njhartsh

In a six-year-old essay on the Secular Web, Keith Augustine makes a defense of moral subjectivism based on parsimony. The concluding paragraph states:

Take a look at the essay (it's short)--what do you think? Is there a better way to defend subjectivism? Is Augustine's argument unsound? Do tell.

- Nathan

Wiploc

A value requires a valuer. That is, someone has to value something for that something to be valued. Thus, values are inherently subjective. Thus "objective moral value" is an oxymoron.

I'd credit the guy I stole this argument from if I could think of his name.

Edited to add: Alonzo Fyfe, his name is Alonzo Fyfe.
crc

Alonzo Fyfe

Well, thanks, but....

I must have misspoken somewhat.

Propositions about "objective moral value" are false, but not self-contradictory. Objective moral values would exist, for example, if there were some type of moral property in the universe governing the motion of things in addition to the forces we know about. In some discussions, I refer to these entities as 'goodon emitters' -- states of affairs that emit a certain type of 'goodon' radition that our 'value detectors' can sense directly. Many people do behave as if the have a faculty of goodon detection that directly perceives the moral value of certain states of affairs. Yet, no such radiation, and no such sense of value exists in fact. I would not call such claims oxymoronic. I would simply say that they are false.

Even the statement that propositions of objective moral value are false is, itself, in need of further clarification. This is because "objective" could mean one of two different things.

Well . . . actually . . . three different things. The "subjective(1) vs. objective(1) distinction -- also known as the cognitivist vs. noncognitivist distinction -- asks merely if propositions about moral value have truth content at all. It does not care if the truth content depends on the psychological states of the speaker. Even if "X is good" is merely another way of saying "I like X" it would be "objective" in this sense, because the statement "I like X" is capable of being true or false.

In this sense, I believe in objective(1) moral values.


Another sense, which seems to be the subject of the debate above, seems to concern the third distinction, "subjective(3) vs. objective(3). This concerns whether value exists as a mind-independent entity.

The article in question contains the following quote:

If objective moral laws are part of the natural universe (not part of some supernatural realm), then the universe cannot be unconscious--it must be, in some unknown sense, sentient. Few naturalists would want to accept such a nonscientific pantheistic conclusion.

This is an argument against objective(3) moral values. However, it is a weak argument, because it presumes that values must have a valuer -- that universal value must have a universal consciousness -- which is exactly what is under debate.

In place, I offer the "goodon" argument, which generally fits the same intended mold. We simply have no reason to believe that any state of affairs is a goodon emitter, or that we have evolved to have a competent goodon sensor. Goodons do not exist, and if they did it would be remarkable if we actually had the capacity to detect them.

In this sense I believe in subjective(3) moral values.


This leaves the middle distinction. Subjective(2) values vs. objective(2) values say that values state that valuers are necessary for their to be value, but asks whose mind is relevant in making a particular evaluation.

A subjective(2) statement is a statement of the form, "I like chocolate ice cream." It is a statement whose truth depends entirely upon my brain states. Change my brain states, and you change the truth of the proposition.

Yet, when I make a statement like "You like chocolate ice cream," it is an objective(2) statement. What I think, what I want, what I believe makes no difference as to the truth of the proposition. It is as objective as any claim I may make about atoms, gravity, the speed of light, and any other statement in the field of science. Even though it is a statement that is, in part, about a brain, it is an objectively(2) true statement about a brain.

It is not an objectively(3) true statement because objectively(3) true statements are independent of any mind. Objectively(2) true statements need only be independent of my mind. And statements about your values are objectively(2) true statements. Or objectively(2) false -- I could make a mistake.

Which ultimately leads to the question of: When people make moral statements, are those statements about their own mind, or about other peoples?

I think that interpreting moral statements as being subjective(2) is patently absurd. It makes the way they talk about moral properties, the way they argue, everything that they say and do that is associated with moral statements comically absurd. Moral statements are not subjective(2), they are objective(2). They are statements about value relative to human minds, but the minds that are relevant in making these statements are not solely (or even substantially) their own.

Whose minds are people talking about when they talk about moral value? Actually, everybody's. Moral claims are not claims about whether something is good or bad "for me". They are claims about whether something is good or bad "for us", where "me" is such a small portion of the "us" that its effect is inconsequential.

One of the major reasons that I take moral statements to be "we" statements appears in the cited article. The fact is, people who engage in moral discussion take statements of the form, "Genocide is morally right," and "Genocide is not morally right," to be contradictions. Yet, they do not take statements like "Rock and roll is better than country music," versus "Rock and roll is not better than country music." to be contradictions.

