Philip Osborne

Basically, the assertion is that Yahweh can create, and has created, parameters that even he can't violate. Omnipotence cannot be claimed for Yahweh whether he can or can't, the very concept of omnipotence is ultimately illucid.

It is not necessary for theists to assert that God created absolutely everything separate from Himself. Granted, many theists think this is so, but I think they are misguided. A theist who holds that God must operate within the realm of what is logically possible can also hold that God did not create the space of possibilities without violating his theism, and with respect to other considerations (such as modal logic), it makes a great deal of sense to hold this latter statement true. So there is no requirement that God be able to create parameters which He cannot violate.

Sincerely,

Philip

Bible Humper

Hello Philip, it seems to me that you have invalidated many theistic arguments with that last post, especially first cause arguments.

If this is so, many Xian arguments are about to have the rug pulled out from under them!

First of all, if there is asserted to be certain fundamentals that are even more integral than Yahweh, all pretense of the first cause, and "uncaused causer" arguments being in Yahweh's favor evaporate immediately.

The laws of physics and Yahweh both function within these parameters which "outrank" them, so the Xian is just as stumped as the naturalist, even after presupposing Yahweh, to ultimately explain the "why is there something rather than nothing" question once he reaches the "why?" of this "space of possibilities" which even fetters Yahweh.

Another important point is that these parameters are naturalistic rather than supernaturalistic because of the fact that Yahweh "did not create the space of possibilities".

If there are fundamental naturalistic laws which Yahweh did not author, what possible use is he as an answer to "first cause" and "why is there something rather than nothing" arguments?

The Xian still needs to account for the framework within which this "space of possibilities" fundamentally limits Yahweh's scope in the same way that the naturalist does for explaining why there are laws of physics in the first place, and indeed the Xian must do so in the same naturalistic manner as the naturalist!

Why are there parameters within which Yahweh and the laws of physics both conform and exist rather than no "space of possibilities" at all?

It appears that Yahweh not only suffers from being a mere "God in the gaps" deity, but He must swallow the indignity of being an entirely superfluous one! If there is already a natural "space of possibilities", there is no need at all for supernatural intervention unless it is to actually break the parameters mentioned which brings us full-circle back to the original dilemma!

Taffy Lewis

Olorin,

The statement "If you are omnipotent that means you can perform every logically possible action which is consistent with perfect benevolence." was supposed to read :

I should have proof-read the post.

The point of my post was that your power cannot be equivalent to God's if he is capable of creating a universe with five fundamental particles. That is something which is logically possible and consistent with perfect goodness.

The problem with your analysis is that "God can do everything consistent with his nature" is not equivalent to "God can bring about every logically possible state of affairs except those which are inconsistent with perfect goodness."

The former definition of God's power is so general that it could include a being with very limited power. But that latter definition does not allow for this.

Taffy Lewis

Olorin,

I deny that all propositions about the future have a truth value. If some aspects of the future are indeterminate then propositions which describe those states of affairs cannot have a truth value. They are neither true nor false. This might include future free actions of rational agents.

If that is so then failure to know their truth value doesn't constitute ignorance on anyone's part, including God. There is literally nothing to know with regard to such propositions apart from the fact that they have no truth value.

Minimally, omniscience must include knowledge of everything that is the case and everything that is possibly the case. And since the future has many aspects that are merely instances of possibilities then there is nothing to know beyond that.

I think confusion might arise if one assumes that the future is somehow "there" and therefore it is something which can be known. But if there is nothing there then there is nothing to be ignorant about.

K

Taffy:

Would you then throw out Biblical prophesy since the future is indeterminate and not even known by God?

Olorin

My amount of power, or the extent of my abilities, does not have to equal God's for me to be omnipotent. This extent is determined by the limiting factors derived from the nature of the being. I have many more limiting factors than the Christian god-concept, so ofcourse the extent of my abilities will be far less. I agree. However, since one of my limiting factors is that I cannot create things out of nothing, to ask me to create said universe would be to ask me to bring about an illogical scenario. Ofcourse, my set of possible actions does not extend to creation. But, what if I say "I can bring about every logically possible state of affairs except those which are inconsistent with my nature"? You have mentioned only one additional attribute for God, omnibenevolence. If you group all of his attributes together, you have his complete nature. Then, wouldn't it be okay to say "God can bring about every logically possible state of affairs except those which are inconsistent with his nature"? I think the reason for this is that you have taken the complete nature of God into account in the former definition, and ofcourse, this includes more than one limitation (or subset of limitations) as implied by the latter definition. Since the second definition describes a being with less limiting factors, the extent of it's abilties would be greater. I was just about to ask that.

