Mageth,
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Originally posted by Mageth:
...we act predictably, because we wouldn't choose differently in a certain set of circumstances given our natures.
Is this not a succinct definition of determinism?
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I think most of this confusion arises from our views of what free will is. I would (loosely) say that if something is causally determined from within (from that person's nature), they have free will. How would you define free will, and what is an example of someone making a decision that is "free"? If the decision is solely determined by outside factors like the wind, I wouldn't define someone's decision as free. Similarly, if the decision is solely determined by other persons, I wouldn't define the decision as free.
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So he actualized 'natures' that pre-existed, knowing how they would behave in every circumstance? Where is the room for "free will?"
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Because the decisions these actualised natures make are causally determined by them and therefore morally chargeable to them. It's moral responsibility that I'm primarily concerned about. If someone's decisions are "free" but they cannot be blamed for it, I couldn't really care less.
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And isn't his decision/choice/compulsion to perform the actualization of a particular nature, knowing how it will behave, in effect him "choosing" the existence, and thus the behavior, of that particular nature?
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Not if people's natures exist as a given. I don't think God "invented" or "created" people's natures. He didn't say "Hmmm... I'm going to make someone obnoxious, argumentative and irritating, and he shall be called Mageth" -- JUST KIDDING!
I think people's natures exist as a given in the mind of God, and thus God only
actualised rather than actively crafted and decided what their natures would be. Hence, moral responsibility is the individual's, not God's.
Wizardry,
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By Scrutinizer: I don't think causing something to exist requires time --
By Wizardry: Why not? You'll need to support this statement with some sort of argument. Your assertion doesn't really mean much.
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With all due respect, your assertion that causing something to exist
does require time needs to be supported with some sort of argument.
I'll use the example Kenny gives in <a href="http://iidb.org/ubb/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic&f=50&t=000009&p=" target="_blank">this thread</a> (hopefully he won't mind!):
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Imagine a universe which consists solely of a single, eternally stable (such that it does not change or decay) point mass. Would it be meaningful to assign spatial coordinates to such a particle? Would it be meaningful to define any sort of passing time? Now suppose, instead, that this point mass is the type of particle that decays. In an instant, it changes from state A to state B. It seems that we now have a definite way to assign a “before” and “after” relationship between states (although, does the direction of these assignments matter or is it completely arbitrary which state is “before” and which is after?), but it still doesn’t, at this point, seem all that meaningful to speak of the length of duration between these changes (duration relative to what?). Now, let’s go back to our original stable point mass; let’s also throw another stable point mass into our hypothetical universe. Now, it seems meaningful to talk about spatial extension given that one can define a distance between these two point masses. Still, it is only meaningful, in this instance, to speak of spatial extension in one dimension. Now suppose we throw a dozen or so point masses in with their own motions relative to one another, decay processes, etc. It looks as if it is now becoming more meaningful to talk about assigning well defined space-time coordinates, distances, durations, etc.
The point of this exorcise is that space-time is only well defined in terms of relationships between things. Without such relationships, space-time does not exist in any well defined way. In other words, space-time is not a “thing-in-itself,” but something that emerges from the relationships between objects in the universe. Objects in the universe don’t depend on space-time for their existence; rather, space-time depends on them.
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So, I don't think causality requires time. I think time requires causality. Time, in my opinion, exists as a
mode of perception, but doesn't exist as some entity above causal relationships that allows them to occur. If we were omniscient, time wouldn't exist as a mode of perception. However, we are finite and limited, so it does.
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FIRST, the universe did not exist. THEN, the universe existed.
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It is meaningless to speak of the universe not existing
at a particular moment in time and then existing later on, if you adopt a view of time where time only "exists" because the universe does.
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God's omniscience requires that he know how we will act, according to our natures, given certain external influences. By creating different external influences, he could essentially make our decisions for us.
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Well, he would know what decisions we would make given a different set of external influences, but I don't understand why this is damaging to Christianity. God
wouldn't create a different set of external influences because he acts in accordance with his immutable nature, his omniscience, etc., and this is the universe he chose to create.
Could it have been different? Yes.
Would it have been? No.
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Your example does not apply because you assume that all external factors would be the same in the me killed, me not killed scenarios. I can still be struck by lightning, or hit by a meteor or drowned in a flood. Brake lines could snap and a bus could go wildly out of control, jump a curb and hit me even though I was never even trying to cross the street and the bus driver was trying to avoid me. I can still die even with a careful bus driver and crosswalk avoidance on my part.
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Yes, but I don't think the external factors would be different. They just "are", so I don't think it is meaningful to speak of things like "But what if a tornado came along right at that moment?" or "What if I were struck by lightning?".
Theli,
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What I mean is if he could see what was happening, what had happened and what was goin to happen at once, then the course of history must be set and unchangable or else his vision of the future would be false and useless.
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Okay, we
could act differently to how we do in certain situations because we have the mental and physical ability to act differently. We
wouldn't act differently, however, because that's who we are. Let's say for example that you're emotional and compassionate by nature. If you see a beggar on the side of the street as you're walking by, you
could simply stroll past without giving him any money. Since you are compassionate and feel emotionally sorry for the beggar, however, you
wouldn't simply stroll past.
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He would still not be able to pick a certain point in time to act, since he's "timeless" and there is no duration between the creation of the universe and the point where he would act from he's point of view.
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The difficulty in conceptualising it from your point of view seems to be in the fact that you think God would have no
time to act. You're saying that there is no duration between the creation of the universe and the point where he would act. That's not a problem unless you think he needs "time" to get ready to act -- I don't. I think God can act at any point in our perceived "time" even though he is timeless.
Regards,
- Scrutinizer
[ January 25, 2002: Message edited by: Scrutinizer ]</p>
01-25-2002, 11:48 AM
