jlowder

I thought John Bice's article, "The Creationist Holy War," was very well written. I have two quibbles with the author, though. Bice writes the following:

I do not see any reason to believe that a "Godless universe would be the end to the concept of an ultimate morality which preexisted man." The are several prominent philosophers who have argued just the opposite, including Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, David Brink, Quentin Smith, Michael Martin, Paul Draper, Richard Swinburne, and even Robert Adams, to name just a few philosophers. It seems to me that before one can declare that a nontheistic morality cannot be objective, one needs to refute the arguments of such philosophers.

Bice goes on to write:

I highly doubt that Johnson "ignores [that] possibility." On the contrary, I suspect that Johnson happily agrees. Johnson would probably say, "Yes, I agree, man can invent moral systems, but they are not objective." The proper response to Johnson is to challenge the assumption that moral objectivity presupposes theism in the first place. Also, I do think the notion of a "created moral absolute" is a contradiction in terms. Yes, humans create ethical systems, but that isn't what moral philosophers mean when they talk about morality being objective.

Bice also writes the following:

I agree that evolution and God are logically compatible. However, I'm not sure that completely addresses creationist worries. For while evolution and God are logically compatible, it may be the case that, nevertheless, evolution is more probable on the assumption of metaphysical naturalism than on the assumption of theism. Indeed, Paul Draper, Louis Pojman, and at least one other philosopher (whose name escapes me) have argued that evolution is evidence for naturalism and against theism. See, e.g., Paul Draper, "Evolution and the Problem of Evil" in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (3rd ed., ed. Louis Pojman, Wadsworth, 1997), pp. 219-230; cf. Louis P. Pojman, Philosophy of Religion (Mayfield, 2001), chapter 6. Indeed, I used just such an argument in my debate on the existence of God with <a href="http://www.infidels.org/infidels/products/video/lowder-fernandes.html" target="_blank">Phil Fernandes</a>.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ October 03, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

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Bice

Thanks for the feedback on my article “The Creationist Holy War.”

I’ll try to address your quibbles as succinctly as possible.

You mention:
First, let’s define the word objective. I’m comfortable with the following definitions: “Free of any bias or prejudice caused by personal feeling; based on facts rather than thoughts or opinions; existing independently of the individual mind or perception.” In my opinion it is absurd to believe that prior to, or even moments after, the “big bang,” it was objectively wrong for human beings (who did not yet exist) to kill other human beings. The notion that billions of years before humans existed, it was written into the fabric of the universe that killing another human being is wrong, but killing a mosquito is acceptable appears to me to be absurd. I would require objective proof that this is the case. Where is the purely objective evidence that a human life is more valuable than a mosquito’s life?

Human life does not have any objective, or innate, value other than what we, as humans, give it.

However, I do agree completely that once a set of moral premises has been agreed upon, it is possible to have an objective ethical code that is based on those premises. For example, if it were universally agreed that one central moral premise is “human life is precious,” it then follows that certain types of behavior would be immoral. That’s simplistic, but you get the idea. Where I disagree with you, and apparently a large group of philosophers, is the notion that a premise such as “human life is precious” could possibly be objective. Why is human life precious? If a more advanced alien race came to Earth and wiped out all humanity, would that be immoral? From our perspective, yes, but from theirs it might be the equivalent to squashing an ant mound. Or, perhaps, just as in the “Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy” they were simply making way for a galactic by-pass. The point is that morals are a human construct.

Next you question my statement that “Johnson ignores the possibility that man can, and does, make his own moral judgments and create his own ethical virtues and absolutes.”

I would be forced to agree with Johnson that human morality cannot be purely objective for the reasons I mentioned above. The point I was making in the article is that human beings are not rendered immoral without a deity. In fact, I would argue that religious morality usually lags behind social moral thinking (equal rights, slavery, tolerance).

I believe Johnson would be quite correct in asserting that a morality based on an “ultimate truth,” that is “purely objective,” requires a deity, or recognized a “law giver.” Someone, or something, that is in a position of authority over humans. As I alluded to previously, perhaps we can create a moral system that is in perfect harmony with what is best for human society, and maximizes human happiness. However, why is human happiness an objective good? The answer, of course, is that happiness is good because we are humans, and we like being happy. That is not an objective answer.

