Primal

For those who have not seen the article, posted by Kantian that I'm replying to go here: <a href="http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/stephenhicks/diss/hicksdiss2.html" target="_blank">http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/stephenhicks/diss/hicksdiss2.html</a>

Also go to the thread: Rational Foundationalism vs Presuppositionalism in the Existence of God forum. Found here: <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=50&t=000751" target="_blank">http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=50&t=000751</a>

(there you will find my early criticisms of the less philosophical/more general points of the article)

Now for my criticism of the article:


On a general criticism of traditional foundationalism:


This is true: hence the system is open to abuses. However all a foundationalist can say then is that what *is* obvious and self-evident *is* obvious and self-evident. If you were asked "What is green?" or "what is pain?" One can do little more then refer to the most basic of experience; if this does not help prove either "pain" or "green" exist, then there is nothing one can do. However this does not negate either 1) That the said sensations exist. 2) That the said sensations exist, as basic, none inferred sensations.

This is interesting as I view the Cogito argument itself with suspicion; it borrows from logic and the assumption that there is a consciousness/statements are in fact made.

Tricky, I believe in induction as well but that induction needs a foundational/somewhat deductive basis. For example when using inductive data to prove something; I am assuming my methods works and that what comes to my methods as new data is in fact justified in some manner by the validity of my methods.

For example: Take the claim: The moon is above me.

I know this to be true via my sensation of the moon;observation. But underlying this is many assumptions: 1) There is an objective world. 2) My senses are correctly describing this world at this moment.

At least these two must work to deduce from the data that I really am seeing an actual moon. The thing is then; not to draw a sharp line between induction and/or deduction as the two often times blend.

The rest of the criticism merely presents Hume and Kant's rejection of foundationalism: assumes they are right and move on. A foundationalist answer would be that Hume and Kant are 1) Fundamentallyw rong. 2) At odds with logic i.e. by contradicting themselves. 3) Must in the end either accept certain axioms as self-evident/fundamentally true; or in the case of Kant; revert to mere circularity.

This circularity however, has to be assumed to be true if it is to hold; otherwise then you are merely trying to justify an claim unjustified; with another claim that is itself unjustified; create a vicious circle. This can only be avoided if one assumes that at some level; a claim is justfied or if one assumes that the circle process leads to justification. Both however declare certain axioms to be self-evidently true and capable of justifying all others and are hence implicitly foundationalist. i.e. the coherence theory for example must assume the truth or soundness of coherence, as well as underlying principles of what makes something "coherent" to work.

Arguments against Chisholm's Foundationalism: It should be noted that though I disagree with much of Chisholm; I believe some arguments against him, given the author's own description against Chishol, fail to refute his ideas.

Argument from a failure to adress skeptics:

I found this argument unsatisfactory for many reasons: The first and most obviosu being that throughout the article the author does not seem to distinguish between the kinds of skepctivism he or she is presenting.

The skepticism directed against Chisholm, to be a serious threat to foundationalism and not just the idea of correlation; has to not just attack objectivism but the very idea that all knowledge is derrived from self-evident axioms or that self-evident axioms exist. This is because one can imagine at first: a foundationalist system that is either idealist,pluralist or agnostic in regards to objectivism/subjectivism. The skeptic Chisholm seems to be talking about is the "universal skeptic", one that will, literally, deny anything no matter what. This skeptic is "irrefutable" (a claim I disagree with literally and only agree with in a sense) in that they cannot be made to accept any given claim or if one accepts their system: literally nothing holds true.

This ie because any means of refutation or proof are rejected before the fact; and it is impossible to prove any point if one has already thrown out all standards of proof beforehand.

A problem with this skepticism though is it is totally devoid of logic, that is: inconsistent. Because one if in the end forced to doubt one's own skepticism.

To avoid this a school of lesser skepticism developed in which only one's ability to sense an objective world was questioned. This helps the skeptic avoid the charge of self-contradiction. And is the one the author declares he or she is first talking about in his/her article:

This skepticism is far more limited in scope and is, in many ways still compatible with foundationalism; just not an objectivist theory that demands correlation.

The distinction is thus important but is never made. However as the author seems to think that the skepticism Chosholm responds to is a serious threatto foundationalism: I will assume he is reffering to the stronger form of skepticism; what is usually known as a "universal skeptic". I will thus limit my argument to this: if the author though means by "skeptic" the correlation skeptic: he or she is guilty of equovocation.

The author claims that Chisholm admits he faces an "unanswerable argument"; and should thus accept this. However this line of reasoning faces many problems:

1) The idea that Chisholm "should" accept an unanswerable argument is merely assumed. Why "should" he?

2) The article ignores the fact that Chisholm thinks his own arguments "unanswerable".

The other part of this argument deals with the idea of "faith".

