Hugo Holbling

This is a problem that came up as a sidenote to Berlin's description of negative and positive freedom. My concern is how to establish a demarcation criteria to distinguish between the absolute or relative merits of methodological individualism and social structuralism, particularly in political philosophy but also social and critical theory - are these incommensurable, as Berlin suggests? If not, can the agency and structure approach bear fruit?

My apologies if this makes no sense to some folk. The question i'm asking is in bold.

Hugo Holbling

Hmm....

Given that no-one in this forum seems to know anything about critical theory (apart from foundationalists dismissing it out-of-hand), i'd like to ask the mods to send it on down to politics, where i hope it'll find some life.

Basically, i'm asking about discussions in politics and social/critical theory. Are those who see ultimate value lying in the individual or the collective respectively doomed to forever talk past one another, as Berlin seems to suggest?

(The terms used are methodological individualism and social structuralism, hence the thread title "methodological incommensurability". )

Bill Snedden

I'm not really sure this belongs in PD. It is, after all, a question of political philosophy...

However, I'll bite...until those who advocate that "ultimate value" finds instantiation solely in the collective realize that their argument is wholly fallacious the two factions will forever be talking past one another...

Regards,

Bill Snedden

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"A society that does not recognize that each individual has values of his own which he is entitled to follow can have no respect for the dignity of the individual and cannot really know freedom." F. A. Hayek

Hugo Holbling

... as i thought, but no-one answered.

Thanks, Bill. I take it you're a methodological individualist (quite a mouthful), which gives me a chance to rephrase what i'm asking...

The point of this thread is not to dispute the soundness or otherwise of methodological individualism and/or social structuralism (try saying that fast five times... henceforth to be MI and SS), but to ask if the two methodologies/approaches/hermeneutics are incommensurable; for an MI, is the failure to convince an SS due to faulty thinking on the part of the latter, or the impossibility of the venture itself, and vice versa?

Berlin seems to suggest that he favours incommensurability when he discusses his concepts of negative and positive freedom. I guess this could be expanded into a wider consideration of philosophical argument on any topic, but for the time being i'm interested in the question as it relates to political philosophy and critical theory. Is there a middle ground to be found, as in agency and structure, or can there be no possibility of any grounding at all?

This would be negative freedom and makes Hayek a player for the incommensurability side.

jpbrooks

Perhaps it might help to provide the definitions of the terms methodological individualism and social structuralism along with the tenets of those positions that are in conflict with one another, or a link to a website that provides preliminary information about this topic.

Bill Snedden

I must admit that I'm unsure of the terminology, but if MI refers to the position that "value" has its ultimate source in the individual, then I would fit that description.

C) Faulty thinking on the part of the latter which renders the venture impossible.

Well, of course it's not quite that simple...

Hmmmm...exactly what do you mean by agency and structure? Are we talking individual versus group norms?

I must admit, I can't immediately envision what "common ground" would look like between these two groups. The conceptual framework within which each is working is radically different. It's almost like two competing logical systems.

If I were two use an analogy, it would be to compare the two to the competing philosophical schools of realism and idealism. The very fundamental axioms upon which each is based are incompatible.

On second thought, however, logic would seem to provide a framework within which each system of thought can seek to understand the other. After all, each acknowledges its efficacy, its axioms, etc. Perhaps the common ground upon which MI and SS could be mutually considered is human nature. While each disagrees as to its fundamental status, don't both sides agree that it is human nature (in some manner) that determines the basis for value? If so, the common question becomes "does human nature support MI or SS?" Logic should then provide a common framework within which that question can be evaluated.

I'm sure that I'm being overly optimistic. Then too, this is based upon a foundationalist paradigm. How would an anti-foundationalist approach this dilemma?

Would that indicate that others who would argue similarly (Friedman, Mises, Rawls, etc.) might also be so identified?

Regards,

Bill Snedden

John Page

Hugo:

I'm not familiar with Berlin and incommensurability is a very long word but here goes my answer: No.

