ex-xian

zorq

Spenser, I looked at your post about the non-ontological argument, and I decided to formulate the contra positive (double negative as you call it) argument and this is what I came up with.

1. If God can be conceived to be something with some deficiency, then God can be conceived to have the possibility of existing.
2. God can be conceived to be with some deficiency.
3. God can be conceived to have the possibility of existing.

This argument seemed wrong, So I looked back at the link you provided, and I saw that you had arrived at the Non-Ontological argument by taking the contra positive of a different argument


So, I took the contra positive of this argument and came up with what I think should be the real Non-Ontological argument

1. If God cannot be conceived to be something with some deficiency, then God cannot be conceived to have the possibility of existing.
2. God is not conceived to be with some deficiency.
3. God can not be conceived to have the possibility of existing.

In short, I think that you took the contra positive without changing the “without any” to a “with some.”
This revised argument is still valid to using your definition of deficiency, but I don’t think that it would be very convincing to a theist.

I may be wrong, about my contra-positive conversion, if so, then I apologize for stepping in.