Most immediate problem: The word "faith" can be used in two different senses. The first sense, to refer to any belief noninferred or based on trust. The second to refer to a belief no supported by logic, evidence or reason: usually in respect to a spiritualist claim. There is also another sense that means a spiritual belief in general, however it should be quote obvious that this does not apply to Chisholm in any way.

The first type of faith, the broader/weaker definition: is not necessarily irrational. The second type of faith is irrational. Chosholm may merely be adhering to the first type of faith and not the second. The article is then misplaced.

This "faith" would likewise allow for a belief to remain self-evident or as Chisholm says: self-justified.

Lastly, this line of reasoning ignores the fact that Chisholm sees universal skepticism as merely a different kind of faith. Hence Chisholm is not being irrational in merely putting one faith over another: as neither has any more merit then the other. Chisholm's foundationalism may thus "beg the question" but so does skepticism.

Problems I see with Chisholm and skepticism

A problem I see with Chisholm's defense is IF Chisholm by faith, meant faith of the stronger type. In which case I would say it is more correct to merely limit faith to the weaker/broader type in regards to foundationalism. This eliminates any said "paradox".

My criticism would be more that Chisholm's response is in many ways incompatible with foundationalism. If Chisholm admits that the skeptic and him are at equal epistemic levels: he is admitting that their axioms are equally "true"/evident.However if the foundationalist axioms are considered self-evident: this simply cannot be the case. It seems then that an belief such as Chisholm's that skepticism and foundationalism are equally true is more constructivist then foundationalist. And hence fundamentally wrong from a foundationalist viewpoint.

A more consistent/foundationalist answer is to say that universal skepticism is fundamentally wrong at the axiomic level. In this sense skepticism, far from being "irrefutable" is refuted immediately. Skepticism is thus bankrupt from the get-go. To this I see not how a skeptic or critic can respond except with a pure rejection of what I claim i.e. a non-inferred assumption that I am wrong from the get-go. In which case I will not say we are at equal levels: but that tehy are wrong from the outset.

In this sense skepticism is so utterly wrong, that there is no more to do then accept the fact that it is wrong without further reasoning.

The grain of truth though in what Choshelm was saying is held in this fact: skepticism is irrefutable in the sense that foundationalism cannot come to an agrrement with skepticism through shared standards. This is because the ultimate standards of both camps are rejected by the other. You really cannot start from either position as a starting point and by applying their principles get to the other. One cannot start from the position "certain truths are self-evident" and come to the conclusion that "no truths can be self-evident." Likewise one cannot start by saying "no truths can ever be self-evident" and en with the conclusion "these certain truths are self-evident". Universal skepticism and foundationalism are like two ships passing at see that neither the tween shall meet.

Given this, a foundationalist must thus declare skepticism wrong from the outset as it contradicts immediately what is self-evidently true. This is not saying they are on equal footing: only that skepticism is so bad, that any further reasoning beyond immediate rejection is impossible and unecessary.

On the articles rejection of paticularism:

I share the authors conclusion but not necessarily his method. Paticularism fails as a foundationalist method of justification most miserably. As foundationalist by their very nature reason from self-evident none inferred axioms to derrived conclusions. Hence any attempt to start with any conclusion is irrational and will fail from the outset in terms of justification. What perhaps may be the problem here is a confusion of the order of justification or proof, with the literal chronological order of thought itself. The two are quite simply not one in the same.

In terms of explanation though, analyses of the order in which we chronologically think and reason; paticularism may describe an actual process. However it is not the sole process or method. We may go from cinclusions to justification: but may and in fact must also go through the opposite process.

First and most obvious is how we must go through the opposite process: that of going from justification to conclusion in order to justify the claim in teh first place. Paticularist reasoning only works if 1) The conclusion was already reached by some sort of method. 2) The underlying premises are already shown to be or accepted as justified in some way.

Second are counter-examples: Mainly from math and inductive reasoning.

One is math doesn't have to start with the answer ,such as n plus n=four, then presume 2 plus 2. One can instead start with 2 plus 2= n and say n=4.

More inductive reasoning like biology works in a similiar manner: one does not always start with a right conclusion and then find data. One can find data and form a conclusion; as was the case for the existence of dinosaurs. Or one can present a partial conclusions and refine it later through collected data.

The issue of paticularism though is ultimately and irrelevant one for foundationalism: as it deals with later end reasoning and the order of it chronologically, not the nature of justification or self-evident axioms that are the core of foundationalist thought and what must be overthrown if foundationalism is to fall.

Attempt to link foundationalism to correlation/objectivist theory

This is avoided if one merely puts the word "sense" where apearance would be. This makes the claim neutral in regards to the objectivist/subjectivist debate.

The claim that self-evident beliefs may be wrong and hence not self-evident is reponded to in a similiar manner:

This is resolved by substituing "is red" which may be wrong; with "believes is red" which is not open to disproof. Notice during both red as never rejected as something "sensed" it is only the source that is under question.

