pug846

I'm curious as to why some of you feel there are Objective moral facts. What arguments do you think favor your position? Can you offer a method that A)establishes that there are objective moral facts and b) will let us identify what we ought to be doing in "moral" situations.

Tom Piper

Pug,

I assume you will allow that there are objective legal facts. All that is necessary for there to be such facts is a 'process', a means, by which these facts come into existence, as it were.

It is wrong to turn right on a red light unless you have come to a full stop first. This is an example of an objective legal fact in some parts of the United States.

Will you then agree that if there is such a process, a means, by which moral facts come into existence, then there will be objective moral facts.

Tom

[ February 17, 2002: Message edited by: Tom Piper ]</p>

Orpheous99

There is no such thing as objective moral facts. All moral systems are subjective. Weither they are personal or as a community they are subective. Scale is irrelevant.

XGuilt

Without objective moral facts, humanity would have ceased to exist eons ago. Let's start with the first objective moral fact: Existence exists. That we can perceive that which exists reveals the second objective moral fact: human consciousness. For humanity to remain aware of its own consciousness, it must survive; to survive it must identify (through the only means it has: its cognitive senses) that which is conducive or inimical to human life. What is conducive is 'moral', what is inimical is 'immoral'. This is the inately secular equation with which humanity is aware of its own existence and remains able to assure its continued survival. It was merely unfortunate, centuries ago, that theism arrogated all concepts of human 'morality' - or should I say that theism abrogated and replaced them with the 'gawd standard', along with its necessary antagonist in the form of the 'devil standard' (e.g., 'good' and 'evil'). There are innumerable assertions, here and elsewhere, that attempt to dismiss the fact that human morality can (and does) have an available, entirely objective standard - a theoretical and practical viability that is grounded firmly in objective epistemology. That standard is called the Philosophy of Objectivism, and its creator is Ayn Rand. After centuries of philosophical distortion and destruction of 'objectivity' - from all the mystical subjectivists from Plato to Kant and all their 'spiritual' descendants, Rand brought us back to reason by identifying the singular, inherent factor of all human existence that provides us with the only objective standard by which humanity can make proper moral choices to ensure both the quality and quantity of its very existence: human life, and what is conducive or inimical to it. All other considerations for a proper human moral standard WOULD be 'subjective', and theism has held control over the entire subjective realm since its inception. In my experience, the term 'subjective' is most commonly employed by those who are not equal to the epistemological argument at-hand; in other words, it is a convenient 'out' that enables them to reject self-responsiblity for cognitive awareness of the observable reality around them. Subjectivism has been expanding like a plague for centuries, and it ultimately comes down to a singular combination of objective, utterly MORAL facts: 1) a lack of self-esteem, and 2) a refusal to accept personal responsibility for acknowledging reality - as it exists. The bottom line is this: if any 'subjectivist' were to fully actualize his/her (non-objective) assertions AND have to bear the realistic consequences of doing so, he/she would rather quickly cease to exist. Of course most 'subjectivists' I've experienced, both here and world-wide during my half century of living, are more into endless qualification and quantification of applications of that term to themselves than anything else - i.e., 'rationalizing' that "cause and effect" doesn't apply to THEM and their particular form of 'subjectivist' theory. More than any other entity in recorded human history, we have religion (of ALL kinds) to thank for the spread of this plague of subjectivism. 'Faith' - the very foundation of any and every definition of 'subjectivism', and 'reason' - the very foundation of objective epistemology, are antithetical. Those two particular concepts of human consciousness cannot exist simultaneously in the same man or at the same time. It is either-or, and the quality and quantity of one's very life depends on the MORAL choice one makes between the two.

pug846

I didn’t mention it in the OP, but I purposely left the definition of an “objective moral fact” up in the air for each of you to define for me.

Tom said:

I’m not sure what you mean when you say there are objective legal facts – Perhaps you could explain further.

It is only ‘wrong’ given that humans have decided that as a social convention and as a matter of convenience, you have to come to a full stop. It could have been the other way around and in some parts of the US, it possibly is. Your use of the objective here is rather unusual – what do you mean by “objective.” The process you describe here is a bunch of people deciding what laws should and shouldn’t be accepted – In what sense is this objective?

