Primal

It has come to my attention that there are a group of people called presuppositionalists who believe that theism is necessary for objectivity and that atheism is incompatible.

How does this work? How does God justify logic,science, and objectivity? The presuppositionalist basically states God just somehow does. Why? Because of the way they define God, as one who justifies these things. But isn't this question begging?

Their second attempt of justification is because, these things are true...something has to justify them and this is God. But again this gets one nowhere. How do we know these things are true? Through God. How do we know these things are justifed through God? Because they are true.

Lastly they apeal to possibility. God *can* justify these things so God *does* do so. A bit of a non sequitur to say the least.

And what kind of objective system do they propose?

One built on conclusion more then method. An absolutist system. In which case anything to be proven at all must be proven absolutely. And since scientific claims are not proven absolutely...they are of no value. Hence we should merely abandon science. But most presuppositionalists are not willing to go that far.....they wish to argue that God upholds science. To do this they must argue that science is absolute, in which case they are in a bit of a jam in explaining why science was wrong about such things in the past as the existence of meteorites.

The last argument for presuppositionalism is a negative; how do nontheists justify their beliefs? Here they often times confuse the epistemic with existential.

On the epistemic level, many like me state they are self-evident.

To which the theist will often times scoff "The self-evident? Bah....that's question begging". But is it? Question begging is when you justify an unproven claim with another unproven claim...but the self-evident is said to be proven in itself. So how is it question begging? Presuppositionalists do not like to go this far.

Also then, using the same standards what about the presuppositionalists own "question begging"? How is presuppositionalism itself proven? The presuppositionalist for this usually gives no answer. Many will state "It just is".....well no question begging there.How Is God Himself justified?


At the existential level they ask how can these things physically exist? Many foundationalist materialists like me will say as instrinsic properties of objects in the universe...as existence as such.

To which the presuppositionalist will merely scoff more. Usually giving little more then mere arguments from incredulity, which are really not arguments at all.

Again applying these same standards though, God in presuppositionalist arguments would have to have intrinsic properties...less God's form be chaotic.

So are natural and theistic foundationalism(presuppositionalism) on equal footing?

In short the answer is "no". Here we invoke objective principles.

First off the presuppositionalist viewpoint is superfluous; as much as a presuppositionalist does not like it, secular underpinnings to fundamental axioms of reason and logic are available. This makes such explanations ones with the least amount of assumptions and hence better ones.

Second the presuppositionalist viewpoint is incompatible with many things: as such absolute principles are the laws of logic,maths,etc: are said to be created by God...not eternal. Also many scientific laws are violated among which is the first law of thermodynamics as God creates the universe. Lastly, the creation of anything at all from nothing is so fundamentally absurd as to be dismissed altogether. If something can just come from nothing, by magical means or others, a new God can just pop-up out of nowhere.


Lastly, presuppostionalism uses backwards reasoning. There is no link between God and logic,science or any other objective principle. How can I exactly deduce from the claim "God exists" to "logic is valid"? Usually the presuppositionalist argues from logic to God, but a real "proof" or justification demands that one can argue the otehr way around. From God to logic; but this does not work at all. Technically if I start from the premise "God exists" I cannot deduce very much at all besides that. And if I am to reason backwards from my viewpoint to "this is true and supported by God" I am applying another standard independently making God uneccessary in the chain of reasoning. God then is a conclusion and not a premise. If one can then though, argue from conclusions to premises: if I can justify my premises with my conclusion instead of the other way around. I can justify anything at all. I can say "God exists and hence the world is bearen of matter". In this way, presuppositionalism sinks into a sort of constructivism.

Kantian

Both presuppositionalism and any form of foundationalism are easily undermined by the s<a href="http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/stephenhicks/diss/hicksdiss2.html" target="_blank">ame criticism.</a> "Foundationalism has been rejected by virtually every major epistemologist and phi­losopher of science of the last half of the century, from the later Wittgenstein to Popper to Sellars and Quine.

Any differences between these two vertically designed philosophies are merey cosmetic.

~transcendentalist~

Keith Russell

Kantian:

Thanks for the link; sometime in January I should have time to study it more thoroughly.

(But, I didn't think you liked Objectivism...)

Keith.

Jobar

My take on presuppositionalism:

-God *must* exist.
-Therefore, God exists.

I think that violates Occam's Razor; it's simpler to just say that existence exists. God is superfluous.

theophilus

Fascinating. This reminds me of the PBS specials where creationist arguments are presented by and then demolished by evolutionists.

Have you ever actually read any presuppositionalists? Van Til; Bahnsen; Frame? Even Gordon Clark?

If you have, you need to go back because you don't understand their argument.

