Alonzo Fyfe

I promised myself that I would not get involved in a purely philosophical debate. However, I find so much effort wasted on the subject of objective vs. subjective morality that I am hoping that I can say something useful.

People talk about objective and subjective morality as if this were a simple dichotomy. It's not.

Subjective morality says that morality depends somehow on mental states. But which mental states?

Belief-subjectivism holds that morality depends on what a person believes is right or wrong.

Desire-subjectivism holds that morality depends on the desires (including the likes and dislikes) of a person.

These mental states are separate, so a moral statement can be both, at the same time, belief-objective and desire-subjective.

Then there is the question of whose mental states are relevant. We can start with two of the simplest forms of this distinction:

Agent-subjectivism holds that it is the beliefs or desires of the person performing the action that determines right and wrong.

Assessor-subjectivism holds that right or wrong is in the mind of the person assessing the action.

Assuming agent-subjectivism is true, the rightness or wrongness of an action can be both, at the same time, assessor-objective and agent-subjective.

Multiply these two distinctions together, and we already have four different versions of objectivism/subjectivism, where moral claims can logically be both objective and subjective.

But we do not stop there. There is also third-person subjectivism -- where right and wrong depend on the beliefs or desires of some party other than the agent or the assessor.

Religious ethics, actually, are third-person subjective, where the third person is God. Try telling a religious person someday that he is arguing for a form of moral subjectivism -- that religious ethics hold that morality is objective as far as humans are concerned, but still subjective in the sense that all moral claims depend on the attitude of God as the subject.

Then there is a whole set of collective-subjectivisms, which divorces right and wrong from the beliefs or desires of any person, and holds that it depends on the beliefs and desires in a group -- within a particular culture, for example.

One of the most common versions of collective-subjectivisms is democratic subjectivism. Right and wrong under this system depends on the most common attitudes (whether beliefs or desires) in a culture or group.

Then there's additive subjectivism. Additive subjectivism allows for the possibility that an action is wrong even if approved of by a majority of society, as long as those who disapprove do so with a sufficiently greater per-capita intensity.

Of course, here we must also worry about how to define the group. Is it a culture? A nation? All of human kind? All intelligent life in the universe? Does it include animals?

Here, again, is the crux of the whole matter. If morality is subjective in any one of these ways, then it is objective with respect to all of the others.

For what it is worth, I am a collective desire subjectivist where all desires and their intensity are relevant to any moral calculation. But this still yields a single, correct objectively determinable answer to any specific moral question.

Vorkosigan

Interesting. So how does your objective calculation determine whether an action is moral? In the US, for an adult to suck a child's penis would result in a prison sentence. Among several South American aboriginal groups, a male baby is calmed for sleep by gentle sucking on its penis.

I have not yet convinced my wife that this treatment would be effective for my insomnia.

However, note that in the US, orally stimulating a child is a morally actionable act, in those groups I alluded to, it is not considered to fall under any moral framework. I can think of many similar situations.

So how do you determine whether a specific act calls for a moral judgement? It seems that you need a set of values that would no objective basis.....

Michael

Alonzo Fyfe

For now, let's remain focused on the point of the orignal essay.

Every subjective system is also objective from outside the system. Cultural subjectivism is individually objective. Desire-subjectivism is belief-objective. Agent-subjectivism is assessor-objective. Religious objectivism is actually third-person subjective.

You cannot name a type of system "with no objective basis" that does not become objective the instant that you shift subjects.

[ March 21, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Pomp

Interesting. Even taking your various shades of subjectivism into account the subjective-objective dichotomy still exists, with the true objectivists claiming that morality is not dependent upon any mental state.

Here, again, is the crux of the whole matter. If morality is subjective in any one of these ways, then it is objective with respect to all of the others.

I'm not sure how this works. Could you explain further?

Religious ethics, actually, are third-person subjective, where the third person is God. Try telling a religious person someday that he is arguing for a form of moral subjectivism -- that religious ethics hold that morality is objective as far as humans are concerned, but still subjective in the sense that all moral claims depend on the attitude of God as the subject.

