bd-from-kg

It appears that a number of people on these boards are adamantly convinced that altruism (or “true” altruism, as some of them put it) does not exist. Invariably this turns out to be a result of a belief in psychological egoism, most often in the form of psychological hedonism.

Psychological egoism (PE) is the doctrine that all human action is motivated ultimately by one's own self-interest. Psychological hedonism (PH) is the doctrine that all human action is motivated ultimately by a desire for one's own happiness. (Note that these are not moral theories, but theories about human psychology – about what in fact motivates human beings, not about what ought to motivate them.)

Here are some typical expressions of what I’m talking about (all taken from the same thread in the Morality forum):

In an earlier thread in the Philosophy forum, DRFseven expressed essentially the same idea:

I have the impression that this view is shared by a large number – perhaps a substantial majority – of the contributors to the II forums.

The odd thing about this is that PE is pretty much discredited among professional philosophers; in fact, it’s hard to find one who defends it. On the other hand, it was espoused by Ayn Rand, who seems to have considered it an essential underpinning of her Objectivist philosophy.

This leads me to ask the following questions:

(1) How many people here accept psychological egoism as a valid theory of human behavior?

(2) How many of you were influenced to adopt it by reading the writings of Ayn Rand or other Objectivists?

(3) Are there any serious arguments for PE?

Keith Russell

bd defines 'psychological egoism (PE)' as "the doctrine that all human action is motivated ultimately by one's own self-interest."

then, bd asks:
(1) How many people here accept psychological egoism as a valid theory of human behavior?

Keith: Not I. I think all human actions should be motivated by rational self interest, but I certainly believe that there are human actions which are neither selfishly motivated, nor rational.

bd then asks:
(2) How many of you were influenced to adopt it by reading the writings of Ayn Rand or other Objectivists?

Keith: One moment. Rand never said anything of the kind. Your definition of PE states that all human actions are motivated by self-interest. Rand clearly believed (whether you agree with her or not) that some human actions are motivated by self-interest, but that many (perhaps, in her view, most) are not. Your view of PE is incompatible with Objectivism.

bd concludes by asking:
(3) Are there any serious arguments for PE?

Keith: We have heard some members of this forum recenlty positing that all human actions ultimately are motivated by self-interest. If that is the case, I have to ask, 'self-interested', as compared to what? If there is nothing but self-interest, then we still need to identify the characteristic that differentiates various kinds of human actions, because there clearly are differences.

Calling all actions 'self-interested', in no way brings us any closer to an understanding of the various kinds of human actions, nor their causes.

Keith.

admice

And now we are finding many more evolutionary reasons for human behavior that are to increase one's chances of having one's genes carried on to succeeding generations.

bd-from-kg

Keith Russell:

I think you're right about Rand. I was relying on (apparently faulty) memory. After reviewing the matter I would have to agree that , while she was certainly a proponent of ethical egoism (EE), the position that one ought always to act in one's own self-interest, and of rational egoism (RE), the position that it is always rational to do so (and irrational not to), she does not seem to have advocated PE.

That's EE. I disagree, but that subject belongs in the Morality forum. From your reference to "rational self interest" it seems likely that you also hold with RE. I disagree with that as well, but that's getting so close to being a moral question [one need only add "and one has a duty to try to act rationally" to make it a moral claim] that it probably also belongs in Morality.

Yes, that's one of the standard arguments against PE. It essentially redefines "self-interested" in such a way as to deprive it of any useful meaning.

This is closely related to the "unfalsifiability" argument. It seems as though, in order to retain any plausibility, PE has to be defined in such a way as to make it unfalsifiable, at which point it is no longer saying anything about the "real world", since it would be true in any possible world. That is, at that point it's no longer an empirical theory, it's a statement about how one proposes to use certain words.

Keith Russell

bd:

I agree completely.

Now, if you don't favour rational egoism, what do you advocate?

(Or, should you answer that question in the 'morality' forum?)

