Alonzo Fyfe

Okay, I know that you are not going to read this because it is too long. Yet, handling the issue is scattered pieces has proved frustrating.

The best way to prove the objectivity of value is to get down to it and prove the objectivity of value.

In the end, I illustrate my points by arguing against the thesis that life is the only true value.

One final note: many talk of "objective value" when they really mean "intrinsic (absolute) value." If you are not clear on this distinction, you will find the essay confusing. Value, as an intrinsic property, does not exist. Yet value, as a relational property, is an objectively knowable part of the real world.


To understand value, we must start with propositional attitudes, of which there are two basic types, beliefs and desires.

These are called "propositional attitudes" because they describe a mental attitude to a proposition. Take, for example, the phrase, P believes that X. X is a proposition -- a sentence, capable of being true or false. P's belief is a mental attitude toward X, that X is true. For example, if P believes that snow is white then P has a mental attitude that the proposition "snow is white" is true.

Desires work in a similar way. Where P desires that X, P has a particular attitude towards X, namely the attitude that X should be true. The word "desire" here stands for all affective states; hate, fear, love, loath, like, dislike.

Beliefs are motivationally innert -- they simply represent data storage in the brain. All motivation springs from desires. Effectively, the motive is to make it the case that X is (or remains) true -- the strength of the motive being determined by the strength of the desire.

If P desires that he have steak for supper than P has the mental attitude that "I have have steak for supper" become (or remain) true and is motivated to make it true proportional to the strength of the desire.

If it is true of P that he desires that X, then it is true of X that it is desired by P. Another way of saying this same thing is that, if P values X, then X has value for P.

And since "P desires that X" is itself a statement that is testable -- objectively knowable and scientifically verifiable, "X is desired by P" is also objectively knowable and scientifically verifiable.

Values, then, are objectively knowable, scientifically verifiable facts. Yes, they are objectively knowable facts about relationships between states of affairs and (subjective) states of mind -- desires. But they are still objectively true or false, facts about and within the world.

Note that values are independent of beliefs. What a person believes the value of something to be is independent of the value that it has in fact. A person may believe that a certain action is pleasing to God, and value it for that reason, but if there is no God then the person's belief about the value of that action are false.

Every true value claim, then, describes three elements. (1) A person or group of people P having a particular set of desires, (2) A state of affairs referred to by a proposition X, (3) A relationship between the person and the proposition. (All claims that introduce God or intrinsic values into the mix are false, because neither God nor intrinsic values exist.)

Everything said here can be said of negative values (aversions) with the appropriate changes.

Just as there is no limit to the propositions that can be the object of a belief (people can believe just about anything), there seems to be no limit to the propositions that can be the object of a desire.

There are two main types of value -- end value and value as a means. Things valued as a means are valued because of the things that they can bring about. Money, generally, is a univeral means. Life, also, has value as a means. Other things are valued independent of their consequences. Eating, sex, laughter, are all desired as an end in themselves -- even in the face of adverse consequences.

When we speak about the value of X, we may be speaking either about its instrumental value (use as a tool), or its value as an end, or both. X's total value is the sum of its value as a means and an end. Even here, we can talk about X's total value for P, or X's total value for a collection of people, C. In all cases, X's total value is an objectively knowable, scientifically verifiable fact given the desires held within a community.

It makes sense to refer to these as relational values. But relational properties are still objective. Location provides a great example of this. You cannot describe the location of anything except by reference to something else. The keys are on the table, New York is roughly north of Washington DC. But these relational properties are still objective, and still an appropriate subject of scientific investigation. Indeed, science would be lost without them. Accordingly, the inability to describe the value of anything except as it stands in relationship to other things (desires) does not subtract in the least from its position as an objectively knowable fact.

The Scotish philosopher David Hume once argued that there is a gap between fact and values -- and since then the existence of such a gap has been taken as near to law. Yet, there is a problem with this thesis. If there is such a gap, then how do values affect actions? How does it cause a person to speak the truth, or to repay a debt, or to save a life? Either there exists a bridge across the fact-value chasm, or values are some strange sort of substance whose existence can be reasonably doubted. In other words, values either exist in the world facts, or values have as little real-world relevance as Santa Clause and the Easter Bunny.

