Thomas Metcalf

§0 The Maximal Power Test is a method we can use to figure out if some being S is maximally powerful. I take it to be uncontroversial that only if a being is maximally powerful can it be omnipotent. If it is possible to describe a hypothetical being with more power than S, we can conclude that S is not omnipotent.
I plan to submit God to the Maximal Power Test. First, a few definitional conditions, a là Spinoza.

§1 For these purposes, God is defined to be, at the very least, a very powerful, omniscient, necessarily existing being Who cannot learn or do evil. (These last predicates follow, arguably, from His omniscience and moral perfection.)

§2 Let "lpsoa" stand for "logically possible state of affairs that it is possible for an agent to bring about."

§3 I use "cannot" thus: if and only if x cannot perform y, then there is no possible world in which x performs y. (Transworld identity is confirmed via essential properties.)

§4 "Power" refers to the ability to bring about a large number of lpsoas, i.e., if (A) for every lpsoa y can bring about and x cannot bring about, there is a corresponding lpsoa that x can bring about and y cannot bring about, and (B) there is at least one more lpsoa x can bring about that y cannot bring about than there are lpsoas that y can bring about that x cannot bring about, x is more powerful. (The notion of a "corresponding lpsoa" is considerably intuitive; I will develop it further shortly.)

§5 Finally, there are a few intuitive stipulations to make about power; if x can cause y to cease to exist, and y cannot cause x to cease to exist, then, ceteris paribus, x is more powerful than y. The same goes for if x can remove the powers of y and y cannot remove the powers of x.
Now that I have set the stage for the Maximal Power Test, let us consider God. I claim that God fails the maximal power test, because there is at least one hypothetical being with more power. I will name this being "Jane." Let Jane be qualitatively identical to God except that Jane can learn and do evil.

§6 It follows that for every lpsoa God can bring about, there is a corresponding lpsoa that Jane can bring about. There are two salient sorts of lpsoas here; some do not predicate the action of some particular agent, and some do. Let "n-lpsoas" stand for the former variety, and "a-lpsoas" for the latter. Examples of n-lpsoas include "Someone or other goes to the grocery store," "It's sunny in Olympia," and "Insect I bites a horse." Examples of a-lpsoas include "The Mariners win the World Series," "Tim cheats on his taxes," and "Pat does something stupid."
In general, we can say that God and Jane can both bring about the same n-lpsoa for any n-lpsoa, but for some a-lpsoas, we must introduce the concept of corresponding lpsoas. The reason is that limitations based on the agent in question can preclude the actualization of a particular a-lpsoa by a particular being. Some examples will make this much clearer. God cannot bring about "Jane brings about 'Jane talks to a human'," but Jane cannot bring about "God brings about 'God talks to a human'." The first corresponds to the second, but they vary in the agent doing the action. We may say that the first is an agent-variant lpsoa of the second. (Both God and Jane can bring about the n-lpsoa "Someone or other talks to a human.")
I believe it is fairly clear that there is a significant number of a-lpsoas such that God can bring about one agent-variant lpsoa and Jane can bring about a different, corresponding agent-variant lpsoa. We are now in a position to see the variety of lpsoas that God, Jane, or both God and Jane can bring about, and that Jane is at least as powerful as God. (Note that Jane, as a being who can learn, cannot bring about "A being who cannot learn freely does z," but God cannot bring about "A being who can learn freely does z.")

§7 It is clear that God and Jane both cannot bring about "Jane ceases to exist" or "God ceases to exist" although these are not lpsoas (because both Jane and God exist necessarily). Further, it seems acceptable that neither God nor Jane can bring about "Jane loses his powers" or "God loses his powers," because the powers of God and Jane are essential properties of each. Again, these are not lpsoas. We have accounted for the stipulations provided in §5 above. So far, it seems that both God and Jane could pass the Maximal Power Test.

