Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"Even if God does not currently know X, God is able to know X, and so God's lack of knowledge of X does not count against His omnipotence."

If we take omniscience to be the knowledge of all facts, instead of the ability to know all facts (which follows from omnipotence), then God is not omniscient in the actual world or He is. If He is, then He cannot bring about the soa in which someone or other causes him- or herself to learn something without first forgetting something, but this is a consistent and bring-about-able state of affairs. If omniscience is only the ability to know all facts, this conflicts with most theists' intuitions and seems to follow from omnipotence -- why don't we have a special word for the ability to untie all knots or to shear all sheep or to play all songs?

"The idea that God is able to prevent any evil act is, I think, essential to the traditional conception of God's sovereignity."

Well, so is the idea that there's no more powerful being than God. I think it is important to focus on the hypothetical situation in which Jane also existed, or in which Jane existed instead of God.

"If this is so, then it seems that the only way we can determine whether or not God passes the maximal power test is to determine whether or not God exists..."

Could you explain this further? If Jane exists then God does not exist. If God exists then Jane does not exist. If God exists, the situation in which Jane exists is impossible, but it should still trouble theists to say that if Jane existed, she'd be more powerful than God.

"Any being could be 'conceivably' more powerful than it is. Suppose I allow that subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents provide a useful analysis of whether or not a being can be more conceivably powerful than it is."

I think this is too simplified. The reason some antecedents are impossible is because they express a contradiction analytically, as in your case. The situation you describe we know to be impossible. But we do not know the situation I describe, in which Jane exists instead of God, to be impossible until we know whether Jane exists instead of God. Also, the reason it would be impossible -- God's free choice of prohibition, I assume -- does not seem to be the same "way" in which a being greater than the greatest conceivable being is impossible.

In sum, I don't think anyone can consistently say "Maximally powerful being S would be more powerful if it were different in conceivable way W." The added abilities to draw square circles or beget married bachelors are inconceivable.

Philip Osborne

Concerning omniscience, I think the whole notion of God having to know everything is misguided. Concerning most theists' intuitions, if theists were given a choice between a God that can and does know all truths by free choice and a God who simply has to know everything because of His nature, but who gets a special word for that property, theists would choose the former. I think the term omniscience is used because it is Biblically and theologically significant; as a part of natural theology, however, I think omniscience follows as a function of omnipotence.

It is true that this is an unconventional position. However, it is a fully consistent one, and, in my opinion, much more plausible than the standard account. My account renders omniscience intelligible by reducing it to God's omnipotence, whereas the traditional Anselmian must postulate a highly unusual property which must be assumed as fundamental to God.

I think this is too simplified. The reason some antecedents are impossible is because they express a contradiction analytically, as in your case. The situation you describe we know to be impossible. But we do not know the situation I describe, in which Jane exists instead of God, to be impossible until we know whether Jane exists instead of God.

Yes, there is a difference between my example and the situation concerning God and Jane, but it does not seem significant. If God exists, then the hypothetical situation in which Jane exists seems to fall to the criticism I leveled previously. If Jane exists, however, then God does not exist, and so determining whether or not God passes the maximal power test becomes irrelevant; why do so if God is fiction? In either case, we do not resort to the maximal power test to determine whether or not God exists. If God exists, then God is maximally powerful. If God does not exist, then God would not be maximally powerful. This is as much as the test can tell us, and no more.

Also, the reason it would be impossible -- God's free choice of prohibition, I assume -- does not seem to be the same "way" in which a being greater than the greatest conceivable being is impossible.

God cannot choose to make things impossible or possible; this violates the S5 axiom of modal logic. He cannot declare 1+1=8 to be possibly true or "All bachelors are unmarried men" to be possibly false. The reason Jane would be impossible is because God exists in every possible world; a world in which both Jane and God exists is impossible, so it follows that Jane exists in no possible world.

I might have rushed through a few points, so please excuse any errors.

Sincerely,

Philip

Thomas Metcalf

Philip Osborne:

I think we've decided what we need to decide with regard to omniscience. You take omniscience to be something incidental that follows from God's omnipotence and is important to mention simply because of its theological significance. I take omniscience to be an independent property, and I think a being could be non-omniscient and yet still be omnipotent.

As for the Maximal Power Test, I still think it should be troubling that we can consistently say, there is a more powerful conceivable being. Certainly, this being could not possibly exist if God exists, but we've simply reached a point where conceptual and logical possibility diverge. (This may in fact be a reason to doubt the concept of God as defined to exist in all or no possible worlds.)

If we were to imagine that reality were radically different somehow, such that there were a very limited necessary being, and that this being would necessarily prohibit the existence of more powerful beings, we would have to say that this limited necessary being could pass the Maximal Power Test. Suppose we define McEar as a necessary existent and suppose he were alone in the universe, and give him the further characteristic of necessarily preventing the existence of more powerful beings. I do not think McEar could ever pass the Maximal Power Test, even in this rather alien situation. There are no logically possible more powerful beings, but there are still conceptually possible more powerful beings. This is how this situation is importantly different from the example of the hypothetical being that could draw square circles and the like; this sort of being is neither logically nor conceptually possible.

