Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattdamore :

Well, I wasn't attempting to identify all the factors that bear upon whether someone should prevent suffering. I was just pointing out one reason to prevent suffering, and noting that God might have other reasons, too, for all wek now.

Now let's take a look at Guthrie's theodicy moves:

We must ask whether there is any other way to secure God's desire, and in this case there is. God could give humans better skills at recognizing God's handiwork in the universe, for example. Then so much suffering wouldn't be required.

If it's logically possible for humans to exist in a correct, pure, and instructed state, then God can achieve that goal without using suffering.

So I don't think Guthrie will get anywhere with these attempted theodicies.

Ah, but let's be careful. That's only the case if God already exists. Suppose that the Extra Reason did exist. Then, we should have even more reason to think there'd be less suffering in the world. But there isn't. So we have even more reason to think God didn't exist. Yes, the state of affairs explicated by that extra reason would exist, if God existed. That's why the Extra Reason, if the whole atheological "Extra Reason Move" ("aERM") is cogent, provides yet more force to the argument from evil, force that I think would have to be equal to the force the theists' Extra Reason Move brings.

You talk about this more later:

Even if God existed, the Extra Reason Move claims, we should still be surprised at how much evil there is, precisely because God hasn't prevented more. So what we should really be denying is not that the Extra Reason exists, but that God exists, says the proponent of EAE + aERM. Because if God didn't exist, it wouldn't be surprising that despite the existence of the Extra Reason, there isn't less suffering. It's only surprising if God does exist.

You seem to think of the EAE as claiming that it's logically impossible for there to be this much evil in the world and the belief "God probably doesn't exist" not be warranted. That's an awfully strange way to put it, but let's stay there for a moment.

Introducing another possibility here would look like this: Maybe it actually is logically possible for this much evil to exist and "God probably doesn't exist" not to be warranted. And I would say, sure it is, but is it probable? I mean, essentially, what the UPD would be saying toward the EAE is "Maybe your argument is weak. Maybe God has an unknown reason to allow it to seem strong." I don't think those statements alone can answer any evidential argument.

Well, I don't remember what Hasker ends up saying, but it has a pretty big hole. Something like "There needs to be gratuitous evil so humans can step in to prevent it." But then obviously it wouldn't be gratuitous.

As usual, van Inwagen does a much better job, saying that some evil is just the result of indeterministic events and therefore unpreventable (so, unprevented), yet not necessary for a greater good. That might be true, but it doesn't seem likely that most evil is that way. We can just add "preventable in principle" into our definition of "gratuitous" and it still looks as if we still have the problem of evil. So I conclude that gratuitous evil is incompatible with God, because God wouldn't allow any in-principle-preventable evil that's not necessary for a greater good.

But it's not a "further justification of God's nonexistence." It's an Extra Reason for God to prevent suffering. So if the theist adds specific reasons for God not to prevent suffering, the way Guthrie attempted to do when he was talking about S, that would be something important. But then we wouldn't be in the UPD territory anymore. And I think all those attempted specific reasons are answerable. What I'm talking about is just the bald assertion that maybe God has extra reasons not to prevent suffering, which, I think, is perfectly answerable with the bald assertion that maybe God has extra reasons to prevent suffering beyond the obvious. Sure, if the theist started to describe some plausible extra reasons, I'd be in trouble unless I could offer some of my own in the other direction, but I doubt that the antecedent of that conditional will be satisfied anytime soon.

Likewise.

mattdamore

Hey Tom!

I see what you're saying. I knew what I did say would probably be a little off what you intended for the argument to go. It's just that I wanted to see if it would succeed if what you thought was the obvious reason, really was the obvious reason, and if it was not, then, for some reason that I'd further think about your arguement would be unclear, and therefore invalid, since your terms are ambiguous. But I guess that's irrelevant.

Do you see what I was saying though? If your intention was to provide the reader with one possible reason that God could have which would match his obvious reason, and it ended up being the case that this obvious reason was not a reason that could be possessed by God, because of S, would that not in some way affect the logical set-up of your argument, since it seems that S would justify God being within His moral rights not utilize the things explicated in D*?

I don't think Guthrie's reasons here provided will work if they are split up like this. I think the maximum power of the reasons provided will obtain on if they are tied to eachother in conjunction. Even though I think it is dubious as to whether or not the granting of these 'better skills' (if they are logically possible and/or do not contribute to a more good than bad counterfactual outcome) will somehow have adverse effects on the other reason in the conjunction. If, for example, God did grant these 'better skills', how would that affect God's desire to work with being with libertarian free-will, to the extent that He wants them to become responsible human beings. For example, the one side of the conjunction, which states that God should equip humans with these 'better skills' in order to recognize God's handiwork (let alone respond to it!!), would not guarantee the instantiation of of God's other desire for humans to be rational, responsible creatures. William Lane Craig says, "I think it is logically possible that God might choose to prefer a world in which moral maturity and responsibility are goods He wants to achieve. So, my question is, how, from your stand-point can you assess that this is not a good idea? and What do you suppose God should do in order to instantiate this side of the conjunction without the use of sufferings, on various levels that God so sovereignly decides?

In your answer to these questions, I also want you to keep this quote from Craig in the back of your mind: "What I'm saying is that we're not in a good position to assess with confidence the probability of whether God could have a morally sufficient reason for permitting any specific evil. Let me give you an example from science: chaos theory. In chaos theory, it's been shown that even the flutter of a butterfly's wings could set in motion forces that would result in a hurricane over the Atlantic, and yet no one observing that butterfly would be able to predict that outcome. Similarly, when we see, say, the murder of an innocent man, we have no idea of what ripple effect that might send through history, how God's morally sufficient reason for permitting that might not emerge until later. We're simply not in a good position to assess that kind of probability.

Sure it's logically possible, but as Craig says, "I think this is clearly not necessarily true. Given human freedom, God cannot guarantee how people are going to use that freedom. And if He intervenes every time to prevent people from choosing evil, then we turn into puppets or marionettes. So if God is going to create a world of significantly free moral agents, He has to allow them to make choices for evil, and therefore it may not be within God's power to create a world of free creatures in which evil does not exist.