On consciousness demanding all claims be related and hence justified in relation

This objection is avoided merely by recognizing the term experience may be used in different senses: in the first to indicate the traditional sense of perception and the paticular. In the second to ascribe to all things literally in one's neural network.

Second the author is confusing claims related in the sense that they are part of the same consciousness and cannot be seperated in fact; with epistemic justification and how claims can be separated in regards to their epsietmic merit. The former does not necessarily negate the later. One may merely be examining a specific aspect at a specific time that is literally connected; just as one can examine a person's hand in isolation without having to actually cut it off the person.

On how one is to justifies/makes distinctions between the self-evident

The distinction would itself be a part of the self-evident nature of the claims. Something not open to analysis i.e. open to inference.

Ultimately the question comes down to: How do you know what is self-evident is self-evident? i.e. how does one show the self-evident to be evident?

To which the only answer a foundationalist can give is "it just is". Likewise if a person were asked "how do you know what you sense as sight, you are sensing as sight?". To which all you can do is accept the fact that you are.

The fact is the self-evident by its very nature cannot be proven by inference to earlier standards; if it could, then it would not be self-evident.

The main crux then is: Must anything to be considered evident, be inferred? Foundationalists say "no" because this leads to infinite regress.

Critics assume the answer to the question is "yes". However then fail to show how everything proven if inferred without 1) Sinking to infinitism. or 2) Going in evidently bankrupt circles.

On none derrived definitions

The last part of this criticism is where the error is made: in assuming the question of what counts as a definition is still open. Again, basic definitions like basic principles are not inferred from earilier definitions, and circularity is merely for sake of clarification.

To illustrate this, lets say you were asked to define "sight" or "seeing". And for every word you define it as like "observing" you have to define as well. Ultimately you will end up in circles or else have to go off forever making up new words. Both are obviously useless, the infinite because "sight" never becomes meaningful and the circular, beacause if we don't already have some idea of what "sight" or another word in the circle means beforehand: the exercise will fail to confer meaning.

Now does this mean the definition of sight is completely up for grabs? Lets say I state "sight is that which, you hear." I am most certainly wrong. In regards to humans, ecolocation I would define neither as sight nor hearing as we experience it. So what gives? The fact is that we cannot infer the meaning of the word from other words; because the meaning of the word is quite simply not inferred by other words but by the very phenomenon it is applied to. These are basic or "raw" words. Some of which are so fundamental that further derivation is not possible. Thus certain raw words like "sight,touch,pain,pleasure,real" are not made meanignful by their relation to other words by but raw experience. This means you just realize what they mean at the moment and do not need to analyze them any further nor does further elaboration i.e. comparison to other words confer distinction.

Hence the idea of "justification" is not necessarily "up for grabs" just because it is noninferred from previous words. Justification may simply be a raw word, that describes the inferring of certain conclusions from certain premises/axioms. The term "justification" is no more up for grabs then the term "sight".

Notice however how similiar the arguments from definition are to the argument asking for a request to justify the self-evident. Both in fact go by the same sort of reasoning. And both criticisms make similiar assumptions i.e. that all claims to be evident must be inferred or all words to be meanignful must be inferred from other words to be defined.

Both hence suffer from the same flaws: 1) They failt to refute foundationalism. 2) They sink into infinite regress or vicious circularity.

From a foundationalist viewpoint both are fundamentally wrong as well.

On believing makes it so, type reasoning

Here I agree. Accepting a claim does not make it true and to say it does is to break with the very roots of foundationalism. Foundationalists must hold that certain axioms are self-evident and true whether a person accepts them or not.

On the Criticism of Moser's Foundationalism

I admit that I for the most part, find Moser's "foundationalism" to be indefensible and hardly even a foundationalism at all; as there is little in the way of axioms and no certainty. It is clearly an objectivism but not a foundationalism. Perhaps it shares some foundationalisy elements though, in which case it can be considered quasi-foundationalist. In which case all I would argue is that the self-evident must be certain, for to assume otherwise is to believe it is open to disproof and hence not really self-evident at all. Likewise that systems built on uncertainty never really get off the ground and sink into constructivism. For how do we verify any claim at all when all we have are uncertain claims with which to work with?

The author's comments were therefore, very much on the mark with respect to Moser. All except for one that I must take serious issue with.

Mainly the claim tha Moser believes in a certain process and people simply do not thinkg this way.

This is unfair and for the most part, irrelevant. The question is one for psychology,neurology and cognitive science: not philosophy. Perhaps the lady is doing the reasoning implicitly as we all do, and her beliefs are implicitly justified.

A comparison that illustrates what I am saying:

-Mr. Credo touches a stove

- Mr.Credo feels higher then comfortable or healthy temperature on his hand.