OK, why do I think that? Let us assume that both MI and SS are being viewed in relation to the same reality. The MI view shows us that individuals can change the minds of other individuals and, when it comes to action, certain individuals act as prime Movers/leaders. In this way, the focus is on the individual. From the SS viewpoint one might observe that the specific acts of individuals are subservient to the system and their collective success is more a function of their organization than the ndividuals themselves.

However, both of the above viewpoints are positing "rules" that govern individual and societal behavior and the assumption of any such "rules" as universal or absolute creates dogma. We, by observation and analysis, impute the "rule" - the rule itself is simply an idea in our minds, it does not actually control other individuals or societies through an MI or SS method.

To me, the issue is to identify the controlling influences relevant to the outcomes that are important. e.g. I think the phenomenon of fashion (form without utility) is mass behavior and lends itself more to SS as the key driver whereas MI concepts might be more mportant for understanding sleeping habits.

What is required, IMO, is an understanding of how the commonality of form of the brain/mind and the mental constructs/states it can support provides a reflector through which common behavior and individual behavior can be seen to interact through both empathetic and verbal communication. Arguably, Critical Theory projects will provide this better insight and facilitate the development of improved societal systems (whatever that means!)

You mention agency and structure. Agency is an enabler of group behavior and structure is how we perceive things through our mind's eye (including social structures).

I've probably missed the point by a few miles. However, your question did stimulate me to think of competing societies - one that believed in the primacy of the individual force (MI) and the other believing in the primacy of social force (SS). With these emphases, we would then have the individualistic poorly organized society vs. mindlessly mechanistic society.

Incommensurability is not an issue, IMO, MI and SS are bottom up and top-down views that both exist within reality. Please consider: Cheers, John

Hugo Holbling

Fair point, jp. Let's hope the following clears things up somewhat.

Methodological individualism (MI) is a methodology - obviously - and not an ontological assertion. Perhaps Mises' statement that "only individuals act" sums up the approach best; that is, questions of free will, psychological motivation or a myriad other aspects aside, we had better assume this as axiomatic. It's self-evident, says MI, that the individual is the basic unit of society and so our studies must take this fact into account from the very beginning. Another way of thinking about it would be that the individual forms or determines the society. Social Structuralists (SS), on the other hand, reject this approach, arguing that the resulting social theory would have to involve and account for too many factors to be of any use or relevance. Instead, they advocate the study of social structures (hence the name) and in particular the emergent properties thereof. In this case, society to a greater or lesser extent determines the actions of individuals. Functionalism is a good example of this, wherein society is defined by functional relationships between social institutions.

It's important to realize that neither methodology advocates that the individual or the state/society is somehow intrinsically more valid than the other, although many people do make this claim.

Agency and Structure is an attempt at compromise, in which a dialectic process is envisaged. Individuals give their own meanings to the world, but these then become institutionalized and influence/limit the actions of the individuals that make up the society.

If you've read any Derrida you'll immediately recognize the critique of prescence that's been performed here, which would suggest to me that the methodologies are not incommensurable.

Thanks for your comments, Bill. In answer to your question, i'm interested in this concept of agency and structure because it seems to suggest the Derridean play of differance, or, as Critchley puts it:

Once again i wonder if the quest for certain foundations not only leads to talking past those who disagree with your axioms, but also missing quite how beautiful this play can be. Perhaps i'm too much the romantic!

It would appear so, although not necessarily Rawls.

Thanks for your comments, John. I hope i've explained what i'm asking now.

If you glance at your quote in the light of my explication above, you may find that we're not so far apart on this. You may make a Derridean yet!

John Page

Apart, Hugo? However could that happen?
Classify me as you will, but I am neither for him or against him. As for his ideas, I am no expert - but as long as the proposition is not that meaning is transcendental. :banghead: and grammatology is the magic, why would I disagree?



Cheers, John

Hugo Holbling

No need to force you into a box; i'm just interested to see what people make of his work. Alas, hardly anyone seems to have read him - the very definition of a philosophical crime, perhaps!

In any case, this thread is not about Derrida. What say you now of methodological incommensurability, in light of my clarification of terms?