This is an important hint that Keith Augustine in his article does not catch. People do not treat statements about musical preference the same way they treat statements about the morality of genocide. Yet, his analogy says they are the same. An argument that assumes a similarity in something that every native speaker treats as being dissimilar is -- at best -- making a mockery of language.

The fact is, we can explain the difference between these two different types of statements without resorting to objective(3) moral assumptions.

If moral statements are taken to be objective(2), while music statements are taken to be subjective(2), we have a reason for this distinction that does not force us to accept any claim about objective(3) values.

The music statements are "I" statements -- statements that relate the value of the music to the speaker's mind alone. As such, different statements spoken by different speakers are not contradictory. But, then, taste in music is not considered a moral issue. Moral statements are a different type of statement.

The moral statements are "we" statements -- statements about what is good for us, all of us, as a group. Thus, they describe value that is substantially independent of the speaker's mind. The speaker makes up a small portion of the group. These types of statements are objective(2).

Objective(2) values are real. The only way to deny the reality of objective(2) values is to deny the existence of other minds. As long as external minds exist, external values also exist. And if they exist, we can talk about. And we do talk about them. When people engage in moral debate, they are talking about these objective(2) values.

In this sense, I believe in objective(2) moral values.


So, ultimately, I believe that:

Moral values are objective(1) -- they are genuine propositions capable of being true or false.

Moral values are objective(2) -- they are propositions that are at least in part about minds -- however, not the speaker's. (They are not "I" statements but "WE" statements.)

Moral values are subjective(3) -- they are dependent on minds. All value requires one or more valuers; without valuers there is no value.

Wiploc

Oh, let it be me who misspoke. I can quit attributing my position to you --- though you definitely inspired it even if you don't agree with it.

Let me challenge your theory of objective morality. (Of course maybe I'm just challenging how it's stated.) Suppose we live in a slave-holding state, and the slaves are adjusted to this, they believe that slavery is the natural order. They may not like being slaves themselves, but their goal is become free so they can own slaves themselves.

If I say, "Slavery is wrong," according to your theory I must be saying that there are more people in the world who don't like slavery than who do. And that, as I understand your theory, is the entire claim. I expect I'm wrong about that somehow.

My understanding is different. I think can opine that slavery is wrong even if I am the only person who believes that. My claim might be rendered as, "I don't like slavery, and if you got your mind right, you wouldn't like it either."

crc

Alonzo Fyfe

So, what is your position? If it is the affirmation of Moral Subjectivism(3), then I agree with it. Ultimately the article in question only raised objections to Moral Objectivism(3). This is accompanied by a false dichotomy that says "those who reject moral objectivism(3) must accept moral subjectivism(2). But this was a mere assertion -- an a false assertion at that. Moral objectivism(2) remains a viable option even for those who reject Moral objectivism(3).

Now, if your position is a rejection of Moral Objectivism(2) and an affirmation of Moral Subjectivism(2), then I do not agree with you.

In other words, go ahead and attribute any opposition to Objectivism(3) to me -- I would be proud to accept the credit. But, if you want to defend Subjectivism(2), then I would rather be left out, if you don't mind.

So, let us look at your argument.


Well, there are many places at which to raise objections.


First, what is 'slavery'? Chattel slavery -- where slaves are mere property -- excludes slaves from the 'us' calculation. Chattel slavery is wrong by definition.

You must be talking about a different type of slavery, a slavery that includes slaves in the group of 'us', considers their well-being and concludes that it cannot be improved except at very great cost that exceeds the benefit to be provided to the slave. If this is slavery -- that puts as much weight on the well-being of the slave as that of any free person, and regards them as moral equals -- then this is a strange sort of slavery indeed. And it causes me to wonder what, exactly, we are calling 'slavery' here.


Second, your statement that they believe that slavery is the natural order turns out to be a non-sequiter at best and question-begging at worst. What the slaves believe is not relevant. They may believe that the world is flat, but if the world is not flat then this counts against what the slave believes. The very question at issue is whether 'slavery is good' is or can be true. And to begin with an assumption that the slave's belief that 'slavery is good' is true simply begs the question.


Third, your interpretation of my theory as If I say, "Slavery is wrong," according to your theory I must be saying that there are more people in the world who don't like slavery than who do. is indeed incorrect. However, your interpretation is not inconsistent with the limited information I gave in my post above. I must add more details.

I have described what it means to say 'X is wrong' in more detail elsewhere. The basic statement is that 'X is wrong' means 'A person with good desires would not support X', and a 'good desire' is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires regardless of who has them.

