Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Thomas Metcalf · 12-13-2002, 01:23 PM

This post refers to the debate <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/bill_cooke/cooke-aijaz/aijaz3.html" target="_blank">here</a>.

Mr. Aijaz writes,

Quote:

First, the fact that there is at least one transcendent Creator of the universe, even if its identity is unknown, eliminates atheism a priori as a viable option.

(Italics original.)

Yet this cannot be true. Suppose the "transcendent" creator of the universe were a mindless, finite spacetime "blob" that no longer exists. This situation is far more agreeable to the theist than to the atheist. In fact, I think a case can be made that it is inconsistent with theism. Cooke's point was that the creator of the universe is a creator of the universe, and nothing more. Mr. Aijaz seems to fail to realize this:

Quote:

The logic of the Kalam cosmological argument is unassailable; if one agrees that everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence, and the universe began to exist, then it follows inescapably that the universe has a cause of its existence.

This seems to depend upon a careful understanding of what the kalam argument actually is. Certainly, the form of the argument is valid, but only if the argument is taken to be the one presented directly above. There needs to be another premise for it to confirm theism, something like "If the universe has a cause of its existence, then a god exists," and I doubt anyone can support that premise.

Aijaz lists what he takes to be several reasons that no one could ask for the creator of God. Yet the only way he can save God from the question of creation is to claim that God did not begin to exist. This is certainly acceptable, but again, this highlights the strength of Cooke's criticism: the atheist need only believe that something that did not begin to exist caused the universe. No one has found a way to show that this something is anything like a god. If Aijaz has more than a passing familiarity with the literature, he knows that no serious apologist takes the argument as he has presented it to confirm theism; the reason there are such things as "second-stage" or "third-stage" cosmological arguments is that the argument by itself is quite impotent.

Mr. Aijaz reports that the following is his teleological argument:

Quote:

1. A universe exhibiting fine tuning is not improbable under the theistic hypothesis.
2. A universe exhibiting fine tuning is very improbable under the atheistic hypothesis.
3. Therefore, a universe exhibiting fine-tuning is evidence for theism over atheism.

Unfortunately for Mr. Aijaz, this formulation is exceedingly weak. First, the atheistic "hypothesis" might simply be that there is a multitude of worlds. At first blush, this may seem to commit the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy, but in fact it still provides reason to think our universe was not finetuned; why would God decide to finetune this universe and not any other? Why would an unnatural cheater just happen to choose this universe to tune correctly? These questions reinforce the intuitive plausibility of the thesis that a great many worlds avoids the problem of the argument from finetuning, and therefore will function as an explanation.

Second, and more importantly, the argument may be parodied as follows. Let L be the situation, "A random number generator that can return results from one to one googolplex is run, and returns 23." Let H be the hypothesis that a magical elf exists who loves the number 23 and loves to influence putatively random number generators. Suppose L were to obtain.

1. L is not improbable under H.
2. L is very improbable under ~H.
3. Therefore, L is evidence for H over ~H.

But of course it wouldn't be. Aijaz's formulation fails to account for the fact that we have absolutely no idea what the background probability of God is. If we can take Aijaz's argument form to be persuasive, we can demonstrate the likelihood of all sorts of crazy hypotheses, even one so crazy as "God exists."

I conclude that Aijaz has not successfully made the kalam argument work for theism, and has not presented the finetuning argument with any persuasive force.

[ December 13, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>

mattbballman · 12-19-2002, 01:27 PM

Dear Mr. Metcaf,

First, to affirm that the kalam's structure is valid and also sound is to make headway indeed. If the only complaint is that the cause is undefined, then further progress toward God is just a couple of inferences away. With respect to the nature of the cause, it must be understood that there are only two types of causes -- events and agents. It cannot be an event because the universe is finite in age, which contradicts what an event-cause entails. Therefore, the cause must be an agent which is what theists mean when they refer to God. And to say that "No one has found a way to show that this something is anything like a god" has not read widely on the literature of this argument. Most of the proponents of the kalam establish how one goes from "cause" to "God," including G.J. Whitrow, Willaim Craig, Richard Swinburne (who proposes an inductive version). The teleological argument may be a manner by which to manifest the personality of the cause of the universe as an argument to be taken in concert with the kalam, it is only an additional step. Inferences can rightly be made from the kalam to imply a Creator of the universe. But more to the debater's point, why can't an independent argument for a Designer not establish the personality of the universe's cause anyway?

