Jamie_L

The abortion thread lead me to thinking of issues relating to unused fertilized eggs from invitro-fertilization (IVF) procedures. Certain stances on the abortion debate have interesting implications for the morality and legality of certain aspects of IVF.

Most IVF procedures involve a shot-gun approach to fertilization - fertilize a lot of eggs and implant several into the mother in hopes that one or more will successfully "take". As I understand it, the process often leaves extra fertilized embryos that remain frozen for potential future use.

If the parents successfully get the number of children they desire, is it morally acceptible to destroy the remaining embryos? Should it be legally acceptible? If the stance is taken that a fetus is a life deserving substantial rights as soon as it is created in the mother (the typical pro-life stance), does this apply to IVF embryos as well? If abortion were illegal, would the parents creating IVF embryos have the same obligation to make sure all the embryos get carried to term in the same way that they would be obligated to do so if they had created a fetus through normal sexual intercourse?

Obviously, this is most thorny when taking a pro-life stance. Supporters of abortion rights have an easier time dealing with this issue. I would be interested in hearing responses from those who oppose abortion even at early stages of pregnancy.

Jamie

Danya

This is something I have been thinking about as well. I posted this in the abortion thread.

I would very much like to hear what others think about this issue and why it is treated so differently than abortion.

Viti

I too would like to hear from the pro-life camp on this issue, so this is a bump.

Danya

I would like to hear anyone's views on this. I'll bump it once more before I give up.

luvluv

Well, I actually did not know they made more than one embryo until the whole stem cell thing came up. I guess a lot of pro-life people are the same in that regard. Most of them, I would guess, are ignorant of the fact.

I've also heard the argument that the life created isn't life if it isn't in a viable environment, i.e. the mother's womb.

Danya

Well, I actually did not know they made more than one embryo until the whole stem cell thing came up. I guess a lot of pro-life people are the same in that regard.

It did not occur to me until then either. I wonder if any of the pro-lifers who have sought these treatments saw the hypocrisy of going through with them and applied their morals to themselves once they found out.


Most of them, I would guess, are ignorant of the fact.

If they did not pay any attention to the recent stem cell controversy this is a possiblity.

I've also heard the argument that the life created isn't life if it isn't in a viable environment, i.e. the mother's womb.

That would be convenient but how do they come to that conclusion?

And If that were the case there would have been no argument for their use in stem-cell research. Nor would there be a problem creating embryos strictly for that purpose.

bd-from-kg

Jamie_L:

You raise a fair question:

As you say, this is really only a problem for pro-lifers, and in particular those who believe that the conceptus is entitled to legal protection from conception. The answer isn’t obvious; in fact, pro-lifers disagree on this point.

Before giving my own answer, I should mention for the sake of full disclosure that this is not a completely abstract question for me, since some good friends have resorted to this procedure. So my own opinion may be more of a rationalization than an objective conclusion.

Anyway, a good place to start is with luvluv’s comment:

This is pretty garbled, but the person she (?) heard this from probably had the same idea that I have. Of course an embryo (or an unfertilized egg for that matter) is “life” and even “human life”. And a fertilized egg is more than just ”human life”; it’s a human being. But is it entitled to legal protection? That is, is it a “person”?

To shed some light on this, let’s consider a conceptus with a fatal genetic defect such that it will inevitably die before the end of the second week. Is it a human being? Yes. Is it a person? IMO, no.

Why? Well, in the old <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=14&t=000370&p=5" target="_blank"> 12-week-old fetus</a> thread I argued that anyone who will naturally and foreseeably become capable of cognition is a “person” – i.e., is entitled to legal protection. To make this as clear as possible: by “foreseeable” I mean only that it can be foreseen as a “reasonable” possibility; i.e., the individual has a “fighting chance” to become capable of cognition. And by “naturally” I mean that it will happen in the normal course of events” – i.e., unless someone intervenes to prevent it.

This is not intended to exclude everyone who will never be capable of cognition; it is a sufficient condition but not a strictly necessary one. Individuals who fail to meet it are given legal protection in some cases. But these exceptions are made for the sake of others who do meet the criterion. On the other hand, no one who meets this criterion is denied legal protection, except for the unborn.