§8 I believe there is a lpsoa that Jane can bring about and God cannot bring about, that corresponds to no agent-variant a-lpsoa that God can bring about and Jane cannot bring about. That is, if we accept that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the lpsoas God can bring about and the lpsoas Jane can bring about -- if the lpsoa in question is an n-lpsoa then they both can bring it about, and if it's an a-lpsoa, there will be a corresponding agent-variant a-lpsoa that the other being can bring about -- we will find that there is at least one lpsoa Jane can bring about that God cannot bring about.
Consider the lpsoa “Jane learns without being caused to learn by an outside agent.” Jane can bring about this lpsoa, and God cannot, for if God brought it about, it would really be God Who caused Jane to learn. Now, let us search for a corresponding lpsoa that is beyond Jane’s power but within God’s power to bring about. We cannot simply insert “God” for “Jane,” because “God learns without being caused to learn by an outside agent” is not a lpsoa and is beyond the power of both Jane and God. Yet, God can bring about “Jane learns while being caused to learn by an outside agent,” which is beyond Jane’s power. Let us consider, then, a very similar lpsoa: “Jane causes Jane to learn.” God cannot bring about this lpsoa, because it would really be Jane causing Jane to learn, and Jane can bring about this lpsoa. God can, however, bring about “God causes Jane to learn,” and if Jane were to bring it about, it would really be Jane causing Jane to learn.
What we need is a lpsoa that only a learning being can instantiate, and a non-learning being cannot instantiate. Let “S1” refer to the lpsoa “Someone or other causes him- or herself to learn.” S1 happens to be an n-lpsoa. Therefore, there will be no agent-variant lpsoa that either God or Jane can bring about but the other can’t. It should be clear that God cannot bring about S1, but Jane can. Both Jane and God can bring about “Someone or other is caused by an outside force to learn.” It therefore seems evident that Jane can do all God can do, and more. This agrees with the intuition that a being who can learn and do evil is more powerful than a being who cannot, ceteris paribus.
Another example of an lpsoa that Jane can bring about and God can’t is S2, “Someone or other freely chooses to do evil.” God is defined as a being Who cannot do evil, and so only beings with the capacity to do evil can bring about S2. Again, one of God’s essential properties has set a limit on the variety of lpsoas God can bring about, a limit that does not exist on Jane’s power.

§9 One possible objection is apparent. The apologist might claim that S1 is not in fact a lpsoa because no agent can bring it about; no one truly causes him- or herself to learn, but rather, is caused to learn by antecedent causal factors and a combination of stimuli. My response is that there is a different reading of “to cause oneself to learn” that avoids this difficulty: If x causes herself to learn, then x chooses to learn and then succeeds. Certainly, other people or objects might aid in the acquisition of knowledge, but if we can say that if x had not made that choice, x would not have learned, then it should be acceptable to say that x has caused herself to learn. Jane could choose to read a book and thereby gain some knowledge, and if Jane had not chosen to read the book, she would not have gained that knowledge; the same situation would not occur with God.

§10 A second, stronger objection is as follows. S1 might be said not to be a suitable state of affairs at all, because of its vagueness. After all, every time God or Jane caused “someone or other” to do a, He or she would be causing some specific person x to be doing a. The only way Jane could cause x to cause x to learn would be if the value of x were Jane herself, and if this is the case, then God could bring about “God causes Jane to learn,” which Jane is unable to bring about. Jane can bring about “Jane causes Jane to learn,” which God cannot bring about. If it is true that every time Jane brings about S1, she is bringing about “Jane causes Jane to learn,” then it might seem that God always has the corresponding action “God causes Jane to learn” available in His repertoire.
The best counter-response here is that “Jane causes Jane to learn” and “Jane brings about S1” are indeed distinct situations. It may be true that, as it happens, every time Jane brings about S1 she is causing herself to learn, but it seems clear that we can understand the content of “someone or other causes him- or herself to learn” without having to assign it a specific actor. It is not the case that every time S1 obtains, Jane has caused herself to learn. Therefore, simply, the two are not logically equivalent. What happens is that every time Jane brings about S1, she has caused herself to learn, but it should not be surprising that some states of affairs obtain only in certain circumstances and can obtain as results of different sufficient conditions. We speak of “someone or other” doing something fairly frequently, and we are certainly aware of when this state of affairs has obtained, so it seems to make sense to speak of it as if it’s something a person can bring about.

