amount of phenomena of sufficiently various sorts identified as participating in casual chains, in order to conclude that we would be justified in holding the belief that all human actions are, as I said before, fully determined and brought about by the state of the world immediately prior to their being undertaken. We need not be concerned with whether "everything is determined", rather only with whether all human actions are.

"4. For free will to exist, it can be argued that the will must be some kind of uncaused thing. If you choose () to believe this, you are subscribing to a belief that your belief is random - in which case there is no will to exert itself."

I am not concerned here with advancing the notion of libertarian free will as a means of solving particular problems having to do with moral responsibility. Certainly our method would be faulty if we reach a conclusion concerning the nature of human actions solely from a pre-existing belief about the nature of moral responsibility.

This is simply a matter of determining whether or not we are justified in believing a particular claim - only one claim, and it is not what you may have read me as suggesting. Even if we should conclude that we are not justified in believing of all human actions that they are fully determined and brought about by the state of the world prior to their being undertaken, we will clearly NOT in virtue of this alone be justified in believing that instead they are not so.

"Hence, what X believes and whether X necessarily causes A are different things. We can take up belief based on the balance of evidence - this would seem to be more satisfactory from an evolutionary sense. Beliefs that accord with the nature of reality better enable survival in reality. "

Yes, let us do this, but also let us be careful not take a belief to be also a justified belief if it is not appropriate to do so.

student739

John Page

Studentia:

My italicisation in the above.

Yes, but what is sufficient and what is justified and under what circumstances it is appropriate was the topic I was addressing. Conclusion - we can make educated predictions.

Your example of A being determined by X's actions is not contrary to the notion that X is able (by means of analyzing the previous behavior of its environment) to predict that A will happen if X acts in a particular way. This does not mean that A will always happen if X acts in that particular way - there may be some higher order disruption of the predicted causal chain such as a volcanic eruption or a malfunction in the thought processes of X such as a brain tumor.

Does this address your points?

Cheers, John

El_Hober

:banghead: :banghead: :banghead: :banghead: :banghead:
this idea is really quite simple, don't dress it up with big words and lots of inane lawyer-speak. Instead, read my thread about it here

at least that's what i think you were saying in that mess