Thomas Metcalf

I've been thinking about what may be a new approach to dealing with skeptical theism (a.k.a. "agnostic theism" a.k.a. the Unknown Purpose Defense a.k.a. the Human Cognitive Limitations Defense). (See Wykstra, Alston, and van Inwagen.) This and Plantinga's "outweigh with warrant" defenses seem to me to be the only two defenses against the evidential argument from evil worth anything. I'd also like to know if any authors have already propounded something similar.

The possibilist UPD claims that it's possible for God to have a purpose for all the suffering in the world, and claims, further, that this possibility is enough to reject the inference from inscrutable evil to pointless evil. (We make similar inferences all the time. There seems to be no point to some of the suffering in the world, so we conclude there isn't, the way there seems to be no magical elves living in the building, so we conclude there aren't any.) Let us call this defense (D). And let us suppose that (D) provides 100 units of argumentative weight. I'll call the units of argumentative weight "russells."

Now consider another position, which I'll call (D*). (D*) claims that it's possible that God has an extra reason for preventing suffering beyond the obvious one, and claims, further, that this possibility provides good reason to think God will prevent suffering beyond what he normally would. It seems to me that we have no principled reason for deciding (D) provides 100 russells, but (D*) provides fewer than 100 russells. Each identifies a possibility and suggests that the mere possibility is enough to sway one's assessment of an inference. Well, why not rate the two equally?

If I'm right, this completely neutralizes the version of UPD I'm considering. I think the best thing to say is that a mere possibility provides no argumentative weight for or against the evidential argument from evil.

Taffy Lewis

Thomas Metcalf,

It seems that a subtle attempt is being made to shift the burden of proof onto the theist. And referring to skeptical theists as employing an "unknown purpose defense" seems to support this. I think you and I may have discussed this before but I'll continue since others might also be interested.

For any argument, it is the proponent of the argument who bears the burden of proof. In this case, the proponent of your type of evidential argument from evil must support the premises of the argument. Some good reason must be given to believe the premises are true. The theist is under no obligation to argue that any of the premises are false. And this is exactly what is implied when it is argued that the theist must suggest some unknown purpose is likely to exist.

Fundamentally, your style of evidential argument from evil is what Richard Dawkins has referred to as an argument from personal incredulity. You can't think of a reason why God would permit some particularly extreme evil or evils and then conclude that there must not be any reason.

In order to argue that something doesn't exist one must have the background belief that if such a thing exists then it is likely you will be aware of it. But in the case of God's reasons for permitting evil there is no reason to believe we would be in any such position.

The only argument I've seen to support the notion that if God exists we would be in a position to know his reasons for permitting every instance of evil is that if God loves us he would, like a good parent, reveal to us either that he has such reasons or he would reveal the reasons themselves. This is the sort of argument suggested by Drange and O'Connor. ( I believe it was originally suggested by Howard-Snyder though he doesn't support it )

Drange suggests that God can give us a "brain boost" in order to make us intelligent enough to understand his reasons for permitting every instance of evil. But the problem with this argument is that it ignores other aspects of the God-parent analogy. Sure, when they can, parents reveal their reasons for acting. But it is not uncommon for parents to fail to reveal their reasons for acting even when they can reveal those reasons. For example, a parent might not give their child all the answers while helping them study for math. They may want them to learn to solve the probems on their own.

Other rebuttals to Drange's "brain boost" scenario are available but the above analogy is enough to counter it.

Bill Snedden

I don't agree. IMO, the attempt at analogy you offer doesn't quite fit.

The "answers to the math problems" aren't the "reason for acting." The reason for acting would be "so you can learn the answers on your own". Therefore, the analogy to God's not telling us the reason for evil would be the parent not telling the child the reasons he won't give the answers to the math problems

Unfortunately, that analogy doesn't militate against Drange's argument.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Thomas Metcalf

Taffy Lewis :

Glad to see a response from you. I take it you're granting that my post neutralizes the possibilist UPD I described, but you think there is a better response to the evidential arguments from evil.

The inference ("inscrutable" to "pointless") has its own support, and it's something like this principle, the Principle of Ruling Out:

(RO) If we are unaware of the existence of something, we may rule its existence out unless given evidence to the contrary.

Prima facie, (RO) might look rather permissive, but I don't think it is. At least, you and I use it all the time, and I can't think of any negative consequences of accepting it. I believe there genuinely is gratuitous suffering, because I am aware of no evidence of greater goods. You believe you are genuinely not a brain in a vat, because you have no evidence for the obtainment of that situation. Right?

The principle (RO) might be undergirded with the observation that, to put it crudely, most things don't exist. Most concepts are not instantiated; most possibilities are not actual. So, inductively, we can say that for any concept C, if there is no evidence that C is instantiated, then it probably isn't.

But I can think of no reason that God would want that to occur instead of him just letting us know, whereas I can think of good reasons for parents to let their children figure out math problems for themselves. The reason parents do so is to give the children practice in solving future math problems by themselves, but I can't think of a reason God would want to give us practice formulating theodicies when one will do.

What are some other problems with the "brain boost" scenario?

Jobar

Thomas, I like the practical consequences of your RO Principle; on the day-to-day level, all sane people use it constantly. It prevents us from being overwhelmed with unproveables.

