Alonzo Fyfe

There is no logically compelling reason to call anything by any particular name.

I used to have a shy, little gray cat that skittered around under and behind the furniture. I used to call him "my little pet mouse." Nobody could hope to provide me with a logically compelling reason to call him something else. Their inability to provide a reason does not imply that my cat really was a mouse.

More to the point (using an example borrowed from J.L. Mackie in ETHICS, INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (Penguin Press, 1977)) there is no compelling reason to call the smallest bits of any particular element 'atoms'. In fact, those who originally did so made a mistake, because 'atom' meant 'indivisible particle' and those who first used this term thought (falsely) that these particles could never be split further. They could have, perhaps (and with some sly sense of humor) called these things 'gargantuoms' instead.

Yet, the fact that there is no logically compelling reason to call these things 'atoms' or 'gargantuoms' or any other name does not lend support to the thesis that all of chemistry is subjective. And we would all dismiss out of hand anybody who asserted that they could prove chemical subjectivism by asserting, "What you call 'lead', I will call 'gold', and you cannot provide me with any logically compelling reason to call it 'lead'".

Facts about what we may or may not call things do not translate into facts about what those things are and are not.

DRFseven

Fyfe, in the "playing with words" part of the discussion, I believe you are missing the point that you have arbitrarily, though popularly, defined morality. I think the crux of the whole difference in opinion between objectivists and subjectivists lies in the one thinking there is an absolute definition and the other thinking there is not.

Malaclypse the Younger

Yep. Language is intersubjective.

So what's your point?

Alonzo Fyfe

Since I have as much as argued that all definitions are, ultimately, arbitrary I fail to find much significance in having it pointed out to me that this definition is arbitrary.

I think that those who find significance in pointing out this unavoidable fact are making a mistake. They infer (incorrectly) that since there is no nonarbitrary definition of a word that there is no nonarbitrary fact that can be stated about the thing to which a word, once defined, refers to.

The only relevant criticism that can be raised against a person's use of a word is that it is used inconsistently. As far as I can tell, nobody has even attempted to show that I have used my terms inconsistently. They have merely asserted that definitions are arbitrary.

On the other hand, my objections to individual subjectivism have all been grounded on questions of consistently.

Perhaps, but this is a false dichotomy. I think it is a mistake to hold that there must be a difference of opinion between subjectivists and objectivists. I am a subjectivist in that I hold that there are no values independent of mental states. I am an objectivist in that I think we can make objectively true and false statements about those mental states (and, thus, about values).

The debate between subjectivists and objectivists, on my take, is like the debate between two people where one shouts, "John has red hair", while another shouts, "No, he wears glasses," as if to say that a person cannot both have red hair and wear glases.

DRFseven

Didn't you say, previously, that Mal's definition of morality was wrong in that it did not mandate taking others' feelings into consideration? I realize that Mal said his personal definition included consideration of others' feelings, but he said that others' need not. Did you not then say that a morality without that would not be morality, just as a mouse without mouse features would not be a mouse?

But I state that your definition of morality is arbitrary, not to imply that it is wrong, but to show that could just as well NOT include consideration of others.

DRFseven

Of course, once an objective is specified, but you have to think it first. I'm the first to agree that morality is useless without an objective (which seems the opposite of what objectivists usually think).

Malaclypse the Younger

Alonzo Fyfe

You are misunderstanding the argument. I am not arguing that because all word-assignments are arbitrary there is no objective meaning. I'm arguing that because all word-assignments are arbitrary, we cannot infer from the mere existence of a word-assignment that the assignment has an objectively correct meaning.

If your argument is that the popular definition of morality includes the connotation that morality includes valuing the values of others, I would agree that you're probably right. Since I've said as much before, and you continue to argue, I suspect that's not your only point.

Such an agreement, however, is entirely consistent with individual-subjectivism. It is merely the observation that, under individual-subjectivism, most individuals actual do value the values of others. There is no contradiction.

However the argument that removing that value from the definition removes any logically possible objective meaning for "morality" is, I believe, false. Rather it would change the meaning of "morality" to something else.

But we are philosophers, not lexicographers. Changing the meanings of words is part of the job.

I certainly agree with you there. I've made this point a few times myself.

[ March 30, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

Malaclypse the Younger

I actually don't believe this to be the case.

The objectivist asserts that statements of the form "X is right" have truth values, independent of the truth values of statements of the form "person Y believes 'X is right'". The subjectivist denies either that statements of the first form have truth values, or denies that such truth values can be known for specific statements of X without reference to statements of the second form.

If objectivism is true, then the two statement "person Y1 believes 'X is right'" and "person Y2 believes 'X is wrong'" is indicative of a contradiction, because the embedded predicates 'X is right' and 'X is wrong' have definite (and opposite) truth values independent of the beliefs of persons Y1 and Y2. If objectivism is true, then either Y1 and Y2 believes a falsehood, which is irrational.

However, the subjectivist, by denying that the embedded predicates have any truth values, does not see a contradiction, merely a difference.

Contrast this view with physical objectivism. I am a physical objectivist: I believe that statements of the form "X physically exists" have truth values independent of the truth values of statements of the form "I believe 'X physically exists'". I believe that there is a good epistemological basis for this assertion, viz. & to wit: evidential arguments from perceptual facts. The argument for physical objectivism is a little more detailed and subtle than that, but that's the gist.

[ March 30, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

Tom Piper

I think I understand the answer that Alonzo Fyfe would give to the question I am about to ask, but I would like to hear what others have to say. If Alonzo answers, perhaps it will help facilitate understanding of his view. The question is 'What is the difference between what people here are calling "moral subjectivism" and no morality at all? Be as specific and as concrete as you can?'

Tom

[ March 31, 2002: Message edited by: Tom Piper ]</p>

DRFseven

Yes; good question, Piper's son. Wish I'd thought of it.