excreationist

What about all the money you spend on non-essentials for yourself rather than to giving to starving children? Maybe your morality is more complicated than you thought.

DRFseven

But society's standards ARE pretty important in the moral acquisition process, don't you think? That is how morals are funneled to successive generations in a society, and how the shaping instead of breaking of morals is accomplished. I agree with you that moral feelings are personal, but your society's moral climate comprises the mileu from which you experience and come to conclusions of right and wrong (even if that society is eclectic).

njhartsh

Very often, sure.

I certainly won't dispute that. But the issue at hand, I think, is the very nature of normative claims, not the considerably more prosaic pragmatic question of how exactly they got into your head. The question is not (directly anyway) what it was in my personal history that gave me the belief that (say) wanton homicide is wrong; the question is, specifically, why is wanton homicide wrong?

Actually, I think the taste/ethics comparison I raised above is worthwhile in this area too: it seems to me that food preferences get into our brains in pretty much the same ways that ethical convictions do, and yet more or less everyone I know considers food preference to be the epitome of a subjective value system. So absolutists have a long way to go to demonstrate how subjectivism is somehow contradictory or impossible.

- Nathan

long winded fool

It is illogical for you to take a right on Sixth Street if... This is why goals need to be examined. No one "comes up" with goals necessarily. Goals ultimately stem from desires, not just objective intellectual decisions. "My goal is to kill my brother." You need to ask, why? What desire am I fulfilling, or what fear am I escaping, by killing my brother? Is killing my brother the most logical means of fulfilling this desire? Will it interfere with my other desires of avoiding incarceration and shame? Are there any other ways to fulfill this desire? If so, will they better enable me to avoid undermining my other desires? If not, are my other desires more important to me than my desire which causes me to want to kill my brother? The moral thing to do in this case is to either fulfill your desire in a way that will prevent you from losing the chance to fulfill or retain your other desires, (put a picture of your brother on a punching bag, maybe?) or to simply ask yourself what is making you desire this and deal with that, (talking out whatever problems you may have with your brother.) These might enable you to fulfill the same desires as killing your brother would, without putting you in a position that you do not desire to be in. Every situation is different and there are countless variables, but logical examination points to the moral action.

You do entertain the theory that one might pursue goals that seem pretty troublesome:
The most important response to this (and the most important point I would like you to take away from my post) is, of course, "So what?" So what if my goal is illogical or somehow self-defeating? That fails to prove that it is absolutely morally wrong. Until you demonstrate a connection between a test you suggest and absolute morality, all you have done is tell us what characterizes (im)moral actions in your subjective opinion.

If your goal is illogical and self-defeating, then you aren't examining your goal very closely. Human desires by nature rarely are self-defeating. Desires stem from instincts that are designed to ensure survival. A self-defeating instinct generally results in extinction. If a desire is designed to help you, (hunger) and you formulate a goal that will hurt you, (over-eating) then you are in distress as a human being. Many humans like to eat more than they need to survive. By doing this, they are acting on a desire to survive in a way that is detrimental to their health and consequently their survival. Their fundamental goal is to survive like all animals. They are going about it the wrong way. Their morality is therefore wrong and should be corrected, since their actions are not fulfilling their goal.

I hazard to guess that human beings do lots of illogical things every day. Undoubtedly many of these are on a par with turning right to get to K-Mart when turning left is much simpler and faster. You don't seriously believe that a mere wrong turn is immoral, do you? It does happen to fit the description you've provided perfectly.

Morality comes into play when human beings are hurt by illogical actions. I see no distinction between logic and morality. All immoral things are merely illogical actions which result in some kind of harm to human beings.

Then show me the contradiction.

Compare: "Taste in food is subjective. Chocolate ice cream tastes terrible." Is that a contradiction? What relevant epistemological difference is there between taste in food and morality?

On what grounds can you force me to not eat chocolate because you think it tastes terrible? This is what you are doing by preventing me from killing Nathan's sister. The comparison to truly subjective things like taste and beauty isn't accurate, since we don't force people to eat certain things and appreciate certain things. Morality is enforced by society. You are not entitled to any morality that conflicts with mine, and vice versa. If my morality tells me to kill Nathan's sister, you are going to prevent me from doing so. We cannot both be right. A cannot be non-A. Without an objective and absolute reference for what is or isn't moral, the term 'discussing morality' becomes nothing but a euphemism for war.

Because within subjectivism, all of these "acceptable"s and "unacceptable"s are indexed to and dependent upon the being(s) whose moral perspective(s) they come from--in this case, to and upon me. You have the (unbounded) epistemic right to believe that killing my sister is morally good or that chocolate ice cream is delicious. I disagree on both counts.

Then one of us (or both of us) is mistaken in our morality. We both have the right to our morality, but our moralities can't both be right any more than A can be A and not A.