And if we do decide to hold true to this fact-value, I see no option but to dismiss all talk of value as irrelevant in the real world. Yet, we are still left with the relationships between states of affairs and desires described above. Whatever we decide to call them -- if we were to use the word "relpoints" instead of "value" -- we would soon discover that "relpoints" covers almost everything we used to say about "value" -- except "relpoints" refer to something real.

There are no intrinsic values -- therefore there is no proposition X that has an intrinsic "ought-to-be-desiredness" built into it. If P desires that X and Q desires that not-X (has an aversion to X), there is no fact of the matter that will determine that P's desire is "more true" than Q's (and vica versa). Yet, this does not imply that all desires are equal.

Remember, X describes a proposition, and the total value of X is determined by its value as an end and its value as a means to bringing about other ends. Now, note that "P desires that X" is also a proposition -- let is call this X(1). X(1) also has value. It may be valued end in itself, and it certainly has value as a means to bringing about other ends (through the actions that X(1) causes). Desires that tend to fulfill other desires are good; desires that tend to thwart other desires are bad.

People who have desires such that, in fulfilling them, tend to thwart the desires of others may be called evil. People whose desires are such that, in fulfilling them, they tend to fulfill the desires of others are good.


Now, I would like to look at the proposal that life is the only true value.

Translating this into the account described above, this states that X is life or -- more precisely (because X must be a proposition), X is "P is alive." To say that life is the only true value means that the only value-proposition that, for every P, P desires that P is alive and P desires nothing else. Everything else in the world has value for P only to the degree that these things contribute to making it the case that "P is alive" is or remains true.

As a descriptive theory, this is obviously not true. The fact that people intentionally do things that they know risks or shortens their life proves that people are motivated by ends other than the preservation of their own life.

Of course, life-theorists do not hold that life is the only thing that is valued. They hold that it is the only thing that ought to be valued. The trick is in making sense of this "ought."

I have stated above, there are no intrinsic values -- no built-in "ought to be valuedness" intrinsic to the state of affairs "P is alive." Occam's Razor gives us the only tool we need to cut this oddity out of our ontological network.

So, what argument can be given for the proposition that life is the only true value? The argument most commonly used is that life has value as a universal means. Whatever one does desire, being alive is the only way to obtain that desire. Thus, reason dictates that we value life above all else.

But this argument is built on a false premise. It says that for all possible X, where P desires that X , "P is alive" has instrumental value. But this is not true, for example, where P desires that he not be in great pain, "P is dead" may have far more instrumental value than "P is alive." If P desires that his children (and their children) live in a land of freedom and opportunity, P's desires are those that may well require putting his life at risk as a soldier in war.

It is true, in the vast majority of cases for any given individual P, that "P is alive" has more instrumental value than "P is dead". Thus it is true that it us usually more rational for a person to act so as to make sure the proposition "P is alive" remain true if not for its own sake, then for the instrumental value of "P is alive." But there is no rational argument to be made that the instrumental value of "P is alive" is ever any more or less than the instrumental value of "P is alive," or that "P is alive" hold any sort of special position in an ethical system.

And that is an objective value-fact.

[ April 14, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Pomp

Alonzo Fyfe,

Okay, I know that you are not going to read this because it is too long.

Liar. I read every damned word of it. Nice post.

tronvillain

Yes, quite a good post. As a proponent of subjective morality I have absolutely no problem with it, except:
From the perspective of those people whose desires are fulfilled or thwarted obviously, whether directly or indirectly.

[ April 14, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

It depends on what you mean by "from the perspective". A person can objectively know about a relational property without being one of the relatants. The statement "the keys are on the table" makes sense, even if I do not happen to be either the keys or the table. It is still objectively true. And whether or not a desire fulfills or thwarts the desires of others remains objectively true, whether you or I happen to be the person whose desires are being thwarted, or the person doing the thwarting.

tronvillain

My point is that if someone's desires are not thwarted by a given person, they will have little reason to call that person "evil" though they may thwart the desires of another person. Of course, most people's desires involve the fulfillment of the desire's of others to some degree, so most people will often call such a person "evil" or at least consider their actions wrong.