Secondly, appealing to the Many Worlds hypothesis of quantum physics to account for the improbability of our finely tuned universe is just as speculative and metaphysical as theism. At least theism has other, independent reasons for its credibility whereas the MW hypothesis is just pure speculation. Furthermore, the Many Worlds hypothesis is so fantastic that philosopher of physics John Earman calls its splitting of space-time a "miracle." "Not only is there no hint as to what causal mechanism would produce such a splitting," he complains, "there is not even a characterization of where and when it takes place" ("The SAP Also Rises: A Critical Examination of the Anthropic Principle," American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): p. 312.). In his book The Mystery of the Quantum World, Euan Squires writes, "In an effort to understand the quantum world, we are led beyond physics, certainly into philosophy and maybe even into . . . theology"
(The Mystery of the Quantum World (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1986), p. ix.). If the Many Worlds hypothesis is the best defense against the design inference, theism is in pretty good shape.

Finally, the the teleological argument is not suggesting one improbability based on an equal number of improbable equals. Rather, it is that the there is only one result that is astronomically improbable in the face of a vast probability of other results. For example, the design argument is akin to placing a red dot, representing a life-permitting universe, in the middle of the state of Texas surrounded by blue dots which would represent life-prohibiting universes. What you would have is an ocean of blue dots the size of Texas and one tiny red dot, yet the red dot is what is obtains. Physicists John Barrow and Frank Tipler point out in their monumental book, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, that "the odds against assembling the human genome spontaneously is . . . enormous: the probability of assembling it is between (4^-180)^110,000 . . . and (4^-360)^110,000" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 565). So this level of improbability compounded by improbability by improbability cannot be explained by a random generator that's just as metaphysical and speculative as theism.

matt

[ December 19, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf · 12-19-2002, 02:39 PM

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"It cannot be an event because the universe is finite in age, which contradicts what an event-cause entails."

Explain more please. I suspect I can just posit a third kind of cause, a mindless timeless cause of finite effects. That's my explanation, and we'll see whether mine or yours better squares with the Razor.

"Most of the proponents of the kalam establish how one goes from 'cause' to 'God,' including G.J. Whitrow, Willaim Craig, Richard Swinburne (who proposes an inductive version)."

I meant that none of these have succeeded, and I stand by that claim.

"...why can't an independent argument for a Designer not establish the personality of the universe's cause anyway?"

Because we simply don't know that the creator would be the designer.

"...appealing to the Many Worlds hypothesis of quantum physics to account for the improbability of our finely tuned universe is just as speculative and metaphysical as theism."

Some interpretations of quantum physics suggest a "many worlds" hypothesis, regardless of our ignorance of the details. Further, it does not commit us to as large a violation of Ockham's Razor as theism does.

I don't recommend an appeal to authority here, either. The vast majority of cosmologists is composed of atheists.

"Rather, it is that the there is only one result that is astronomically improbable in the face of a vast probability of other results."

No matter how big you make the odds in the Lottery Fallacy, it's still a fallacy. Imagine my neighbor wins a lottery, when the odds are a googolplex to the power of a googolplex to one, against. This is far greater than the odds against a life-permitting universe. Ought I to conclude that my neighbor cheated?

mattbballman · 12-20-2002, 08:20 PM

dear metcaf,

(i) It is not possible that an eternal cause would yield a finite effect. Consider, for example, that elevated temperatures exist eternally. What these temperatures will do is cause heat for all eternity. But if the cause were an agent, then an agent could suddenly will to cease causing heat. So, all eternally existent event causes that have no antecedents will necessarily yield eternal effects. Yet the universe is finite. So an eternal event cause cannot be an explanation for the universe. The only appeal, if the cause is to be "mindless," is to opt for an infinity of finite event causes. But then we have the initial problem of an actually infinite number of things.

(ii) The idea that the designer of the universe cannot be the creator of the universe is about as absurd as saying that the designer of this post cannot be the creator of it! If I were a non-Christian seeking reasons to abandon the theistic hypothesis, I would be shaking in my boots if this is the best I could do:-D

(iii) The purpose of the authoritative references was not to exonerate theism but to explain why the Many Worlds hypothesis is rejected. Besides, the purpose of authoritative reference is not to endorse their worldview based on their expertise but to undergird by example a specific complaint.