I think you, like most moral absolutists, are having a very difficult time conceptualizing the idea of (im)morality without presuming absolutism. The statement "If morality is what is acceptable, then anything unnacceptable must be immoral," while arguably true within a given subjective notion of right and wrong, trips plenty of "false premise" alarms when I read it from you. I hope it's clear to you that the phrase "be immoral" means something different within subjectivism (see previous paragraph) than it does within absolutism.

In subjectivism, immoral is anything that you decide is immoral. This is a tautology. If I ought to poke you in the eye because that is my moral belief, and you prevent me from doing so, you are enforcing your moral beliefs over mine. If you are a moral subjectivist, you are being hypocritical. You claim I am entitled to my version of morality, then when I try to act on it you stop me. You say my morality is equal to yours, then you tell me I'm acting immorally and that I ought to act the way you think I ought to act, i.e. I shouldn't poke you in the eye. If you honestly believed morality were truly subjective, you wouldn't do this.

Because it's based on my subjective notion of what people ought and ought not to do. Undoubtedly those people have their own subjective notions (such as, perhaps, "The best way to judge an action as immoral is to say: 'If you desire this, then it is illigocal to do this'"). So what?

So who's right? Are we both right if you believe 2+2=4 and I believe 2+2=5? This makes for a friendly environment, but I'm sure you agree that it certainly prevents any kind of logical discourse.

Majority? Who said anything about majorities? You, I or anyone else is capable of believing that the actions of a majority (or an oligarchy, or a monarchy--you name it) are wrong. Now you're talking politics, not morality.

But morality is enforced by the majority. Who's morality ought we to enforce? In a democratic society it's obviously the morality of the majority. If you don't like it, we punish you.

Re "dogmatism," I should point out that a subjective human (which is to say, a human ) is perfectly capable of finding a given moral question indeterminate. For example, I think the bombing hypothetical suggested by "Tom Sawyer" above is at best very, very difficult. I certainly don't "have the answers," because at least in the abstract, I can't say whether I would consider that bombing acceptable or not. Forgive me, but that seems to me rather un-dogmatic.

Moral subjectivism is usually designed to be anti-dogmatic. Unfortunately, the results are just as dogmatic as the objective morality it moves away from. Who are you to tell me I can't poke you in the eye if morality is subjective? You do not have the authority, yet you still do. This is arbitrarily dogmatic. Likewise, who am I to poke you in the eye? I do not have the authority, except that morality is subjective and I must do what I feel is moral. Entirely subjective morality is also the philosophy of non-reasoning animals. As soon as you assume that there are certain things that ought to be absolutely enforced regardless of anyone else's personal morality, you are demonstrating a belief in objective morality. You may allow others to believe what they want, but you do not allow others to act on their beliefs unless their actions do not conflict with your beliefs. Human beings cannot escape this reality. We may not know what is objectively moral at any given time, but we know that morality is objective and we strive to find it.

Well, that's "absolute" taken in a very special and quite irrelevant sense. The fact that a given policy (say, the Fugitive Slave Act) facially applies to me hardly demonstrates that it constitutes absolute morality, much less that it's right.

I agree. However it does show a belief in some objective absolute standard of morality. Keep in mind that belief in absolute objective morality doesn't mean that one knows what is moral and immoral. If one assumes the authority to pass a law preventing some actions that they consider immoral, then they believe that this version of morality ought to apply to absolutely everyone all the time. This is not a subjective belief in morality.

Again, compare: "'There are some things that just taste horrible!' A taste subjectivist cannot logically say this with any conviction, because those horrible-tasting things might be delicious to someone else."

Pretty silly and irrelevant, huh? I suppose you're right that subjectivists do realize that things aren't "just wrong" but rather "wrong given the principles I hold," which strikes me as a far humbler stance--but otherwise I fail to see how the existence of moral disagreement somehow shows a fundamental flaw in subjective morality.

Silly and irrelevant until you tell me I'm not allowed to eat something you think tastes horrible. Moral subjectivists claim that one cannot do this, yet by telling me I'm not allowed to kill Nathan's sister, a moral subjectivist has just contradicted him or herself.

What do you mean by "intellectual"? I suppose you probably mean "epistemological," in which case you may have a point; but I fail to see the relevance of that. Recognizing the mere epistemic right of people to disagree with me is not exactly difficult.

A moral objectivist recognizes the right of people to disagree with him or her. What we (I) do not recognize is that two conflicting beliefs can both be correct beliefs. Either the conflict must be resolved, or one or both of the beliefs must be absolutely wrong.

You keep asserting this, but you haven't explained why. Where's the hypocrisy? You are perfectly welcome to believe that it's good to kill my sister. (I daresay a creative person like yourself could think of several goals that, in your tactical-analysis steamroller, killing my sister could theoretically serve.) I believe it is not good, and I will therefore act to stop you. Which one of us succeeds (or commands a majority, or whatever) has, in the abstract at least, little to nothing to do with the question of the nature of morality.

