Kip

P1. By definition, if a person possesses free will, a person could have acted otherwise than that person did act.
P2. By definition, these other actions never did and never will occur.

Because if any did occur that would cease to be an "other" action and become an action that the person did actually commit.

P3. A person can never make an action occur that, by definition, never occurs.

P4. People do not possess the power to do otherwise.

C1. People do not possess free will.

Can you identify a flaw in the logic? You may wish to challenge the third premise but I suspect the argument simply illustrates that the popular definition of free will as "the ability to do otherwise" is inherently flawed. The proof appears to be almost tautological because the conclusion follows so easily from the definition. Notice, however, that the disproof has no mention of determinism. If this is a working definition of free will, the idea is falsified not by universal determination but by our simply inability to commit more than one action at any given time. How could we ever possess the power to do that which, by definition, is never done?

The problem, I suspect, is that free will is not the ability to do otherwise, but the ability to do either. Because "otherwise" implies that the decision has already been determined, by either the natural laws or also by the agent himself. But that latter distinction is exactly the question of free will. Freedom is the ability to do either action and not the ability to do other than you (perhaps freely) did.

An example I use to illustrate the free will dilemma is to imagine a man strapped down to a chair, chained and wrapped up. The man wishes to have a glass of water on the other side of the room but the chains and restrains physically prevent him. We would nevertheless admit, however, that the man possesses "metaphysical" free will. Although he is strapped down and pinned he still freely chooses to have the glass of water. That he is physically prevented from carrying out his metaphysical will is of no consequence.

Now, however, replace the man with a robot. The robot does not need to be so advanced and humanoid that we doubt the future possibility of such a creation. We only need a robot sufficiently similar to humans to express a will and be strapped down. Now imagine that this humanoid robot is strapped down, chained to a chair, and restrained. Suppose that this robot, like the man, sought the glass of water across the room but is physically prevented from doing so. Do we grant the robot the freedom of the will? Of course not. Now lift the chains from the robot's body. Undo all of the locks and remove all of the restrainst. Imagine the robot standing up, eagerly walking over to the water, lifting up the glass of water and allowing the cool liquid to swim down the plastic esophogus. Does the robot possess free will now? No. We must distinguish between physical freedom and metaphysical freedom. The robot is unrestrained by chains by is restrained by his programming. The robot never chose to desire water, rather, he simply does desire water. He can only do what he is physically programmed to do. If he had been programmed to hate water instead of love water, the robot would have run to the other side of the room and hid. The question, however, is the extent to which the man is like the robot.

Here is an older, more dramatic argument:

P1. People cannot choose without choosing according to unchosen rules.

Without such rules, the people would be paralyzed by the decision and their ignorance. How could people possibly choose to drink water unless there was a rule to seek happiness and drink if the water is healthy but abstain if the water is poisoned? How could the people know whether or not to drink the water with such a rule?

P2. Free will is independent of rules.
P3. People choose.
C1. People do not possess free will.

AtlanticCitySlave

(P2) doesn't follow, since it's not by definition that the other actions never will occur. Rather, it's that they never did occur. Just because I choose not to eat chocolate ice cream today for breakfast, it doesn't follow it will never occur that I do.
This obviously leads to (P3) being a problem, since again, it simply doesn't follow. Just because an action has never taken place, in all of a beings history, it doesn't follow it never will. Rather, it follows they can't alter the past (that we know of). So, sure, they may not be free to change the past, but it certainly doesn't follow they are not free (able to make a choice between different things) in the future.
What is usually taken to be, at the very least, necessary for free-will, is the ability to make a decision, change one's mind, etc., up to the point of the actual action. I don't see how it makes any sense to project that into any further actions the person might make.

[ June 13, 2002: Message edited by: AtlanticCitySlave ]</p>

Philosoft

I think Kip's P2 implies (or needs to state) that "other actions" will never occur at time T, where T is the moment of decision. In that sense, the same "other action" will never again occur, potentially or actually.

Kip

By action, I mean other action at time T. Obviously, these other actions (simply from the definition of other) never occur. You are correct that these actions may occur later but that does not contradict my conclusion any. Free will, according to this definition, is not the ability to do other than you did later, but the ability to do other than you did at that moment T. I hope that clarifies the matter.

owleye

Kip...