(iv) I have already explained that the lottery example is disanalogous to the origin of the universe. In a lottery, every applicant (who purchases only one ticket) has an equally improbable chance of winning. But in cosmogenesis, only a life-permitting universe has those incredible odds and the wealth of life-forbidding universes are enormously more probable.

matt

[ December 20, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]

[ December 20, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf · 12-20-2002, 09:18 PM

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"So, all eternally existent event causes that have no antecedents will necessarily yield eternal effects."

I still see a non sequitur. If agent-causation can be indeterministic, then non-agent-causation can be indeterministic. Either that, or agent-causation is deterministic, upon the agent -- in which case I'll say non-agent-causation is deterministic on the non-agent.

"The idea that the designer of the universe cannot be the creator of the universe is about as absurd as saying that the designer of this post cannot be the creator of it!"

Being A wills that physical existence exists, Being B wills that its character be a certain way. It is a mistake to confuse existence with character.

"In a lottery, every applicant (who purchases only one ticket) has an equally improbable chance of winning. But in cosmogenesis, only a life-permitting universe has those incredible odds and the wealth of life-forbidding universes are enormously more probable."

In cosmogenesis, every particular universe has those incredible odds against it. It's just that we happen to care more about life-permission. Suppose we assign a number to each of the ticket purchasers. Only one ticket purchaser could satisfy the predicate "has number 923,437," and the wealth of ticket purchasers who do not have 923,437 is enormously more probable. If #923,437 wins, do we assume a magical lottery-influencing elf exists who loves the number 923,437?

mattbballman · 12-21-2002, 08:29 PM

metcaf,

(i) If the causal reasons for something's existence are antecedently present in an event cause that is eternal, then that event cause must also be eternal. But this implies that the effect is also eternal -- something that contradicts observation in cosmology.

(ii) Design and create are both functions. Neither are matters of character for prior to God creating anything He was not the creator. Your distinction between Being A and Being B is confused.

(iii) Your lottery example is still disanalogous. Although you say that one ticket is improbable but all of the others are greatly probable, What does that mean per your example? The only way this can be true is if the number generator would somehow favor the probable numbers so that it is false that P=(1/n) where n="the total number of results possible." I can imagine one way this can be done. Suppose that the "probable tickets" are all "111,111," "111,141," "121,111" and such where each probable ticket has five 1's and then a number from 2 - 9. Also suppose that the generator is equipped with 6 ball bins (one bin for each digit). Each ball bin has 100,000 1's in it and then one of each number from 2 - 9 (a total of 100,008 balls per ball bin). So if 923,437 appears as the winner and this ticket were owned by a Mafia member (a favorable result for him), we would have good reason to think that the bin were "designed" for the Mafia man to win. When anthropic physicists discuss the improbability of the universe, they mean that the universe itself is not equally unlikely or simply less likely than life-forbidding universes; rather, it is astronomically unlikely that a life-permitting universe comes into being preferring cognitive human beings (a favorable result).

matt

Thomas Metcalf · 12-21-2002, 11:37 PM

Originally posted by mattbballman:

"If the causal reasons for something's existence are antecedently present in an event cause that is eternal, then that event cause must also be eternal. But this implies that the effect is also eternal -- something that contradicts observation in cosmology."

Huh? Why does "the event cause is eternal" imply that the effect is eternal?

"Design and create are both functions. Neither are matters of character for prior to God creating anything He was not the creator."

I'm talking about the existence of the universe versus the character of the universe. Being A is responsible for the former, Being B for the latter.

"Although you say that one ticket is improbable but all of the others are greatly probable, What does that mean per your example?"

When did I say that? I said all results are equally improbable. If a Mafia member won the lottery, you would immediately conclude that someone cheated?