I want to point out, though, that the italicized sentence above is probably wrong on the largest scales. It may be, in fact, that there is infinite diversity in infinite combinations; all possibilities are somewhere, in the infinite multiverse, solid and observable fact, for any hypothetical observers close enough to observe. There's a recent issue of Scientific American which presents the many-worlds hypothesis as highly probable; it's the cover story of the May 2003 issue, and there are in fact 4 possible "levels" on which parallel universes might exist!

For us, in our observable universe, the RO Principle is valid though; even, I'd say, necessary. It rules out the possibility of an interventionalist God, but not a pantheist or deist one, IMO.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Jobar :

Suppose that the multiverse is in fact an array of all possible worlds, such that we're only living in one of them; they're all concrete, and everyone calls their own world the "actual world." This is close to the position of the late David Lewis. If that were true, then there would still be an "actual world," to us, and it would still be true to say that most possibilities are not actual; what would not be true would be to say that most possibilities are not concrete. But I'd be perfectly satisfied with concluding that God does not exist in the actual world, or if you like, in our particular universe. I think God (if God is not defined to be non-contingent, which I think he must not be) exists in some possible worlds -- just not in this one. If that means God doesn't exist in our universe, so be it.

To say most possibilities are not actual, if all possible worlds are concrete, is just to say that most possibilities are not actual in our own possible world. So a justifying reason for suffering probably isn't in our own actual world.

Theli

I've never understood how the purpose or greater good argument harms PoE in any way. I mean, from our perspective every action taken by god would be done knowing of it's concequences, and should therefore be considered a purpose, an intention.
The problem still remains though:

Does god desire evil? / Is evil part of the finished creation he hope to achieve?

If YES, then the suffering inflicted on us is desirable by god, he wants us to feel pain. A stance inconsistent with good. Not Omnibenevolent.
If NO, god doesn't want evil to exist but allows it in order to reach his goal. God cannot reach a desired goal without undesirable means. A burden only beings with limited power must bare. Not Omnipotent.

Steven Carr

Theists generally concede there is pointless suffering in the world.

Indeed, I will hit you over the head with this theological piece of 2 by 4 debating wood, until you agree that there is no point to me
inflicting such suffering on you.

Jamie_L

Taffy,

No one's saying the theist must inovke UPD. The fact is, theists do invoke UPD. UPD is invoked because the atheist makes the PoE arguement and claims it is sound and valid. The UPD proponant is attempting to point out that this is in error.

No. PoE is in response to the assertion that an omnimax diety exists. It is within the definition of an omnipotent being that no state of affairs will exist unless the omnipotent being desires that state of affairs as an end to itself. It's not that I can't think of a reason why God would or would not do something. It's that the definition of God being presented to me dictates that nothing will exist unless God wants it for its own sake. Suffering exists. Thus, by the definition of God, God wants suffering for its own sake. This conflicts with another aspect of the God definition: omnibenevolence. The difficulties come from the God assertion, not from the individual arguing PoE.

UPD says it's possible God wants suffering for some other reason. Given the definition of God, however, that is not true. It is not possible God wants suffering for another reason. Because God could effect that "other reason" through will alone. The only reason to involve suffering would be a desire to involve suffering.

Now, with respect to the OP:

Thomas,

(D*) seems odd to me. While (D) is making a claim that, if true, would result in the way the world actually is, (D*) is making a claim that, if true, would result in the world being different than it is. Thus, while they may be logically equivalent, (D*) is observably false. God does not prevent more suffering than exists now. Thus, it seems that there is good reason to say it has very little argumentative weight.

An interesting thing about UPD and PoE , to me, comes out when we look at the arguements in order:

(1) Omnimax God is asserted, making a claim of knowledge about God.
(2) PoE response: The asserted God contradicts the observed world.
(3) UPD: Claims that we don't have knowledge about God.

In essence, (3) refutes (1). UPD tries to trump PoE by saying its possible we don't understand God, but if it's possible we don't understand God, then its possible (1) is in error. And if possibilities are sufficient to trump, then UPD strikes down (1) as well as (3). We can say, well, it's possible that God is evil and malicious, and good is just something he's trying stamp out. Let's call that (1*). Given UPD, (1*) should have just as many russels as (1).

Jamie

ComestibleVenom

Originally posted by Taffy Lewis
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"Fundamentally, your style of evidential argument from evil is what Richard Dawkins has referred to as an argument from personal incredulity. You can't think of a reason why God would permit some particularly extreme evil or evils and then conclude that there must not be any reason."
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The problem here is that in cases of an omnibenevolent God, no human CAN think of a reason because it contradicts the very human meaning of omnibenevolence to permit any degree of evil, let alone the vast excess that exists on earth.

Thus, the sort of inscrutability demanded by the theist in essence reinforces the notion that god-theory is utterly diconnected with reality. That's precisely the conclusion intended, and so the meta-argument stands.

(PS. As far as I'm concerned, the problem of evil poses no logical problem for the Theist as long as they insist upon a God who is disconnected from reality in every human discernable way. This in itself constitutes a far more fundamental problem for the theist then does the original problem of evil, so it does not suffice as a refutation of the AE.)