"P3. A person can never make an action occur that, by definition, never occurs.

"P4. People do not possess the power to do otherwise.

"C1. People do not possess free will.

I would suggest that you not use definitions to bolster your case one way or another, since the question that troubles philosophers is not whether or not we can define free will out of existence, but whether or not free will exists.

I think the following represents a better argument than yours though it has much of the same spirit to it.

P1. The universe evolves in accordance in accordance with necessary laws -- i.e., laws in which any state of the universe necessarily follows from a temporally prior state. Necessity implies that no other state could possibly have existed given the prior state.

P2. Thus, the state of the universe evolves necessarily from the whatever original conditions of the universe were and no other outcome is possible given this origin.

P3. Given that there are no possible alternative universes, there can be no choices from which alternative universes could be decided.

P4. Given that there are no choices in the universe, there can be no free choices in the universe.

P5. If there are no free choices to draw upon, the will cannot choose from among them.

C. There can be no free will.

"Notice, however, that the disproof has no mention of determinism."

Not so. Determinism is indirectly referenced by alleging that there can be no power to do otherwise that what was done.


"If this is a working definition of free will, the idea is falsified not by universal determination but by our simply inability to commit more than one action at any given time."

It is not required that we have the power to "commit more than one action at any given time." It would only be required that more than one action is a possibility at any given time. It is an argument about possibility, not about actuality.

"The problem, I suspect, is that free will is not the ability to do otherwise, but the ability to do either."

That's right. So what motivated you to go through all of the above rigmarole?

owleye

Kip

I disagree. Lack of free will (the power to do otherwise) is not equivalent to determinism and is also combatible with randomness and acausality. Although I am very sympathetic to your argument (which is similar to my own opinion on the matter), yours does reference determinism and is less simple than mine. The premises are, in my opinion, more vulnerable.

Because the proof, if valid, exposes the subtle fallacy of defining free will as the ability to do "otherwise" and (I understand) this definition is popular. If the argument is valid, this popular definition of free will is incorrect. I am going to go read the "Define Free Will" thread now.

[ June 14, 2002: Message edited by: Kip ]

[ June 14, 2002: Message edited by: Kip ]</p>

John Page

Kip:

Even if logically sound, I don't think your statements prove anything because they're set in the past. i.e. such proof is prediction a posteriori when any "free will" has already acted!

Cheers, John

AtlanticCitySlave

Yeah, that's basically what I was trying to say.

owleye

Kip...

"I disagree. Lack of free will (the power to do otherwise) is not equivalent to determinism and is also combatible with randomness and acausality. Although I am very sympathetic to your argument (which is similar to my own opinion on the matter), yours does reference determinism and is less simple than mine. The premises are, in my opinion, more vulnerable."

The inability to do otherwise implies that only one outcome is possible from a given set of conditions. Alternatively, the outcome is determined from a given set of conditions. This is what is called hard-determinism. Soft-determinism (I think) allows there to be more than one outcome possible from a given set of conditions. All that's required is any actual outcome follows from the given set of conditions -- i.e., there is a causal nexus.

Perhaps you could clarify how free-will involves randomness and "acausality." Though there may be some merit to bringing in these ideas, I have my doubts you can bring them in successfully. (Note that if the outcome of a decision is indeterminate in principle, then the will cannot determine it, making the case for free will difficult to understand.)

"Because the proof, if valid, exposes the subtle fallacy of defining free will as the ability to do "otherwise" and (I understand) this definition is popular."

Free will depends on our ability to do otherwise (or to have done otherwise). it is not defined in that way. Your proof failed to show this. Indeed, you seem to have concluded that it failed. The ability to do otherwise (or to have done otherwise) implies only that from a given set of conditions more than one outcome is possible. It does not imply that more than one outcome can be actualized (though in the many worlds interpretation, this too is a possibility).

owleye

Synaesthesia

Free Will exists because in circumstances that are very similar in relevant ways, we can take various different courses of action.

As far as I'm concerned, taking any sort of meaphysical approach to the question presumes too much. I see absolutely no need to invoke high level philosophy to explain the consistency and variety of beatle, sloth and monkey behavior.