bd-from-kg

Keith Russell:

You may find some of Robert Bass’s essays about Objectivism of interest, starting with The Rights (and Wrongs) of Ayn Rand.

You can find lots of other interesting stuff at his web site (including a lot more on Ayn Rand). The site map can be found here.

The AntiChris

Well I guess this'll teach me not to be so rash as to cross swords with bd.

First off, I did not argue that altruism does not exist.

I did argue that an essential component of the motivation to act altruistically must be, at some level of consciousness, a perceived expectation of an emotional payoff and that it seemed, to me at least, that this was trivially self-evident. I also pointed out that I did not believe that acts of altruism were motivated by what is ordinarily meant by self-interest.

It seems to me that if one argues that an altruistic act cannot be one that is motivated, at a fundamental level, by the need to fulfil ones own desires, then one is simply defining altruism out of existence.

By no stretch of the imagination would I call myself a philosospher (amateur or otherwise) so I have no idea how if these views are in line with PE.

As for Ayn Rand, I've been put off by the style and presentation of the little I've seen and have had no inclination to delve further.

Chris

Tani

bd-from-kg:

from your example, there are 3 statements:
a) If I choose to eat a prime rib with a baked potato smothered in sour cream in spite of the fact that the doctor has told me that I had better lose weight, I am being irrational.

b) I know that this is an irrational choice.

c) if I make (the irrational choice), I’m “choosing to be irrational”

now my problem with that is that i can make 2 interpretations out of what you said, but neither make sense.

first interpretation:
1) doctor told you to not eat greasy / it is in your interest not to eat greasy
2) if you choose to eat greasy, then you are irrational.
3) you know that eating greasy is an irrational choice.
4) if i make a choice of not eating greasy, i'm "choosing to be irrational." (you used two different froms and it made reading the error difficult, so i'll change it in (4') which contains the same meaning)
4')if i choose eating greasy, i'm "choosing to be irrational." (absurd conclusion - "eating greasy" is an irrational choice in number 2, while "eating greasy" is being irrational in number 4. as choice can neither be or not be rational, the conclusion is absurd.)

second interpretation:
1) doctor told you to not eat greasy / it is in your interest not to eat greasy
2) if you choose to eat greasy, then you are irrational.
3) you know that to choose eating greasy is an irrational choice.
4) if i make a choice of not to choose eating greasy, i'm "choosing to be irrational." (you used two different froms and it made reading the error difficult, so i'll change it in (4') which contains the same meaning)
4')if i choose to choose eating greasy, i'm "choosing to be irrational." (contradiction - the first agent is the second agent yet the first agent is rational while the second agent is irrational, creating an agent that is both rational and irrational)

your example either ignores the difference between"being rational" and "rational choice," or you didn't bother explain why one can be rational and irrational at the same time. i showed you why i don't follow your logic, may be you can show how you don't follow mine?

it sounds more like his assertion lose factual content just because you deemed it so since i don't see how factual content has anything to do with it. let's think about this: in what world does conservation of momentum does not suppose to apply? again, theories are not suppose to be ad hoc and they must apply to all (logically) possible worlds. one method to falsify a theory is to show that there is at least one possible world (ie. one case) where the theory fails. it is precisesly this feature that theories involve the word "all" or "any." the issue with "his" theory is the law of identity. it appears to be a tautology because self-interest is used (by "him") as a name for the equality equation: want(x) = do(x). the name is given by definition, and therefore adheres to the law of identity. this is why it always appear true (tautology) because it's the identity of that equality. what you believe however is that want(x) != do(x), and that's the true issue.

i don't know exactly how you can engage in a philosophical dialog with another person where there is no prior agreement on definitions. may be the first thing to do is to actually formulate a precise definition of self-interest, want, do, etc, that both can agree on, or there will not be any dialogs but only many monologs.

Keith Russell

bd:

I've seen those before, but thanks.

Keith.

Keith Russell

tani said:
"this is a problematic view. one can't chose to be rational, for otherwise it begs the question. the concept of "ought" entail choices and (ir)rationality is the basis of making choices. you can't chose to be rational as rationality is defined by the very process. this is similar to existence as not something to chose or to possess."

Rationality is the basis only for making rational choices.

One is certainly able to choose to be irrational, in which case 'rationality' is no longer the basis for their decisions.

Keith.

Keith Russell

Chris:
"It seems to me that if one argues that an altruistic act cannot be one that is motivated, at a fundamental level, by the need to fulfil ones own desires, then one is simply defining altruism out of existence."