Slavery is wrong because a person with good desires would have an aversion to slavery, which is because an aversion to slavery better fulfills all desires regardless of who has them.

For a more detailed defense of this, see my Ethics Without God series. If you do not want to wade through all of it, the last two sections posted so far (plus a new section to be posted by May 8th) should be sufficient.

Anyway, it cannot be measured merely by taking a vote.


Fourth, your ultimate defense of subjectivism(2) seems to rely upon how little work needs to be done to make 'slavery is wrong' true. All you have to do is believe it and, presto, you are there. Where, interpreting a statement like 'slavery is wrong' as an objectivist(2) type statement makes the statement. However, the ease at which a proposition like 'slavery is wrong' can be made true is idential to the ease at which 'slavery is right' can be made true. All you have to do is opine 'they were wrong to abolish slavery' and, presto, you are there -- the abolition of slavery is wrong.


In order to actually defend 'slavery is wrong' in this system, you will need to accomplish two things.

(1) Identify the properties of an institution I that can properly be called 'slavery'.

(2) Demonstrate that a desire for this institution (a universal desire that I) is compatible with the greater fulfillment of desires generally regardless of who has them.

I hold that there is no I for which both (1) and (2) are true. If (1) is true of I, then (2) is false, and if (2) is true of I, then (1) is false.

njhartsh

Hi, Alonzo. Yours is the most nuanced and intelligent critical response to a subjectivist argument I've read. You and I agree wholeheartedly on what you call "subjectivism(3)," but I do not understand your comments regarding the s(2) vs. o(2) issue.

I'm with you on your comments about "goodons" and "I like chocolate ice cream." (Were you knowingly referencing me in your use of chocolate ice cream, or is this just kismet?) And finally, I understand from your more recent statements that the post I am about to quote is an incomplete explanation of your views about area (2). I fear you may need to walk me through the additional details of your account, because this is the first time I've read your posts. My apologies.

I'm still with you, though I see a train wreck ahead. Obviously we can make objective statements about the outcome of a given subjective(3) evaluation. ("My husband loves this wallpaper." Etc. Same point as yours.)

Now we're getting down to business.

It seems to me that moral statements are quite clearly statements about one's own internal subjective(2? 3? I'll say 2 for now) evaluations. It is true that many people (myself included) sometimes find support or comfort in the (objective(2)) fact that others share with them a given Moral Belief X, but I seriously doubt that this is the crux of what is behind their (I say subjective(2)) support for Moral Belief X.

A major point that I think you are ignoring to your peril is that (in my estimation at least) a vast proportion of our species believes that morality is objective in all three ways you describe. Your central evidence for objectiv(2)ism is that people treat moral claims as objective--but so far as I can tell, this simply reflects an inaccurate understanding of the world on the part of such people. It seems to me that your argument is analogous to proving the existence of a god merely by pointing out that creationists credit the formation of the universe to said god. Surely that's a useless citation if (as seems very likely) these people are merely factually wrong.

So what? Creationism is certainly absurd, but that is not a reason for accepting it. The fact that people treat moral statements as if they are objective (as if they reference an objective reality outside of the speaker's subjective mind) does not demonstrate that they really are.

Again, I think you are correct that many, many people believe they are referencing a source (such as a deity) outside of their own minds when they state a moral principle, but this is a mere mistake on their part. As I've mentioned, I think it in fact is the "own" mind of the person making the moral statement that is almost "solely" at issue.

Take opposition to capital punishment. I find capital punishment morally indefensible. (We're agreed that that's an objective(1) statement and a subjective(3) statement.) In polls I have seen, the majority of my fellow American citizens find capital punishment morally acceptable; but the citizens of the remainder of the industrialized world overwhelmingly agree with me, not my fellow Americans. (Those are also objective(1 and maybe 2) statements and subjective(3) statements.)

Now, when I argue (as I have on this website) that capital punishment is wrong, I do indeed mention the feelings about it in those foreign countries, and my opponents once in a while point out the majority support in my country. But none of this cinches the point. Indeed, even if I were the only person on the globe who found capital punishment objectionable, that would not change my mind. My subjective evaluation (and the subjective(2) truth of my statement "Capital punishment is wrong") is not a bit founded upon popular support for my evaluation.

The converse case seems to me to make your description appear absurd. Assuming once again that the people of the world voted against me, 6 billion to 1, in favor of capital punishment, would it make sense for me to say "Capital punishment is right, but I think it's wrong"? It seems to me that that's precisely what your account requires. Not because majority rules, but just because every "mind" available except mine holds the pro-CP belief. If, as you argue, "the minds that are relevant in making these statements are not solely (or even substantially)" mine, then how could I ever maintain that capital punishment is wrong in this case?

