Synaesthesia

There is no logical contradiction in thinking that Kenny is an illusion created by the fish tank in which my brain floats. Therefore, “Kenny exists or 2+2=5” is false UNLESS we add the premise that “Kenny exists”. So any valid existential claim of the form “X exists or Logical Contradiction” entails that we have assumed the truth of X.*

Now if you presuppose the truth of (1)“Kenny exists or 2+2=5”, since 2+2=5 is a logical contradiction within arithmetic, (1) does indeed require that it is a logical contradiction to deny Kenny’s existence. In other words:

(1)X or Logical Contradiction

Therefore
(2) ~X --> Logical Contradiction
[It is logically contradictory to deny X given Premise 1]

Regards,
Synaesthesia
[edited for syntax]

*Or we have other premises that imply that X exists.

[ July 21, 2002: Message edited by: Synaesthesia ]</p>

Automaton

I'm sorry Kenny, I don't have access to Plantinga's original text (being the piss poor scholar that I am ), but this quote is found reproduced in the objective literature, where it is highly unlikely that someone would deliberately misquote another's writings, especially when the target audience for the literature is those probably already familiar with those person's writings.

"Inuitive" support is not much help to me. I refuse to accept any sort of necessary existant can be postulated as existing in some possible world, without prior premises that prove first that this necessary existant is first necessary. I will not accept []&lt;&gt;p without first learning of &lt;&gt;p, and I will not accept &lt;&gt;[]p without first learning of []p.

Automaton

Hi Kenny. Actually, it would be a being at least somewhat like God, in that if it had power, it would have unlimited power (omnipotence), if it had knowledge, it would have unlimited knowledge (omniscience), etc., but it would not have to be God in any way. It would not have to create any universes for example. If you accept that "maximal" is a reasonable function of attributes, then you must accept that there is a great logical scope of entities other than God, which can possibility maintain this function. Unless you want to demonstrate it to be impossible for any other being apart from God to posess "maximal existence", of course. And, even if you only accept that God can have maximally functioned attributes for some reason, then we can still construct a similar parody:
1. If God exists, God is necessary.
2. In some possible world there is a being that knows there is no God.
3. If something is not true in some possible world, then it is not necessarily true.
4. Therefore, God is not necessary.
5. Therefore, God does not exist.
I believe it is irrational to selectively accept the reasoning of one argument because you agree with the conclusion and deny the exact same reasoning that leads to the negation of the previous conclusion. I mean, I would certainly not accept any atheological argument, that, using the exact same reasoning, would lead to a conclusion of theism.
I see. I consider it strange, as Hartshorne even labels the axiom that something is possible until shown impossible, as Intuitive Postulate. Must something be assumed impossible until shown possible? Would it be rational of me to simply state "God is impossible", without any sort of reason behind this statement?

Automaton

Why? Could I not say the same thing of simply any person who disagrees with me in any minor way?
"Atheists are insane, they don't accept the obvious, intuitive premises of this argument."
"Theists are insane, they don't accept the obvious, intuitive premises of this argument."
And so on, ad infinitum.
It's just not a very good way to try to support premises in piece of formal logic. If mathematicians started simply claiming certain theorems were "intuitive" without proving them, where do you think we'd be?
I trust my intuition in practical situations, because it seems to me I am hardwired in some way or another to subconsciously react for survival. But that does not mean I can accept whatever unsupported premises I feel like, willy nilly.
Alright. Accepted. On an intuitive basis, you may have every reason to accept the premises, but objectively, you must agree an unsupported argument is not a very strong one?
How about some convincing proofs?

Kenny

Theli,

Sorry you feel that way.

Well, if the argument is successful then it shows that maximal greatness implies a being possessing maximal excellence necessarily exists. I would say that a demonstration that a being exists necessarily has more than a little relevance to the probability that said being exists.

I fully agree that intuition does not “change the reality around us” and that it is not fully reliable. But, our intuition does, as you concede, “have baring on our knowledge of reality” and it can function as a source of warrant. A great deal of the knowledge we take for granted relies in part or even in whole on rational intuition.

Well, I disagree with your philosophy of math here (being the mathematical Platonist I am), but that’s a discussion for another day. If you don’t like that example as something known through intuition though try these. How do you know that the people around you have minds like your own as opposed to being functional zombies? Or, how do you know that the universe didn’t just pop into existence five minutes ago bringing your memories along with it? Or, how do you know that the principle of induction holds so that you can genuinely rely on past experience to make future predictions? I think if you examine these questions long enough, you will find that, in the end, your going to have to fall back on certain basic intuitions you have about the universe around you.