I know that the quote was not on our topic, but I believe that it can shed light on what we're arguing about. Logical possibility doesn't necessarily entail actualizability. Since it may not be feasible (because of the 'stubborness of free-will). If it's not feasible, then it is out of God's hands to actualize fully. I don't think that this would unsurp God's omnipotence, since I believe that omnipotence is a more complex term than 'only' the ability to do that which is logically possible (a la McEar).

Would not the probable outcome (on the basis of the probability scale we were using for D and D*) be person relative, since I would believe that the independent arguments for God's existence are quite compelling (putting existence of God above .5) and you, I assume, do not find the arguments compelling (maybe putting them significantly lower than .5)? Or is the probability calculas constructed from the stand point of reality. If so, how is that accomplished. Because if it is the cases that it is person relative, then what I said in my previous post would stand, since I believe that God already exists. I would presume that the next step in our argument would be to start the evaluation process of the different arguments for God's existence that have been offered. Which is, sorry to say, quite an undertaking! (Which is why I'm going to be obsessed with this stuff till the day I die ).

My thought process is the complete opposite, since I believe that this extra reason doesn't exist and God does (remember what I said about the person relative nature of the probability calculas in the context of what we're arguing about).

I could reword your quote above to what my though process is like.

Thusly:
That's only the case if the extra reason already exists. Suppose that God did exist. Then, we should have even more reason to think there'd be a state of suffering which is justifiable. It is justifiable. So we have even more reason to think the extra reason doesn't exist.

It seems that any objections you raise with my reformulated paragraph, I could put those objections to you.

It's only surprising if the extra reason exists. Since, from where I stand personally, the probability of God's existence is higher to me than the probability that this extra reason exists.

The reason that I hold that it is logically incompatibile if a reason which you probably agree with. I might be wrong on means of getting there though. The foundation of EAE is that gratuitious evil makes it improbable that God exists. If a seperate argument can be constructed that can show that gratuitous suffering is logically incompatible with certain attributes of God, then would not EAE as a whole be logically incompatible with God, since at it's foundation is the advocation that their exists gratuitous evils.

Ok. I see your point. But take this conclusion as further evidence of what I explicated right above this.

Right. But you were saying that this extra reason isn't utilized, so, in effect, this would warrant further justification of God's nonexistence.

But this bald assertion would be enough to counter the logical incompatibility I explicated above, refuting EAE. Sure it's probable both ways, but then we could extract not only EAE, but the 'Evidential Argument for God's justifiable reasons to allow evil' argument.

I see your point that it's possible, but I don't see how it could be shown to be actual, per the above.

Jobar

To all- I am going to lock this topic for a short while, copy it, and then split off some of theophilus' posts and replies to him, into a new thread I will name 'theophilus vs. atheistic epistemology'. I will of course link to that thread, and then unlock this one.

Jobar, moderator.

...done. theophilus vs. atheistic epistemology

Hey, the new server works GREAT!

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattdamore :

I see where it would have gone, yes. But I think everyone will agree that there's a good reason to prevent suffering. It might be outweighed by the considerations in S, but it's some reason toward preventing suffering.

I'm not sure it would affect it at all. God has to let us have some ability to recognize his handiwork. Why would a greater ability get in the way of our freedom? We'd still have the choice about whether or not to accept and worship God -- it's just that we'd be a bit more perceptive as humans.

Again, this is only a possibility. It's also logically possible that God might choose to prefer a world in which humans are born with all the skills they need. Merely throwing "maybes" at each other leads to impasse, unless one is attempting to answer the logical argument from evil.

I'm just not seeing the importance of letting humans bumble around blindly, not realizing what's going on, most of the time, until it's too late. What would be the obvious problem with creating a group of humans who were better at recognizing the goodness of God? Worshipping him would still be up to them.

Well, it's not implausible that some suffering is required somewhere. It's just implausible that this much is. And we have to compare the instruments of creating God-belief here; one is merely a stronger perceptual apparatus, and the other is intense suffering. Which of those seems to preserve free will; which decision to worship God is freer, the one inspired by rational reflection upon God's creation based on a superior ability to recognize and evaluate it, or the one driven by pain?

Here Craig is simply propounding an Unknown Purpose Defense, and it inherits all the problems of the others. If we're not in a good position to assess the probability of whether God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting something, we're not in a position to assess the probability of whether God has a morally sufficient reason beyond the obvious for prohibiting something. I point to an evil; Craig says it might have better effects down the road; I say it might have even worse effects than the apparent down the road. The two mentionings of possibilities neutralize each other, and the prima facie weight of the suffering continues through.

Beyond this "neutralization" move, however, there are all the well-known problems with UPDs. We can't intervene to prevent suffering because we don't know what the effects of that suffering will be down the road. We can't trust our empirical knowledge because God might be deceiving us; we're not in a position to assess whether he would have good reasons for doing so that aren't immediately apparent. So this UPD leads to ethical and epistemological skepticism.

And this is a version of Plantinga's The Nature of Necessity Free Will Defense. The problems are that (1) it's not plausible that every instance of suffering is the result of a free will decision, (2) it's not plausible that God must allow freedom of action instead of just freedom of choice, especially because he already limits our freedom of action so much by the use of natural laws, and (3) significantly free moral agents just doesn't seem to be a good enough good to outweigh such events as the holocaust, the Lisbon earthquake, etc. Finally, no one's asking God to intervene all the time, and even if he did, we wouldn't need to be puppets; we would still have plenty of freedom of choice and freedom of action to choose differing goods, and we could even have freedom of choice to choose evil -- it's just that our evil choices wouldn't result in success as often.

This is all predicated on the assumption that there aren't any strong independent arguments for God's existence. This assumption is often taken for granted in discussion of the problem of evil. If there were strong evidence for God's existence, this would be strong evidence against the existence of gratuitous evil, for example. But I'm saying if we assume there's no strong evidence for God's existence, we have to rate the probabilities at .5.

