Hochstetler

I've been introducing myself to the Ontological Argument for God this week. I've a few thoughts on the subject and would love any feedback/criticism from all of you.

First, here's my gloss on the most famous bit of Anselm's argument:

"When imagining a Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB), we must imagine this GCB as existing. Otherwise, we would have a GCB with an obvious improvement: existence. An imaginable improvement like this would disqualify a candidate GCB, by definition. Considering the established fact that whatever exists in imagination must also exist in reality, we can know without a doubt that the GCB does, in fact, exist."

I'm sure if it were worded this way from the beginning, no one would've paid any attention to the argument. Am I out of line in my gloss?

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Like everyone else (I'm sure), I got the immediate feeling that the Ontological Argument (OE) jumps from imagination to reality in some tricky way. I think I figured out where that happens.

The OE gets to the point of saying something like "God exists in our understanding." This is the vital point. Quite often, God is granted existence at this earlier point in the argument. His geography is then merely expanded into actual existence a step or two later.

We shouldn't allow such an equivocating statement like "God exists in our understanding" at all until we've granted _God_ existence. We should only say "We can imagine/conceive of God." This way, we are still the subject.

Or, we can say "An imagination-bound God exists in our imagination." Then we can follow the OA to realise that this is inconsistant with our definition of God as a GCB. We'd have to say "A God present both inside and outside imagination exists in our imagination."

These statements sound a little silly with so many "imagination"s in them, but I think failure to nest the correct amount of "imagination"s is the whole reason people have ever given the OA merit.

What do you think?

- Hochstetler

NonHomogenized

Ah, but a GCB which is limited in existence to the imagination has an obvious improvement: existence in reality.

So obviously god has to exist

From what I can tell, the argument basically says "God has to exist, otherwise it wouldn't be god", based on one nicely camoflauged piece of pure drivel, that being that anything we can imagine, has to exist. If you don't accept that premise (and, therefore, the existence of elves, vampires, leprauchans, zeus, the IPU, etc etc etc ad nauseum), then the argument falls flat.

rainbow walking

Ummm...I think Anselm is trying to say that if you set out to imagine the GCB, that an existent GCB is greater than a non-existent GCB. Of course, this doesn't prove anything other than the imagination is a great place to assign value assessment.

If I had to choose to put a price on two products, and one of them existed literally such that I could put it on the shelf, and the other only existed in an imaginary sales catalogue, I'd be inclined to put a higher price on the product I could put on the shelf...why? Because I'm likely to sell it quicker than one that exists only in an imaginary catalogue.

Anyone interested in a very old and highly used deity?

No?

Care to shop the catalogue then?

ComestibleVenom

No, you're right on the bulls eye. The ontological argument is a ridiculously complex argument that presents a plausible-sounding syllogism to the following effect.

1.Dang it, God must exist.
2. Therefore God exists.

Spenser

In another thread I have created my own argument. This is from the comments going on around the McHugh vs. Krueger debate:

Go Here

The Non-Ontological Argument

1) If God cannot be conceived to be something without deficiency of any kind, then God cannot be conceived to have the possibility of existing.

2) God cannot be conceived to be without deficiency of any kind.

3) God cannot be conceived to have the possibility of existing.


Note, the OA can be paradied to argue a GCB that is purely evil just as it can be used to argue one that is purely good...

ex-xian

Modern philosophers have recognized that, whether he meant to or not, Anselm presented two ontological arguments for god's existence. The first, and most commonly presented, is:
1) God is that which none greater can be thought.
2) That which none greater can be thought exists in the understanding.
3) That which exists in the understanding and in reality is greater than that which exists in the understanding alone.
4) God, by definition, exists in reality.

The classic response by someone whose name I can't remeber was:
1) I can think of the most perfect island.
2) An island that exists in reality and my mind is more perfect than one which exists in my mind alone.
3) Therefore, the most perfect island exists.

I think it was Hume who summed up the critique by saying that existence is not an attribute.

The second ontological argument is not, IMO, so easily dismissed.
1) God is that of which none greater can be thought.
2) That which cannot not exist (that which exists necessarily) is greater than that which can not- exist (exists contingently).
3) God necessarily exists.

This avoids predicating something called existence of god, and is not subject to perfect island or perfect horse (unicorn) critique.

Anyway, my 2 cents.

ex-xian

Spencer, your post reminded me of something my philosophy prof showed me.

Ax ~(Gx)
~Ex Gx

Or, for all x, nothing can be said god is x. Therefore, there does not exist an x such that god is x. This rests on the via negativa, or way of the negative. The way most sophisticated theist view god. It holds that since god is infinite, any predication of god is necessarily equivocal. Therefore, the only way to speak of god is in the negative. That is, for any attribute, god is not that attribute, since we cannot speak coherently of infinity.

Hochstetler

I've heard an intersting alternate formulation too. From what I remember, Anselm pointed out that a God (or GCB) who cannot be imagined not to exist is surely better than one who can be imagined not to exist.

I think this is lovely. All you have to do is point out that some of us can manage to imagine that the GCB does not exist...and you've proven that it _doesn't_ exist.

Hochstetler

When you write the words "a GCB" in the subject of your sentence, are you placing that GCB in the world of actual existence or in the world of conceptual existence?

My original point was that people mistakenly grant the GCB actual existence (though hide this by qualifying "in the mind"), then -- since GCBs expand to reality by necessity -- the GCB gets to have overt actual existence.

I believe this is a grammatical ambiguity.

If you frame the GCB as an imaginary being in conceptual existence, then the GCB only gets to expand to being conceived and actualized ... within imagination!

Spenser

I'm afraid I am going to have to completely disagree with you on one thing; My name is spelled SpenSer...