Xguilt said:

Unsupported assertion – The best I would give you is without the perception of Objective moral facts, humanity might have ended a while ago. Clearly, this has no bearing as to whether or not there actually are objective moral facts.

Why should I accept this as the only standard? Why can’t I have more than one potential “ultimate ends?” How is this standard, “objective?”

Odd – Although I don’t know what you mean by “subjectivist,’ many of us adhere to our ‘non-objective assertions’ and have continued to exist. Care to explain? Although I certainly hold my life as valuable, I hold it as a competing good amongst a variety of things. For instance, if I had to lay down my life for my girlfriend, I would do it in a second – I, like many others, hold other people’s life as exceptionally important. And although I will often times put my wants and needs ahead of other people’s, and in my case, my girlfriends, that doesn’t mean at times I wouldn’t put my value of her ahead of my value for myself. Finally, I often pick courses of action that aren’t as good for my life as other courses of action because I will really value some activity more than what is good for my life. I often value learning as an end in itself and if the choice were to come down to eating a healthy meal or doing something that has a better chance in helping me “survive,” I will forgo it because I enjoy reading, despite if the reading is useful to me or if it is somehow benefiting my life.

I’m not sure what most Objectivists mean when they say ‘subjectivists,’ given that Rand seemed to have no clue what most ‘subjectivists’ believed and felt there was such a either-or position in philosophy of either accepting her form of realism, or being an irrational ‘subjectivist’ who didn’t accept reality…err…the ‘primacy of existence’ at all.

Tom Piper

Pug846,

I will tell you what I meant by 'objective'. Then you tell me what you meant by 'objective'.

I meant something such as, '...deriving from experience with actual objects, phenomena, or conditions'; '...expressing or dealing with facts or conditions perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations'; '...real independent of any particular individual mind'.

The various traffic laws are whatever they happen to be whether I know what they are or not. The rules for monopoly are what they are indpendent of what I happen to think that they are.
Various words of an ordinary language mean what they mean independent of what I happen to think that they mean.

It is true that if humans in the United States go through the appropriate processes they can change the existing laws-- in this sense they are, in a sense, conventions. I can't change the laws to suit my own preferences, and the laws are what they are whether I like it or not.

If there is a means by which moral laws can be put into place, but not by humans, and humans are powerless to change them, and they are binding on humans, then these will be objective, in the way that 'legal' laws are, and they will not be a matter of convention in the sense in which it is normally understood.

I have showed you mine, now you show me yours.

Tom

bd-from-kg

pug846:

Several clarifications are needed here.

(1) There’s a difference between the existence of a fact and being able to prove it. For example, there might be eight planets circling Betelgeuse, but I can’t prove it. I had eggs for breakfast on May 5, 1952, but I can’t prove it. Modus ponens is a valid rule of inference, but I can’t prove that it is. I am right now having a headache, but I can’t prove it. I am currently perceiving an off-white color (among other things), but I can’t prove it. And I’m thinking about the questions you’ve raised, but I can’t prove it. It seems to me that these are all different kinds of propositions, but in all cases it’s clearly possible (and in some cases certain) that they’re true, yet none of them can be proved.

(2) There’s a difference between knowing (or even being able to prove) that there are facts of a certain kind and being able to identify which propositions of that kind are true. Thus, no doubt some meaningful propositions about the weather that will be occurring at a given latitude/longitude at 11 AM on August 22, 2671 are true, but I have no way of identifying which ones they are.

I won’t go into this further since it isn’t especially relevant to the present discussion. Saying that there are objectively true moral propositions but there’s no way in principle to identify them, even with a reasonable degree of confidence, does seem to be indistinguishable from saying that there are no objectively true moral propositions.

(3) Talking about “objective moral facts” is putting the cart before the horse. We should begin by talking about objectively valid moral principles. And the thing to notice about moral principles is that they are not properly understood as “factual” statements at all; they are principles of action. This distinction is not unique to ethics. For example, the “Principle of Induction” is not a fact at all, objective or otherwise; it’s a principle of action. What it says, essentially, is: “If B has been observed to follow A on every one of the numerous occasions when A has occurred in the past, expect it to follow A in the future.” This is a good rule to follow, but by its very nature it cannot be a “fact”; it doesn’t even appear on its face to express a proposition – i.e., to say something that might be true or false – any more than “Close the door!” does. Similarly, Occam’s Razor says essentially “Of all the explanations that fit the facts, choose the simplest.” Neither of these is completely unambiguous by any means, but they’re still valuable principles of action.

