Llyricist

Yep, alot of people think the US justice system doesn't have all the necessary steps, alot of people think it has too many, we have something called consensus and compromise to work this out. Hence MOST complete. But yet again you're only helping to prove how subjective this issue is.

In a dictatorship, I'm sure the leaders would feel that they had all the necessary steps, and that's all that really matters until the revolution

I asked a question, how do you define rationality? That was NOT an argument, it was trying to lay the foundation for communication. If you refuse to answer, then we cannot communicate on this issue. But here goes, using the dictionary definition, an example of diametrically opposed rational decisions/conclusions.

I prefer to turn right out of my office parking lot and take a U-turn to head West, Because it is easier than trying to wait for both directions of traffic to clear, My boss prefers to turn left directly because it is the shortest distance. Both rational decisions, just differing weights given to different factors. There is nothing inherently objective or absolute about rationality. Or it would be called a Rational Moral Standards instead of Objective _

Normal

This is kind of what I'm getting at: That people have an inherent system of morals that they can use to judge one system as being "complete", and that some values they have as being "necessary". That most people have similar subjective standards for morality seems to me to point towards a "complete" moral system existing.

Yes, and you value time and your boss values distance. Neither of you are "right" or "wrong" objectively, but subjectively you have different values.

The thing I don't get, is how you can go from one person not wanting to turn left as not being the authority, to if the majority of people turn left, your boss should turn left as well. Do you see what I mean?

Llyricist

It only points me to the conclusion that we are the same species, and would naturally have evolved very similarly.

Actually it is not necessarily the majority that decides, but that does seem to be the most fair way. And don't get too confused, when I said _I_ don't have authority, I only spoke for myself. Until recently, Sadam Hussein DID have the authority to dictate HIS subjective standard within Iraq (for instance).

In the US we are lucky to be able to share somewhat in the decision making process of what becomes "Right and Wrong", Thus having no real authority by ourselves but a share in it. How we got there was something called the War for Independence from Britain

Otherwise we may still be in a position of having the oligarchy deciding right and wrong for us without our input at all.

Normal

Ok, I get you now. You are saying the only authority for a moral system is the body of power which can enforce a moral system, and that the better moral system enforced is the one which more people agree on.

Sounds reasonable, but my problem comes from what if the moral system you are a part of doesn't agree with you on a main issue of your own moral system. In the end the rational basis for argument will come down to two values that arn't agreed on, ie. time vs. distance. Really, to extend my problem with morality to the authority in power is not representative of my main problem. My main problem comes between two people who have different core values arguing for their respective values. Is there a definite right answer? I think it's rational to believe yes, there is a definite right answer to some moral questions, which would imply an objective moral system existing in some form.

Llyricist

Do you have a reason for believing this?

Llyricist

By the way, don't be embarrassed that you have that feeling, I'd be lying bigtime if I said I didn't also have that feeling. It just doesn't stand up to scrutiny, insofar as being THE RIGHT way. Though.... if you have have real life and THIS life reasons for believing your morality is correct, and they only had the bible....... I'd say you were the more rational. Point is where do your values come from?

Normal

Well, there is a definite "right" answer to any moral system, the only difference would be the values in question. If humans share at their base at least one common value (say, to survive), then that's one value we share in determining the "right" answer.

I wouldn't say I'm embarrassed, it's more that I have ideas about this that I might not have proof for, or haven't fully thought about.

About where my values come from: To be honest, I have no idea. I suppose them come from a respect for other people, but where does that respect come from? I'm searching.

Llyricist

Well the point was, if you have no reason for your belief, it cannot be said to be rational.

As I have theorized, I believe the tendency toward empathy/valuing other humans/ whatever you want to call it is biological/genetic, arrived at through evolutionary advantage. Of course this only applied to the immediate group, along with that tendency evolved a tendency toward hostility/animosity toward humans outside the group. Not to be potilitically incorrect, but in line with observations of other closely related primates, that hostility is less evident among females and toward females by males. That is, trading females among groups was biologically helpful in stirring up the gene pool so to speak.(preventing inbreeding)

Note my use of the word tendency, different people will have different levels of the empathy/animosity tendencies which range to the extremes.

Normal

But wouldn't that only make sense if there was some kind of "empathy gene" to be passed on?

I must admit my grasp of evolution is probably juvenile.

Bill Snedden

My apologies for the lengthy delay in reply...

I used to really enjoy reading Lewis when I was in high school. I must admit, however, that now his most "scholarly" works seem to me little more than sophistry. His "poetic" works, like The Great Divorce (a masterpiece!), The Screwtape Letters, and The Pilgrim's Regress, however, are another matter indeed. IMO, Lewis excelled at storytelling and his apologetic gifts were much better used there.

That digression aside, Lewis does have a point. I would also agree that all fighting is at base about values, which means there are moral issues involved (which, I think, is what Lewis meant). However, that doesn't mean that morality need be objective (which is Lewis' error); it merely means that a common platform needs to exist for two opposing parties to present a rational case. Such a platform need only be intersubjectively agreed to.

But as I may have mentioned before, much depends upon how we define "objective" and "subjective". Lewis argument depends upon the truth of something we might term "naive moral realism", or the belief that moral facts exist independently of observers and that they can be perceived directly. IMHO, such a view is simply untenable. The past 50 or so years of analytic philosophy have demonstrated that such a naive realism WRT material existence is highly questionable. How much more so must it be for immaterial existents?

I think that you misunderstand the point of my example, or perhaps it's the "objective/subjective" definition issue, again.