Regarding your point that a “created moral absolute” is a contradiction. I disagree. The definition of absolute that I was using is “to the very greatest degree possible.” For example, I believe that humans can assert the notion that cold-blooded murder for profit is an absolute wrong. It can never be condoned. We can consider that notion in the same way as Christians consider the commandment “thou shall not commit murder” as an absolute. My point was that evolutionary theory does not imply immorality. We can impose ethical absolutes on ourselves; we don’t require a deity for that. Having said that, just because we may all agree, and provide rational reasons why, cold-blooded murder for profit is an absolute wrong, that in no way demonstrates that it is a purely objective reality. It’s not the same as a physical reality such as gravity. Gravity would presumably exist without any humans around to name it.

Lastly you write:
I agree with you. I believe evolutionary theory is powerful evidence against theism. In fact, I think the creationists are quite correct to view it as a threat. Evolutionary theory opens up a significant variety of problems for theists. The point I was attempting to make was that evolutionary theory doesn’t spell the end for religion or morality. Rather than fighting the truth, religion can do what is has done for centuries; it can simply adjust. Religion has successfully dealt with previous challenges that seemed devastating, such as a round earth and the heliocentric solar system. The fact that so many theists have accepted evolution as a fact, and have not lost faith, demonstrates that point. Personally, I think they should have lost their faith, but that’s another topic.

Thanks for your comments,
John Bice

[ October 03, 2002: Message edited by: Bice ]</p>

jlowder

I'm willing to stipulate the definition of objective you provide at the top of the paragraph, but later in your paragraph you seem to assume that moral objectivism entails beliefs that have nothing to do with moral objectivism. For example:

On the assumption that morality is objective, how does it follow the fabric of the universe contains a moral rule that says, "Do not harm human beings"? I agree that such a view of things would be absurd. But moral objectivism doesn't entail that view. All that moral objectivism says is that moral principles are objectively true (i.e., independently of the subjective beliefs of persons). As such, moral objectivism is a metaethical position, not a normative position. The metaethics vs. normative ethics distinction is important. The moral principle, "It is wrong to kill a human being," is a normative statement. But moral objectivism doesn't entail any normative statements. Furthermore, just because moral objectivists believe it is wrong to kill human beings, it doesn't follow they are committed to the existence of the specific rule, "It is wrong to kill human beings." Instead, moral objectivists could be committed to a more general principle, e.g., "It is prima facie morally wrong to end the life of a person against their will." The point is that humans don't have to be specifically mentioned in the moral principle, in order for humans to be the beneficiaries of that moral principle.

I think that's a rather poor analogy. The cognitive capacities of mosquitoes don't even come close to comparing with that of human beings. A better question might be, "Why is a human life more valuable than a chimpanzee's life?" At least then we would be talking about a sentient animal. And in response to THAT question, the answer may very well be, "A human life is not more valuable than a chimpanzee's life." On this issue, I find James Rachels' argument in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0192861298/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">Created from Animals</a> to be very persuasive. Although chimpanzees lack the characteristics necessary to be morally responsible for their behavior, it seems that chimpanzees can be the beneficiaries of moral obligations just as much as humans can. Since the structure of their nervous system and brain is very similar to that of humans, it is extremely likely that chimpanzees can, for example, experience physical pain just as vividly as any conscious human can experience pain. Therefore, our moral obligation not to inflict pain on others would seem to apply just as much as to chimpanzees as it would to other human beings. But, to put this back into perspective of your original statement, this doesn't undermine moral objectivism one iota, since objectivism does not entail the view that human beings are intrinsically morally valuable, in a way that no non-human animals could ever be.

Regarding human construction of ethical systems, I cannot agree with you that an invented ethical code is objective. If human beings universally agreed on a moral principle, that wouldn't make the principle objectively true. You have confused objectivism with intersubjectivism.

You have also confused moral objectivism with moral absolutism. Moral objectivism is simply the view that moral principles are objectively true. It doesn't specify whether moral principles are overridable. In contrast, moral absolutism is the belief that there are no exceptions to moral rules. Thus, someone could be a moral objectivist and reject moral absolutism; another person could be a moral subjectivist and a moral absolutist.

As for Johnon's argument, I think you are missing the point. When theists say that objective morality requires God, they are not making the claim that nonbelief leads to an increase an immoral behavior. (They may hope that their lay audience misunderstands their philosophical argument and instead reaches that conclusion. Nevertheless, that is not their argument as they state it.) Instead, theists like Johnson are making a statement about metaethics. Therefore, to respond to such an argument by stating, "human beings are not rendered immoral without a deity," is to miss the point of the argument.