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12-19-2002, 01:27 PM	#2
mattbballman Regular Member Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: myrtle beach Posts: 105	Dear Mr. Metcaf, First, to affirm that the kalam's structure is valid and also sound is to make headway indeed. If the only complaint is that the cause is undefined, then further progress toward God is just a couple of inferences away. With respect to the nature of the cause, it must be understood that there are only two types of causes -- events and agents. It cannot be an event because the universe is finite in age, which contradicts what an event-cause entails. Therefore, the cause must be an agent which is what theists mean when they refer to God. And to say that "No one has found a way to show that this something is anything like a god" has not read widely on the literature of this argument. Most of the proponents of the kalam establish how one goes from "cause" to "God," including G.J. Whitrow, Willaim Craig, Richard Swinburne (who proposes an inductive version). The teleological argument may be a manner by which to manifest the personality of the cause of the universe as an argument to be taken in concert with the kalam, it is only an additional step. Inferences can rightly be made from the kalam to imply a Creator of the universe. But more to the debater's point, why can't an independent argument for a Designer not establish the personality of the universe's cause anyway? Secondly, appealing to the Many Worlds hypothesis of quantum physics to account for the improbability of our finely tuned universe is just as speculative and metaphysical as theism. At least theism has other, independent reasons for its credibility whereas the MW hypothesis is just pure speculation. Furthermore, the Many Worlds hypothesis is so fantastic that philosopher of physics John Earman calls its splitting of space-time a "miracle." "Not only is there no hint as to what causal mechanism would produce such a splitting," he complains, "there is not even a characterization of where and when it takes place" ("The SAP Also Rises: A Critical Examination of the Anthropic Principle," American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): p. 312.). In his book The Mystery of the Quantum World, Euan Squires writes, "In an effort to understand the quantum world, we are led beyond physics, certainly into philosophy and maybe even into . . . theology" (The Mystery of the Quantum World (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1986), p. ix.). If the Many Worlds hypothesis is the best defense against the design inference, theism is in pretty good shape. Finally, the the teleological argument is not suggesting one improbability based on an equal number of improbable equals. Rather, it is that the there is only one result that is astronomically improbable in the face of a vast probability of other results. For example, the design argument is akin to placing a red dot, representing a life-permitting universe, in the middle of the state of Texas surrounded by blue dots which would represent life-prohibiting universes. What you would have is an ocean of blue dots the size of Texas and one tiny red dot, yet the red dot is what is obtains. Physicists John Barrow and Frank Tipler point out in their monumental book, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, that "the odds against assembling the human genome spontaneously is . . . enormous: the probability of assembling it is between (4^-180)^110,000 . . . and (4^-360)^110,000" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 565). So this level of improbability compounded by improbability by improbability cannot be explained by a random generator that's just as metaphysical and speculative as theism. matt [ December 19, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]</p>

12-19-2002, 02:39 PM	#3
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Originally posted by mattbballman: "It cannot be an event because the universe is finite in age, which contradicts what an event-cause entails." Explain more please. I suspect I can just posit a third kind of cause, a mindless timeless cause of finite effects. That's my explanation, and we'll see whether mine or yours better squares with the Razor. "Most of the proponents of the kalam establish how one goes from 'cause' to 'God,' including G.J. Whitrow, Willaim Craig, Richard Swinburne (who proposes an inductive version)." I meant that none of these have succeeded, and I stand by that claim. "...why can't an independent argument for a Designer not establish the personality of the universe's cause anyway?" Because we simply don't know that the creator would be the designer. "...appealing to the Many Worlds hypothesis of quantum physics to account for the improbability of our finely tuned universe is just as speculative and metaphysical as theism." Some interpretations of quantum physics suggest a "many worlds" hypothesis, regardless of our ignorance of the details. Further, it does not commit us to as large a violation of Ockham's Razor as theism does. I don't recommend an appeal to authority here, either. The vast majority of cosmologists is composed of atheists. "Rather, it is that the there is only one result that is astronomically improbable in the face of a vast probability of other results." No matter how big you make the odds in the Lottery Fallacy, it's still a fallacy. Imagine my neighbor wins a lottery, when the odds are a googolplex to the power of a googolplex to one, against. This is far greater than the odds against a life-permitting universe. Ought I to conclude that my neighbor cheated?