-Mr. Credo realizes something is too hot.

-Mr.Credo realizes the stove he is touching is too hot.

-Mr.Credo realizes he is in an objective reality

-Mr.Credo realizes that his senses are telling him of this objective reality.

-Mr.Credo realizes thus he cannot wish the stove away or change his hand so as to be compatible with the fire.

-Mr.Credo wishes to not have his hand burned off.

-Given the above and Mr.Credo's knowledge of causality, Credo decides the wisest course of action is to remove his hand.

That's one interesting way of putting it. Now this occurs when most of us touch a stoves, with our nerves: very quickly and implicitly. Does this mean our nerves or us are high powered physicists/biologists/objectivist philosophers?

Nope, but then how about our nerves? Or wait; are we simply unjustified in thinking the stove is the source of heat and removing our hands? Unlikely, and even if true; it ignores the fact that we do not seem to think so and remove our hands from the stove.

Now how is it we do all the above so quickly? By what mechanisms? I do not know, nor do I need to to do epistemology. I likewise do not know the brain processes I am doing when I do simple math. The gymnist does not know of the exact laws of physics he or she is working under when he or she does amazing stunts. Mainly because such things are irrelevant.

The argument from Mrs.Credo is irrelevant to an examination of the fundamentals of justification. It is instead of complex subject for science; not a basic one for philosophy. And requires research.

The article in this sense confuses the justification of a claim with an explanation of claim or fact. That is epistemic reasoning with causality.

This ends the my take of the article for the most part.

Ultimately though, it should be clear that the foundationalist system, with its self-evident axioms and raw definitions must be assumed.

The regress argument is often times offered as a justification of foundationalism: but this tactic is folly. As the regress argument assumes certain underlying ideas like that of logic. If logic for example does not hold,nor the idea that truth is independent of preference then the regress argument can simply be denied out of preference. Or it can be accepted yet what it implies, no matter how directly can be denied. Non sequiturs are allowed if there is no logic.

In the end one will then be stuck trying to justify foundationalism with the regress argument and the regress argument with foundationalism: a position that is based in cricularity not self-evident principles.

Foundationalism thus must be assumed: this does not make it untrue. For it has been shown that to assumes all evidence must be inferred is itself an assumption which leads into asburdity.

In the end one must either then simply assume/accept foundationalism as correct, and that there are self-evident truths, or one must not. In ether case one will be making an assumption: the difference is the foundationalist admits this and believes his or her assumptions to be true.

That means though to accept foundationalism is to make assumptions: to reject it is to likewise make assumptions. However foundationalism it is noted admits it is built on assumptions: other systems do not even as they are.

Ulterior reasons for accepting foundationalism,(note: these do not justify foundationalism which must, as I already said be accepted or rejected at the fundamental level, they give more reasons for believing foundationalism besides one thinking it to be true)are:

1) Foundationalism presents the most solid underpinning for science,materialism,objectivism and logic. This is because other systems quickly sink into relativism,circularity or infinitism.

2) Other systems at some level are bound to be illogical, which means you can be charged for having an irrational faith.

3) Foundationalism provides firm ground for atheism: as it can easily be shown using logic and reason that theism is incoherent,superfluous and sometimes even inconsistent with itself.

4) Other philosophical systems ultimately burrow at some level from foundationalism. In that they have to make "assumptions" somewhere and assume these assumptions hold. Even universal skepticism; which must assume there are no self-evident truths and nihilism, which presumes one can have to beliefs must at some point rest on assumptions.

5) Foundationalism allows for the easiest means of self-correction; as well as establishing the strongest base for an open minded philosophy. Other then axiomic principles and direct derivatives: there is much room for foundationalism for questioning and growth.

The last point is one of clarification. I am not saying that because foundationalism is assumed it is not evident or not proven. I am saying that it is evident but someone must ultimately accept this fact without inferring it. I am also not saying that other systems are not incorrect just because they and foundationalism are assumed: I am saying they are fundamentally incorrect and one must ultimately accept this without inference.

I am also aware of the fact that foundationalism is open to abuse. That someone can thus declare something self-evident no matter how absurd. However I must point out that every system is open to abusee; and I believe foundationalism to be less so though due to its rigorous adoption of logic and reason. I also recognize in any foundationalism there is disagreement: but in any system there will be disagreement. Also that the fact that foundationalism can be abused does not refute the system: just because someone can lie about something being self-evident does not mean there are no such things as self-evident truths. Nor does the fact that foundationalism has disagreement. Critics who argue from this angle ignore the fact that in foundationalism truth is unaffected by abuse or disagreement.

Foundationalism is thus: as fundamental epsistemic decision and requies thus a radical acceptance at the fundamental level. One should no that one can technically deny any fact of reality: but reality does not go away. Likewise foundationalism: no matter how much denied does not cease to lose its evident standing or reality.