Taffy Lewis

K,

There are at least two responses to this.

First, God's report of a prophecy could be nothing more than a revelation of his intentions. In a sense, I can predict the future. I can tell you what I intend to do. I can say, "Tomorrow I will go to work." Granted, I have limited power and therefore I may not be able to fulfill my intentions. But God is omnipotent. So if he says that something will happen it is likely that it will happen simply because he has the power to bring it about. None of this requires foreknowledge in the sense of being able to "see" the future.

Secondly, it is not necessay that the entire future is indeterminate in order to give us a significant amount of free will. In fact, it might be that many of our actions are determined by our nature or environment (or both). But our lacking free will in the case of many of our choices does not exclude the possibility that many or most of our choices are indeterministically free. Further, many macroscopic events may be deterministic. But that does not mean that all of the future is fixed.

Taffy Lewis

Olorin,

I don't see how the addition of divine attributes could imply that omnipotence is empty of content or have the consequence that everyone is omnipotent. Which attributes did you have in mind?

You seem to want us to believe that omnipotence = "being able to do whatever it is one can do"

But having "the power to bring about any logically possible state of affairs consistent with perfect goodness" is certainly not equivalent to "being able to do whatever it is one can do". As I've said, the latter is too general.

K

Taffy:

I'll take your two responses separately so we don't overlap them.

1. God knows His own intentions:

There are specific prophesies in the Bible that hinge directly on the specific actions of individuals (eg. Jesus' predictions of Judas' betrayal and Peter's denial). Would you throw the accuracy of these accounts out because those involve knowledge of the future without any decisions on the part of God?


2. Some of our choices are dictated by nature others flow from free will.

Would God hold anything against us that was dictated by our nature? For instance, I absolutely positively can not believe in God. I've tried very hard to but was unable. Some have a decietful or bloodthirsty nature. Would God hold that against them? Some were born into non-Christian families making the odds of them becoming Christian much smaller. Would God damn them for that? In short, which of our decisions involve free will? How do we know which ones we're accountable for?

This line of thinking is similar to mine - I just take it to it's logical conclusion and say that every single decision we make is the result of our inherited nature and our environment.

Philip Osborne

When I say that God does not have to create absolutely everything, I mean that necessary truths and/or objects, such as 1+1=2 or the existence of abstract objects exists necessarily (surprise!) and hence do not have to be created. God also exists necessarily. The idea or question of whether one "outranks" another is, in my own opinion, not a philosophically meaningful or useful question.

The Xian still needs to account for the framework within which this "space of possibilities" fundamentally limits Yahweh's scope in the....

It should first be noted that first cause arguments do not have to specifically relate to why there are natural laws. Some philosophers, such as Quentin Smith, think natural laws are metaphysically necessary, so if a theist were to hold to this view, then he would hold that God did not create them, just as God did not make it so that 1+1=2.

....to ultimately explain the "why is there something rather than nothing" question once he reaches the "why?" of this "space of possibilities" which even fetters Yahweh.

The answer to "why is there a space of possibilities" is that the space of possibilities exists necessarily and hence does not require further explanation. However, it is not as obvious that the physical universe, or the aggregate of all contingent entities, or whatever it is that is the object of cosmological arguments, exists necessarily. In fact, it is more likely that such things are contingent and hence if they are to have an explanation at all, it must be in terms of something else.

I don't think a cosmological argument has to be phrased as "why is there something rather than nothing?" After all, answering the question with "abstract objects exist because they exist necessarily" tells us why there is something that exists, but doesn't meaningfully answer the question of why we exist, why our universe exists, and why they are the way they are. So I think a theist could say, "Why do contingent entities exist?"

"If there is already a natural "space of possibilities", there is no need at all for supernatural intervention unless it is to actually break...."

The existence of the space of possibilities does not at all explain why any contingent entity exists. So I think the theist could still meaningfully ask the cosmological question.

Sincerely,

Philip