12-20-2002, 08:20 PM	#4
mattbballman Regular Member Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: myrtle beach Posts: 105	dear metcaf, (i) It is not possible that an eternal cause would yield a finite effect. Consider, for example, that elevated temperatures exist eternally. What these temperatures will do is cause heat for all eternity. But if the cause were an agent, then an agent could suddenly will to cease causing heat. So, all eternally existent event causes that have no antecedents will necessarily yield eternal effects. Yet the universe is finite. So an eternal event cause cannot be an explanation for the universe. The only appeal, if the cause is to be "mindless," is to opt for an infinity of finite event causes. But then we have the initial problem of an actually infinite number of things. (ii) The idea that the designer of the universe cannot be the creator of the universe is about as absurd as saying that the designer of this post cannot be the creator of it! If I were a non-Christian seeking reasons to abandon the theistic hypothesis, I would be shaking in my boots if this is the best I could do:-D (iii) The purpose of the authoritative references was not to exonerate theism but to explain why the Many Worlds hypothesis is rejected. Besides, the purpose of authoritative reference is not to endorse their worldview based on their expertise but to undergird by example a specific complaint. (iv) I have already explained that the lottery example is disanalogous to the origin of the universe. In a lottery, every applicant (who purchases only one ticket) has an equally improbable chance of winning. But in cosmogenesis, only a life-permitting universe has those incredible odds and the wealth of life-forbidding universes are enormously more probable. matt [ December 20, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ] [ December 20, 2002: Message edited by: mattbballman ]</p>

12-20-2002, 09:18 PM	#5
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Originally posted by mattbballman: "So, all eternally existent event causes that have no antecedents will necessarily yield eternal effects." I still see a non sequitur. If agent-causation can be indeterministic, then non-agent-causation can be indeterministic. Either that, or agent-causation is deterministic, upon the agent -- in which case I'll say non-agent-causation is deterministic on the non-agent. "The idea that the designer of the universe cannot be the creator of the universe is about as absurd as saying that the designer of this post cannot be the creator of it!" Being A wills that physical existence exists, Being B wills that its character be a certain way. It is a mistake to confuse existence with character. "In a lottery, every applicant (who purchases only one ticket) has an equally improbable chance of winning. But in cosmogenesis, only a life-permitting universe has those incredible odds and the wealth of life-forbidding universes are enormously more probable." In cosmogenesis, every particular universe has those incredible odds against it. It's just that we happen to care more about life-permission. Suppose we assign a number to each of the ticket purchasers. Only one ticket purchaser could satisfy the predicate "has number 923,437," and the wealth of ticket purchasers who do not have 923,437 is enormously more probable. If #923,437 wins, do we assume a magical lottery-influencing elf exists who loves the number 923,437?

12-21-2002, 08:29 PM	#6
mattbballman Regular Member Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: myrtle beach Posts: 105	metcaf, (i) If the causal reasons for something's existence are antecedently present in an event cause that is eternal, then that event cause must also be eternal. But this implies that the effect is also eternal -- something that contradicts observation in cosmology. (ii) Design and create are both functions. Neither are matters of character for prior to God creating anything He was not the creator. Your distinction between Being A and Being B is confused. (iii) Your lottery example is still disanalogous. Although you say that one ticket is improbable but all of the others are greatly probable, What does that mean per your example? The only way this can be true is if the number generator would somehow favor the probable numbers so that it is false that P=(1/n) where n="the total number of results possible." I can imagine one way this can be done. Suppose that the "probable tickets" are all "111,111," "111,141," "121,111" and such where each probable ticket has five 1's and then a number from 2 - 9. Also suppose that the generator is equipped with 6 ball bins (one bin for each digit). Each ball bin has 100,000 1's in it and then one of each number from 2 - 9 (a total of 100,008 balls per ball bin). So if 923,437 appears as the winner and this ticket were owned by a Mafia member (a favorable result for him), we would have good reason to think that the bin were "designed" for the Mafia man to win. When anthropic physicists discuss the improbability of the universe, they mean that the universe itself is not equally unlikely or simply less likely than life-forbidding universes; rather, it is astronomically unlikely that a life-permitting universe comes into being preferring cognitive human beings (a favorable result). matt

12-21-2002, 11:37 PM	#7
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Originally posted by mattbballman: "If the causal reasons for something's existence are antecedently present in an event cause that is eternal, then that event cause must also be eternal. But this implies that the effect is also eternal -- something that contradicts observation in cosmology." Huh? Why does "the event cause is eternal" imply that the effect is eternal? "Design and create are both functions. Neither are matters of character for prior to God creating anything He was not the creator." I'm talking about the existence of the universe versus the character of the universe. Being A is responsible for the former, Being B for the latter. "Although you say that one ticket is improbable but all of the others are greatly probable, What does that mean per your example?" When did I say that? I said all results are equally improbable. If a Mafia member won the lottery, you would immediately conclude that someone cheated?

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