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05-26-2002, 08:59 AM | #1 | |
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Moral argument revisited
Greetings! I used to post here about two years ago. I believe the name I used was Bloodloss. For a while it felt like the quality of discussion was really heading down-hill. There were a lot of inflammatory people trying to stir up the worst out of everyone, and it was taking away from thoughtful, respectull discussion.
But I come back, and I see that this forum had really weathered all that quite nicely, and looks to be on a nice growth path. So because I am interesting in thinking, I thought I would begin to particiate again. I want to bring up something from another thread. I didn't see the discussion in that thread going this particular diection, but I would love to have some discussion on it, so I'll pick it up here: Quote:
Hogwash. I say that, and I actually am a spiritual man. It’s still hogwash. I take nihilism to be self-explanatory as a term, but to avoid ambiguity for this argument I take “relativism” to mean an argument that there are no moral absolutes of any kind, only what is relative to a particular individual and only then in light of the particulars of a given situation. What I will say in response are simply posits – suggestions of other possibilities for frameworks in which certain fundamental moral principles could be grounded. First of all, someone might claim to believe in an ethical/moral theory in which every person is responsible to 1) his or her own heath and well-being 2) the health and well-being of those directing related to him or her and 3) the health and well-being of the larger world (i.e. social responsibility, community action, etc.) His or her actions might be motivated by a desire to work in all three of those spheres for the greatest health and well-being (mentally, physically, emotionally, spiritually, etc.) possible to the greatest number of people possible (a utilitarian argument). Someone else might object challenging that the person prove that health and well-being are absolutes that we have a moral obligation to strive for in our own lives, in the lives of those we relate to, and in the larger world as a whole. My response to that challenge would be to say that for this discussion, the challenger has provided the tools by which I can also hang the moral argument for God. If I ask why I should do a thing, and the response I get is, “because God said so” it’s almost obvious what the next question from my mouth would be: “why is what God says right?” For the moment, let’s assume God exists, and that what God says “is more than just man-created texts and beliefs, etc. In that case, just like I might assume that people ought to desire health and well being for themselves and as many people as they can possibly have influence over, so the theist simply assumes that we ought to want to do what God says, or even more basically, that whatever God claims as moral absolutes are clearly right. God is not the proof for moral absolutes, God is simply one functioning premise by which we say, “I believe that x is true because I hold y premise.” A theist assumes as a premise that God is right. Now to further point out how the claim that there can be no moral alternatives available to atheists other than relativism or nihilism is incorrect, I should point to example structures for moral “absolutes” that have nothing to do with a belief in God. Again remember that I do believe in God. That doesn’t change the fact that the claim made above is hogwash. Also, when I use the term “absolutes” what I mean is something like this: rape is wrong – it’s always wrong, there will never be a circumstance in which rape would be morally right, by the very nature and definition of the thing. That moral statement is “absolute” in the sense that it universally applies to all beings with reasoning enough to make choices and differentiate between right and wrong (as opposed to lower animals acting on pure instinct.) Let’s say we establish certain things as ethical/moral “absolutes.” For the sake of argument, let’s take one I gave earlier and say that the health and welfare of the individual, the individual’s direct relationships and responsibilities, and the greater society/community is the moral responsibility of all human beings. The obvious question of follow is why. On what grounds does one claim this as a absolute obligation applicable to all human beings? Here are some possibilities: 1) A Hedonistic approach – basically responding by saying that an individual’s happiness is the ultimate concern of an individual’s life, straight pleasure over pain analysis. However, with a twist – the twist being arguing that part of the individual’s happiness in wrapped up in the happiness of others. If everyone in the world was happy, the individual would have the potential to maximize his or her own happiness. Whereas if everyone in the world was miserable, his or her ability to maximize that happiness would be diminished. The reason for this is that we are clearly relational creatures. We interact, we establish relationships, whether they are deep and yoking or more casual. And those