§11 Now that I have argued that a being as defined in §1 is not maximally powerful, I will do some work to make the connection between this being and the God of the apologists stronger. Specifically, I will argue that a being who is omniscient in the actual world cannot bring about S1, and that a being who is morally perfect, omniscient, and very powerful cannot bring about S2. First, if a being x is essentially omniscient in the actual world, then there is no possible world in which this being learns. We have defined this being to be omniscient, so transworldly identical beings in nearby possible worlds are also omniscient, and none of them will ever learn. On the other hand, if x is accidentally omniscient in the actual world, then there are indeed transworldly identical beings in nearby possible worlds who learn. Yet, we may modify S1 slightly to preclude accidentally omniscient beings from bringing it about, thus: “Someone or other causes him- or herself- to learn, without first forgetting anything.” An accidentally omniscient being would have to forget something to gain the power to learn, and therefore could not bring about the modified S1 for reasons analogous to why an essentially omniscient being could not bring about S1.
A morally perfect being cannot bring about S2. For these purposes, morally perfect beings are those who correctly determine the correct choice to make in any given situation for which there is a morally correct choice, and make that choice, and beings who correctly determine the morally incorrect choice to make in any given situation for which there is a morally incorrect choice, and never make that choice. Now, it should be uncontroversial that it is morally incorrect to cease being morally perfect, so a morally perfect being will never cease to be morally perfect. An omniscient and very powerful being will have total control over her choices; that is, she will not be fooled or coerced into ceasing to be morally perfect. It follows that a being who is morally perfect in the actual world is morally perfect in all future states of all possible worlds. Therefore, there is no possible world in which a morally perfect being brings about S2.

§12 It may be possible to abandon the definition of “power” given in §4 and adopt a new one so that God might still pass the Maximal Power Test. Let us consider a version of “power” that stipulates that power is a result of the ability to bring about a-lpsoas, rather than lpsoas in general. The damning lpsoas in §8 were n-lpsoas, so perhaps the theist will have more luck if she limits God’s power to a-lpsoas. What, then, if God can bring about any a-lpsoa? This simply does not seem to characterize the power of God fully. We can name literally thousands of n-lpsoas that we think an “omnipotent” being ought to be able to bring about, but if we only know God can perform a-lpsoas, we are not in a position to say He is omnipotent by most people’s intuitions. Power seems to be about bringing about some states of affairs that do not happen to predicate particular agents.
Another option available is to limit God’s power very carefully. One might say that God has the power to bring about any lpsoa, except for the ones that involve someone or other learning or making a morally imperfect choice. Yet, this definition seems patently ad hoc. For any essential limitation on God’s power, we could circumscribe our definition of “power” to account for such a limitation; if God happened not to be able to communicate with humans, we could say communication with humans need not be part of God’s repertoire. I believe it makes much more sense to believe that the abilities to learn and to do evil indeed grant a nonzero amount of power to the person that possesses those abilities.
There is the possibility that power should be thought of in relative terms; the most powerful being would simply be the most powerful being that exists. But we do not seem to adopt this sort of definition for very many other properties. We do not say the being who knows the most is omniscient, so we should not say the being who is the most powerful is definitely omnipotent. If earth were all that existed, then we might say George W. Bush is omnipotent in 2002, but the combined power of the rest of the world would certainly be enough to overthrow him. It would seem that if God is simply the most powerful being, this leaves open the possibility that we might overthrow Him.
Finally, one might decide to redefine power as the ability to bring about any lpsoa that an unlimited, perfect being can bring about. Again, however, we seem to have made a stipulation that departs somewhat from our intuitive views about power. It seems quite clear that if God were not morally perfect, there would be a far greater number of lpsoas He could bring about. Perhaps God’s limitation of moral perfection is self-imposed, but it is still a limitation. God might pass the Maximal Perfection Test, but He would fail the Maximal Power Test.