The standard weasel tactic is to claim that god's opinion is intrinsic to his nature and, therefore, objective.

Alonzo Fyfe

I agree that "objectivism" is sometimes used in these cases, which then results in equivocation and confusion. This view is more accurately defined as "absolutism" or "intrinsic value theory."

This equivocation between intrinsic value theory and objectivism leads to confusion in a lot of arguments that I have read. Objectivism also means true or false independent of a particular individual's beliefs.

I often encounter people arguing that since there are no intrinsic value properties that moral statements can not be objectively true. And, on the other side, people argue that since individual belief subjectivism is absurd that there must be intrinsic moral properties.

Indeed, a huge percentage of the arguments I have read through are locked into this false dilemma, unable to recognize that moral statements can refer to something other than intrinsic moral properties and still be objectively true or false.


Again, look at the issue of theist claim of having an objective set of ethics. If there were such a God, and He had the values ascribed to Him, then for you and I there would be a set of right and wrong actions independent of our mental states.

But, there is no set of right and wrong actions independent of any mental states -- they are dependent on God's mental states.

Thus, subjective (relative to God), but objective (relative to you and I).

(Yes, they have this wiggle room you mentioned, but it can be ignored for illustrative purposes.)

Mental states are real. And claims about mental states are as objective as claims about any other human characteristic (e.g., hair color). This represents, then, an important set of statements that are both objective and subjective.

Objective in that their truth or falsity is independent of belief in their truth or falsity. (Whether you believe that P is objectively true or false independent of whether I believe that you believe that P).

Subjective in that they are statements about mental states and, consequently, dependent on the states they are about. (Whether you believe that P is crucially dependant upon whether you believe that P).

[ March 21, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Pomp

Alonzo Fyfe,

I agree with your analysis, for the most part. It is, of course, true that quite a bit of equivocation between various senses of the word "objective" goes on in discussion here, but I'm not sure how to solve that problem. Although I don't have any problems with your definition scheme as you have presented it, I'd like to see it in action. How useful is it? What does it do that other such schemes do nto do? Can you answer turtonm's question?

I call myself a moral subjectivist because, in order to eveluate whether or not a particular prescriptive statement is objectively true or false, I hold that we need to know the subjective value system of the agent it applies to. In other words, I hold that the statement "X ought to do Y" is objectively true if, and only if, the statements "Y is the most efficient means for X to attain Z" and "X values Z" are also objectively true. Where do I fit into your definition scheme?

I asked you how a system of morality that is subjective under one of your views is objective under all the others:

Again, look at the issue of theist claim of having an objective set of ethics. If there were such a God, and He had the values ascribed to Him, then for you and I there would be a set of right and wrong actions independent of our mental states.

I disagree. How does a thestic god's subjective value set establish objective right and wrong for me? At the most, it establishes that there is a supreme cooercive power that will act as an uber-deterrant regarding my acts that it disapproves of. This would certainly change my actions to an extent, as Y might no longer be the most efficient means to attain Z (see above) if a god existed and was willing to punish those who performed Y, but it would not establish that my altered actions were objectively correct, or, at least, not in the sense theists mean when they claim that their god's existence establishes objective morality.

But, there is no set of right and wrong actions independent of any mental states -- they are dependent on God's mental states.

Thus, subjective (relative to God), but objective (relative to you and I).

I disagree. Such morals would still be subjective to us, as they would depend on our mental states. The only reason the theistic god is able to act as a theoretical uber-deterrant is that it can reward and punish us, based on our subjective values.

Mental states are real. And claims about mental states are as objective as claims about any other human characteristic (e.g., hair color). This represents, then, an important set of statements that are both objective and subjective.

I agree.

Malaclypse the Younger

It seems that a good operational definition of "objective" is "an objective statement is a statement known to be true or false for all rational agents" (where rationality is defined without regard to the specific question).

Thus the statement "ice cream is tasty" does not appear to be an objective statement, because separate rational agents might disagree with no way to come to agreement: There seems no way to persuade me of the fundamental irrationality of a person who says, "ice cream is disgusting."