EAE, if strong, leads to the conclusion that God probably does not exist. So I don't think it relies on a logical incompatibility anywhere. At least, it's never phrased that way. To say it's possible that EAE could be strong and belief in God could be warranted is basically to say that it's possible that an inductive argument could be strong and it could be warranted to deny its conclusion. I don't think that's a likely possibility unless there's independent evidence for the denial of its conclusion.

But see, here's the logical incompatibility in question (at least, I think so; correct me if I'm mistaken):

(1) EAE is strong.
(2) There is no argument for God's existence as strong as EAE is against his existence.
(3) Denial of "God probably doesn't exist" is warranted.
(4) (1)-(3) are incompatible.

I think it's a genuine logical incompatibility, by virtue of the meaning of "strong" -- "strong" just means that it warrants acceptance of its conclusion. So your possibility that you'd introduce, I take it, is that there is a good reason for all the suffering in the world. I still don't see how, (a) not only does my possibility ("maybe there's a good reason beyond the obvious to prevent suffering") not "neutralize" this possibility, but further and more importantly, (b) how that bears upon the above incompatibility. As long as you grant that EAE is strong, you're already 99% of the way there, I think. Saying there might be a good reason to prevent suffering is to deny (1), not to deny (4).

mattdamore

Tom, thanks for your replies.

Ok, but let me be clear then that the considerations behind S would nulify the probability of the reason propounded for suffering's prevention. The probability, it seems, would be on S's side, thus subtracting a little force from your formulation of EAE.

This seems like a sensible proposal, but let's look at it a little more closely.

First, I have a 'burden of proof' question: Would it be up to me to prove that your quote (Q) doesn't have force, or would you have to prove that such a 'greater ability' (GA) exists and that GA, from your finite perspective, is preferable to what an infinite God has chosen to utilize. I know this may sound a little question begging, because Q is brought up as evidence against God's existence (brought up within the arguer's no-God universe). It looks like I was wrong to in my latter reason for why you might have the burden of proof, because of the no-God context you are coming from when you are making your argument. From my standpoint, you are stepping into my 'God exists' universe and bringing up Q. So, if you step into my 'God exists' universe, should it not be labeled question-begging, since Q is proposed in the universe where it is a presupposition which God exists? If Q is raised on the context of that presupposition, is the theist within her rational rights to shift the burden of proof for the truth-value of Q over to the atheist?

Second, I have a question on your wording. Are you saying that GA should be instantiated to take the place of suffering for only 'recognition' (R) of God's handiwork? If so, I think that R is not the end that God has in mind. But 'responding to R in such a way as to lead to salvation' (RWS). So, I don't see how GA could be used to lead to RWS. You would have to argue about some necessary connection existing between R and RWS. I don't see how this how R->RWS is true. If it's not true then maybe GA doesn't do it's job as well as suffering without somekind way that makes GA affect LFW. After these clarifications I think we'll make better progress.

So should I change Craig's quote to '"I think it is logically probable that God might choose to prefer a world in which moral maturity and responsibility are goods He wants to achieve." If this change is done, then would I need to produce evidence of this probability?

Hmm. I'm not inclined to agree that this happens. First, what do you mean by 'bumble around blindly'?

This is just GA in different wording, so I'll highlight those questions I had for that again. I don't see how GA would necessarily imply a greater probability for increades response to salvation. For one, knowledge of a thing does not always (and from case to case, varies from greater to lesser) lead to the action of responding to what that thing calls one do to. For example, smokers. Second, GA on it's own ignores some basic theological tenets within the context of Christianity. The Bible teaches that we have a sin nature (SN), so it isn't likely that GA would, on it's own do the trick. Our desires, intentions, emotions, etc . . under the hinderance of SN wouldn't change if only the perceptual apparatus which houses SN is enhanced. Third, there are the difficulties of ambiguity raised above.

And this is where I see the 'burden of proof' (BOP) thing come again. It seems to me that you have BOP, since the morally sufficient reasons (MSR) which Craig alludes to are intelligent generalizations about why God would act is such a way, and your MSR are meant to go against certain natural intentions God has (the unactualization of the 'extra reason' beyond the 'obvious one). So, whereas Craig's MSR are general and better coincide with the way in which God obviously operation, and your MSR are more specific and go do not appear to coincide with the way in which God obviously operates, you must bear the BOP in proving that reason beyond the obvious one exists, so your challenging probability can stay and challenge Craig's. But until this happen Craig's probability, I think, is enough to do the job of pointing out how we're not in good positions to assess knowledge regarding the using or withholdings of God with certain evils are plans He wants to utilize in His overall plan.

It just seems to me that you have to bear BOP with your possibility. Since the effects in reality are being utilized from God's infinite perspective, then these 'worse effects' said to possibly exist must be proven to take place contrary to God's infinite knowledge.

I also think this may vear more into the existence and character of God, because I think if God exists, and his character is such that he would be justified in having these 'better effects' obtain, then these possible 'worse effects' you bring up would be dubbed extremely impossible. So, in effect, I want to propose the (if God exists and has a specific sort of character=GESSC) fact that GESSC makes the possibility of the existence of the 'worse effects' extremely improbable. If they are extremely improbable, and GESSC makes Craig's possibility extremely probable, then I am more justified 'evidentially' for sticking with Craig's possibility over yours.

But lack of knowledge of what happens further down the road is something that is imposed upon us with our choice. We're not omniscent. Because of this imposition, we are no longer in a position base our ethical actions from that stand-point. I believe that X (who has knowledge of what happens down the road) has set up the world in such a way as to allow for UPD within the ethical context of burning upon the beings consciences an ethical ought that will work in perfect accordance with God's plan to actualize God's UP. But for us to say that because we lack the knowledge of God's means to arrive at His specified end that therefore that ethical 'oughtness' might be comprimised because of some worry that the utilization of this 'oughtness' might interrupt 'the plan' is, I believe, impossible. My reasons vear away from the problem of evil, into the nature of God's sovereignty, which I believe should be understood within the context of Molinism. If you want to open up a seperate thread on this, that would be fine.

