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Old 06-12-2003, 01:28 PM   #11
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Originally posted by Jamie_L :

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It is not possible God wants suffering for another reason. Because God could effect that "other reason" through will alone. The only reason to involve suffering would be a desire to involve suffering.
I thought as much until recently. But consider this state of affairs:

Someone makes a free will decision for some evil to come about, and the free will decision succeeds.

If humans' freedom is super important, as theists think it is for some reason, then God could absolutely not allow that state of affairs without allowing some suffering. God doesn't want the suffering itself; God wants the free choice to come about.

Of course, it's highly dubious that it really is an outweighing good for all that freedom to occur, but I have to admit that God could allow suffering without desiring suffering.

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While (D) is making a claim that, if true, would result in the way the world actually is, (D*) is making a claim that, if true, would result in the world being different than it is. Thus, while they may be logically equivalent, (D*) is observably false. God does not prevent more suffering than exists now. Thus, it seems that there is good reason to say it has very little argumentative weight.
All (D*) asserts is that God has (or would have) some extra reasons for reducing suffering. It gives us extra reason to believe that there would be less suffering than there is now, if God existed. So it just strengthens the conclusion that God does not exist, because it strengthens the conclusion that there is too much evil. (If (D) and (D*) are cogent. I tend to think neither is.)

It's not the case that if (D*) were true, there would be less suffering than there is now. Rather, if (D*) were true, then either there would be less suffering than there is now, or God would not exist. By disjunctive syllogism, we can confirm the second disjunct.
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Old 06-12-2003, 01:41 PM   #12
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Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf



Someone makes a free will decision for some evil to come about, and the free will decision succeeds.

If humans' freedom is super important, as theists think it is for some reason, then God could absolutely not allow that state of affairs without allowing some suffering. God doesn't want the suffering itself; God wants the free choice to come about.

Of course, it's highly dubious that it really is an outweighing good for all that freedom to occur, but I have to admit that God could allow suffering without desiring suffering.
It is probably a crime in many states to allow somebody to commit evil acts when you can prevent them.

Is God a criminal, according to the American legal system?

I am not a lawyer, so I don't know.
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Old 06-12-2003, 01:51 PM   #13
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Default Re: On the Unknown Purpose Defense

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Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf
I've been thinking about what may be a new approach to dealing with skeptical theism (a.k.a. "agnostic theism" a.k.a. the Unknown Purpose Defense a.k.a. the Human Cognitive Limitations Defense). (See Wykstra, Alston, and van Inwagen.) This and Plantinga's "outweigh with warrant" defenses seem to me to be the only two defenses against the evidential argument from evil worth anything. I'd also like to know if any authors have already propounded something similar.

The possibilist UPD claims that it's possible for God to have a purpose for all the suffering in the world, and claims, further, that this possibility is enough to reject the inference from inscrutable evil to pointless evil. (We make similar inferences all the time. There seems to be no point to some of the suffering in the world, so we conclude there isn't, the way there seems to be no magical elves living in the building, so we conclude there aren't any.) Let us call this defense (D). And let us suppose that (D) provides 100 units of argumentative weight. I'll call the units of argumentative weight "russells."

Now consider another position, which I'll call (D*). (D*) claims that it's possible that God has an extra reason for preventing suffering beyond the obvious one, and claims, further, that this possibility provides good reason to think God will prevent suffering beyond what he normally would. It seems to me that we have no principled reason for deciding (D) provides 100 russells, but (D*) provides fewer than 100 russells. Each identifies a possibility and suggests that the mere possibility is enough to sway one's assessment of an inference. Well, why not rate the two equally?

If I'm right, this completely neutralizes the version of UPD I'm considering. I think the best thing to say is that a mere possibility provides no argumentative weight for or against the evidential argument from evil.
I think I'll jump in here, even if I'm not responding directly to your point.
The entire PoE argument for the non-existence of God fails at all points.
1. There is no "evil" in a materialistic world. Sickness, natural disasters are merely aspects of materiality and have no moral significance. Evil becomes a preferential response to circumstance.

2. The argument from evil, i.e., "if there is a God, there would be no evil," is a mere tautology: "if I define the existence of God as contingent on the absence of evil, the presence of evil means that God cannot exist according to my definition."