Keith.

faustuz

Wasn't morality at one time considered a philosophical matter? Or was that ethics? I get all these terms confused.

bd-from-kg

Short answer: I don't agree with RE; in fact, I think that as a policy always acting in one's interest is entirely irrational. This of course is my objection to EE as well, since I do in fact take it as self-evident that one should always try to act rationally.

So what is rational? Giving equal consideration to everyone's interests (including one's own, of course). As for my justification for saying this, you'll find a short explanation of part of it in my post at the bottom of page 1 of the "murder for gain" thread. But I'm planning to start a new thread specifically on this subject soon, so you'll have an opportunity to comment if you wish.

JP2

I think there is an element of egoism to many actions we commit (we are, after all, each at the centre of our perceived universe) but that is not to say that our moral duties, or any acts of supererogation we voluntarily commit, are entirely motivated by egoistic impulses. We may give to charity because it makes us feel better, but there is an extra-personal, philanthropic understanding that underlines the action in the first place: there are people out there who require our help, and it is morally "good" to do so. It is our empathy that inspires this sense of moral duty to others, and if one possesses no such empathetic capabilities, then one will have no concept of moral obligations, and one cannot thus absolutely commit a moral action purely out of egoism: if one has no moral spectrum to begin with, what would one have to gain by giving to charity? Therefore, even if such supererogatory acts are somewhat undermined by egoistic impulses (makes us feel pleased, less guilty etc.) there still must be a philanthropic sentiment behind the action to give benefit us in any way from an egoistic stand-point.

Having said that, I don't think one can act from a position of absolute altruism either, as it ends up being a position of self-effacement - in order to survive one must act, quite frequently, in self-interest. If every action is devoted to the "greater good" then what sense of the self are we left with? Can we altruistically eat, sleep, or defecate for instance?

The key is to strike a careful balance, I suppose, between submitting to the will of the das sein and the collective wills of the mit sein. The greater the extent to which our needs are met, then the greater our ability and thus responsibility to perform supererogatory actions. A rich man, for instance, has owes a greater duty to his fellow man than a homeless individual who struggles to meet his own needs, let alone those of others. The moral obligations of the two, however - that is to say, the actions that each are permitted or ought not to perform - are the same.

The trouble with this entire argument, however, is that we are morally evaluating these systems of morality (egoism and philanthropy): by which system of morality does this basis for evaluation come from? By suggesting that a system of morality is invalid because it permits or denies certain actions which we - prior to the fact - find "morally reprehensible" would appear to suggest to me that we each have a deep-seated moral spectrum that precedes any system of morality ever logically devised: that is, we tend to render systems of morality valid or invalid based on our pre-existing moral principles, not the other way around.

So the point is, by which system of logic can we declare egoism and/or philanthropy invalid, other than by employing some other moral system? Is there any other way we can evaluate the validity of a system of morality, then by morally critiquing it?

Morality is not a logical concept, nor is it necessarily consistent. That is why, any attempts to constrain it within a neat little logical system such as the ones proposed here, are doomed to failure. If you want to hear more about this theory I have here, you need only to ask.

Tani

this is a problematic view. one can't chose to be rational, for otherwise it begs the question. the concept of "ought" entail choices and (ir)rationality is the basis of making choices. you can't chose to be rational as rationality is defined by the very process. this is similar to existence as not something to chose or to possess.

as far as i know, this is a wrong view. one thing about empirical theory is that it must not be ad hoc, that is, it must not only describe one particular thing at one particular situation (one possible world), but must apply to all things in all situations that are within the scope of the theory, ie. it is meant to be able to describe all possible worlds.

Keith Russell

bd:

Heading to work, so I'm not going to take the time to check the 'murder-for-gain' comment at this time.

I look forward to your thread; I most definitely will be commenting there.

(But, a preface: I fail to see how I, with my own individual persepctive, need to view others with the same level of concern as myself. They have their own individual perspective, and if I am capable of caring for myself and them, shouldn't they at least be able to care for themselves without requiring my assistance?)

Keith.