This represents a misunderstanding of Modal logic which is understandable if you have never encountered it before. Possibility and necessity are to be understood in a logical sense. Saying a proposition is “possible” in modal logic amounts to saying that it could be true in some hypothetical world described be a set of logically coherent propositions and saying that a proposition is “necessary” amounts to saying that it cannot fail to be true in any hypothetical world described by a coherent set of propositions. Modal logic does not say that “possible = necessary.” It does say that if it is possible that something is necessary, then it is necessary. But, this is evident from the definitions of the terms. If a proposition is possible, then it is true in at least one logically possible world. If it is possible that a proposition is necessary, then it is true in at least one possible world that that proposition is true in all possible worlds. But, if that’s the case, then said proposition must be true in all logically possible worlds or we have a logical contradiction.

As far as Modal logic’s connection to reality is concerned, it seems indispensable for an analysis of counterfactual claims (such as “x would have happened if it were the case that y”) which in turn seems essential to both philosophy of science and the analysis of certain basic metaphysical constructs such as causality. It has also proven useful in certain mathematical applications such as proof theory.

Anyway, I’ll be back later…

God Bless,
Kenny

[ July 22, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Theli

Kenny...

But this rests on the assumption that we live in that possible world (where the proposition is necessary).
You must first show that we live in that world. And you must also show that the proposition actually is necessary.

And here comes the error in the argument. The possible world is just that (possible). A possibility.
It isn't necessarily existing. In wich the claim "true in all logical worlds" is just a possibility.
This argument seems to play with the idea that there are an infinite amount of worlds (all logically possible) and a claim can exist in one of those worlds that effects all other worlds (including our own).
Although those worlds doesn't factually exist. They exist only as possibilities. And any proposition that is true in such a world is only true there (in that world).

If a proposition regarding all possible worlds stated in a certain possible world was necessarily true then:
1. It would have incomprehensible consequenses on our world. Everything that would even be considered possible would become true. Including contradictions.
2. It would be an assumption that rules out the possibility of the propositions opposite. Assuming that god (for instance) cannot be nonexistent.
Wich goes against the basis of this argument as god's nonexistence is a possibility to, and could also exist as a necessity on some possible world.

In the end we get possibility = necessity.

I hope this isn't too incomprehensible.

[ July 23, 2002: Message edited by: Theli ]</p>

Kenny

It is obvious that you have not yet really grasped the structure of the argument (and since the terminology is somewhat foreign to most people, that is not blameworthy). Line (4) is not a premise. The only real premise in the argument is “1) There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated.” All the other lines in the argument follow from this premise and the definitions provided. In other words, (4) is not assumed at all; (4) is derived from the definitions and premise asserted in (1). So, your objection to the argument here is groundless.

Line (3) is not a premise either, but rather a line that follows from the original definitions. Again, Line (4) follows from (1) and the unpacking of the definitions that occurs in (2) and (3).

God Bless,
Kenny

P.S. Automaton, I haven’t forgotten you…

Kenny

Theli,

Your previous post suggests very basic misunderstandings of modal logic. All I can say is that the basic rule of inference in modal logic “If it is possible that X is necessary, then X is necessary” is not really controversial as I’m sure any atheist here familiar with the subject could verify for you. I do not wish to go on defending this basic principle of inference to you here. I recommend that you do some searches on modal logic and read up on the subject a little. If you have any questions, perhaps you could raise them in the philosophy forum.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ July 23, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Synaesthesia

Automaton,
Probably where we are today. The discovery of non-eucledian geometry shows that there are numerous self-consistent systems we can formulate. Of course, their correspondence to the world’s structure is a different matter altogether.

Hey Kenny,
Well it does seem that I didn’t read the definitions at the beginning, but read them during the course of the argument. That was careless of me.

Your objection, however, misses the central point of what I wrote in a very ironic manner: The structure of how God’s existence is assumed is totally irrelevant. The problem is that it is assumed at all.

My argument is fundamentally unchanged. Once you have assumed that a God who exists in all possible worlds is instatated, the formalism of how you do it is utterly irrelevant, the question has been begged. There is no point in making such a logical argument.

One might as well just come out of the closet and without the sophistry say “I’m assuming that God exists.” And go from there.

Regards,
Synaesthesia

Theli

You give up so early?
Atleast you did it with triumph. By stating that your opponent simply doesn't 'understand'.
Perhaps I understood it too well.
I can see how the argument you posted be used to confuse the person reading it. And you apperantly wan't to keep it's "real meaning" outside my reach.

The problem with the argument still stays.
A possible world cannot have a proposition that govern all other possible worlds. To claim this is to assume that the proposition is a necessity in advance.
It's a tautology.