Skepticos

In another thread (Rational Beliefs Based Only on Evidence), Keith Russell writes:

"Nearly every human being has the capacity to use reason. But, reasoning is not automatic. Each of us has the choice whether or not to be rational."

Interesting statement. But what if reasoning is, in some instances, non-automatic? That is, it seems that there are many instances in which reasoning is done automatically. For instance, when I see a squirrel cross the street, my mind automatically forms a belief in correspondence to this experience. This process does not seem, in any way, volitional in nature, but automatic. And I would clearly concede that this is an example of reasoning.

Just a thought. Thoughts?

- Skepticos

[ October 19, 2002: Message edited by: Skepticos ]</p>

Keith Russell

Skepticos:

I don't consider forming memories from perceptual experience to be the same thing as 'reasoning'.

Keith.

Skepticos

Keith Russell writes:

"I don't consider forming memories from perceptual experience to be the same thing as 'reasoning'."

I am not talking specifically about memories, but beliefs (though I recognize that memories can be considered a category of belief). Consider my example of perceiving the squirrel. I see the squirrel crossing the street, and I automatically form the belief that that squirrel is crossing the street. This process seems to me to be an instance of reasoning (i.e., forming beliefs in accordance with the evidence of experience), and it also seems to be non-volitional in nature. Thus, it strikes me that there are instances of automatic reasoning.

- Skepticos

[ October 23, 2002: Message edited by: Skepticos ]</p>

99Percent

When you see the squirrel you aren't forming a belief, you are simply perceiving the squirrel crossing the street.

Skepticos

99Percent writes:

"When you see the squirrel you aren't forming a belief, you are simply perceiving the squirrel crossing the street."

True. Simply perceiving the squirrel is something distinct from forming a belief about the nature of the perception. But the point I am making is that given the perception, the formation of a belief is a consequent and automatic occurence. And, and far as I can tell, is non-volitional in nature.

- Skepticos

99Percent

No. Belief making requires a choice. You can't believe you saw a squirrel because you just saw it. However to believe for example that you will see a squirrel again requires a thought process that involves reasoning and therefore a belief.
When you see a squirrel crossing the street you simply know you saw the squirrel - there is no belief involved and its automatic knowledge.

If you aren't sure that you saw a squirrel - maybe it was dark and it could have been cat then you need to reason out the possibility that it was a squirrel. "I believe its a squirrel because I have seen squirrels cross this street before". There is the volitional need to reason it out. Otherwise its simply a fact - you saw something and you don't care what it was so you don't think what it could have been.

[ October 23, 2002: Message edited by: 99Percent ]</p>

Skepticos

99Percent writes:

"You can't believe you saw a squirrel because you just saw it."

I guess I can go flush the dictum, SEEING IS BELIEVING, down the toilet. What was I thinking all these years?

Just Kidding, 99Percent. =)

- Skepticos

99Percent

Hehe

That shows that seeing is not believing, but seeing and then thinking is believing.

Skepticos

I think that we need to define *belief* before we continue. Because it is possible that we are using different meanings.

Allow me to venture a working definition: A *belief* is a proposition which is considered correspondent to experience.

- Skepticos

[ October 24, 2002: Message edited by: Skepticos ]</p>

Kim o' the Concrete Jungle

Wow! A definition of belief that excludes Christian faith (which would presumably be a proposition held in-spite of experience). But hey, that's not my problem.

The social psychology literature that I've recently been reading points up that people tend to process things heuristically, rather than always through logic. It suggests that reasoning occurs only when people are conscious of the need to make a well-considered judgement in a situation.

Subconsciously, people rely on a schema's; i.e. the set of prior expectations we have about how things are, the way things work, and the effects that will follow on from causes.

There is the representative heuristic, where we compare something to various schema's we hold, to see which it belongs to. Once we have decided it belongs to a particular schema, we judge the thing as having all the qualities that the schema would lead us to expect. For example, you have an impression of a thing moving, and perceive that it fits your prior notion of a cat. You then assume that all the cat's features will fit with the schema you have concerning cats -- that it has sharp claws, that it purrs when it's happy, and so on.

There is the availability heuristic, where you try to judge how likely something is to occur, or how frequently something may occur, by comparing the situation to examples of similar situations that come to mind. For example, if you are wondering how likely you are to break a leg skiing, you might recall that such-and-such broke his leg skiing. If you can think of several people who have broken their legs skiing, you might consider the risks fairly high.

There is the simulation heuristic, where you ask yourself "what if this happened?" or "what if I did this?" Then you try to answer that question by comparing it to similar events or actions in the past, and your notion of how people are likely to react.

Finally, there is the anchoring heuristic, where you try estimate something you don't know by comparing it to something you do. For example, if someone asks you if such-and-such is smart, you might make an estimation based on whether this person is smarter than you, or not.

Human beings tend to use these heuristic methods of judgement in most situations, unless something puts them on their guard, in which case they will take the more rigorous approach of considering evidence and applying logic.

Heuristics are like mental short-cuts, they are quicker than reasoning things out, but they are also less reliable and more open to error.