I would say given two beings, S and T, such that there is no logically or conceptually possible more powerful being than S and there is no logically possible more powerful being than T, but there is a conceptually possible more powerful being than T, S is more powerful than T. Conceptual possibility seems to be even stronger than logical possibility, and therefore, if we're looking for a maximum, we should be strict enough to take the "maximum of possibility" as well.

The Maximal Power Test seems to me to be intimately related to hypothetical conditionals. If the universe contingently contained nothing but me, any Maximal Power Test would have to make use of counterfactual excursions -- yet I think we could still say I would fail the Maximal Power Test. If everything in the universe were destroyed tomorrow except for me, I would not suddenly begin to pass the Maximal Power Test.

Philip Osborne

If we were to imagine that reality were radically different somehow, such that there were a very limited necessary being, and that this being would necessarily prohibit the existence of more powerful beings, we would have to say that this limited necessary being could pass the Maximal Power Test. Suppose we define McEar as a necessary existent and...

I think even your conceptual version of the Maximal Power Test falls under the same criticism you use against mine. Suppose McEar exists in the scenario you describe, but that in this scenario, the space of what is "conceptually possible" is radically different. Perhaps in this world, it is inconceivable that there be beings more powerful than McEar. In this case, McEar would pass the maximal power test. You might argue that this example is neither logically nor conceptually possible, but I see no reason to privilege conceptual possibility. If it is argued that the Maximal Power Test is simply defined as having conceptual power as necessarily part of that concept, then the question is whether or not God is even required to pass this test. I could argue that God passes the Maximal Power* Test, which makes the restriction to metaphysical possibility. There needs to be some argument to show that it is not enough for God to pass the Maximal Power* Test, and it seems to me that the prospects for such an argument are rather bleak.

Sincerely,

Philip

Thomas Metcalf

Philip Osborne:

From this discussion, I think a person could conclude something in at least two different directions. First, I think there are reasons to doubt that God could be defined as a necessarily existing being, and these points may simply provide more support for that position. It is considerably counter-intuitive to say that if God exists, God's nonexistence is logically impossible, and the fact that God's nonexistence is conceptually possible constitutes a continued departure from our intuitions. But I do not think this is an objection I wish to develop here, especially given the topic of the original post.

What seems to be far more problematic is this. We could choose to conclude that God is a maximally powerful being if there is no metaphysically possible more powerful being, but we must check back with our intuitions about power. Perhaps the most powerful being will prohibit the existence of any more powerful beings, but it seems just as consistent to conclude that if God exists, there can be no omnipotent being. The most powerful being is limited in a non-trivial way, and by Its own existence precludes the existence of beings with fewer limitations. There is no more powerful metaphysically possible being, if God exists, but my position all along has been that we should worry if there are conceivable more powerful beings. I think this strongly agrees with our intuitions about omnipotence.

Suppose that I am the supervisor of a group of employees in a corporation. Because of the complaints of Milton, one of my employees, I am deeply concerned with the monopolization of staplers by some employees, and I worry that someday, someone might borrow everyone's stapler and then most people would be left without the ability to staple anything (except by hand, which is inefficient and dangerous). Therefore, I decree that anyone who has every stapler at her desk is instantly fired; if you notice that you have every stapler at your desk, well, you're no longer an employee. Now, in this situation, it is logically impossible for an employee to have every stapler, because a person with every stapler is no longer an employee. But I do not think it is reasonable to conclude that an employee with every stapler except one at her desk instantiates the property "possesses the company's staplers maximally." Rather, a better conclusion would be that it is impossible for an employee maximally to have the company's staplers at her desk.

[ November 12, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>

Philip Osborne

As often happens in our discussions, I think we've taken this thread as far as it can go on this subject, so this will most likely be my last post on it. I would like to thank you for an excellent discussion. Anyway...

What seems to be far more problematic is this. We could choose to conclude that God is a maximally powerful being if there is no metaphysically possible more powerful being, but we must check back with our intuitions about power. Perhaps the most powerful being will prohibit the existence of any more powerful beings, but it seems just as consistent to conclude that if God exists, there can be no omnipotent being. The most powerful being is limited in a non-trivial way, and by Its own existence precludes the existence of beings with fewer limitations. There is no more powerful metaphysically possible being, if God exists, but my position all along has been that we should worry if there are conceivable more powerful beings. I think this strongly agrees with our intuitions about omnipotence.

While the limitations of omnibenevolence may seem to contradict our intuitions about power in the conventional sense, so long as the Anselmian is correct about the nature of logical space, these limitations in no way contradict our intuitions about power*, used in the sense enumerated in my previous response. It is true that most theists conceive of God's creative ability in terms of power, but this is most likely because most theists are unaware of the differences between power and power*. So while making the switch from power to power* seems to contradict most theists intuitions, from a purely philosophical standpoint, there seems little for the Anselmian to lose by making this transition. So again, there must be a philosophically compelling reason to reject power*. While it contradicts our intuitions about power, this tells us nothing about whether or not the concept of power* can be legitimately used to describe a being worthy of worship.

Sincerely,

Philip

Thomas Metcalf

Philip Osborne:

I agree that we've probably taken this thread to its limit. I'm not in a position right now to criticize the use of power* instead of power for determining a being, say, to be worthy of worship. At this point, I think I'll be content to "take the edge off" some of God's purported attributes and demonstrate that a strong conception of omniscience presents problems, as does a strong conception of power.

Thanks for helping me to bring out (and hopefully strengthen) the details of my argument.