Let me clear something up. I agree that morality is subjective in the sense that everybody has different ideas and beliefs. In this respect, it's easy to prove that morality is subjective. Just find a Christian and a Satanist. They do not agree on morality. Now, is killing your sister wrong? We both have different opinions. If I am right, as you must admit is the case since my action is moral, I have the authority to kill your sister. If you are right as you also must admit is the case since my action to you is immoral, then I do not. This is a contradiction. You can't tell me I'm wrong when I kill your sister anymore than I can tell you you're wrong for not eating chocolate. If you don't like chocolate you don't have to eat it. If you think it's wrong to kill your sister, then don't kill her. When you apply your morality to me, you are demonstrating a belief that your morality is absolute and that mine is not, or at least that your morality is "more absolute" than mine.

DRFseven

To answer this, I think you have to answer the question, "What specific thing has to happen in regards to a specific act for the act to be considered wrong?" The answer would be that the moral feelings of the one(s) doing the considering must be offended. Nothing has to be justified; it need not be rational. The only criteria that MUST be satisfied is that of moral valence. Does it or does it not seem moral?



I agree with you on the dynamics of food preferences being similar to that of morality. I have often used the "cuteness of kittens" as illustration of the inherent subjectiveness of value judgements (for some reason when I think of moral examples, I always come up with cats). Once and for all, are kittens cute or not? Surely any right-thinking person should be able to come up with an absolute answer for this question. Surely there is a rational reason why they are or aren't cute? Surely we are born with a genetic predisposition to like or dislike the fuzzy, big-eyed way they look? Surely, if there is a supreme being, it embodies this feeling about kittens in its very nature? Surely the answer to the question of kittens' cuteness lies in nature, itself? No? Well, then, the answer must depend upon how the observer values the appearance of the kittens, and that, of course is subjective opinion.

njhartsh

DRFseven--I think you and I agree on pretty much everything we've discussed. Should we continue our round of heated agreement?

Now, to my fellow long-winded poster:

If the quickest route to K-Mart involves taking a left on Sixth Street. That's what I said. By your moral theory, that makes a right turn on Sixth Street (given a goal to go to K-Mart) immoral. I find that absurd.

Tactics, goals, desires, objective intellectual decisions--who cares? How is any of this connected to objective moral truth?

Fine, desires. Some people desire to love their fellow (wo)man. Others desire to purchase a twelve-pack of Diet Seven-Up at the K-Mart on Sixth Street. Still others desire to kill their spouses' adulturous lovers. Another group desires to annihilate all members of a given ethnic group from the face of the earth. These desires imply goals, which in turn imply tactics. However, I still haven't seen any suggestion from you why that thought process, applied to any of these desires, demonstrates that the tactics (or goals or desires) involved are objectively moral.

Let's take the murderous spouse. He's incensed that his wife has been sleeping with another man. He flies into a murderous rage and then maps out a plan for procuring a gun, sneaking up on the lover and blowing said lover's head off. This tactical plan is, we'll posit, entirely logically sound given his goal of homicide. The husband carries out his plan and succeeds in murdering the lover.

By your theory, isn't it patently clear that this man's actions are supremely moral? They certainly flow directly from his desires and goals. They are in fact not "self-defeating," because his attempts to achieve the goal are very likely to help, not hinder, his goal.

In the murderous-lover hypothetical, of course it is. This man desires his rival dead. Killing the rival is a fairly logical way of achieving this.

Who says this man has any conniptions about incarceration and shame? Quite possibly his desire for revenge is far more important to him than any concerns about prison and disapproval. You can't seriously believe that there aren't people who prioritize goals very similar to these in precisely this way.

I suspect that some desires are not only not routes to objective morality, but that we can even consider them wrong.

That doesn't get our cuckold his revenge. You baselessly assume that this person has "other desires" noteworthy enough to interfere with vengeance.

This makes no sense with the moral theory you have presented. You have argued that objective morality is merely a question of discerning which tactics will most efficiently forward the actor's goals and/or desires. Here you suddenly suggest that those desires are themselves questionable; but on your theory as you have stated it up until now, the desires (or goals--it matters little) are allegedly grounded in objective moral fact. Your argument is internally contradictory.

When the cuckold "ask[s] [him]self what is making [him] desire" revenge against his wife's lover, pray tell, how is he to evaluate the results he comes up with? Sure, sure, "hard logic"--but based on what premises? What distinguishes a good source of desire from a bad one? And how is any of this objective?

Aha, so it's all about survival instincts, eh? Hm.