Finally, objective moral principles do not require a lawgiver, any more than the laws of logic or the laws of mathematics require a lawgiver. (To deny this point would be tantamount to saying that there was a time when 2+2 did not equal 4, or there was a time when a proposition could be both true and false--at the same time.)

In conclusion, we have not yet been presented with any good reasons to believe that metaphysical naturalism precludes an objective ethics. The fact of the matter is that metaphysical naturalism tells us nothing about the nature of moral principles. Therefore, metaphysical naturalists can be subjectivists, intersubjectivists, or objectivists. But whatever position they choose, they have to choose it themselves, based on the merits of that position. Naturalism doesn't make the choice automatic.

[ October 03, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

Bice

Thanks for the discussion. Ethics, as a matter for study, has never interested me very much, however I can see that it is an interest of yours. I will attempt to explain why I think moral objectivism over reaches.

You state that:
That statement seems to suggest that moral facts are of the same sort as physical facts. That is a concept I reject. A hydrogen atom is an atom that consists of only one proton. That is a fact, and as such will be accepted at any time by anybody who understands this fact. The belief you propose, as a moral objectivist example, “It is prima facie morally wrong to end the life of a person against their will,” is not a fact of the same kind. Actually, it is not a fact at all. Further, I would criticize that “general principle” with a one-word question. Why? Why is it generally morally wrong to end a life? Let me give you a science fiction/relativistic example. In Start Trek, the Klingons are a warlike and violent race. Their moral code is somewhat based an a Darwinian “survival of the fittest.” There is dishonor in dying an old man, killing a weak superior officer is a recognized method to move up in rank. They believe that the weak are a disgusting burden on society. You may argue that such a society might not actually work, but I see no obvious reason that it couldn’t. The point I’m making is that who is right? If what you say were correct, there would be no argument. If moral principals were objectively true, it would be obvious. Much like no one argues about how many protons make up a hydrogen atom; because, in that case it actually is objectively true.

Later you say, regarding my mosquito point:

Apparently you miss my point. It’s an excellent analogy precisely because the cognitive capabilities of a mosquito don’t come close. If, as moral objectivism suggests, moral principles are objectively true, it should be especially obvious why a human life is more important than a mosquito. Further, even explaining why a human life was “objectively” more valuable that a lump of igneous rock would be an impossible task. My point is that moral principles are not objectively true. I assert that there are no objective criteria by which to make the claim that human life is more valuable than a mosquito. It is ONLY from our perspective that we see human life as more valuable than a mosquito, or life in general as more valuable than a rock.


You say:

I think you misunderstand, or perhaps I stated it poorly. I was arguing that we could construct our own moral absolutes. Not, objective absolutes. Once these absolutes (or core moral principles) have been established, we can then objectively draw conclusions from those “factoids” that we get from our “core principles.” I certainly did not mean to imply that an invented ethical code is objective, only that it can be objectively derived from subjective precepts. An invented ethical code could be executed in an objective (or nearly objective) fashion, after the core beliefs had been established.

You further note that:

Actually, I wasn’t confusing them; I simply reject both moral objectivism and moral absolutism. Once again, I disagree with the statement that moral principles are objectively true. I believe that logic and mathematics are objectively true. You make mention of that in this statement:

I simply submit that moral principles are not in the same category as logic or mathematics. As evidence for my argument, it is interesting to note that you don’t hear too much argument about 2 plus 2 equaling 4 these days, or that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time. However, you do hear endless bickering over moral principles. You might argue that this is because moral principles are far more complex, however, I would argue that moral principles are simply not objectively true. Further, there are other philosophies, which have by no means been proven wrong, that reject the notion of objective moral principles (see Emotivism. Also known as the Boo/Hooratheory).

Further, I believe that the burden of proof is on the person making the claim. If I claim 2 plus 2 equals 4, as an objective truth, I am prepared to prove it. If you claim that certain moral principles are objectively true, which I assume would also mean that some moral principles are objectively false, then you must prove it. You must demonstrate such a truth in an objective way. So if you say, “It is prima facie morally wrong to end the life of a person against their will,” why is that the objective truth? Is it because it makes for a more civil society? Why is that an objective good? Is it because, perhaps, that it will tend to produce the most happiness? Why is human happiness an objective good? Do you see what I’m saying?