But the quote was speaking of every instance of suffering. It was speaking of suffering being a necessary part of a world where free creatures exist.

Well, when you say it like that! Briefly, Glenn Miller, states Much suffering, pain, and even evil (in its painful consequences) can be seen to contribute to good outcomes. Physiological pain is largely preventative; natural disasters often provoke positive community responses and integration; heinous moral evil often challenges us to stronger moral stances; painful consequences of evil choices often serve to lead us to change our patterns of choices, and/or inspires those "watching us" to do so, for more extensive impact. .

For a good argument stating that there is more good than bad as a result of freedom, read http://www.christian-thinktank.com/gr5part2.html

How would this go about though? Is it through the elimination of of objects of desire, human desire? Is it never allowing us to have desires to be aroused to the point where we commit an evil?Should God remove our intentions by miracles, or initially creating us with any intentions leading to evil? Should God remove acts of the will leading to evil? Should He stop evil by limiting our bodily movements? Shoud he remove evil by miraculous intervention?

Each one, I think, raises a number of difficulties. Pick one, and we'll discuss it.

So, your particular argument against UPD would only be convincing to people who believe that God doesn't exist. Then that's not me!

It's the hidden assumption implicit within EAE, not EAE itself. That assumption being that gratuitous evils exist. This assumption seems to be logically incompatible with certain attributes God has, since the exercising of those attributes, I believe, would result in no gratuitous evils. So, if this logical incompatibility takes place involving the hidden assumption with EAE, would not EAE, as a whole, be effected, since this implicit assumption is the foundation of EAE?

The one you presented wasn't really the one I had in mind.

See above.

Thanks for your comments!

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattdamore:

As long as the considerations behind S are supportable, and I've argued that they aren't.

Well, we can use induction. The current level of our abilities doesn't preclude significant freedom. So any nearby level probably wouldn't, either, unless you can think of some reason that it would.

That's okay with me, but why would humans not be better at doing that if they were better at recognizing God's handiwork?

Well, of course, "logically probable" doesn't mean anything. But yes, it would have to be "probable," and you'd have to provide evidence for its probability. Whether something is logically possible is visible to everyone a priori, but figuring out whether something is probable is harder.

But we can't even respond if we aren't aware of the thing to which we're responding. My position is that greater ability to recognize God's handiwork would lead, in the end, to more salvation.

I think our desires, intentions, and emotions are very much subject to what we perceive. If I behold the glory of the heavens, I'm more likely to feel a strong emotion of love toward God, or however that's supposed to work.

Well, wait a minute. Look what you say later:

You can't have both. Are we in a good position to discern these motivations or not? What Craig is offering is actual reasons to believe there are morally sufficient reasons. What I'm criticizing is the old bald assertion: "Maybe there are good reasons we don't know about." And that one bears the same burden of proof as my counter-assertion of a maybe, if I can answer Craig's specific reasons. Which most philosophers of religion seem to believe are answerable; it seems to be a common ground position among leading philosophers of religion that no good theodicy exists.

It seems the same goes for the "worse effects" that would result from God preventing more suffering than he does now.

This seems to me to support the notion that we can't make ethical decisions about intervention at all, because we can't judge what will happen down the road. Could you explain more carefully your response to this point? Is this what you mean requires a discussion of Molinism?

Maybe a specific example will be helpful. I saw a story on TV the other night about a girl who was born with a severe deformity in her face. She required eighteen painful surgeries to begin to correct it, and it was still very noticeable. The possible world in which she only required seventeen surgeries seems to me to contain just as much freedom as this one.

That's a rather large piece. Could you point me to the relevant parts, or summarize the argument here please? Or just answer why the free will of Hitler to kill millions of people was more important than the free will of millions of people not to be killed.

Here's a possibility. Suppose people successfully torture babies 100 times a year now. If God intervened secretly and prevented that torture (not the choice, but the successful carrying out of that choice) so that it only happened 90 times a year, he'd be a morally better being. And we'd still be making just as many free choices as we did before -- it's just that we'd be successful less. God could accomplish this via a natural law, the way he prevents lots of our evil choices already via natural laws.

Not exactly. My EAE would only be convincing to people who don't have good reasons to believe God does exist, reasons good enough to outweigh EAE. These good reasons would allow the theist to perform the G. E. Moore shift with respect to gratuitous evil.

The assumption is only that gratuitous evils probably exist. The conclusion is that God probably does not exist.

mattdamore

Hey Tom,

I looks like we may be heading into territory which would qualify a need to open up additional threads for accomidation purposes.
I let you know when I recommend that to happen as my post unfolds.

I don't think I've seen an argument that isn't supportable, but rather the contention that the probability exists that S has an epistemic/metaphysical defeater in the reason beyond the obvious one you postulated. But this probability doesn't have an argument, that I've seen. If this probability doesn't have an argument, then the contention from which the probability seeks to support is unsupported.

My reasoning for saying that I have seen only the contention of a probability is from here:
Next-

I see. I think this would usher in other reasons God has in conjunction with the stated maxim that free-will shouldn't be violated (VFW). One of the 'other reasons' that I would like to introduce in regard to what should be added to to VFW in the defense against your GA advocation would be the question of why and what God intended to create when He created human beings (referring to the basic abilities and capacities given to humans) (GIH).

This is where we might have to open up another thread, because our posts will probably grow exceedingly longer as new defenses are brought forth for examination.

What does GIH consist in? Here, I will guote John. Feinberg: Then the theological idea of the sin nature is introduced which allows for the perversion of some of these capacities. This probably, but not explicitly the way you worded it, contributes to the idea which explicated when you said, I'm just not seeing the importance of letting humans bumble around blindly, not realizing what's going on, most of the time, until it's too late.

So, how does Fienberg know this? He further substantiates his remarks in the following: By looking at the sort of being be created when he created us, and by noting that the world in which we live is suited to our capacities.

