mnkbdky

This is the begining of an article idea--it is not yet finished. If anyone has some ideas or criticism they care to offer me, please feel free. Thanks

--mnkbdky

Questioning P-ness

Personhood (from here on, P) is a hard thing to define. However, P does seem to have essential, that is to say necessary properties—perhaps even eternal. The purpose of this study will be to articulate the essence or necessary properties of P. Simply put, I will be probing the depths of P-ness. Now, since I am most familiar with myself as a P it makes sense that I should be the subject of this inquiry. Therefore, I will be specifically attempting to grasp my P-ness. In fact, it seems to me that there are essential qualities to every P that are only accessible to that particular P. Thus, it is only through introspection that someone, including myself, can discover the necessary qualities of their particular P-ness. Before I may start grappling with my own P-ness, though, I must make a fundamental distinction about necessity.

Aristotle in his Prior Analytics, i.9 makes a distinction between de dicto modality and de re modality, which can be directly applied to the necessity of my P-ness. Modality de dicto is attributing a necessary property to a proposition or dictum, where as modality de re is attributing a necessary property to the object itself. The question becomes, then, Is the necessity of my P-ness de dicto or de re? For simplicity, let us refer to P-ness de re as hard P-ness and P-ness de dicto as soft P-ness. To restate the question, then, Is my P-ness hard or soft?

JP2

So your existential qualification can be defined by the strength of your P-ness?

Freud would have a field day.

mnkbdky

Here is another idea I just though of.

Perhaps, though, I am approaching this matter from the wrong perspective. Martin Heidegger believed that the whole approach of western metaphysical substantive P-ness was pre-mature. Instead he suggested that we could not even understand the substantive P-ness without first understanding the pre-ontological/background/fore-structure of P-ness. He began to look at P-ness phenomenologically. Perhaps, then, I should be looking at my P-ness phenomenologically. As Marty would put, I am a Dasein or a P-ness-in-the-world. This means that I have first and foremost a primordial P-ness. My ontic or secondary P-ness is only revealed through the possibility or being-able-to of my P-ness, especially through the possibility or being-able-to of my P-ness not to be. The possibility of my P-ness not existing places me into a mood (Stimmung) of dread (Angst). This angst then reveals my care (Sorge) for my P-ness, which allows me to reflect upon it and know it as a substantive or ontic P-ness.

mnkbdky

If you are not getting the joke, then try reading it aloud. Here is a newer version:

Personhood (from here on, P) is a hard thing to define. However, P does seem to have essential, that is to say necessary properties—perhaps even eternal. Because I am most familiar with myself as a P it makes sense that I should be the subject of this inquiry. Therefore, I will be specifically attempting to grasp my P-ness. In fact, it seems to me that there are essential qualities to every P that are only accessible to that particular P. Thus, it is only through introspection that someone, including myself, can discover the necessary qualities of their particular P-ness. The purpose of this essay, however, is not to lay down any definite answer as to the nature of my P-ness. Rather, it is a mere meditation on the possible ways in which I might approach the understanding of my P-ness. Let me begin grappling with my own P-ness by making a fundamental distinction about necessity.

Aristotle in his Prior Analytics, i.9 makes a distinction between de dicto modality and de re modality, which can be directly applied to the necessity of my P-ness. Modality de dicto is attributing a necessary property to a proposition or dictum, where as modality de re is attributing a necessary property to the object itself. The question becomes, then, Is the necessity of my P-ness de dicto or de re? For simplicity, let us refer to P-ness de re as hard P-ness and P-ness de dicto as soft P-ness. To restate the question, then, Is my P-ness hard or soft?

Perhaps, though, I am approaching this matter from the wrong perspective. Martin Heidegger believed that the whole approach of western metaphysical substantive P-ness was pre-mature. Instead he suggested that we could not even understand the substantive P-ness without first understanding the pre-ontological/background/fore-structure of P-ness. He began to look at P-ness phenomenologically. Perhaps, then, I should be looking at my P-ness phenomenologically.

As Marty would put, I am a Dasein or a P-ness-in-the-world. This means that my P-ness, first and foremost, has its being-in-the-world, a primordial P-ness. I come to understand my P-ness as ready-at-hand. That is, I first relate to my P-ness as a tool, something I use and become familiar with to the point that I am not even aware of it as being separate for its use. My P-ness is not present-at-hand. That is, it is not an isolated subtantive object cut off from everything else.

In a Heideggerian sense, then, my P-ness can only be understood in relation to the totality of its function, its existential relatedness. My ontic or secondary P-ness is only revealed through the possibility or being-able-to of my P-ness, especially through the possibility or being-able-to of my P-ness not to be. The possibility of my P-ness not existing places me into a mood (Stimmung) of dread (Angst). This angst then reveals my care (Sorge) for my P-ness, which allows me to reflect upon it and know it as a substantive or ontic P-ness.

ieyeasu

I have fully grasped my P-ness, and I must say that the internet was a great help in this process.

Godot

I sincerely hope that you can come to terms with your P-ness, mnkbdky. Having both a primary and secondary P-ness must certainly make for a neat party trick.

Paperstreet

So everything you said was BS? It was starting to make sense to me actually. Anyway I got the joke. (took me a little while though)

mnkbdky

Actually, no. Everything I said was not BS. It is real philosophy. That is a real metaphysical distinction that Aristotles makes and that is Heidegger's philosophy as found in his being and time. I merely applied them to my P-ness.

As Homer would say, "Its funny because it true."

mnkbdky

We must be cautious, though, that we do not focus too much on the P-ness so as to exclude an-other (from here on, A), but that's is a different article.

John Page

I conclude that you are definitely a de dicto P-ness-in-the-world.

Cheers, John