interactions effect us, therefore other people affect us and influence us. Our happiness is affected in part by the happiness of others, therefore we ought to evaluate our actions and behavior based both on our own potential happiness and the happiness of others. But why ought we to be concerned about happiness? The answer is, that it is just a premise that seems practically viable; you cannot prove that we should be concerned in this way. Not my favorite argument on its own. 2) A Utilitarian approach – once we twist the hedonistic approach in the way I have done, it basically implies a utilitarian concept. Here I wouldn’t start from the premise that my own happiness and that alone is all I should care about, rather I would argue that the greatest possible benefit (which would include happiness along with general health and well-being) to the greatest number of people possible is the premise behind certain ethical absolutes. Because rape, torture and things of this nature are never beneficial (I would argue not beneficial even to the perpetrator, because it is ultimately personally destructive behavior) they are always wrong. But more than that, a utilitarian approach can also set up positive principles. In fact the very idea that the greatest possible good (defined as health and well-fare, which is defined above) to the greatest number of people is a moral obligation that all human beings are responsible to is a good example of a moral absolute with a different backing substituted for God. This approach is open to the same questions we would have about God as the guarantor behind a moral argument, but the point of this discussion was to provide examples of foundations for moral absolutes other than God that carry as much weight and credibility as God-backed morality. Since God is open to the same questions, this premise for moral action is as viable as saying we should do something “because God said so.” 3) The Ontological Approach – this is the most interesting one to me. Basically the idea would be that certain moral absolutes are implied in the very structure of existence. Although I wouldn’t really go that far -- it seems to be that the capacity to comprehend a moral obligation is what makes for the ability to differentiate right from wrong, so that an earthworm is really under no kind of moral law. However for reasoning creatures capable of differentiating right from wrong, we essentially do so because we recognize right out of the very structure of our being the foundations for ethical decision making. In other words, someone would argue that its part of human nature to desire happiness, or even that it’s part of human nature to recognize certain actions as right or wrong. Now, I think to try to use this kind of approach to justify very complex concepts such as “rape is wrong” would be difficult, though certainly interesting. However, it seems much more reasonable to argue that something like “pleasure” or “happiness” or “well-being” is a natural instinctual desire for human beings, and that we should strive for such things simply because they are at the heart of what it means to be human. I would then move from there and turn the hedonistic approach into the utilitarian approach by arguing that part of how we achieve personal happiness is through the happiness of others, so that is something we are obligated to strive for. So, my tentative argument would be something like this: you use the ontological foundation to justify the hedonistic approach, then establish that the hedonistic approach necessarily implies utilitarian concerns, and go from there. Something like this: 1) Basic moral obligations have to do with our responsibility to act in accordance with the very structure of out being. (Ontological aspect of my discussion) 2) Part of the ontological structure of being human is a desire for happiness, crudely understood at the fundamental level as pleasure over pain, and understood in a more advanced way as the desire for fulfillment and completion in our lives – I argue this is a natural element of the category of human being. (The Hedonistic aspect of my discussion) 3) As we are relational creatures, both my basic and advanced comprehension of my ontologically originating desire of happiness is in part actualized through the basic and advanced happiness of others. Therefore my moral obligation to my own happiness, demanded out of the very structure of existence and out of the very essence of what it means to be human, necessarily includes a moral obligation to the happiness of others. (The Utilitarian aspect of my discussion) What happens here is there is a system in which we say by the very nature of being human we are responsible to strive for our own happiness. We must recognize that achieving that own happiness can not be done in a bubble, but includes thoughts an actions on behalf of maximizing the happiness of others as well, and this essentially is a solid basis for our all ethical actions, thoughts about rights and wrongs, evaluations of political and economic justice, social concerns, etc. None of it, needs any foundation in an imperative given by a god, and as I have argued above, it is at least as coherent as a