§13 I believe I have demonstrated that God fails the Maximal Power Test. There is a conceivable being, Jane, who would be more powerful than God. Therefore, it seems to be the case that God is not omnipotent.

Vanderzyden

Thomas,

I do not find that you have successfully argued that God is not maximally powerful. First, let's examine your definition of God:

What does "very powerful" mean? I observe that you explicitly avoid mentioning creative power, despite our previous discussion. It is quite reasonable for us to insist that a "Maximal Power Test" must take into account God's creative power. More on this later.

I take "necessarily existing being" to mean that all other beings besides God are contingent. You have not defined well what you mean by necessary existence. In what relation(s) is his existence necessary?

Furthermore, you seem to avoid our intuitions altogether. It would seem, since you rely upon our intuitions in providing us with illustrations, that you must be consistent in applying them to our very existence, as well. As Leibniz so profoundly asked, "Why does something exist rather than nothing?" Any argument concerning omnipotence must take this primary fact into account.

I am also concerned about point #3:

Here you introduce the concept of "possible worlds", but you do not make any mention of our actual world. A common example is the possibility of a multi-verse. Instead of one universe (ours), there may be several. Or, our universe may have "turned out differently". The problem is, we have no justification for believing that either is at all possible. All that we know is our universe. As such, it is tantamount to nonsense to speak of "possible worlds". Here again, we encounter the same difficulty I raised with you previously: our imagination far exceeds what is actually possible in our world.

I accept your definition of LPSOA, all by itself. However, it again becomes troublesome when you combine it with a definition of power:

I have not read Spinoza. If this is his definition, then I have the same bone to pick with him. Power does not intrinsically depend upon superior numbers. One single power may supersede millions of smaller powers. One power may be vastly stronger than all others. It seems that you have difficulty in grasping this concept. However, I do not know what other illustration I can use. You will recall the nuclear weapon example. The destructive power inherent in the use of one hydrogen bomb will overpower (overwhelm, supersede) the usage of the much smaller combined powers of thousands of small firearms.

Also, some powers are responsible for other powers. We know that the powers of assembly workers and engineers have been brought to bear on the construction (or dismantling) of nuclear bombs. In absence of human powers, the power of nuclear bombs would not be utilized.

I have argued previously that creative/destructive power is the greatest power, because all other powers come from this power. Such power is held over all physical matter and metaphysics. God has this power. No other being has it. Therefore God is all-powerful. He is Almighty.

Let's look at your power restrictions:

While you do not mention creative power, you introduce the concept of "cease to exist". You also speak of "power removal". Why is it that you avoid mention of the complementaries? In particular, this begs the questions:

1. If two such beings (God and Jane) exist, what brought both of them into existence?
2. If both beings have powers, what is responsible for the possession of these powers?

To make this inquiry specific, we may take a moment to carefully to inspect your introduction of Jane. It is unreasonable to simply to let another being be "qualitatively identical" to God. You have not explained how two necessary beings can co-exist.

There is yet another concept you have avoided in our dialogues. Again, I encourage you to remember that, in addition to power, there are weaknesses. A weakness may be of two primary types, (a) a deficiency or (b) lower power. The performance of evil is a deficiency--it is to act in a way that is not good. My power to lift a phone book is a lower grade power compared to my power in using anti-tank weapon. My influence over my child is far less power than that of the creator over my existence.