In light of this, and possibly GA, he states, Clearly, if removing evil is God's only goal, he can accomplish it. However, my view of divine omnipotence doesn't allow God to actualize contradictions. Hence, if by removing evil God contradicts some other goal(s) he wants to accomplish, that explains why God can't remove evil.

In conclusion, an in respect of your tweaked probablistic formulation I say that if God did the necessary actions to actualize GA then He would either 'contradict his intentions to create human beings and world as he has, causing us to wonder if he has one or more of the attributes ascribed to him, and/or do something we would not expect or want him to do, because it would produce greater evil than there already is.'

I will talk about the specific way in which you bring it up further down.

The unpredictability of libertarian free-will in general, and the specific moral tendencies of the variety of moral dispositions exemplified by every human to come into existence. Let me explain the former first. R by itself was seen not to be a necessary condition for the instantiation of RWS, since raw cognitive information doesn't always lead a decision to act on the dogma which that information advocates: Hence, my example with smoking. Thus, who knows the better or probable better outcome of GA based on information alone. Now the latter; the moral dispositions of some or most people would not actualize RWS with the instantiation of of GA. It's possible from within the Christian universe. A great example would be Satan Himself. Who better has this GA than him! Yet RWS failed to obtain. If GA is exemplified on this level and yet didn't insure RWS to obtain, then GA doesn't seem to be to be sufficient to account for RWS. I also think the sin nature may play a part in this. I'll expound on that if needed.

This is where, I believe, we may run into a supernatural/presuppostional wall. I would argue, on the basis of divine revelation, that everyone is implicitly aware of the proposed reality.

This has the problems I stated above. Too many unknowns with regard to unpredictability of free-will, the reality of a sinful-nature, and the provided counter-example of GA on a high level failing to make RWS obtain. The 1st and 3rd reason render GA highly improbable and the 2nd reason virtually impossible, epistemically, to know for sure (maybe even metaphysically impossible, since the existence of the sin nature is postulated to make an existential impact on the way in which GA would choose to go).

This is a personal statement and to extend your personal sentiments universally to persons of a variety of varying moral dispositions and personalities, cross-culturally, is a tad overkill. Again, too many unknowns.

I can see the inconsistency. One question, what post is the latter quote found in? I can't seem to locate it. I need to see the context of what I was speaking about in order to see if the two quotes where you saw an inconsistency were speaking of the same thing.

I don't follow you here.

Yep. If you want to discuss this on email or on a seperate thread, I'd be obliged.

Your problem, it seems, is that you are isolating an evil state of affairs without giving any attention to the counterfactual ramifications it could have on S, which overwhelmingly covers the explicated evil. As Craig says, On the Christian view, the joy of knowing God for eternity, for infinite future time, so far outstrips what we suffer in this life, that no matter what you suffer, when you look back on it from heaven, you would say, "It was worth it! I would do it again to attain this sort of joy, this sort of glory, this sort of fulfillment!" So that compensation has to be put into the equation as well.

The BOP is on you to prove that the 17 surgeries would have a better counterfactual outcome than the present: Remember the Chaos Theory quote I provided.

I'll tell you what. Just read the down to the bold italics which state So, I have to conclude that Criterion One is met (for humans) with regards to this earthly life. . This isn't even a 10th of the article, but will be sufficient.

As I answer, keep Fienberg's quote in the back of your mind.

This quote from him should serve as a good spring-board: ... it would give us reason to question God's wisdom. Would a wise God go to all the trouble to make human beings as they are and then persorm miracles to counteract them when they express that humanness in ways that would produce evil? Of course, had God made us differently so that we wouldn't have to remove evil by miracles, that would contradict his intention to make the wort of beings he has made. So either God must perform miracles and thereby cause us to question his wisdom, or he must change our nature as human beings. But that would contradict his goal of making humans rather than superhumans or sub-humans.

So, then, since I believe I have good reasons to believe God exists, I can conclude, from my stand-point, that logical incompatibility is involved, since the contradiction between the reality of gratuitous evil and certain attributes of God not allowing that kind of evil in any possible world exists. Therefore, the possibilities I raised from my stand-point are warranted, and, thus, EAE isn't a problem for me. Why don't we proceed to the reasons why I think I God exists?

Right, but I'm speaking of the surety of it's existence within a possible world, and the implications thereof.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattdamore :

I'm talking about my specific criticisms of the specific defenses, not the more general Unknown Purpose Defense, which, for the purposes of this thread, I'm attempting to answer with an Unknown Purpose Offense, as it were. There are two questions before us within this thread, most generally. Is the bald-assertion-of-possibility UPD cogent, or is it answerable by a bald-assertion-of-possibility UPO? Is there a cogent defense against EAE that does not consist of the bald-assertion-of-probability UPD?

What we're talking about directly below (and through almost all of this post) is the second question, in the most immediate case with respect to the free will defense.

Ah, but my position is that apparently, our LFW is already violated commonly. You can test this for yourself. Point your finger at someone across the room from you, and attempt to shoot a bolt of electricity at her in order to cause her pain. You will fail, every time. It certainly appears as if your freedom of action is constrained considerably.

Interesting. Is it your position that a better ability to recognize God's handiwork would provide absolutely no advantage in accomplishing the Divine purpose of bringing people to God?

This is quite an extraordinary claim, and if you think you need another thread in which to demonstrate it, you have my (somewhat reluctant) blessing. But even if everyone were aware of it, God could have given us a better ability to overcome our sinful nature -- couldn't he have? After all, I think we would enjoy maximal free will when it's not clouded by the perversion of Adam and Eve's legacy.

I see you're not a follower of Plantinga. He would say that our ability to behold the heavens is one thing that's likely to trigger our sensus divinitatis. This is a good point at which to ask why God didn't give us a better sensus divinitatis.

Do a "Find" in your browser for the string "assess knowledge." It's about halfway through your post of July 1, 4:13 a.m. GMT.

Sorry for the obscurity. I mean we're not in a position to discern whether God has good reasons or motivations to act a certain way, so we have no way to estimate the probability that God has a reason beyond the obvious to prevent suffering, or a hidden reason to allow it.