3. The argument from evil as contradicting God's character is, again, a begging of the question similar to 2.

4. The argument from "lack of explanation," is an argument from ignorance, i.e., "I don't understand why God would permit evil, therefore God must not exist."

Athieists must first assume that the nature of human experience is, in fact, as God, through his revelation, has declared it to be in order to use the PoE as an argument against God and, thereby undermine their own argument.

The purpose of the argument from evil, as all atheistic arguments, is to justify unbelief in the God who cannot be denied.
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Old 06-12-2003, 02:06 PM   #14
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Default Re: Re: On the Unknown Purpose Defense

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Originally posted by theophilus
[B]I think I'll jump in here, even if I'm not responding directly to your point.
The entire PoE argument for the non-existence of God fails at all points.
1. There is no "evil" in a materialistic world. Sickness, natural disasters are merely aspects of materiality and have no moral significance. Evil becomes a preferential response to circumstance.
Is there any humour in a materialistic world? Did God invent 'Knock knock' jokes? Did God create evil?

Please prove there is no evil in a materialistic world.

As it happens, very many theists claim there is no evil in a world created by God. They claim that evil is simply an 'abscence of goodness'.

http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/phi...327/lec21.html

'Theists should reject the question, ``Why did God create evil?'' God didn't create evil, because evil is not a positive existence in its own right. Evil consists simply in the absence of a particular good. This is the so-called privative theory of evil.'

So theists deny evil exists and then lambast materialists for being unable to explain how evil exists.....



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2. The argument from evil, i.e., "if there is a God, there would be no evil," is a mere tautology: "if I define the existence of God as contingent on the absence of evil, the presence of evil means that God cannot exist according to my definition."
Are you saying tautologies are not true? It is a strange refutation to say that your opponents arguments are logically unchallengable?
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Old 06-12-2003, 02:11 PM   #15
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Thumbs down Ho-hum...another god-bot response...

Quote:
Originally posted by theophilus
I think I'll jump in here, even if I'm not responding directly to your point.


If you have nothing material to contribute, the polite thing to do is simply to ignore the thread.

As to what you did say:

#1 betrays an appalling ignorance of moral philosophy.

#2 is simply nonsense as even theists (the rational ones, anyway) recognize the issue posed by the PoE.

#3 is similarly non-sensical.

#4 is essentially what Taffy said.

The rest is just more of the same for which you've become well known around here...

Regards,

Bill Snedden
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Old 06-12-2003, 02:15 PM   #16
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Default Re: On the Unknown Purpose Defense

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Originally posted by Thomas Metcalf
It seems to me that we have no principled reason for deciding (D) provides 100 russells, but (D*) provides fewer than 100 russells. Each identifies a possibility and suggests that the mere possibility is enough to sway one's assessment of an inference. Well, why not rate the two equally.
Thomas,

That is a supurb formulation. I expect to employ something like it in my future conversations.

Thanks for the excellent post.
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Old 06-12-2003, 02:23 PM   #17
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Default Re: Re: On the Unknown Purpose Defense

Originally posted by theophilus :

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1. There is no "evil" in a materialistic world. Sickness, natural disasters are merely aspects of materiality and have no moral significance. Evil becomes a preferential response to circumstance.
You seem to be unfamiliar with roughly the past five decades of philosophy of religion. All professional apologists accept that "evil" can stand in for intense suffering and premature death. So this response will get you nowhere.

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2. The argument from evil, i.e., "if there is a God, there would be no evil," is a mere tautology: "if I define the existence of God as contingent on the absence of evil, the presence of evil means that God cannot exist according to my definition."
No one thinks the argument from evil is "If God exists, evil does not exist." You're attacking a straw person. The evidential argument from evil is summarizable as any of, but not limited to:

(A) If God existed, there would probably be less evil. (Drange.)
(B) Some evil is probably gratuitous, and God's existence is inconsistent with gratuitous evil. (Rowe.)
(C) The facts of the roles of pain and pleasure in the universe are more surprising on the hypothesis of God than they are on a nontheistic hypothesis. (Draper.)

These three are (relative) "giants" in the field of atheology, and it would be almost inexcusable that you would not be familiar with their work, if you had done any research into the subject.

