God Fearing Atheist

In chapter 13 of Leviathan, Hobbes begins with:

"Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of the body and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend, as well as he."

This, I think, is absolutely fundamental to contractarianism and morality in general. Man should be willing to "lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself", only if he can expect his actions to illicit a harmful response from his fellows. Ultimately, then, morality is about reciprocity. While "there being nothing simply and absolutely [good and evil]; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taketh from the nature of the objects themselves....", from reciprocity we can arrive at objective standards of behavior, starting from subjective and relative values.

The problem I alluded to in the other thread is that infants, as a matter of empirical fact, cannot reciprocate. If moral duties arise from the rationality of individual utility maximization, from the realization that your fellows can harm you if you them, we must also conclude that there are no moral duties toward infants. But perhaps that is too strong. Lets take a couple of contractarian arguments against infanticide:

1) Although infants may not be able to participate in the contract, they can possibly be protected by virtue of association with those who can. A parent will treat a child as he would look after himself; parents have strong emotional ties to their offspring, and although the child himself cannot reciprocate in any force, the parents surely can. It is also true that, to a lesser degree, most of us are concerned with the well-being of children in general. It is part of the de facto morality of our culture that most people are perfectly willing to cluck their tongue at anyone who *might* lead a child to harm, let alone actually do so.

2) Quasi-aesthetic reflections aside, it is also true that today's children are tomorrows adults; the producers of goods, bearers of burden, purveyors of wisdom, and even criminal deviants. It would seem like we all have a huge third-party stake in assuring children turn out right, they that don't become maladjusted crazies...criminals...what have you.

But ultimately, are these considerations enough to warrant the use of force against those that dispose of their infants? Probably not. The pain we feel when an infant is abused or killed is not an actual "pain"; it is not an act of force against us. It is, really, the statement of an aesthetic preference, a sign that our palate has been offended in some way.

So, at most, I believe, we can simply suggest that there are some indirect reasons for protecting infants. But as a general practice, be it now or in times past, the weight of morality simply passes it by.

-GFA

echidna

Why not ?

If one wishes to view human morality in such base Machiavellian terms, then yes, protecting an orphaned baby will not directly benefit me, since the baby cannot repay me.

But what you are ignoring is that the Social Contract I consider when I try to act morally, is not with the baby. It is with myself and what I believe is the best behaviour. I don’t need to expect payment from the baby to protect it. Human beings are motivated by acting according to their beliefs. All I need is to believe that it is wrong. The reward I receive is knowing that I have acted morally. And my belief in right and wrong will ultimately require me to act with force.

Morality is far more basic than trading beads and blankets. This goes back very similarly to the old Heaven and Hell motivations for morality. I thought we’d ditched those.

I strongly suspect that Hobbes would very much have objected to being quoted in the context of not condoning infanticide, BTW.

tronvillain

God Fearing Atheists:
This is gibberish. Force is warranted when one considers the results of failing to use force worse than the results of using force.

God Fearing Atheist

No tron. It is rational to adopt non-coercion as a *disposition*, playing non-coercion first, and then playing whatever card was played by those you are interacting with (which can be equated with the TIT-for-TAT strategy in the theory of games). As i attempted to show in my contractarianism post, straight-maximization, a disposition to base actions on individual as opposed to joint strategies, affords a lower expected utility to *both* parties.

Someone7

Nothing about anything he said reminds me Machiavelli’s The Prince, nor did GFA say anything about benefits versus rewards in regards to killing or saving infants. I sense a profound misunderstanding of Machiavelli and GFA on your part, since one would think that ‘personal social contract’ of yours prohibits making strawman arguments on purpose. <a href="http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/s7.htm#socon" target="_blank">Click here</a> for the definition of social contract theory.

As I see it, his main statement is that, under social contract theory, babies can not be considered agents in the social contract; they can’t agree to it, so they’re not part of it.

GFA, what would you have to say regarding Rawls’ version of the social contract theory? As I see it, it may be possible to under his version to condemn infanticide, but perhaps this is because of a misunderstanding on my part. Any comments appreciated.

God Fearing Atheist

Of course. Like Hume, I believe we can rightly postulate what might be called "secondary moral principles", or general dispositions to preference that arise prior to the social contract (be it by socialization, evolution, or whatever). Hume belived that sympathy was an essential part of what is a, more or less, contractarian account of morality, extended further by the "artifice of politicians", who encorage those dispositions further still.

But of course, when I say there is no moral reason to not harm infants, im not speaking to those who already harbor a sense of empathy. If morality is about our utility, it would obviously make no sense to speak of the possibly of infaniticide... assuming it was universally disprefered. We would all nessecarly take care of our children; no argument needed.

So what of the others? Those individuals or socities who dont seem to have cultivated feelings of any sort toward their young offspring? It is those i am speaking about. What motivation can give *them* sufficent reason to abstain? Again, I dont see any.

Forgive me if I read that as so much emotive fluff.

Hobbes, while being absolutely ahead of his time in regards to most of his ethics, was exceedingly naive...often downright wrong...in many others.

God Fearing Atheist

Thank you Someone! I am in debt to your objective reading.

As to Rawls, I think his problem lies in equivocating the impartiality of morals. He seems to think that people themselves need to be impartial (which is why he insists we make the contract through a "veil of ignorance") to arrive a impartial morals, which, as i see it, is downright false.

I also think its possible to condemn violence against children, using his system. Through the veil of ignorance, I havent a clue who I am, child, or adult. It would seem wise, knowing this, to honor the lives of everyone...not just those capable of reciprocity (if i turned out to be a child, i'd be screwed). But this is, of course, dependent upon the validity of the veil of ignorance as a reasonable theoretic construct.

[ January 30, 2002: Message edited by: God Fearing Atheist ]</p>

God Fearing Atheist

Related to what Someone posted, Jan Narveson has an excellent FAQ/introduction to Gautherian Contractarianism located here: <a href="http://www.againstpolitics.com/faq.htm" target="_blank">http://www.againstpolitics.com/faq.htm</a>

Epitome

GFA: So basically what you're saying is survival of the fittest? Might makes Right and do away with the weak, sick and helpless?

Sounds like the natural working out of atheistic philosophy to me.

Thank GOD for the religious who value every soul... else we'd be living like savages.

Epitome *who loves it when atheists show their true colors*

Polycarp

Quote:

Originally posted by God Fearing Atheist: The problem I alluded to in the other thread is that infants, as a matter of empirical fact, cannot reciprocate. If moral duties arise from the rationality of individual utility maximization, from the realization that your fellows can harm you if you them, we must also conclude that there are no moral duties toward infants.

This is the most succinct presentation of your main premise, so I’ll focus on these few sentences. Using this premise, we should be safe in eliminating all of our society’s most physically and mentally disabled adult members. Since they are unable to “reciprocate” any harm we might inflict on them, we should be justified (as with infants) in killing them since “there are no moral duties” toward those who can’t harm us. Let me know if you disagree on what I’ve said so far…

Moving on…

If a person is temporarily incapacitated, would we also lose our moral duties toward him or her? For example, a person goes in for surgery and receives general anesthesia, thereby rendering them unable to reciprocate any harm we may decide to inflict on them while they are unconscious. I don’t see how this is any different than the case with infants. The only difference is in the length of time before the person in question (infant vs. patient) would be able to reciprocate any harm we might inflict. How do you arrive at a criterion for an acceptable time interval for reciprocation? An hour? Day? Week? I fail to see how this could be consistently applied.