The "wrongness" of stripes & plaid has everything to do with my subjective evaluation of the aesthetical nature of the conjunction (contrasting shapes, as you mention). While I can certainly make a very good case for the fashion court based on the physical characteristics of stripes & plaid, I cannot prove that stripes & plaid are "wrong" absent some agreed-upon set of values like "distracting is bad".

I'm saying that moral judgements are essentially the same way, only I think there is good reason to believe that a value or values exists to which all humans subscribe, or at least have very good reason to subscribe.

One thing I would add: you humorously decry the "material" examples upon which we're forced to construct analogies, but surely you see the parallel to objective moral facts?

If there are objective moral facts, then (given some version of moral realism) coming to intersubjective agreement about their existence should be no more complicated than intersubjectively agreeing about the existence of a tree. If Lewis were indeed correct, then moral value is simply "there", readily perceived by any human and our agreement about it should be no more controversial than our agreement about the existence of the tree. The fact that we don't seem to perceive or agree to moral facts in that manner or uncontroversially militates against Lewis' argument, IMO.

Good! So we're agreed, then, that there is a value that all humans share or, at least, to which rational argument can be made that all humans should share?

Well, of course many people do indeed take actions that are not in their own best interests, and it may be rational to do so (I recommend Parfit's Reasons and Persons for some excellent argument along these lines.).

However, that aside, do you really believe that "killing and plunging (do you mean 'plundering?')" would indeed result in further happiness? If not, as I assume you would agree, why do you think it should be so difficult to create a rational argument demonstrating the fact? If the family fails to heed your argument, does it demonstrate that your argument was wrong, or that they are acting irrationally?

Well, I believe "intrinsic value" to be incoherent because I believe that value presupposes a valuer. "Intrinsic" means "within", so for something to be "intrinsically valuable" it would have to mean that the value for the object comes from the object itself, irrespective of any observer. But if "value" presupposes a "valuer", the relationship of the observer to the observed is inseparable. IOW, "value" comes from the relationship of the valuer to that which is valued and therefore cannot be an intrinsic property of the valued itself.

But there is a sense in which we might perceive value as intrinsic: that in which we all agree that something is valuable.

For example, we would probably agree that our own lives are valuable; in fact, I wager that the great majority of people would agree. The fact that most people would agree might lead us to believe (or argue) that there is something about life that makes it intrinsically valuable. But I think such a belief or argument is fundamentally mistaken as to the attribution of value in such a case. The fact that humans almost universally value their own lives says much about human nature and little about the value of life itself.

I think we do share one as I noted, above.

I think that most people base their moral systems on what they learned (or didn't learn) as children. In that sense, I think that most people's moral systems are culturally dependent. In many cases (perhaps most), that means dependent upon a particular religion as well.

However, what informs religious/cultural values? That is the answer that's probably lost forever to history. I believe that they all find their base as responses to universal human values (life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, etc). But this is by no means an uncontroversial belief. I find that it seems to make the most sense to me, even given that there are exceptions (sharia might be a notable example).

Lewis believed that the existence of largely complementary moral systems among diverse cultural and religious beliefs was evidence of objective moral value, however I believe that it's more reasonable to believe that such a phenomena is due to the fact that we're all human beings who to some extent share common goals (to survive, to flourish, etc) rather than its something imposed externally or the alleged recognition of an external moral fact.

Those are interesting definitions, but I should note that your definition of "objective" would not necessarily preclude "intersubjectivity". That's not surprising; as I said earlier, I think most people actually think of "objective" in this way. From what you say, below, it does seem that you actually interpret it a bit differently than I would, however.

Edited to add: See Alonzo Fyfe's first post in this thread for an interesting delineation of the difference between objective and subjective in regards to morality. I think his definitions make some sense, even though I disagree to some extent with the distinction he creates between what it means for a moral theory to be objective or subjective. See especially the last paragraph of that post which would most accurately reflect my own belief.

Well, not necessarily. There are atheist objectivists. That is, there are atheists who are materialists who subscribe to objective moral theories. I would agree, however, that such theories are problematic, but not necessarily easily dismissed.

The way I see it, there do exist multiple competing intersubjective moral systems. However, I believe that rational arguments can be made to demonstrate that one is superior to another based upon the values that both claim to support. Let me attempt to illustrate using an example.

Female circumcision is a more or less common practice in some cultures. Western civilization and its attendant moral systems would condemn such a practice as barbarous and immoral, however the (largely) Eastern cultures that condone this practice would not. Both cultures, however, would probably support the statement "our way is the best way for humans to live". I believe that it should be possible to create a rational argument to demonstrate that, in fact, female circumcision does not represent "the best way for humans to live" and therefore demonstrate that any moral system that claims to be "the best way for humans to live" and yet supports female circumcision is self-contradictory and therefore inferior.

Will the proponets of female circumcision agree? Perhaps not; there are, after all, people who still believe the earth to be flat. Does this mean that I cannot condemn the practice? Not at all; if I can demonstrate that their practice actually violates their own standards, I will have demonstrated that it is immoral by their own standards. Even if they should continue to claim otherwise, their claim will have been vitiated.

At any rate, I certainly never claimed that it would be easy. Tradition is difficult to supplant; people often continue to believe irrational things regardless of evidence to the contrary. You'll also notice, I'm sure, that there are several hidden assumptions in my arguments. I recognize that and have not limned them for the sake of brevity and because I believe them eminently reasonable and largely self-evident. But, of course, that could be merely my subjective bias.

Regards,

Bill Snedden