Celsus

A new article is up in the Sec Web Library: Pitfalls of Metaphysics and Chimera of Divine Revelation by Mohammad Gill. This may be more suited to philosophy, but I thought I'd give it some play here first.

Some excerpts:
Thoughts?

Hugo Holbling

Since it seems a shame to see this thread die, i'll step in briefly.

According to F.H. Bradley:

How's that, Joel?

Celsus

Well it's a response, so I guess I'm happy. The two excerpts were not really the focus of the article (despite the title), but that specific metaphysic concepts (that have been subject to astonishing amounts of undeserved scrutiny) is and always has been, subjective. So since Gill isn't trying to show that "metaphysical knowledge is impossible," perhaps we need a different kind of critique? Go on, invite Bede here, you know you want to.

Joel

Hugo Holbling

Heh! Would you believe it - i read the entire article. Thanks for pointing that out anyway.

I thought i'd post that quote because of the selections you offered. I posted another quote in my latest response to Sojourner that may interest you, particularly given Gill's remarks early in his piece. It's an interesting objection to this part of the essay:

Tell me what you make of it, and while you're at it you can give your own impression of the linked article.

I guess Bede is busy elsewhere, especially since i've wheeled out Feyerabend, but i'm always glad to see his input. If i didn't know better, i'd take your comments as proof that someone actually reads the nonsense i post.

Celsus

Ok Hugo, I'll take Gill's metaphyisical postulate and raise him another:
Oh and we might as well quote Carnap as quoted in the article while we're throwing around ideas:
Gill's idea is obviously dependent on the assumption of the existence of objective reality, and that empirical evidence can also expose the nature of reality. I have no problems with that, but then I'm no philosopher. I can also point you to other discussions I've had on methodological naturalism as a more or less reliable path to objective knowledge here, here and here (just the first 4 pages, if you want to test my positivistic bias), and a half-arsed attempt at an essay still in the works here. Of course, you can call this a "metaphysical" position, but unlike most metaphysics, I like to think it squares up to reality.

Joel

Hugo Holbling

Is this false modesty or are you doing yourself a disservice?

As i've tried to explain in the other thread, i see no need to make this assumption: it's as though instrumentalism went under the radar. I'd have liked to have seen Gill make some comment on it, particularly in early twentieth-century physics.

Thanks for those. TheologyWeb sure is slow loading.

The distinction you make between metaphysical and methodological naturalism is interesting but i have a problem with the latter that isn't related to assuming it to be identical to the former; viz. the idea that science has a unique methodology. (That is, i'm looking to disagree with you to bring about an interesting discussion, and this could be it. ) It seems rather that today we have to think of it as comprising in a list of varying approaches, the presence of some or all of which we call science. Take, by way of an interesting example, Robert Carroll's article here, wherein this is very much the case. Gone are the days of viewing the demarcation problem as one that could be solved by criterion like verificationism, falsificationism, probabilism, Bayesianism, and so on: the philosophy of science has had to adapt to the critiques of Lakatos, Feyerabend, Kuhn and others. If Carroll's understanding is anything to go by, it makes the usual dismissal of an idea due to lack of a potential falsifier pretty much moot, irrespective of the problems with falsificationism that are temporarily overlooked.

Well, i didn't. However, i still don't like the sound of "squaring up to reality" as this expression makes no sense at all to me. Sorry.

Celsus

Hi Hugo,

This could well be a fascinating discussion. I'm afraid I really am no philosopher, and have read precious little of the names I should have read to comment intelligently. I'll try to get a reply to you in the morning. In the meantime, I'll move this over to Philosophy since at the moment it's just the two of us, and I'd like to hear other views as well. I'll see what I can do to contact Gill as well.

Joel

John Page

You mean like "Metaphysician, explain thyself."?

Cheers, John
PS Nice to see your incisive wit abound again.

Celsus

Ok, I suppose this is the only meat I'll have to go with. I don't (didn't?) say science has a unique methodology--it has a certain approach that works. Would you accept that (conventional) science only covers the natural, repeatable, and governed by law? I guess returning to the OP, metaphysical postulates have never been able to attract any kind of verifiability, whereas the natural world has. As you can see, the vast majority of these sorts of arguments/definitions are aimed at Creationists, where obviously, the intervention of God is precisely untestable and nonfalsifiable--hence they are focused on, and may give a skewed version of what the philosophers of science really think (e.g. Michael Ruse).

If we refuse to make an a priori acceptance of methodological naturalism, the simple reason for endorsing it anyway is its success. While the borders of what constitutes science may be hazy, the vast majority of scientific discovery have obviously incorporated methodological naturalism at its core. And in contrast to this overwhelming success, we are still not any closer to solving many metaphysical problems bequeathed upon us by dead philosophers (if that is indeed, a goal). The difference? Objective reality?

Joel

Hugo Holbling

Joel,

Fair enough, but people are fond of dismissing ideas because they violate signle criterion like falsifiability in spite of science having had to move to a "list" definition of itself, as Feyerabend suggested and you implicitly avow yourself:

I disagree because i want to see science freed of methodological constraints and the meta-narratives of the philosophers.

This is a case in point: verification on its own is a flawed demarcation criterion that Popper replaced with falsifiability; hence, this objection is not as powerful as it may appear.

See my quote below.

Perhaps it isn't so obvious. Lots of scientific approaches and moves in the history of ideas violated methodological rules or constraints imposed by those who want to see unity where there is only creativity. Galileo - to take a case being discussed elsewhere - used all manner of subterfuge to achieve a redescription on his terms, so the methodological naturalist account is too simple.

Would i let you off that easily? See the quote below...

I remembered a passage from Quine that i want to give you here in order to bring about a disagreement with you and Gill on two fronts: against you, with regard to methodological naturalism being based on the shaky assumption of a unified methodology (in opposition to either a Feyerabendian or "Carrollian" conception); and, contra Gill, that the separation between metaphysics and natural science is not so easy to maintain. Whether these be hopeless positions or misunderstandings of what you both meant, i imagine they will provide for an interesting debate.

This is similar, of course, to the Feyerabend remark i gave in the Galileo thread, but coming at it from a different direction.

Enjoy!

Why are people being so nice to me at the moment? Perhaps you meant to call me witless?