Now it is clear that the conceptus with a fatal genetic defect does not meet this criterion: it is not reasonably foreseeable that it will become capable of cognition. And an embryo in a test tube also doesn’t meet it: it is not going to become capable of cognition unless extraordinary measures are taken.

As to whether this is an appropriate criterion for “personhood”, this is a long argument. At this point I can only refer you to the “12-week-old fetus” thread cited earlier.

Another closely related argument is that, while it is immoral to interfere with a process that will eventually transform somone capable of cognition into someone who actually has cognitive function, we are not obligated to initiate such a process – i.e., to create the conditions in which it might foreseeably occur. This is essentially the same principle by which we are obligated not to kill someone, but are not usually obligated (at least legally) to take positive action to keep someone from being killed. There’s a fundamental difference between causing something to happen and choosing not to prevent it from happening. Again, this principle would seem to permit allowing “test-tube embryos” to die even if one believes that it is immoral to take active steps to kill a conceptus developing naturally in its mother’s womb. Similarly, while most of us would consider it immoral to kill someone in a coma who is expected to recover, that doesn’t mean that one is obligated to perform an operation without which he will never recover consciousness.

Here’s another example which may shed some light on the question. Suppose that a conceptus has no genetic defect, but happens to be incompatible with its mother – that is, if it remains in her womb it will die. Are we obligated (assuming the necessary technology has been developed) to remove it from its mother’s womb and transfer it to someone else? I would say “no”. But if were true that we were obligated to take whatever positive measures might be necessary to keep such a fetus alive on the grounds that it’s a “person” we would be obligated to do this.

One more consideration: it may soon be possible to “clone” individuals from a single cell. At that point every cell in your body will be a “potential human being”. Will we then be obligated to take whatever measures are needed to turn each of these cells into a fully developed human being? The suggestion is ridiculous. This sort of thing is why the “naturally and foreseeably” clause has to be part of the criterion for personhood. But this is the clause that excludes test-tube embryos from being considered “persons”.

This should be enough, I hope, to show that it’s reasonable to be pro-life but to have no objection to IVF procedures. But I would certainly not argue that it’s unreasonable for a pro-life person to oppose them either. Among other things, while a test-tube embryo does not meet my “sufficient but not necessary” condition for personhood, that still leaves the door open for the possibility that it qualifies for personhood on some other grounds. And of course, not all pro-lifers agree with the criterion for personhood that I’ve proposed here. The most that I would be willing to say is that I see no clear reason to oppose IVF procedures, and in the absence of any such reason I would not think of interfering with other people’s freedom by forbidding them.

simian

This is not what I understand of the anti-choicers. The press I read seemed to have the anti-choicers portraying IVF as a source of stem cells as murder. If you are aware of any significant anti-choice groups that think IVF fertilization is not the creation of a new "soul", I would like to see some evidence.

Simian

Jamie_L

bd-from-kg:

Thanks for the response. Even though we are in disagreement on some points about personhood, etc., your position makes sense.

I do have an observation that is probably not relevant to the legal discussion:

Your position creates an interesting situation in which it is acceptable to destroy embrios willfully created during IVF, but not acceptable to destroy an embrio that someone may have had no intention to create through sexual intercourse.

Furthermore, it is acceptable for the "mother" to destroy the embrios when the embrio's life has no impact on hers, but it is unacceptable for her to do the same when the embrio will have a dramatic impact on her life and body.

Like I said, these observations don't negate your argument, but I find it an odd situation.

Jamie

Viti

bd-from-kg, thank you for that thoughtful post, however I believe it is still in issue based on debates with pro-lifers in the past.

According to some anti-abortion advocates, conception is a consequence of sex even if it was not the intention. They have stated that abortion should not be allowed for "accidental" pregnancies based on the decision to have sex knowing that pregnancy was a possibility. In the case of IVF, the embryos were purposely created... to remain consistent shouldn't there be an obligation to nurture them?