This seems to me unclear. Does "for us" mean the class of people to whom this particular moral rule should be applied (in which case this is irrelevant to subjectivism, which asks only about the source of moral ideas, not their application), or does it refer to the class of people who hold the belief (in which case it oddly rules out the perspectives of small minorities)?

Boy, am I ever aware of that discrepancy! You have no idea how difficult it can be even to explain subjectivism to some people...

But of course, I once again question whether this point supports you at all. Of course people who believe that morality is objective(3) act as if disagreement equals contradiction. That means nothing if they are simply wrong--and it certainly appears that they are.

(As a side note, I really think you should read more music, film and restaurant reviews. It is definitely not true that everyone treats aesthetic taste issues as subjective(3) questions. I suspect that the number of people who would find your statement "Rock and roll is better than country music" either objective(3)ly true or objective(3)ly false is staggeringly high.)

This raises at least two possibilities:
(A) Keith Augustine's account is wrong.
(B) The people you cite are wrong.

I choose (B). Why should I choose (A) instead?

It seems to me that, while many people do indeed treat moral epistemology and aesthetic epistomology differently, this is merely an incorrect (and incoherent) approach on their part. A spade's a spade even if a billion people call it a diamond.

It's not the language that is at fault; it is the presuppositions of the people who have maintained the language. In a world full of moral objectivists, why shouldn't moral statements appear objective? That's no better as evidence of objectivism than "God bless you," spoken after someone sneezes, is evidence of God (or of the speaker's theism).

I'd also point out that, if we're just talking about the language involved, I see nothing in the sentences "Rock and roll is better than country music" and "Chocolate ice cream tastes delicious" that forthrightly admits any subjectivity at all. To my eyes, they both purport to be statements of objective(3) fact. That we treat them otherwise without incident seems to me fairly good evidence that there's no real problem with treating moral statements in exactly the same way.

I fear I do not understand what you intend to show with distinction (2), but frankly it doesn't seem to me that (2) has any real independent meaning from (1) and (3). Moral judgments are objective(1) in that they reference objectively extant brain states (it is objectively true that I find capital punishment wrong), and they are subjective(3) in that the experience of those brain states by those possessing them is the only apparent source of normative content. I fail to see the useful distinction between an objective(1) statement and an objective(2) one; so far as I understand it, o(2) is just o(1) stated in the third person. Subjective(2) I don't understand at all.

A couple of side comments from your later post:
Whoa! Enough of this meta talk for you, I guess: Now we've brought in some basic moral principles from goodness-knows-where. "Wrong by definition"? That clashes oddly with subjectiv(3)ism.

Obviously Nineteenth Century slaveowners in the American South held the subjective(3) belief that slavery was right. I continue to be confused by what you mean by "for us," but really I don't think it matters; from the slaveowners' perspective, it was simply the Correct Way To Order The Universe for African slaves to consist as personal property of "free" citizens.

Obviously I disagree with this perspective, but I fail to see how it is "wrong by definition" in any but the most forthrightly subjective(3) sense.

Well, says you. Obviously the slaveowners disagree. Can you put your "goodons" on the table, or is this a mere subjective(3) disagreement?

Thanks for posting!

- Nathan

Alonzo Fyfe

Greetings, njhartsh.

A full response may take some time, and I fear that I am otherwise occupied this evening.

However, I wanted to make a brief comment to this item:

I fear you may need to walk me through the additional details of your account, because this is the first time I've read your posts. My apologies.

It is not to me that you should apologize. I hold you under no obligation to have read other things.

However, those unfortunate others who I can already hear despirately warning, "Psst. No. Don't. Hey. You don't know what you're doing. Don't ask him that. NOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO! Too late! Oh, please dear God not again! Can't anybody here do anything to shut this guy up! Moderators . . . please . . . we'll pay good money. American dollars -- small unmarked bills. Pleeeeaaaazzzeeee!"

They may want to have a word with you.

But I will leave that between you and them.

Alonzo Fyfe

Obviously we can make objective statements about the outcome of a given subjective(3) evaluation.

Well, yes, the same proposition can be a subjective(3) statement and an objective(2) statement -- such as -- "We would generally be better off -- in the sense of being able to get more of what we want -- if we all had some aversion to lying."

This statement is both subjective(3) -- because the value is not independent of minds, but objective(2) when uttered by me because I am not making a statement exclusively about my own mind. I am not reporting what I like, but what would make us better off.


It seems to me that moral statements are quite clearly statements about one's own internal subjective(2? 3? I'll say 2 for now) evaluations.