I am perfectly comfortable disagreeing with you on this, in a way that I wouldn’t be comfortable disagreeing about mathematics, or logic; because, they are truly objective. You seem to believe that cognitive ability is an objective good, human happiness is an objective good, life is an objective good. I do not hold that these are objective goods. We might simply fundamentally disagree on that perspective.


Finally you say:
Perhaps I was over-simplifying in that particular section. As is evident by our little discussion, all these “little side issues” can be complex, and I was trying to keep my article focused on the main point.

Thanks again for the discussion.

Cheers,
John

[ October 04, 2002: Message edited by: Bice ]</p>

jlowder

Again, I would like to focus on the statement you made in your essay, "Godless universe would be the end to the concept of an ultimate morality which preexisted man." That is the statement at issue. I'm not even trying to defend moral objectivism as such; rather, I'm simply making the point that metaphysical naturalism doesn't preclude moral objectivism. Yet most of your points in your latest amount to independent objections against moral objectivism, not a defense of the claim that naturalism rules out moral objectivism.

You wrote:

Moral objectivism doesn't specify whether moral facts are of the same sort as physical facts. Moral objectivists could believe that moral facts are supernatural facts, nonnatural facts, or natural facts. Only supernatural facts are precluded by metaphysical naturalism. Metaphysical naturalists could still believe that moral facts are either natural or nonnatural. Hence, this objections provides no support for the claim that metaphysical naturalism rules out moral objectivism.

As I read you, your next argument was the well-known argument from ethical disagreement.

And elsewhere you wrote the following.

That objection also does not support the claim that metaphysical naturalism rules out moral objectivism. If successful, that objection would undermine moral objectivism. But that objection provides no reason to believe that metaphysical naturalism rules out moral objectivism.

You then address the value of human life:

We agree that if metaphysical naturalism is true, then human beings are not "special," in the sense that all humans are intrinsically valuable and no non-humans are intrinsically valuable. But from the fact that human beings are not special in that sense, it doesn't follow that moral objectivism is false or even that humans are not more valuable than mosquitoes. Again, moral objectivism is a metaethical position, not a normative position. So moral objectivism does not entail any position on the value of human beings. Even if it were true that human beings were not more valuable than mosquitoes, that wouldn't disprove moral objectivism. And therefore the value of human beings does not support your claim that metaphysical naturalism rules out the possibility of moral objectivism.

(For the record, I don't see any reason to believe that human beings have the same value as mosquitoes. Humans are conscious, self-aware beings with goals; humans also have relationships with other people. Mosquitoes don't have any of these properties. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that mosquitoes are even sentient beings. So if we have a moral duty not to harm others, I see no reason to believe that it would apply to mosquitoes.)

Finally, you wrote:

For the record, I am undecided between whether such things are objectively good or intersubjectively good. But the point I want to make is that you still have provided no reason to believe that moral objectivism must be false if metaphysical naturalism is true. What you are raising are independent objections to moral objectivism. You have not shown that metaphysical naturalism undermines moral objectivism.

The relationship between naturalism and ethics is sort of like the relationship between naturalism and politics. Just as a metaphysical naturalist could be a Libertarian, Republican, Democrat, Socialist, Independent, or member of some other party, a metaphysical naturalist could be a moral objectivist, a moral intersubjectivist, or a moral subjectivist. Metaphysical naturalism just doesn't specify one over the other.

Bice

You wrote:
You are quite correct. However, I should add that I have made no attempt to absolutely rule out moral objectivism. I don’t feel that it is required of me.

I’ll try to use an, admittedly imperfect, analogy to demonstrate what I mean. In my opinion, the statement I made, a Godless universe would be the end to the concept of an ultimate morality which preexisted man,” is analogous to a similar statement, “modern medical science, and germ theory, puts an end to the concept of evil spirits as a cause of disease.” Of course, I did not rule out evil spirits as a cause of disease with the mention of germ theory. Evil spirits may well exist; however, for their existence to be taken seriously compelling evidence must be provided. Until such time, I am free to make such a statement with confidence. Analogously, you are correct to point out that I did not rule out moral objectivism by postulating a Godless universe; however, I have also seen no firm demonstration of the truth of moral objectivism. Why would I attempt to rule out something that I don’t take seriously? Once again, until adequate proof is presented, that demonstrates the correctness of the assertion of moral positivism, I am free to make my “Godless universe” statement with confidence.