Now most people would say that, although the Principle of Induction and Occam’s Razor are not facts, they are nevertheless in some sense objectively valid principles of action. But it is notorious that they cannot be proved to be valid principles.

What the proponents of objective morality are really saying is that there are other objectively valid principles of action of the kind generally referred to as “moral principles”, such as the “Golden Rule” and “Love thy neighbor”.

(4) But if there are objectively valid principles of action, statements of the form “X should do Y” can be understood as meaning that “X, do Y” can be derived from such a principle. It can be objected, of course, that moral “principles of action” can conflict. The answer to this is that, in the final analysis, there is only one perfectly valid moral principle. All others are either corollaries of it or generalizations to the effect that it is usually or almost always true that actions of a certain type are in accord with this one “universal” moral principle.

Finally, of course, if “X should do Y” is objectively true, we might call it an “objective moral fact”.

(5) We’re finally ready to say exactly what is meant by saying that a statement of the form “X should do Y” is an objective moral fact. We mean that, if it is true for any one person at any one time that X should do Y, then it is true for all persons at all times that X should do Y. It should be understood here that we are talking about a specific action by a specific person at a specific time. We are not saying, for example, that if it is an “objective moral fact” that Smith should not lie to Jones about a specific matter right now, he shouldn’t lie to Jones about anything right now, much less that he should never lie to Jones about anything, much less that he should never lie to anyone about anything, much less that no one should ever lie to anyone about anything. We are saying only that it is true that Smith should not tell this particular lie to Jones right now, regardless of what Brown, or Davis, or Anderson, or any other person or group of persons may think or feel about it.

Of course, according to my understanding of what it means to say that “X should do Y” is an objective moral fact, the reason that such a fact is “true for everyone” is simply that it is true, period. That is, it must be true that “X, do Y” is derivable from an objectively valid moral principle of action. If it is so derivable, that is an objective fact. It doesn’t matter whether any given person believes that it is. This of course entails that “objectively valid moral principles” are valid for everyone. But that’s just what it means to say that they’re objectively valid.

But the meaning I defined for “P is an objective moral truth” is the generally accepted one in moral philosophy. If someone wants to defend the notion of objective moral truths, he must, at a minimum, defend the claim that there are statements of the form “X should do Y” that are true for everyone, regardless of what they might think or feel. And anyone who wants to argue that morality is not objective must say that there are no such truths: that the Holocaust, for example, cannot be said to have been “wrong” except in the trivial sense that he personally disapproves of it, or that some group of people disapproves of it.

(6) But a direct discussion of whether there are any such objective moral facts is really pointless. The real question is whether there are any objectively valid principles of action of the kind that would generally be called “moral”. And if someone wants to claim that this is impossible in principle, he is going to have to give a reasonable account of things like the Principle of Induction. He will either have to say that this is not an objectively valid principle of action (in which case he will need to say whether it is rationally justifiable to follow it, and if so why), or point out some difference between the Principle of Induction and, say, the Golden Rule, such that the former can be an objectively valid principle of action but the latter cannot. It is also possible to hold that it is possible in principle that there are objectively valid moral principles of action, but as a matter of fact there aren’t any. Of course, this raises the thorny question of what “as a matter of fact” means in this context.

In the end, it seems that this is really a question of the metaphysical status of principles of action such as the Principle of Induction, Occam’s Razor, and the Golden Rule. Can any of them be justified, and if so, how?

[ February 17, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

PompousBastard

The comparison to legal facts is interesting,and not one I've seen very often. Here's why I think it breaks down:

The fact that, for example, it is illegal to drive on the left hand side of a two-way street is not an objective legal fact but an objective fact about a particular legal system. Likewise, the fact that it is immoral to wear clothing made of mixed fibres is not an objective moral fact but an objective fact about a particular moral system. The real question is whether or not a given legal or moral system is completely a human construct or if it is an attempt to describe some Platonic "legality" or "morality" that exists independently of human wants and needs.

