Skepticos

Oxymoron writes:

"...a statement mapping an element of our internal representation of the world to external reality."

I would say that you and I agree on the definition of belief!

- Skepticos

Mr. Sammi

Keith Russell,

should I commence with what constitutes the difference between a secure belief and a not secure belief. Firstly whatever a secure belief is, a not secure belief is outside the domain of the secure belief. Is this confusing? No it is not confusing to me.

A secure belief is a belief which one feels safe holding dear to one's self. A secure belief is a belief which one embraces without further thought.

Without further thought? what in the name of a rational being does further thought imply WHEN we are always thinking? Is this a cause for thinking?

* * *

Having secure beliefs mean being able to act on impulse, it means being able to act on the information related to the belief, it also means being able to act directly on the knowledge of the belief. Note how I have slyly introduced knowledge in this paragraph. This is what I intended to communicate when I wrote about acting on a secure belief.

In contrast to acting on a secure belief is acting on a not secure belief. Although there may be various reasons for acting because of a not secure belief, the one rational reason which I wish to point out, is acting on a not secure belief IN ORDER TO secure the belief, meaning to change the not secure belief into a secure belief.

This example consists on a few detectives, say Sarah, who recieved a big tip off concerning a crime. To close the case Detective Sarah along with junior detective Jasmine stake out the location given to them by the hot tipper. They wish to secure the belief by acting on the belief that the big tip off may be valid. They proceed to act...

On the other end Judge Dread issues a warrant for the arrest of David Peterson based on the judge's belief that the confession, statements and pictures the two detectives have produced are valid and real. Judge Dread has a secure belief about the (possible) guilt of the Peterson apparition.

I hope this makes it clearer concerning my position on acting because of belief.

Sammi Na Boodie ()

Oxymoron

Do you mean "1. There was a squirrel in the park yesterday"?

If you dropped a tab and hallucinated a squirrel, you could still claim to have seen a squirrel and it would - in a limited sense - be true.

In any case, there is a qualitative difference: it is trivial to conceive of a test for the existence or otherwise of a squirrel in the park. The moral fitness of a political system is considerably harder - maybe even impossible - to test.
Now, my definition of a belief (as stated earlier) is "a mapping between our internal representation of the world and external reality". Testability therefore acts as a metric of how well our internal model of the world represents reality.

Statement 2.) would seem to be "testably open". I can think of no specific test that might verify it. However, a single counter-example would floor it

John Page

I don't know!

Try "knowledge" means "something I am certain about" - (I believe) this definition is consistent with the paradox I'm hinting at.

Cheers, John

Keith Russell

Oxy:

If one was on acid at the time one 'saw' the squirrel, that fact would be important to know, if one was attempting to evaluate the claim that one 'saw' a squirrel.

Of course, the level of possibility is also necessary, in order to properly evaluate claims.

It's not only possible, but highly likely, to see a squirrel in a park. So, even if one was on acid at the time, it would not be a stretch to believe that seeing the squirrel wasn't an hallucination; it would be reasonable to believe that one actually did see a squirrel.

On the other hand, if one claimed to have seen Elvis at the park (or anywhere else) that claim would necessarily be highly suspect, regardless of one's degree of sobriety at the time.

Keith.

[ November 04, 2002: Message edited by: Keith Russell ]</p>

Calvan

Hi Skepticos

Here are the questions this post raises for me followed by my short answers to them.
1. Does automatic reasoning occur? Yes.
2. What is belief? A choice to internalize meanings that are formulated other than by personal empirical reasoning.
3. Is belief something that is created from phenomenal experience? No. That would be knowledge.
4. Is belief formation automatic? No. But it may be habitual.
5. Is belief formation an example of reasoning? No.

Calvan

Keith Russell

Calvan:

I still think you are confusing 'observation' with 'reasoning'.

And, I still think the two are quite different.

Keith.

Calvan

Hi Keith,

Observation is at least the apprehension of stimuli. Does observation include the processing the meaning of those stimuli? I would say yes. Is this process reasoning? I would suggest yes. Are there other forms of reasoning? Yes.

I can't see how I am confusing observation with reasoning! Any suggestions?

Calvan

[ November 15, 2002: Message edited by: Calvan ]</p>

One of Origin

Perhaps reasoning can be regarded simply as a selective repetitive reaction to similar stimuli/observations, modified by other stimuli/observations?

Calvan

One of Origin writes:

“Perhaps reasoning can be regarded simply as a selective repetitive reaction to similar stimuli/observations, modified by other stimuli/observations?”

This makes sense to me.

Calvan