system of moral absolutes enforced by a god. There are certainly questions that can be asked of this system like, “Why should we strive for happiness?” I do go a way towards answering that question by saying that if striving for happiness is a fundamental ontological aspect of what it means to be human, than we really have no choice in the matter, and will in fact strive for happiness. So all we see around us are people choosing poorly or wisely as to how they strive for happiness, not people making choices as to whether they will strive for happiness or not. Striving for happiness I argue, is not an option, it is an unavoidable instinct implied by nature of being human. I guess that actually puts this system ahead of the God driven system, because when I ask, “why should I assume that God’s moral demands are good and right,” the response back comes down to a matter of faith and belief – unexamined premises – someone who would say, “well you have to believe that so that the system will work!” I need no such guarantor in the system I just described, because I claim that the foundational premise is essentially a natural law, not an arbitrary premise assumed for convenience sake. It seems clear to me that this is one example of a possibility for moral absolutes out side of the God-backed theory. It seems very clear to me that relativism and nihilism are not the only options for the irreligious. Humanism and Existentialism have developed very clear moral and ethical goals, obligations and responsibilities. Existentialism’s admittedly could be argued to be relativistic. But in the end, having God back up moral obligations is really no safer than any other theory that rests on an unexamined, unquestioned, presupposed premise. So it may not be “relative” but it is only not so because of an arbitrary stopping point -- that being the establishment of a God and his absolute authority over what should and should not be. Personally, I see absolutely no implied need of God to have moral absolutes. [ May 26, 2002: Message edited by: Selwynn ]</p> |
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05-26-2002, 10:53 AM | #2 |
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Greetings Selwynn, and welcome back to II.
Socrates agreed with you that happiness is something all men strive for. (And so do I.) Let me put this to you though- what about people who find happiness in things most find evil and awful perversion? What of Ted Bundy? How do we build a consistent morality when the fact is that humans are made happy by vastly different things? I am pretty much of a moral relativist- given conditions extreme enough, such normally evil things as rape, murder, cannibalism, or slavery can be justified (IMO.) I see no need of any absolute moral statements; we can weigh and balance such things until we find morals and ethics which work in all *but* extreme conditions. Added- Selwynn, this topic looks to be straddled precisely on the line between the Existence of God forum, and the Moral Foundations forum. Which do you feel is the most appropriate? My response is addressed more to your moral argument than to its application as an argument against the existence of God; maybe this is not the direction you would have it take. If it is, though, I think it should be in MF&P. I will abide by your word on the matter. J. [ May 26, 2002: Message edited by: Jobar ]</p> |
05-26-2002, 12:18 PM | #3 |
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Selwynn,
Greetings! I used to post here about two years ago. I believe the name I used was Bloodloss. Captain Bloodloss! Welcome back! I always enjoyed your contributions here, and it's great to see you posting again. This seems like a goof MF&P topic to me but, as it relates so closely to jlowder's recent thread about the moral argument, I'm inclined to leave it here. You and Jobar can make that call though. Personally, I've always found the moral argument to be very weak. Not only is it possible, as you have shown, to have moral absolutes in the absence of a god but it's alo not at all clear that we moral absolutes do exist. I find the evidence for them to be roughly as good as the evidence for a god, so using one to prove the other doesn't strike me as the best strategy one could use. |
05-26-2002, 01:47 PM | #4 | |
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Quote:
Now to get back to response, first thanks for the great reply. There are two things I think to discuss. First, you and I see it differently insofar as if you take a moral relativistic stance, then as you mention you must feel like given extreme enough circumstances rape, torture, etc. can all be justified. Now, I'm willing to agree to disagree here, because I think reasonable people can certainly see it differently, but before I leave it at that let me just deliver a quick thought: Let's take rape for instance. I have a hard time imagining an extreme circumstance that would make rape anything but a moral wrong. The only thing I can think of is some extreme hypothetical such as having a gun pointed to your head and being told you have to rape someone to live. Now I know that’s a bizarre and highly improbably example, but just for a second let’s