Also, you must distinguish between (a) mere ability and (b) an ability that is also a power. This, too, we have discussed. Aptitude is the ability, or capacity, to learn. The ability to learn does not fit your definition of LPSOA. Learning is not a "power to bring about a logically possible state of affairs". An agent may act upon what has been learned (note the passive tense). Let me assert that a power must be actionable. Without action, there is no power. Can you explain how mere cognition (i.e. learning) is a power?

In point #8, you present the core of your argument: Jane can learn. God cannot. Therefore, Jane is more powerful. I have already explained that learning is an ability. It is not a power. In fact, it is a weakness in relation to an omniscient being. For a supposedly omniscient being to suddenly discover that it can learn would immediately call into question not only it's omniscience, but it's omnipotence.

This is yet again another point that I mentioned several times in the other thread. (I wonder why you chose not to consider these critical points in the presentation of this argument.) If God knows all truths that can be known (forgetting none of them), then how is it that Jane is qualitatively equal to God? She can learn, but her ability to learn is wasted, since there is nothing for her to learn. What other truths can she know that God cannot know?

In point #11, after you have declared the cogency (soundness?) of your argument, you elaborate upon the consideration of omniscience. You do not define nor lend support to your concept of "accidental omniscience". How could a being be accidentally omniscient? Again, accidental discovery of additional truths would render the being less than omniscient. In general, point #11 is confusing (as it contains several arbitrary and nebulous definitions), and is wholly contigent upon the assertions that (a) learning is a power and (b) an omniscient being could learn.

Therefore, the hypothetical, arbitrarily defined being Jane cannot possibly exist, since (a) learning is intrinsically a mere ability and extrinsically a relative weakness, and (b) an omniscient being has no need, nor is capable, of learning.

I would think that you must extend your "power test" to accomodate considerations of creative power. Without such modification, such a test fails in our actual world, since something indeed exists.


John

[ October 31, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Ikea

In response to the original posting by Thomas Metcalf, I would like to say that I find fault with this line: Let Jane be qualitatively identical to God except that Jane can learn and do evil.

There is a problem with letting Jane be qualitatively identical to God and also be able to learn. There would be nothing for Jane to learn if Jane were truly an omniscient being. Jane would be less powerful than God, because while Jane would be able to learn, God would already know all, and I find omniscience to be a more useful/powerful thing.

I admit that I did not completely understand the rest of your argument with only one read-through. Too many 'lpsoa's for my brain. It seemed coherent though I will try and come back later to look at it.

Ikea

Vanderzyden,

I found fault with several things in your reply to Thomas, though I can't quite figure out how to articulate them yet. The one thing I wished to point out to you was your confusion of Thomas' use of the word accidentally. I think you were interpreting accidental in the sense that we usually use the word outside of philosophy, a mistake, accidental discovery, the like. You ask how a being could be accidentally omniscient. All that would have to happen for that (in the sense Thomas menat) is a being would be omniscient without it being necessary that the being is omniscient. The being just happens to be omniscient. It is possible that it could have been otherwise. Being accidentally omniscient does not involve 'accidentally' ('oops!') discovering that it is omniscient.

If that didn't clarify it, please let me know and I will try again.

Thomas Metcalf

Thanks for your response, Ikea.

Originally posted by Ikea:

"There is a problem with letting Jane be qualitatively identical to God and also be able to learn. There would be nothing for Jane to learn if Jane were truly an omniscient being. Jane would be less powerful than God, because while Jane would be able to learn, God would already know all, and I find omniscience to be a more useful/powerful thing."

I think this is a pretty interesting objection. You seem to be denying a part of §4; to you, to be omniscient grants a person more power than to be able to bring about certain lpsoas. I would say that Jane need not be very far from omniscient; perhaps God knows everything and Jane knows everything except the number of hairs on my cat's head at time t, one second out of all of eternity. In this case, I think we can say Jane's knowing the number of hairs on my cat's head at t does not increase her power much, but the ability to bring about S1, plus, of course, the ability to bring about S2 (which is invulnerable to your objection) grant her a little more power.