I think a separate thread might be best, but let's hold off a while longer and see if we can tie up some issues in this one. I don't want the current thread to be too fecund just yet.

Here is some evidence that world-17 (the world in which the girl only required 17 surgeries) would be better than world-@ (the actual world): The girl would have suffered less. Now you provide some evidence that world-17 would have been worse than world-@. (When you do, n.b. that God can accomplish quite a bit with his omnipotence.) Otherwise, it seems the Evidence Scales are tipped in my direction.

Either that, or you can say we just don't know that less suffering would have been better, but I don't think you can principledly take that route. If you do, it seems we have to deny that world-19 or world-20 or even world-200+the-little-girl's-puppy-gets-run-over-by-a-car would be any worse than world-@.

Here's a quote, emphasis original:

The author seems to me to be minorly blaspheming. He is presupposing, as I see it, that God is not omnipotent. Because according to his story, God could not accomplish these "preventative" goods without suffering. But that's patently false. For example, it is extremely doubtful that insects feel pain as a conscious state (I can give you some sources of you don't believe me) -- yet they certainly have danger- and injury-avoidance mechanisms. I'm sure the same goes for even bacteria. My guess is that pain was simply the easiest way, evolutionarily, to warn us about when we just broke our arm or something like that. (And I might add that Draper's Hypothesis of Indifference makes this relationship much less surprising than a hypothesis of monotheistic care.) I would be interested to see some argumentation to the conclusion that in world-17, there would be a privation of goodness that God simply couldn't replenish, despite his omnipotence.

Here's another way to get at the problem. God is omnipotent. From this fact, I think we can conclude that for any particular evil, more likely than not, God would be able to prevent it without precluding a greater good. (Can't we?) After all, we humans assume that all the time about ourselves, so certainly an omnipotent being would be able to do the same or much better.

I don't find this very compelling. God could easily hide his miracle-working from us. And, as the author notes, God need not even use miracles (but his defense to this point is yet weaker):

This seems to me to be exceedingly poor, almost question-begging. The point at issue is whether God made the right choices in creating us. Merely to re-assert that he created the kinds of beings he wanted to create is to point to a tautology. The question is: Did he in fact create the kinds of beings that a morally perfect being would create? I think the facts of evil in the world say no.

If he had created humans who were better at avoiding pain but just as good at avoiding injury (prima facie metaphysically possible, to me at least -- let's call them humans-2), we would be calling them humans. What's wrong with them being slightly different from the humans that exist today? The defender of theism must explain why it would be worse objectively to create humans-2 than to create humans.

And in fact, God need not use miracles or non-humans. God could institute different natural laws to prevent more suffering, which wouldn't require creation of humans-2 or extensive miracle-working.

Yes, the G. E. Moore shift is a simple matter...

Wait a minute. You're kind of all over the place here. What does it mean to say logical incompatibility is "involved"? Good independent reasons to believe God exists are good independent reasons to believe gratuitous evil does not exist. But I don't see why good independent reasons to believe God exists are reasons to believe that EAE involves asserting a logical incompatibility. There's no logical incompatibility required by the EAE, except, maybe, the incompatibility between having good reasons to think God doesn't exist and no reasons to think he does, and belief in God being warranted. There's also the logical incompatibility between gratuitous evil and God, but I think that one's also eminently defensible. So maybe I'm still not understanding what you think the incompatibility upon which EAE relies is.

If you wish this thread to have yet a third daughter thread, be my guest. I would be interested to see these reasons, although I would caution that even theists seem to have abandoned this approach, except perhaps for Gale and Pruss, and of course Plantinga. Thanks for all the informed discussion, by the way. Yours is a textbook example of the right way to debate the problem of evil, although I tend to believe that the ideal textbook would find your approach unsuccessful in the end.

mattdamore

Maybe the assertion's validity should be measured relative to our background knowledge. Maybe it can be argued within a probability calculas that UPD is more probable than UPO. If our background knowledge is K:

P(UPD/K)>P(UPO/K)

Where UPD='The validity of UPD'.
Where UPO='The validity of UPO'.

I would argue that K consists in the arguments for God's existence and implications which happen to God's character as the arguments are fleshed out.

So, maybe we can relable the defense and the offense as they come through the probability calculas as PUDP and PUPO. Since, as you say, possibilities are superfluous when applied to EAE, then any possibility raised by either proponent on either side of EAE will be countered ad infinitum, possibly. But, I think, if we switch to probabilities, relative to a specific back-ground knowledge, then we can see if it the case the one of the opposing probabilities possessed more warrant than the other. If PUDP is more probable relative to K, then maybe one is justified to accept PUDP over PUPO, if it it's the case the PUDP's K is more plausible than PUPO's K. Now, if you haven't already presented it, (point me out to it if you have), you must not only present the content of your K, but also provide an explanation on both why the contents of your K is more plausible than PUDP's K, and prove that PUDP's K is inconclusive. In a different context, but still relative to this particular issue, Kai Neilson says, To show that an argument is invalid or unsound is not to show that the conclusion of the argument is false. ... All the proofs of God's existence may fail, but it still may be the case that God exists. In short, to show that the proofs do not work is not enough by itself. It may still be the case that God exists. Particularly, one can say this in the context of speaking of my justifications for K under the rubric of PUPD, and how if they did fail, you don't win by default, but you must build up a case of your own for the truety of K under the rubric of PUPO. So, depending on who is the first to present their reasons for their particular K, the above qualifications seem to must have a bearing on its undertaking. So, relative to the full scope of the evidence of God's existence, PUPD might be more acceptable.


I'm also aware of whether God's existence is improbable relative to the evil in the world depends on how probable it is that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil that occurs. It's just admittedly tough to assess the accuracy of such a probability due to the fact that we're not in a good epistemic position to make particular judgments on this specific probability with confidence. So, this probability would seem considerably lower than the probability which is secured through various arguments provided for God's existence. Since these arguments are within our epistemic grasp.

