Ender

How can an objectivist legitimately derive an "ought" from an "is?"

pug846

99percent said:

Why is it immoral to go “against” the free will of another? I do reject this “objective fact,” because I think there are plenty of cases in which you should “go against the free will of another.” (Oddly enough, so do you. I’m not sure what your point is here. Self defense jumps to the top of my mind.)

pug846

Jeff, care to deal with my objections to BD's first post? I'm wondering how you would respond to such an anaylsis.

bd-from-kg

Tom Piper:

The simple answer is that I think that it shows that they are not propositions.

For a much more detailed discussion of the nature of such principles, see the thread <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=21&t=000384" target="_blank">On the nature of metaphysical axioms</a>. The OP explains my position pretty well, but an exchange buried in the middle of the thread is also very relevant here:

(Note that I consider the Principle of Induction and Occam’s Razor to be metaphysical axioms.)

A demonstration and a proof are two different things. I can demonstrate that I have two hands by raising both hands so that you can see them, but that’s not a proof.

but let’s suppose that you are claiming that you can prove the validity of modus ponens by using a truth-table. I imagine that this “proof” might look something like this:

(i) By definition, if a proposed rule of inference preserves truth for all possible combinations of truth-values of the propositions “going in” to it, it is valid.

(ii) [A demonstration that modus ponens preserves truth for all possible combinations of truth-values of the propositions “going in” to it]

(iii) Conclusion: Modus ponens is a valid rule of inference.

Formally, this is a perfectly valid argument. Unfortunately, (iii) follows from (i) and (ii) by modus ponens.

Of course you could construct the argument carefully so that the final step uses some other valid inference rule. But then to justify the final step you’d have to demonstrate that this inference rule is valid.

The beginning of wisdom with respect to logic is to recognize that the fundamental axioms and inference rules cannot be “proved” in any meaningful sense. You cannot use logic to prove the validity of logic; any attempt to do so is transparently circular.

I’m not sure what to make of it even after thinking about it for some time. But nothing in my position entails that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is”. Perhaps some of the subjectivists on this thread might want to tackle this one.

Pompous Bastard:

The most obvious thing about this statement is that it is not an argument. You give no indication of what conclusion you want to draw or how this observation relates to it.

But in fact this distinction isn’t nearly as clear-cut as you seem to think. First off, moral principles aren’t just “guidelines for forming prescriptive statements”; they are prescriptive statements. That’s why more specific prescriptive statements can be derived from them, just as the factual statement “Socrates is mortal” can be derived from the factual statement “Socrates is a man” and the factual principle “All men are mortal”. Similarly, from the command “clean up your room” and the fact "The toys are scattered all over the floor in your room” one can derive the more specific command “Put away the toys in your room”.

But in an important sense the Principle of Induction and Occam’s Razor are also prescriptive statements. As William K. Clifford argues at length in his classic essay <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/historical/w_k_clifford/ethics_of_belief.html" target="_blank">The Ethics of Belief</a>, one has a moral duty to believe something only when one has rational justification for believing it. Thus the principles that define what constitutes rational justification for a belief are moral principles, which is to say that they are prescriptive.

jlowder:

In general, saying “there are objectively true propositions [of a certain kind] but there is no way in principle to identify them” is indeed different from saying “there are no objectively true propositions [of that kind]”. (At least, I think so. Logical positivists would disagree.) But moral propositions are a special case. A fundamental moral principle is that a person cannot be held responsible (i.e., praised or blamed) for doing something unless he knows, or could reasonably have been expected to know (with some reasonable degree of confidence) that it was right or wrong. But if it is impossible to know that any moral principles are true, it is impossible to know whether any given action accords with or violates any moral principles, and therefore no one can ever be held responsible for doing anything. To say that a person had acted virtuously (or wickedly) would mean merely that he had happened by chance to choose to do the right (or wrong) thing without having any idea whether he had or not. In short, if there were no way of identifying any true moral principles, morality would be meaningless. The notions of being praiseworthy or blameworthy could not in principle be applicable to any actual act, and so would be essentially vacuous.

It seems paradoxical to say “X should do Y, but it is impossible in principle for him to know this, and he cannot be held responsible for choosing to do it or not do it.” And it seems especially paradoxical if this is always the case. By contrast, it does not seem paradoxical (at least in the same way) to say, for example, that there are other universes, but that we have no way of knowing anything about them. (In fact, this is essentially what physicists say about black holes: things are happening inside them, but it is impossible in principle for us to know what those things are.)

Neither the Principle of Induction nor Occam’s Razor is a “law of logic” – that is to say, they are not analytic propositions. So if they express propositions, they must be synthetic. But synthetic propositions are statements about the “real world”, and the POI and OR are not statements about the real world, but metaphysical principles for interpreting or making sense of the real world. Since they are neither analytic propositions nor synthetic propositions, it follows that they do not express propositions at all. Yet surely they are principles of some kind, and they are clearly guidelines of some kind for rational behavior (specifically, in this case, the behavior of forming beliefs), or else descriptions of what rational behavior (in certain contexts) consists of. So I call them principles of action. If you have a better term, I’d be glad to hear it.