You're right, though, that I should have accounted for this in my argument. I think it's even possible to modify this slightly so that Jane still believes all true propositions and doesn't believe any false propositions; it's just that one of her beliefs isn't justified. Maybe she correctly believes the number of hairs on my cat's head at time t and believes she's correct about it. In this case, she cannot be said strictly to know that fact, but it would appear she will function as if she did anyway.

Thanks for taking a stab at my article. I wonder if I should indeed limit the use of acronyms such as "lpsoa."

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"What does 'very powerful' mean?"

Well, what does "very" mean and what does "powerful" mean? Put them together. The only point to adding it is to show that we don't know yet whether God is omnipotent, and that He has powers about which we could possibly say "Jane removes God's powers." This is important for §5 and §7.

"I take 'necessarily existing being' to mean that all other beings besides God are contingent. You have not defined well what you mean by necessary existence. In what relation(s) is his existence necessary?"

Philosophers define "necessary existence" very specifically. If God exists necessarily, it is impossible for Him not to exist and He exists in all possible worlds. This is what philosophers mean by "necessary."

"As Leibniz so profoundly asked, 'Why does something exist rather than nothing?' Any argument concerning omnipotence must take this primary fact into account."

Why? That's a different argument altogether.

"Here you introduce the concept of 'possible worlds', but you do not make any mention of our actual world. A common example is the possibility of a multi-verse. Instead of one universe (ours), there may be several. Or, our universe may have 'turned out differently'. The problem is, we have no justification for believing that either is at all possible. All that we know is our universe. As such, it is tantamount to nonsense to speak of 'possible worlds'."

Philosophers define "possible world" very specifically. How could you have read Leibniz and not be familiar with possible worlds? Possible worlds, since the death of David Lewis (R.I.P.) and largely before, are taken to be consistent and maximal propositions. They are ways the world could have been and could be. To say that we have no idea whether other worlds are possible is to say that we have no idea whether I could have worn a green shirt yesterday. I think you'll find that almost everyone believes that yesterday I could have worn a green shirt.

"The destructive power inherent in the use of one hydrogen bomb will overpower (overwhelm, supersede) the usage of the much smaller combined powers of thousands of small firearms."

But if I have ten million hydrogen bombs, plus a .45, I'm more powerful than a person only with ten million hydrogen bombs, all else equal.

"In particular, this begs the questions:

1. If two such beings (God and Jane) exist, what brought both of them into existence?
2. If both beings have powers, what is responsible for the possession of these powers?"

Philosophers define "begs the question" very specifically; it is not anything like provoking the question. Anyway, I don't care how Jane came into existence, or how they got their powers. It is immaterial to my argument. All we need is that a hypothetical being would be more powerful than God.

"You have not explained how two necessary beings can co-exist."

Why couldn't they? My argument does not even require that they co-exist, only that if Jane existed, she would be more powerful than God.

"The performance of evil is a deficiency--it is to act in a way that is not good."

I don't see the connection between morality and power. The power to bring about a wider variety of moral situations seems greater than the power not to bring about such a wide variety.

"My power to lift a phone book is a lower grade power compared to my power in using anti-tank weapon."

But the power to lift phone books and use anti-tank weapons is greater than the power simply to use anti-tank weapons, all else equal.

"Aptitude is the ability, or capacity, to learn. The ability to learn does not fit your definition of LPSOA. Learning is not a 'power to bring about a logically possible state of affairs'. "

I know. I never said it is. But learning allows a person the power to bring about a lpsoa.

"Can you explain how mere cognition (i.e. learning) is a power?"

I don't know, but learning seems to involve action. If cognition isn't a power, then "I have the power to think" is an internally incoherent sentence. So if it isn't, then my argument is correct. Further, either "I have the power to learn" is incoherent or coherent. If the latter, to which most people will agree, then my argument works.