consider it. If you decide to rape someone because you believe you life depends on it, how does that exactly mean that rape is anything other than a moral wrong? I believe in the possibility of ethical conflicts, or ethical dilemmas, wherein a person is confronted with two ethical obligations which are in direct conflict. In this case a person’s healthy obligation to his or her own self preservation is in conflict with his obligation to the just treatment of other human life. I think the person could choose to die rather than harm someone else or choose to do some painful, but recoverable harm to someone else to save his or her own life and it would be very difficult for anyone to “judge” the decision just or unjust. But my point is this: nowhere in that scenario did rape ever become a moral right. If the person believe the obligation to his or her own life is the higher moral obligation, it does not then make rape a moral right, it simply means he or she chooses to commit a immoral act for the preservation of what he or she believes to be a higher ethical obligation. I would contend that this happens to greater or lesser degrees in life all the time – that we are often confronted with ethical dilemmas where we must betray one principle to uphold what we believe (for various reasons) are higher principles. Being in a situation where you believe yourself to be forced to commit an immoral act for the sake of a higher moral obligation doesn’t make the immoral act suddenly moral. That’s my way of thinking about it, although perhaps it’s just semantics? So that’s the first thing to discuss. The second thing is your question posited to me, which I also quoted above. What about people who find happiness in the most evil and awful perversion? To this I have some questions and a point of my own: 1) Do we hold the mentally incapacitated (through insanity, mental disease, or mental defect to the same criteria of ethical obligation? Or do all discussions of ethical and moral obligations, premises and foundations be they relative or absolute depend on the capacity of the individual to understand the consequences of actions and differentiate what I will just call “right and wrong” in a very reductionary fashion? 2) If all human beings are driven to seek happiness, is not part of all ethical/moral judgments a question of evaluating the success, worth and effectiveness of individual’s methods of seeking happiness? Meaning that I would question the veracity of Ted Bundy’s claim to the kind of happiness I refer to, which is more in tune with the word “fulfillment” than with the word “pleasure” or “fun.” 3) Keep in mind that my argument was that true happiness is not possible in the purely hedonistic argument, i.e. the idea that happiness is a pure matter of selfish actualization of some kind. Rather I argue that by the very nature of our relational being part of our actualization of happiness (more in the terms of completion, security and fulfillment and less in the terms of purely emotional, fleeting circumstantial, or basic instinctual) depends on the happiness of others, so that we are obligated to work towards both our own happiness and the happiness of other people, because in fact the two are completely interrelated. This to me would seem to take away from the possibility of someone claiming that a serial killer was just seeking his happiness and we cannot argue that he or she acted immorally. I believe in the context of the way I have argued (dependent obligations and well as independent actualization equaling our moral quest for fulfillment) it is in fact possible to deem certain ways of action as wrong while still keeping to the basic belief that moral absolutes can be founded on the concept of maximizing happiness (again one last time, with the understanding that the maximizing of that happiness is dependent on the happiness of others, so that in the course of striving for our own happiness we are obligated to strive for the happiness of others wherever possible, meaning I couldn’t really go out and murder them and be striving for either my ultimate happiness or theirs.) I would agree with you that if we just left if at the point where one claims that striving for our individual happiness is the foundation for moral action, we would be helpless to condemn anyone for any action they might choose to take, no matter how barbaric. On the other hand, if we consider that 1) “happiness” is more closely tied to the word “fulfillment” than it is “pleasure” and 2) “happiness as fulfillment” necessarily implies an obligation towards the happiness of other people, then we might question ether Ted Bundy is really finding “fulfillment” as a human being (if we assume Ted Bundy is/was mentally sane) and also question how well he has upheld his moral obligations to other people on which his very own happiness/fulfillment rests. I think then we could find room to condemn his actions as unjust, immoral, wrong, etc. Sel |
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05-26-2002, 01:50 PM | #5 | |
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So I'll look forward to reading your posts in the future! Sel |
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