Just to make our disagreement explicit, I assert that moral statements are statements about what we (not just I) should desire in virtue of the fact that desiring it would make us (not just me) better off. A person making a moral claim is not reporting what he likes or dislikes, but what it would be good for us to like or dislike, where 'good' is further understood as 'what will generally aid in the fulfillment of our desires'.


It is true that many people (myself included) sometimes find support or comfort in the (objective(2)) fact that others share with them a given Moral Belief X, but I seriously doubt that this is the crux of what is behind their (I say subjective(2)) support for Moral Belief X.

I agree with this statement, but disagree with the supposition that moral statements are reports about "me and those people who like what I like". They are reports about "what it would be good for us to like". It is quite possible that things that are true of "what me and those people who like what I like" may not be true of "what it would be good for us to like"

And, just to be overly redundant given a tendancy of some to want to assert that I am being question-begging, "good for us" is based purely on desires -- it means nothing more than "that which would fulfill our desires." It is no more mysterious than understanding "good for me" as "that which will fulfill my desires". And the thesis that I am defending is that moral claims are not "good for me" statements, or even "good for me and those who like what I like" statements, but "good for us, independent of the differences in our individual likes and dislikes" statements.



A major point that I think you are ignoring to your peril is that (in my estimation at least) a vast proportion of our species believes that morality is objective in all three ways you describe.

You are absolutely right. People do behave as if morality is objective in all three ways that I describe. I have so far ignored this fact. And the instant somebody calls me on this they can raise a number of issues that must be addressed. But . . . when that point comes . . . I think I can handle those problems. Ultimately, I have not ignored them, I just haven't covered them in these posts.


It seems to me that your argument is analogous to proving the existence of a god merely by pointing out that creationists credit the formation of the universe to said god.

Well, here is your challenge. It may "seem to you" that this is the case, but can you provide an argument that this is the case.

We agree that "value relative to desire" is real, do we not? If "Nathan likes chocolate ice-cream" can be a true statement, then "chocolate ice-cream is liked by Nathan" is also a true statement. Right? We are not talking about a strange god-like mysterious entity . . . at least not yet.

Now, let's say an opportunity arises for you to come here and we decide to hook up for the weekend. We decide to see a movie together, and you ask, "Are there any good movies in town?"

Let us assume that, in the course of our previous discussion, we have discovered that you like action movies while I think they are dreadfully boring, and I like animated movies which you view as childish.

When you ask, "Are there any good movies in town" we both know that you are not asking "Are there any good-for-Nathan movies in town?" because if you were asking that then action movies would be at the top of the list. And you are not asking, "Are there any good-for-Alonzo movies in town?" because we know that animated movies do not qualify. We both know that you are asking "Are there any good-for-Nathan-and-Alonzo movies in town?" On this standard, action movies and animated movies would go to the bottom of the list.

There is no mystery in using the word "good" in a "good for us" sense, as opposed to a "good for you" or a "good for me" sense. No super-natural properties are required.

"Good for us" in this sense is largely an objective(2) claim. We are still talking about good relative to desires, but we are not talking about good relative to your desires alone or my desires alone. Still, in this sense, our subjective preferences have a great deal of weight.

The larger the "us", the less weight that your desires or my desires carry, the more objective(2) the statement becomes.

If you look at the way people talk when they discuss morality -- interpreting moral claims as "good for me" statements simply makes no sense. It makes more sense to interpret moral claims as the broadest possible "good for us" type of claim. Look at the way people debate, the types of evidence they use, the types of inferences they draw, the form of the arguments, and plug the "good for me" interpretation into that behavior, and you get nonsense. Plug the "good for us in the broadest possible sense" into that behavior and things start to make sense.

This makes moral claims the most objective(2) type of value claims possible.

Now, one additional point . . .

Naturally, each person is going to prefer that the group "good for us" decision be closer to that individual's "good for me". That is to say, each individual will tend to support an objective(2) conclusion that is closer, rather than further away, to their individual subjective(2) values.

Yet, it is a mistake to view this tendancy on the part of individuals pull these two CONCLUSIONS together as proof that the two MEANINGS collapse into one.


Time to go to work. MOre to come.

Dr. Retard

By the way, Ronald Dworkin already used a concept similar to "goodons", only he called them "morons" (from "mor-ality").

I think he wins.

Alonzo Fyfe

Dang him.

Actually, I am extremely grateful you took the time to let me know this. I was able to find a reference (Philosophy & Public Affairs 25, No. 2 (Spring 1996), and I will make sure to include mention of it in my writings.

Thank you.