"For a supposedly omniscient being to suddenly discover that it can learn would immediately call into question not only it's omniscience, but it's omnipotence."

Why?

"You do not define nor lend support to your concept of 'accidental omniscience'. How could a being be accidentally omniscient?"

Philosophers define accidental and essential properties very specifically, as Ikea has pointed out in this thread. If I'm accidentally omniscient, it's not part of my definition that I'm omniscient. That's what it means. If I'm essentially omniscient, on the other hand, then if I weren't omniscient I wouldn't be I.

"In general, point #11 is confusing (as it contains several arbitrary and nebulous definitions), and is wholly contigent upon the assertions that (a) learning is a power and (b) an omniscient being could learn."

Show me where (1) my §11 contains a nebulous definition and (2) where I have explicitly said that an omniscient being can learn. I admit that my description of Jane as "qualitatively identical" to God is misleading; I meant by the fact that she can learn that what that entails is also true, that she is not omniscient.

"...learning is intrinsically a mere ability and extrinsically a relative weakness..."

I don't agree. Most people would say learning is indeed a power. Further, I would say a being who is almost omniscient would certainly not be less powerful than an omniscient being by my §4. And imagine that Jane believes everything God believes and doesn't believe anything God doesn't believe; it's just that one of her minor beliefs is unjustified. She would therefore not be omniscient, but it would seem that functionally she'd be just as powerful.

Ikea

Thomas,
You went and covered everything I wanted to post but wasn't able to articulate properly. That's a relief.

Vanderzyden

Ikea,

Thanks for the precise clarification! I am interested in what else you might have to say about my rebuttal.


John

[ October 31, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Vanderzyden

[ October 31, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Vanderzyden

Thomas,

It would seem that you are taking great pains to inform me of philosophical definitions (most of which I am already familiar), and yet you continue to evade the question of creative power. Is it because you are concerned that your argument cannot take account of this power? Surely you must realize that, until you incorporate this greatest of all powers into your rationale, your arguments do not stand cogently. Instead of continue to harp on that angle, let me simply request, again, that you respond in earnest (or make a concession).

Now, you insist that learning is significant. Let me take the analysis a bit further.

But you are strongly implying it by saying that the hypothetical Jane is more powerful by virtue of her ability to learn. Is that not the essence of your argument?

No, for an omniscient being, learning does not permit the arrangement of one additional lpsoa. That is, again, because, an omniscient being has no need of learning. In fact, the ability to learn and omniscience are completely contradictory (as Ikea was alluding).

Indeed, learning requires action. But the action is effort expended to compensate for a weakness, that is, the relative lack of knowledge. In your examples, I can replace "power" with "ability" and we have the same meaning with "I have the ability to think". Consider the case where all beings possessed only one ability: to think. If this was the only ability, then no power could be exhibited by these beings. None of these beings could act upon their thoughts. Agreed? If so, then you ought to also agree that "power" is an inappropriate descriptor in the the above sentences.

On the one hand, Thomas, you want to appeal to precise philosophical definitions, but alternatively appeal to what the masses will think. In response, I would remind you of Socrates' response to Crito:

Reflect, then, do you not think it reasonable to say that we should not respect all the opinions of men but only some, nor the opinions of all men but only of some men? What do you think? Is this not true?

So, then, we should not concern ourselves with the public opinion of whether "power" or "ability" is most suitable. Rather, we should consider for ourselves what seems right, since we are the ones taking time to pursue wisdom.

In summary, it seems very clear that the ability to learn is not a power. In comparison with omniscience, it is a relative weakness. As such, it cannot justifiably be a positive consideration in the assessment or formulation of a definition of omnipotence.

Before I close, I should indicate where I am in agreement. You wrote:

I agree with this example. It would seem that any example or hypothetical that you propose must conform to this pattern. If we are to discuss omnipotence, it is practical to limit our illustrations and identifications to powers, not mere abilities.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this with you.

Thanks!

John

[ October 31, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>