However the statement, "MtY believes ice cream is tasty" is objective, because any rational agent (by definition) can query the state of my beliefs and determine that the statement is true.

It is difficult to determine if statements about a god are objective or not, since statements of faith are patently disagreed upon by presumably rational agents, with no means in site for ensuring agreement without reference to the specific question. However, it is possible that some statements of biblical theology are objective (since the text of the bible provides at least some basis for agreement); however the objectivity of the bible sheds no light on the existence of any god.

[ March 21, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

There is a slight problem in that it is an ill-formed question -- effectively stating that "from the point of view that cultural belief subjectivism is true, prove it is false." It would take some effort to clear out the question-begging elements.

But, basically, within the two cultures there is a disagreement as to the effects of the action. One says that there are effects which children have a reason to avoid; the other culture says that there are no such effects. The existence of these external reasons determines whether the action is moral or not.


Your views sound to me to best fit the criteria of individual desire subjectivism. Everything you state is true of practical-ought and as an analysis of practical-ought there is nothing I can say against it.

But I have objections with this as an analysis of moral-ought.

To illustrate the difference, imagine a person who is surprised by an innocent person during a robbery. Rational-ought says that he should kill the witness in order to escape. Moral-ought includes reasons other than the reasons that the thief has -- and with these other reasons the thief moral-ought not to murder the witness.

You may then want to challenge me by asking, "But what reason does the theif have to do what he moral-ought -- other than the potential for capture. Well, possibly none. Then what reason does he practical-ought have for doing what he moral-ought? Probably none. This does not imply that a reason for him to do what he moral-ought does not exist.

And the lack of a practical-reason for doing what he moral-ought is precisely the reason it is legitimate to say that he is evil.

Your decision to include the text "for me" at the end shows the shift from moral-ought to practical-ought. And I have repeatedly said that there is no necessary connection between the two.

And since I have denied the existence of a necessary connection, your insistance that no necessary connection exists raises no objection.

My point here is that if (the "if" here is crucial) moral-ought consists in what God likes and dislikes, then there is an objective answer to questions about what a person moral-ought to do independent of his own beliefs and desires.

If you then ask back, "why should I care about what this God wants?" I answer that your question needs to be more carefully phrased.

Why practical-should you care? Maybe there is no reason. Why moral-should you care? The answer is built into the meaning of the term 'moral'

Pomp

Alonzo Fyfe,

You may then want to challenge me by asking, "But what reason does the theif have to do what he moral-ought -- other than the potential for capture. Well, possibly none. Then what reason does he practical-ought have for doing what he moral-ought? Probably none. This does not imply that a reason for him to do what he moral-ought does not exist.

I'm not disputing that other people may have reasons to prefer that he not steal, or kill, or whatever. I am disputing the notion that your "moral ought" has any real signifigance. If our intrepid thief has no reason of his own to comply with what he "morally ought" to do, then the whole concept of a "moral ought" is just hand-waving; it doesn't effect anything.

And the lack of a practical-reason for doing what he moral-ought is precisely the reason it is legitimate to say that he is evil.

I don't follow.

My point here is that if (the "if" here is crucial) moral-ought consists in what God likes and dislikes, then there is an objective answer to questions about what a person moral-ought to do independent of his own beliefs and desires.

So "If X then X?" I'm not sure what you're driving at.

Why practical-should you care? Maybe there is no reason. Why moral-should you care? The answer is built into the meaning of the term 'moral'

What is that meaning, as you understand it?

Alonzo Fyfe

Again, 'real significance' has the same issues as 'ought'.

The suffering of a rapist's victim might not have any significance to the rapist. But that is why we call the rapist evil. Because even though the woman's suffering does not have significance to him, it has significance to somebody.


In a society where there are some people who wish to promote good and thwart evil, it does have an effect -- it tells those people what it is they are to promote and/thwart.


One gets at the meaning of moral by looking at how it is used. And one of the essential components of moral is that it is irreducibly interpersonal. This is part of the reason why I think that individual subjectivist alternatives do not work -- because they are irreducibly intrapersonal.