I am still completely comfortable with my original statement. If metaphysical naturalism is true, I can think of no reason to assume natural laws would provide an “ultimate morality which preexisted man.” I believe that if there are those who take issue with such a statement, and would insist that objective moral principles do exist, they are taking that position on faith. I believe metaphysical naturalism implies that no objective moral truths exist. Morality and ethics are simply a construct of man; they are a “science of societal interactions” which is based on subjectively evaluated desirable outcomes. To be made uncomfortable with my "Godless Universe" statement, however, I would need to be shown satisfactory proof that there are indeed ultimate, and objective, moral truths that preexisted man. The burden of proof, as I said before, rests solely upon those who make the claim that objective moral truths exist. Until such proofs exist, I do not feel that it necessary to rule out what appears to be something that people are taking on faith. I’m not even sure that ruling out moral objectivism is possible. There are a potentially infinite number of conceivable moral principles, how would one rule them all out? Seemingly, the best I can do is demonstrate, one by one, that each supposedly objective moral truth rests squarely upon a subjective moral assumption.

You also wrote:
I must say, it doesn’t surprise me that a human being, such as yourself, would apply subjectively elevated value ratings to such qualities as consciousness, goals, and human relationships. We, as humans, place added value on those characteristics that we perceive to be uniquely human. This is a position based on opinions and feelings, not facts or evidence, which is the definition of subjective. Why should consciousness and relationships be of any more intrinsic value that a highly successful evolutionary strategy? In fact, if we are going to try to infer a purpose or point to the universe, the only “point” seems to be the reproduction of DNA (see Dawkins – The Selfish Gene). I mean, after all, that’s really what we are here doing, and I know of no evidence that suggests another reason for our existence. With that in mind, if one wished to place value on certain characteristics, efficient replication would seem to be that which would be most “naturally” highly valuable. Perhaps, instead of a mosquito, we should be talking about viruses. They have a wonderful plan; let other organisms do the work of replicating for them. Of course, from our human perspective, viruses seem evil, or amoral at best, and we are hell bent on finding ways to “outsmart them.” The point I am making is, who is to say that the virus isn’t more intrinsically valuable than a slowly reproducing and evolving human being? It is sheer hubris that allows a human to look at the universe and believe that our species is in some way special, and objective moral laws preexisted in the universe, just waiting for us to evolve into existence to discover them.

For the record, as a human, I also see human beings as more "important" than a virus or mosquito. I simply recognize that there is no purely objective rationality for thinking this.

Finally, to summarize our discussion on this subject, you objected to my statement, “a Godless universe would be the end to the concept of an ultimate morality which preexisted man.” You defended your objection, in part, with the following assertion taken from moral objectivism, “ . . . moral principles are objectively true (i.e., independently of the subjective beliefs of persons).” I have provided several examples that detail why I believe that, in fact, the opposite is true, that all moral principles are rooted in subjective premises. Lastly, you assert that metaphysical naturalism fails to disprove moral objectivism. Finally, I submit to you, I don’t recognize the burden to disprove moral objectivism. I also doubt the possibility exists to completely refute moral objectivism. Further, I believe metaphysical naturalism implies a value neutral universe, one in which no objective moral truths exist. I have seen no compelling evidence to the contrary.

I appreciate your feedback on my article, and would like to thank you for a stimulating discussion on the subject. The civility shown here is all too rare on the Internet.

Cheers,
John Bice

[ October 05, 2002: Message edited by: Bice ]</p>

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Prometheus

Bice states:
I think there is a danger in this because if objective morality were to exist you would be in danger of not caring about being moral. I think this is a unique situation where the burden of proof works in the opposite direction. Even though the person claiming that objective morality exists is making a postitive claim, the postitive claim needs to be disproved first because if it turns out to be true you will be living your life needlessly in ignorance of many things you may ought to do.

pug846

Prometheus said:

Why should that shift the burden of proof? This situation isn’t unique at all: someone is making a positive claim, if true, would alter the way we live our lives. This same argument could be used to shift the burden of proof in any argument over the existence of God, my claim that your wife is cheating on you, etc.