The above is not entirely true. Altruism is often promoted by guilt, and--while one may not actually desire to donate to charity--one does so because one doesn't wish to be berated by one's employers, church, spouse, etc.

So, altruism may not be one's desire, but merely the lesser of two evils--donate, or face criticism.

Further, altruists often appeal to the government to force altruistic actions form taxpayers who do not fear intimidation, and who would not otherwise choose to donate, except that it is now the law.

Arguing that giving of one's time or money to a given cause is 'the right thing to do', these altruists often persuade governments or other organizations simply to take money from their citizens or members, and donate it to a cause--often without the citizens' or members' knowledge.

People can often be forced or coerced into behaving altruistically without their knowledge or consent, or at least without a conscious or explicit desire to be altruistic.

Keith.

bd-from-kg

Tani:

You’re right; it is important to get clear on definitions. Indeed, much of the superficial appeal of PE derives from the fact that terms such as “self-interest” are used loosely, with the proponent switching from one definition to another (often without realizing it) depending on what kind of act he’s interpreting as “self-interested” at the moment.

Anyway, so far as I can see, your point is that “being rational” means something like “being capable of applying reason to the decision-making process”. In this sense, of course, one cannot choose to be rational; one either is rational or one isn’t. I was speaking of acting rationally, by which I (obviously) meant something like “doing what one’s reason recommends”. Certainly this is only possible for a rational creature, but being rational does not guarantee that one will act rationally.

There’s really little point in deliberately interpreting someone as meaning something absurd when there is an obvious, straightforward reasonable interpretation.

As for your comments about empirical theories, they’re just wrong. Empirical theories do not apply to all logically possible worlds. Any theory that applies to all logically possible worlds is not an empirical theory.

This is getting far afield from the current discussion. I can only suggest that you read a little on the philosophy of science. What I’m saying isn’t at all controversial, and there’s really no point in arguing about it.

Mr. Sammi

I will prime my roast first.

To accept an external world with similar beings helps the rational being to be super-rational.

To realise in our current society that our selfish pleasures are dependent on our super-rationality leads us to prepare the way for sustainable selfish gain.

To realise that expected and predicted consequences are not casual to our own subjectivity helps us to understand there may be no feedback from altruism, no reward forthcoming, there is only a possibility that altruism may sustain selfish needs.

* * *

Some humans enhance their rational selves in the way described above WHILE others approach super-rationality AND the rest remain bound to their narrow selfish unchanging views of the world.


Sammi Na Boodie (self-defence)

bd-from-kg

The AntiChris:

Jeez. I did not pull the usernames I did out of a hat, nor was I relying solely on the short quotations I gave at the top of the thread. These were meant to be representative of the positions of the people quoted. I do not engage in “Gotcha!” polemics.

Well, yes and no. What you actually said was:

In other words, altruism as the term is commonly understood does not exist, but if we redefine “altruism” appropriately we can get something that does exist.

Under the circumstances I think that my characterization of your view was fair.

In any case, whatever you have to say about altruism, your position is clearly a version of PE. For example:

Note that word “conscious”. This is exactly what PE advocates say: it often appears to us that our actions are not motivated by an expectation of self-benefit, but subconsciously, that’s the real motivation.

Apparently what you think is “ordinarily” meant by a self-interested act is one where the agent is conscious of his self-interested motives. But that isn’t what’s ordinarily meant. When the ordinary person discovers (or comes to believe) that an apparently altruistic act was really primarily motivated by subconscious self-interested desires, he immediately ceases to regard is as altruistic and reclassifies it as self-interested.

And later:

The notion that, even in apparently altruistic acts, our own pleasure is “at a fundamental level” what we’re really “aiming at”, is precisely the doctrine of psychological hedonism.

You now say:

Well, of course whenever one performs any intentional act one does so to fulfill some desires that one has. The question is about the nature of these desires. To the extent that the motivating desire is to benefit other people, the act is altruistic. To the extent that it is the desire to experience an “emotional payoff” – that what we’re really aiming for is our own pleasure – the act is not altruistic, but self-interested. We are using other people as a means to obtaining pleasure for ourselves. This is precisely what psychological hedonists claim we are always doing when we perform apparently altruistic acts.

Keith Russell

Greetings:

Altruism isn't about pleasure, is it?

If I have ten bucks, I could take myself out for a nice lunch, or I could give the ten bucks to a homeless stranger.

Both acts might bring me the same amount of pleasure, albeit in different forms--

--but, wouldn't an altruist state that giving the money away is morally superiour, regardless of whether or not the pleasure in doing so was lesser than, equal to, or even greater than, what the pleasure I might experience by spending the money on myself?

Keith.