[ December 04, 2002: Message edited by: theophilus ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by theophilus:

"If you have, you need to go back because you don't understand their argument."

I've read some Bahnsen and some van Til. Are you proposing here to defend presuppositionalism?

If you are, here's my preliminary attack. I believe that the universe metaphysically contains objective foundations for rationality. This hypothesis is more parsimonious than to say these foundations are the result of a singular consciousness.

Primal

Kantian: Problems with said article.

1) It does not even adress presuppositionalism.

2) It is not directed against foundationalism in general but two contemporary theories

3) On popularity: philosophy is not a popularity contest; so even if foundationalism was unpopular; that is irrelevant. Secondly, the author provided no hard data even proving this: just conjecture.

4) It basically boils down to this: foundationalism requries faith. Faith in the vaguest sense possible and clearly not in the same sense as religious faith.

With this I agree: but which positions doesn't require this kind of faith i.e. belief without inference?

Coherence theory,pragmatism, and Kantianism all require a similiar "faith" and more often then not borrow from the foundationalist viewpoint without aknowledging this. Just like so-called "deontological" and "absolutist" theories tend to borrow from "situational" and "teleological" premises without such aknowledgement.

Kantian I have likewise made a more in depth criticism of the said article in the philosophy forums.

[ December 05, 2002: Message edited by: Primal ]</p>

Kantian

Trivially and painfully true, but when are you going to admit that presuppositionalism is a form of foundationalism? Once you do, then how do you insulate your candidate for foundationalism from the same criticism you [think] you are leveling against presuppositionalism?

The article demonstrates that previous candidates of foundationalism have been challenged and overturned and these contemporary ones are moved up the batting order. They should have reworked their philosophies around the older ones' difficulties and in doing so, progress beyond the previously refuted foundationalist theories. It's possible to be a disciple to a certain philosophy, but it behooves the apologist to defend his aesthetic choice against potential refutations and criticism, and in the progress make the transition from dogmatism [it is true because it must be] to a living philosophy of the modern times.

It's convenient to suppose that philosophy is ahistoric, free from such troublesome issues such as contingent facts of change, of culture, of activity, of dynamism, but FWIW, since there is a type of progress in philosophy- not like those of the sciences - a historical movement of generating structures or patterns of argumentation that in turn breeds radical offsprings. It is possible to philosophize upon the carcasses of the previous thinkers, but soon enough, someone will take you seriously and advance philosophy beyond your efforts. And you're too quick for your own good- the author provided hard data: the names of those thinkers who have advanced arguments against foundationalism. I would add Heidegger, Richard Rorty, Gadamer, Lyotard, Feyerabend, Levinas, and several other post-foundationalists.

I fail to see your point. Care to elaborate the distinction between the faith of a foundationalist and that of a presuppositionalist?

Actually i think foundationalist has to adopt a starting point somewhere, and declare it free from "epistemic impurities," inasmuch as the presupper does, and define that "axiom" as a self-evident knowlege, which is justified true belief. I strongly advise you to read Sellars' book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0674251555/qid=1039230752/sr=1-4/ref=sr_1_4/102-9674264-2883308?v=glance&s=books" target="_blank">Science, Perception, and Reality</a>, especially the Empiricism and PHilosophy of Mind section.

This should be interesting to argue, or at least in your case, substantiate and back up beyond mere assertions. I don't see how these various colors require "faith" or that they "borrow" from a foundationalist viewpoint. Coherentism denies the possibility of any immediate justifications, which is the cornerstone of the assumptions a foundationalist must make. Pragmatism on the other hand avoids introducing a "structure" to knowledge and the issue of justification emerges only within a particular context, i.e. assumptions are taken for granted, even though they are open to criticism, and any criticism are under other contexts that privileges other assumptions. Kantianism denies that there is an immediate knowledge, given the structures of the presuppositions we always adopt.

Would you mind elucidating more about exactly what is "rational foundationalism" and how it avoids the common criticisms of contemporary foundationalism? Is your brand of foundationalism concerned with a structure of a system with justified true beliefs, or is it divided into a foundation and a superstructure? Are the beliefs in the superstructure dependent upon ONLY the foundation for justification? Are you of the opinion that the only knowledge is "justified true beliefs" and is that a foundationalist enterprise? Does your foundationalism depend on a type of a regress argument that avoids both circularity and the infinite regress argument? Would you say that the weak point of foundationalism is its committment to immediate justification or the belief that all mediate beliefs must rely on the immediate justified foundation?

~transcendentalist~

[ December 06, 2002: Message edited by: Kantian ]</p>

Kantian

Quick question, Thomas: in reading Van Til are you comfortable writing book reviews, that is, if you haven't posted them on <a href="http://www.amazon.com" target="_blank">www.amazon.com</a> ? I'd like to hear your opinions, perspective, and conclusions on the works of presuppositionalists- if for nothing but pure entertainment.