I think you may have hinted at this earlier in the discussion with your distinction between freedom of action and that of the will. Timothy O'Connor says, Philosophers who distinguish freedom of action and freedom of will do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or "willings."

So I would agree with you that our 'Libertarian Free Action' is violated, but that is not what I'm saying. I'm speaking of my will: Libertarian Free-will; and the defense which is being contructed takes the violation of LFW to be morally contradictory to the character of God.

Only because of the conjunctive state of affairs that this better ability must accompany and that the utilization of the better ability might result in fewer being saved because the process through with the utilization process works involves a variety of different people with contrasting moral dispositions probably related to the culture from which they developed them. This variety and culture problem (VCP) is difficult to reconcile with GA because VCP might render the knowledge which comes with GA to reject the actualization of RWS. My counter-example was Satan himself. So, in other words, it's another UPD for the truth that we are not in a good epistemic position to assess with confidence the fact that the granting of GA would result in increased RWS. Like I said above (since I beleive you present your UPO for GA) the probability of UPD on K and GA would have to be more than the probability of UPO on K and GA. And, again, it looks like my probability could be greater since I have the proofs for God's existence, and all you have is evil (maybe). But if all you have for K with respect UPO, then that may be too narrow. For, of course, it can justifiably be said that relative to evil alone, God's existence is improbable. If evil (E) is put in conjuntion with God Proofs (GP), then GP and E within my K would warrant my probability higher than your E within your K alone.

I don't think so. How would you think this would be accomplished? I think this runs into the same problems stated above.

Oh, but I am a follower of Plantinga. Hence, when I said, that everyone is implicitly aware of the proposed reality. I would agree with Plantinga that this implicit awareness is analogous to the sensus divinitatis.

Let me put what you quote me as saying in context. Here's what you say: If I behold the glory of the heavens, I'm more likely to feel a strong emotion of love toward God, or however that's supposed to work. This was being said to my: Our desires, intentions, emotions, etc . . under the hinderance of SN wouldn't change if only the perceptual apparatus which houses SN is enhanced. So if what you were saying was in response to the proposition that GA would lead to RWS, and what you were saying was an expression of your personal sentiments of what you would do if granted GA (actualize RWS), then when I said, This is a personal statement and to extend your personal sentiments universally to persons of a variety of varying moral dispositions and personalities, cross-culturally, is a tad overkill., this personal statement I was high-lighting wasn't dealing the implicit awareness in particular, but on your idea that because you personally would choose to utilize GA towards the actualization of RWS, that does not therefore lead one to justifiably extend the validity of that utilization universally, because of VCP.

Never mind. You were right. There was an inconsistency. I choose to stick with the latter: we're not in good positions to assess knowledge regarding the using or withholdings of God with certain evils are plans He wants to utilize in His overall plan., only with a little tweak. We're not in good epistemic positions to assess the knowledge required for 'certainty' regarding God's 'specific plans with specific evils.

Ah, but wouldn't that destroy the evidential probability which you are claiming to be able to discern whether God doesn't have good reasons or motivations in order to support EAE.

Again, I believe that the problem lies in the fact that you isolate an evil state of affairs and judge from that isolation whether or not God should have permitted such a state. And since suffering, in isolation, seems contrary to God's omni-benevolence, this suffering should either disappear or be significantly less than what it is in the actual world. I can only see this argument working if it takes the evil state of affairs in isolation. When you do not take it in isolation, it seems that epistemic problems arise in relation to whether we are justified in saying that a world with less suffering is preferable to the suffering manifested in the actual world. So, what happens when a state of suffering isn't taken into isolation? The answer will lead us, again, to GA. Since his prupose for human life isn't happiness per se, but salvation or knowledge of God. So certain evils may appear pointless in relation to human happiness, but, at the same time, not be pointless in working in the girls life to produce salvation or knowledge of God, which will being true and everlasting human fulfillment. Thus, it may very well be a means used by God to draw people to salvation. Patrick Johnstone's 'Operation World' shows in detail that it is precisely in countries which have endured suffering and hardship that Christianity is growing the fastest!

How does this count against God's omnipotence? If you have read Flint and Freddoso's analysis and happen to agree or disagree with it, let me know. I happen to be in agreement, and would argue that from the definition which the author's ascribe to omnipotence would allow the idea that God could not accomplish certain preventative goods with suffering (PS). So, if you either have read and agreed with their analysis, have read and disagreed, haven't read, or haven't read and want me to explicate what I mean, then we can discuss the truth-value of PS from within that context.

Alston disagrees. Would you like to discuss the Hypothesis of Indifference from both Draper's and Alston's correspondance and our additional nuances to their arguments?

Again, Flint and Freddoso, I believe, disagree that this would count against His omnipotence.

But it isn't the same thing. From our point of view, as free agents, we have the particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. These courses of action seem to be happening from within a counterfactual frame-work. From God's point of view, He cannot actualize states of affairs described by counterfactuals about the free dscisions of other agents (I can argue this further if needed). If the latter is true, then your argument is unclear, since it doesn't consider it's conclusion with a right defintion of omnipotence.

How could this be done?

Could you explain the nature of the tautology?

I think the facts of evil in the world say no.

Remeber that isolation problem I brought up above.

First, your conditional doesn't consider what I raised above: The chief purpose of life isn't lack of suffering, but salvation and knowledge of God. Maybe counterfactual outcomes involving humans-2 are led to less being saved. So the question, again, centers around whether it is justifiable to say that suffering is necessarily utilized by God to bring about the most salvation. Support was given above from Operation World.

Maybe you could explain what this G.E. Moore shift is to me. I am unfamiliar with it.

Within the theological doctrines explicating the attributes of God, there is an attribute which cannot be true at the same time and in the same relationship as this implicit assumption within EAE, which is that gratuitous evil exists, within the context of the hypothetical brought up. So, if this logical incompatibility is involved we may be justified in countering EAE, as a whole, by the utilization of possibilities.

You said what I mean when you stated: There's also the logical incompatibility between gratuitous evil and God, but I think that one's also eminently defensible.