There is also a logical argument from evil that avoids Plantinga's celebrated Free Will Defense (see The Nature of Necessity). See David O'Connor, God and Inscrutable Evil: A Defense of Theism and Atheism.

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3. The argument from evil as contradicting God's character is, again, a begging of the question similar to 2.
How is 2 question begging? What do you mean by "the argument from evil as contradicting God's character"? Is that different from the well-known arguments from evil?

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4. The argument from "lack of explanation," is an argument from ignorance, i.e., "I don't understand why God would permit evil, therefore God must not exist."
Another straw person. Again, I suggest you do some research. The inference in question is closer to, "No one can think of why God would permit evil, and God would have good reasons to tell us why evil exists if he existed, so some evil probably is gratuitous."

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Athieists must first assume that the nature of human experience is, in fact, as God, through his revelation, has declared it to be in order to use the PoE as an argument against God and, thereby undermine their own argument.
Affirming the Consequent fallacy: If God then the nature of human experience is the way God has (would have) described it; the nature of human experience is the way God has (would have) described it; therefore, God. This is a well-known logical fallacy that all beginning philosophy students are taught to avoid. Once again, I urge you to do some research into the topic.

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The purpose of the argument from evil, as all atheistic arguments, is to justify unbelief in the God who cannot be denied.
The way you describe it makes it seem as if there is some evidence for the existence of this being, but atheists and plenty of apologists seem to agree that there isn't.

Here's an argument from evil for you:

(1) If God exists, then gratuitous evil does not exist.
(2) Gratuitous evil probably exists.
(3) Therefore, God probably does not exist.

The support for (2) is that there is no evidence that all the suffering in the world is justified, and because most concepts are not instantiated (most possibilities are not actual), we know inductively that there probably isn't a purpose to all the suffering in the world. You can try to deny (1), the way Hasker and van Inwagen have, but you will fail. The only way to deny (2), in my view, is to attempt to formulate a theodicy (which will most likely fail as well), or to deny induction.
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Old 06-12-2003, 02:24 PM   #18
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Default Re: Re: On the Unknown Purpose Defense

Originally posted by ComestibleVenom :

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That is a supurb formulation. I expect to employ something like it in my future conversations.
Thank you very much. Now, hopefully, no one else has published anything like it, and no one will until I can publish it or decide it's flawed.
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Old 06-12-2003, 02:27 PM   #19
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Originally posted by Steven Carr :

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It is probably a crime in many states to allow somebody to commit evil acts when you can prevent them.

Is God a criminal, according to the American legal system?
Many jurisdictions have "Good Samaritan" laws that require a person to prevent some evil if she is able to without risking her own health. And God is omnipresent, so God is present in at least one of these jurisdictions. Therefore, yes, God is a criminal.
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Old 06-12-2003, 04:26 PM   #20
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Default Re: Re: Re: On the Unknown Purpose Defense

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Originally posted by Steven Carr
Is there any humour in a materialistic world? Did God invent 'Knock knock' jokes? Did God create evil?

Well, like many things, humor is "in the eye of the beholder." Do you want to argue that humor is a function of matter?

Please prove there is no evil in a materialistic world.

Evil, as an objective entity, cannot exist in a materialstic world because matter is neither good or evil. You may want to express dislike for certain phenomenon because they elicit chemical reactions in your brain that make you uncomfortable, but you cannot call that evil in any transcendent sense.

The Marquis de Sade evidently felt good about doing things that you would find unpleasant. What makes your preference any more legitimate than his?

What is your definition of evil and why should God be ruled by that?

As it happens, very many theists claim there is no evil in a world created by God. They claim that evil is simply an 'abscence of goodness'.

So theists deny evil exists and then lambast materialists for being unable to explain how evil exists.....


Well, I'm not one of them, so I'm not sure what your point is.

Are you saying tautologies are not true? It is a strange refutation to say that your opponents arguments are logically unchallengable?
I'm saying they are "only" formally true and, therefore, cannot be used as the foundation of an argument.
If I say "It will either rain or not rain tomorrow," I statement is logically unchallengable but meaningless as far as proving if rain is a good thing or a bad thing.
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