~transcendentalist~

Primal

Presuppositionalism is a form of foundationalism in the broadest of senses only i.e. it relies on axioms: it is certainly a different type of foundationlism then what was adressed in you said article.

I've explained how foundationalism is insulated from the same criticism: the type I'm advocating anyways. Presuppositionalism is distinguished from my own breed of foundationalism at the fundamental level. Presupositionalism is superfluous and ultimately at odds with foundationalism in general. Perhaps you should actually read what I post before criticizing, instead of using cheap and dull phrases like "Primal Screams" (which was so incredibly creative and tasteful Kant) as a substitute?

It's kind of sad seeing as you are trying to use cheap shots to win a debate: when the cheap shots are not even that funny.


How so Kant? Are you so incapable of reasoning that you must rely on dubious articles to present your points for you? It seems that instead of actually confrinting points you instead point to lengthy articles no matter how irrelevant.


How was foundationalism in general refuted? It wasn't really: the author just pointed to possible problems and took the refutation for granted. Much like you do Kant.

Yes a lot of pseudohistorical doublespeak meant to promote one simple and self-refutaing idea: That philosophy is a popularity contest. Philosophy is not developed in the same way as science and just because it is placed in a historical context does not mean it is determined totally by the said context. Do not confuse the two Kantian. For while it is possible for a culture to progress by changing and moving ahead: it is infinitely more plausible for the culture to mess up. Just because there is change Kantian does not mean that change is automatically warranted or considered progress. Nor are all previous steps or philosophies merited.

Philosophy is about fundamental aspects of reality: not culture. It's primary means, derrived from the Pre-Socrataic naturalist tradition is that of reason. If you are saying it is: then you are an intellectutally bankrupt human being.


So all philosophy must always be in a state of change: like a fad? It's not what's "true" but what's "new". That my friend, is the furthest thing from a serious treatment of the subject.


That is hardly what I would call "hard data" meant to convey the enviromental conditions of philosophy in general. It seems Kantian that you are far too hasty and loose in what you accept as evidence. Anyone can did up a couple names: hell a creation "scientist" can dig up a dozen or so scientists that question evolutionary theory. That is called a fallacy via hasty generalization though Kant: a logical error that you learn about in an introductory critical thinking class. You cannot generalize from a small group to an entire profession: especially when its one as large and varied as philosophy.


Fail to see my point or are too strubborn to aknowledge it?

Basically the faith of a foundationalist is faith in the sense of belief noninferred. Or in the sense that I believe man landed on the moon. The vaguest possible sense of faith used to indicate any belief in general either based on testimony or the noninferrred.

Faith in the religious sense(and I did say religious sense Kantian not "presuppositionalist": thank you for twisting my words though. ) indicates belief that is irrational, unproven or disproven in the area of more supernaturalist/spiritualist ideas. The two different types of "faith" are emprically different: the only thing they have in common Kant is they both pertain to beliefs and ideas. Apples and oranges dear Kant.


Yeah ok, but who doesn't? Are you saying the adopted starting points are arbitrary? All arbitrary? Well then you are assuming constructivism aren't you?

Yes Kantian and I will act on your recomendations with such haste. Perhaps you should start actually arguing for yourself instead of substituting arguments with references as you so often do. As philosophy is not a science i.e. a subject that requires much research and reference.

On what basis? What does it stand on then?

But on what basis is this itself justified? WHo decides where this context ends? How is it decided that they are contextual at all?

No imediate knowledge at all? How did the Kantian establish this in the first place?

Ultimately I can ask "why?" forever in the case of above philosophies: and you are either going to have to end somewhere or go in circles. You try to avoid this by only focusing on proximate reasoning i.e. ending somewhere but ending with incompletness in terms of justification.

If you are to justify anything you must assume some justification. If you believe you cannot show me a nonassumned claim I cannot question the truth of. Or ask for justification.

You can't: because it is impossible by definition. If it is not assumed: then you must derrived justification from another source. Meaning the truth of the claim can be questioned.

This whole issue is not negated by focusing solely on proximate justification and neglecting the ultimate.

Well Kant, I would think a person perceptive and witty as yourself would be able to realize all the above questions were already answered, somewhat lengthilly: in an post I made in the philosophy forum.

Also Kant: This line of questioning hardly counts as a criticism. All you have done is point to articles/books and ask questions. Where is the refutation? How has foundationalism been refuted? Where is a system that really makes use of no assumptions?

You are not just taking a de facto stance but actually declaring a philosophical system wrong. This requires strong evidence. Which you have yet to provide.