Finally, I want to comment on your reply to pug846’s question “why should I play this game instead of another one and adopt those set of rules?” (Or in other words, even if there were objectively valid moral principles, what reason would I have to conform my actions to them?)

You replied:

Now of course I would agree that the mere existence of such facts could not motivate behavior. But anything that can be properly called moral principle must be such that anyone who understands what it means for something to be a moral principle, and understands that Z is a moral principle, will have a rational reason to conform his actions to Z. And one of the things that it means to be a rational agent is that if you have a rational reason to do something and no equally strong rational reason not to (or to do something else instead), you will do it. This of course implies that the “reason” for conforming one’s actions to Z must be such that it will motivate a rational person to do so, since no one ever does anything without a motivation.

[Note: I plan to respond to pug846’s comments soon.]

[ February 19, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

Pomp

echidna,

If consciousness and morality are purely materialist entities, able to be explained in reductionist terms, then presumably it should also be possible to produce some level of objective materialist rules for morality.

Is this true ?

This is sort of tricky, and probably depends on what, exactly, we mean by "morality."

If materialism is true, then any moral principles that are widely adopted can safely be assumed to be the product of biological and cultural evolution so, in theory, we have an objective method that could be used to predict what moral rules will be adopted: simply figure out which moral memes will best survive in any specified societal environment. This is much easier in theory than in practice, of course.

I don't think that's quite what you were asking, though. I think what you were asking was more along the lines of "Shouldn't there be some objective criteria for determing what it right?" I would say no, as the concepts of right and wrong seem to be human constructs. IOW, we have objective, material methods for determining what any group of people will deem right, but no such criteria for determining what is "really" right, because there is no "really right" answer.

jlowder

I think that's a good question that is especially relevant to anyone who claims to be an ethical naturalist. David Brink, in his book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0521350808/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics</a>, has a very detailed discussion in which defends ethical naturalism against this objection. I've also been corresponding privately with Michael Martin who (apparently) defends ethical naturalism in his forthcoming book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1573929875/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">Atheism, Morality, and Meaning</a>. I'm afraid I don't have anything substantive to say about this yet as I have found both Brink's and Martin's discussions very technical. I'm still mulling over the whole issue.

But in direct response to your question, I'm not sure moral objectivists are committed to the position that an 'ought' can be derived from an 'is'. Certainly, moral realists (including ethical naturalists) are committed to that view. However, it is not clear to me that other types of moral objectivists derive an 'ought' from an 'is.'

[ February 19, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

Pomp

99Percent,

Simply put, immorality means going against the free will of others, and this is called initiation of violence.

It's not that simple though. Obviously all instances of "going against" someone's supposed free will are not immoral, or else you would be forced to say, for example, that it is immoral for you to rent the last copy of the video I wanted to rent, or that it is immoral for you to not allow me to enter your home and carry off your possessions. This theory doesn't work at all without a fairly complex set of criteria for determining what constitutes "going against" another person's free will. Such a set could easily be constructed, of course, but it would reflect considerations other than preserving free will and, thus, invalidate your claim that free will is the basis of objective morality.

I find it hard if not impossible to reject this objective fact if you still believe in free will. After all moral choices are available precisely because we have free will.

...and sentience, and rationality, etc.

jlowder

I'm not sure what portions, if any, of your response to BD is applicable to me. Please email me privately with the portions you think are applicable.

jlowder

(snip) I'll respond to your other replies to me later.

That's question-begging. This assumes precisely what the externalist denies, namely, that "anyone who understands what it means for something to be a moral principle, and understands that Z is a moral principle, will have a rational reason to do something and no equally strong rational reason not to..." I do not find an argument for such internalist assumptions in your post.

Pomp

bd-from-kg,

The most obvious thing about this statement is that it is not an argument. You give no indication of what conclusion you want to draw or how this observation relates to it.

As I noted, I wasn't drawing any conclusions. I was suggesting that a comparison between moral principles, such as the golden rule, and principles such as Occam's razor might be problematic, as the two sorts of principles prescribemethods for arriving at two different sorts of statements.

But in fact this distinction isn’t nearly as clear-cut as you seem to think. First off, moral principles aren’t just “guidelines for forming prescriptive statements”; they are prescriptive statements. that’s why more specific prescriptive statements can be derived from them,

Of course, such principles are themselves prescriptive statements, but I don't think that's why we can derive other prescriptive statements from them. We can derive prescriptive statements (P, here) from descriptive statements (D, here), providing that one of our D's is a value statement:

D1) Johnny is hungry.
D2) Johnny does not wish to be hungry.
D3) Eating sates hunger.

P1) Johnny should eat.

But in an important sense the Principle of Induction and Occam’s Razor are also prescriptive statements.

Of course they are, in at least one sense: If X desires an increased understanding of the Universe, then X ought to follow principle Y.