I think it's obviously the former, but I'd love to hear some convincing arguments that the latter is correct.

Tom Piper

bd-from-kg,

1. I am curious about what you think the fact that youcan't prove the various things you mention shows.

2. The validity of modus ponensas a rule of inference can be demonstrated with a simple truth-table.

3. How about the following as an example of identifying a true moral principle (offered with a nod of homage toward John Searle):

(i) To promise (to pay) is to place oneself under an obligation to pay.
(ii) To place oneself under an obligation (to pay) is to 'acquire' an obligation (to pay), and, to thereby have an obligation (to pay).
(iii) Obligations are things that, by definition, ought to be fulfilled.
(iv) Promises ought to be fulfilled.

(throughout we will assume that the required 'other things being equal' clauses necessary to reflect the various defeasability (spell?) conditions are understood)

Tom

pug846

Tom said:

So, you are admitting that your objective moral rules are arbitrary? I can make up any game with any sort of rules given the context of what sort of game I want to play. Once I write down these rules, they are, but your understanding, ‘objective’. Yet, they are ultimately, arbitrary and there is no one “right” set of rules. This meaning of the word ‘objective’ doesn’t seem to correspond to what we call ‘objective moral facts.’ If you could flush this out a little more and explain exactly what this method means when applied to morality, we might be able to make more headway.

But I have to agree to play the game first – why should I play this game instead of another one and adopt those set of rules?

Bd said:

We use them because they are (generally) useful to our ends. I assume (?) you would agree with this statement.

And in the same sense, the “Golden Rule” is only useful to our ends and in that respect and in that respect only, it is “true.” I don’t have the thread url saved, but in your discussion of metaphysical assumptions, you argued that certain presuppositions are useful, which is why they are presupposed. A presupposition of God is worthless; therefore, there is no reason to make such an assumption. (My memory could be wrong – I do believe this is a summary of your position in that thread).

This is what I had in mind when I said, “objective moral fact.” However, the phrase, “X should do Y,” is meaningless unless it is qualified with more information. (You went into further detail below and that is where you will find the bulk of my response).
I of course deny that the statement of the form “X should do Y” is true for any one person at any one time that X should do Y. You went through a similar argument with Pompous Bastard, and I will raise similar objections.

First, lets look at a statement of the form you suggested: Tim ought to give money to his sister so she won’t starve. I don’t think this is valid for every possible person in Tim’s position. If ‘Tim,’ doesn’t value his sister, why should he give her a cent? If you can’t provide Tim with a single reason he accepts to give his sister money, how does the above sentence make any sense? Your statement can’t be qualified and all you can say is, Tim, GIVE YOUR SISTER MONEY. If Tim is fully informed about the situation and given his set of values and goals, it might often make sense for Tim NOT to give money to his sister. The only response you can give is to claim that he should, just because. If you are playing monopoly with Tim and Tim doesn’t want to play or follow the rules you have set out for him, in what way would it make sense to say Tim should follow the rules anyway?

In the case of the holocaust, I can certainly argue with individuals that they are wrong on factual grounds. (I.e., they might think that genetically, Jews aren’t similar to them). I can also appeal to their set of values and goals and argue that to stay consistent, they should have been against the holocaust. Finally, I can make the declaration that many people ought to have been against the holocaust because they share a similar set of values and motivational attitudes as I do and therefore, ought to have tried to avoid it. I can of course say that it is “wrong” in the sense that I don’t think it ought to have occurred and it is against my set of values to be involved in such an act. Certainly there were individuals who had all of the relevant moral data in the situation, yet given their set of values, they ought to have participated in the holocaust. That’s unfortunate, but it doesn’t seem to make any sense to say they ought not have participated given that I can’t think of any convincing reasons that they will accept to avoid it.

I touched on my response to number 6 in this response, but will give a more thorough response later. (I.e., principles in action not being true, only being useful or not). I haven’t exactly worked out my thinking here. I hope you continue to participate in this discussion as I always learn a lot from your posts.

[ February 17, 2002: Message edited by: pug846 ]</p>