Do you have any links you could provide which explain the reason for their abandonement? I'd be interested in reading them.

Thank you! BTW, what year in college are you? Since you seem pretty informed in philosophy, may I ask you for some book recommendations that you found helpful in the philosophical maturing process you've experienced?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattdamore :

Indeed, but again, we're moving away from UPD and UPO, in their "bald assertion of probability" forms. The original post was intended to say, given that no argument for God's existence works and that no theodicy works, merely asserting the possibility of a morally sufficient reason is completely useless.

Hm. I think we are, because God is omnipotent. For any possible evil, it's more likely than not that it's not necessary for a greater good, because God is omnipotent. And the set of actual evils is a proper subset of the set of possible evils. We have no a priori reason to think that all the unnecessary evils are crowded into the "possible but not actual" proper subset. Basically, conservatively, the probability that any particular possible evil will be necessary for a greater good is 0.5. Actual evils are a proper subset of possible evils, so every actual evil, as far as we know, has a 0.5 chance of being necessary for a greater good. So it seems overwhelmingly likely that at least one of them is unnecessary.

Yes, but FWD in fact must use LFA. For God could prevent quite a bit of evil by using different natural laws, while still allowing us to make the choice for those evils -- it's just that our choices would be stymied more often.

I've provided some evidence that a greater ability to recognize God's handiwork would lead to more salvation: namely, that you need to recognize that God exists before you can be saved. Now you must provide evidence that a greater ability would actually detract from salvation, or the Evidence Scales remain tipped.

God must create humans with a certain basic moral character. It seems he could have created humans with a different moral character, one stronger and more able to overcome sin.



Never mind. You were right. There was an inconsistency. I choose to stick with the latter: we're not in good positions to assess knowledge regarding the using or withholdings of God with certain evils are plans He wants to utilize in His overall plan., only with a little tweak. We're not in good epistemic positions to assess the knowledge required for 'certainty' regarding God's 'specific plans with specific evils.

Again, it's not as if the scales are completely on balance. I have some evidence that the world would be a better place if the girl suffered less: she would have suffered less, and suffering, ceteris paribus, is bad. So you must show that the ceteris paribus here fails to obtain, or provide your own ceteris paribus evidence that the world would not be a better place, that suffering is good for some reason. If you do, you're not using UPD anymore.

I have pushed the scales in one direction with the introduction of a specific evil and evidence that this evil is bad. If we assume complete ignorance of other factors, we must admit that there is at least one reason that her suffering ought to have been less. Now it is up to the theist to provide an outweighing reason that her suffering ought to have been less.

Well, as I've mentioned elsewhere, these two reasons to believe some proposition P seem to involve much different amounts of freedom of choice:

(R1) I am suffering quite a bit, so I will accept P to reduce my suffering.
(R2) I have observed the glory of the world, and this leads me to accept P, so I will not resist P.

Well, first, I prefer Hoffman and Rosenkrantz's analysis. But as their accounts share quite a bit, I will say that it counts against omnipotence in the following way. (I will encapsulate their accounts to indicate that omnipotence is the ability to bring about any logically possible, bring-about-able state of affairs.)

The following are a logically possible, bring-about-able states of affairs. Let "D" be the proposition "humans do not feel as much pain as they do in world-@":

(S1) Humans evade pain and harm at least as much as they do in world-@, and D.
(S2) Humans exhibit personal achievement and community response as much as they do in world-@, and D.
(S3) Humans experience macro-shifts in public morality as much as they do in world-@, and D.

At least, if they're not logically possible or bring-about-able, show me why not; derive a contradiction.

Yes, but we suffer from that same problem as humans, except we can control the LFW of a different person. God can control his own LFW, and I can control my own LFW, and no one else can control them. But still, we assume that we can reduce suffering without precluding a greater good very frequently, even though we have the same limitations based on others' LFW that God does. Each of us is precluded from controlling anyone's LFW other than our own.

God could hide his "miracle" working very easily -- by changing our mental states so we don't realize what's happening, or using undetectable elves to carry out his wishes, or the like. He's a really smart and powerful person.

"God will create the kind of beings he wants to create." God is omnipotent and libertarianly free, so the only kind of beings he will possible create are the ones he wants to create.

Moore produced it in response to skepticism, and it's become an argument form. Its general form is the following:

(1) P --> Q
(2) P
(3) Q

...

(1) P --> Q
(2') ~Q
(3') ~P

So, when faced with the following skeptical argument,

(1) If skepticism is true, we have no knowledge of the external world.
(2) Skepticism is true.
(3) Therefore, we have no knowledge of the external world.

he shifted it this way:

(2') But we do have knowledge of the external world.
(3') Therefore, skepticism is false.

The way it would work here is:

(1) If God exists, then there will be no gratuitous evil.
(2) But there probably is gratuitous evil.
(3) Therefore, God probably does not exist.

Shifted to:

(2') But God probably exists.
(3') Therefore, there probably is no gratuitous evil.

It illustrates the use of providing evidence for God's existence.

So the atheist says that gratuitous evil and God are logically incompatible, and the theist, or at least you, say that they might not be. But everyone except Hasker and van Inwagen think gratuitous evil and God's existence are genuinely incompatible, because God simply wouldn't permit any -- that's what moral perfection means. So in a way, you have to argue for skepticism about analytic propositions if you want to deny the incompatibility, or take Hasker's or van Inwagen's line. Hasker's is pretty weak; van Inwagen's is stronger, but all we have to do is modify "gratuitous" to include "preventable in principle."

As for the reasons theists have abandoned arguing for God, my guess is that no one seems to be able to get anywhere. Just take a survey of the current literature; all there really are are the finetuning argument, Craig's kalam, and Gale and Pruss's cosmological argument.

I just finished my junior year. We've probably read mostly the same books, but let me say Howard-Snyder, ed., The Evidential Argument from Evil, Drange Nonbelief & Evil, Davis Encountering Evil, and older, Martin Atheism: A Philosophical Justification.