Should I point out that killing one's romantic rivals is strongly favored by evolution? That the cuckold's thirst for revenge is the epitome of a natural desire? Evolutionary dictates are very often horrible moral rules. "Grab as many resources as you efficiently can and make sure they are distributed only to persons who are closely related to you." "Eliminate all rivals for your mate's (or mates') affection." "Cooperate with distant relatives only insofar as it is to your competitive advantage." "Lie, cheat, steal, rape and kill every time it will increase your expected number of grandchildren."

So survival is the end-all, be-all? Gee, I think plenty of people would disagree with that.

Imagine an infantry unit dug in in a trench. All of the soldiers are members of different ethnic groups (i.e., no close genetic relations). A grenade flies into the trench, and Private A is the only one who sees it. A has a split second to decide: should he jump on the grenade (sacrificing himself but saving everyone else in the vicinity), or should he run away at top speed (vice versa)? Obviously the latter course is the only one what will favor A's "survival." For that reason, it's the one evolution unavoidably favors. (You don't pass your genes on by allowing yourself to be killed for the benefit of people with other genes.) In the sense you rely upon, it's the "natural" answer. Does that make it objective? Does that make it right? I say neither.

Once again, I'm afraid that in my subjective judgment, your "objective" value system is pretty scary.

What? You never mentioned this before. You said that tactics that did not efficiently serve goals (or, in the later revision, desires) were immoral, period.

But, as usual, the central question is: why? What is it about harming human beings that is objectively wrong?

What difference does that make? Heck, if I had enough political power I could ban chocolate ice cream because I think it tastes bad. Adolf Hitler was denied entry to an art school in Vienna because the admissions people thought he was a lousy painter--an imposition of a subjective judgment if I've ever heard of one. So what?

Irrelevant. I asked for an epistemological distinction betwen morality and taste--for a difference in how we know that certain things are good/delicious/beautiful. You offer a difference (a trivial and inaccurate one, as my previous paragraph demonstrates) in how we apply morality and taste to other people. That has nothing to do with the issue.

<Sigh.> "If my palate tells me that chocolate ice cream tastes terrible, you are going to disagree with me. We cannot both be right. A cannot be non-A." I would very much like you to recognize how the issue of "prevent me from doing so" is entirely irrelevant. As you correctly state, it's the status of "A" that's in question. Whether I stop you from killing my sister or not, I believe that it's wrong for you to do so--and the nature of that belief is all that matters.

False, obviously. I would hope that it's self-evident to anyone on a discussion board that two people who agree on given premises (such as "Hurting people is generally wrong") can have meaningful discussions based on their shared premises. Even if those premises are subjective ("Ragtime music is beautiful") or false ("The Invisible Pink Unicorn exists"), meaningful discussion is still possible between people who share premises. If the parties in fact don't agree on basic premises, that hardly leaves them with no recourse but war. "Agreeing to disagree" is often a very easy thing to do.

Blatant question-begging. "Then one of us (or both of us) is mistaken in our taste about chocolate ice cream. We both have the right to our taste, but our tastes can't both be right any more than A can be A and not A." Very silly.

You have the epistemic right to your morality. All this means is that I cannot prove that your morality is objectively false--nothing more. It does not mean that I am obligated to let you do absolutely anything you consider to be moral.

No, I do not. I have never said such a thing. In order for our moralities to be "equal," there would have to be some way to measure them. I of course do have subjective evaluations of your stated moral theory (e.g., "That bit about 'natural survival instinct' is scary"), but "equal" generally implies an objective yardstick. That, once again, presumes your conclusion.

You still have given me no reason to believe that this statement is true. Why does subjectivism imply the refusal to apply one's moral beliefs to other people?

The Viennese art school faculty imposed their artistic standards upon young Adolf. This does not make their artistic standards objective (or wrong, or right), nor does it make them aesthetic "hypocrites." Do you understand the difference between epistemology and application now?

According to whom? By my standard, I'm right to prevent you from poking me in the eye. By your standard, perhaps you're right to poke me in the eye. (Maybe that's your natural desire.) Besides bringing in other similarly subjective standard-bearers, I'm not sure that there's much more we can say.

Tell that to the Iraqi Shi'ites. Or the Third World generally.

Tell that to the Bill of Rights. (Goodness, I'm glad you're not in charge. ...On second thought, maybe you are. A thousand apologies, Mr. Attorney General. )

False. Subjectivism does not require the claim that one cannot do this.

You will fare better in arguments with subjectivists when you have a basic understanding of what subjectivism is. A hint: your concession ("I agree that morality is subjective in the sense that everybody has different ideas and beliefs") has nothing to do with subjectivism. Whether people do or do not agree about morality is totally irrelevant to both subjectivism and objectivism.

Then you must explain how you and I have conflicting beliefs about the taste of chocolate ice cream without one of them being absolutely wrong. Your diversion about application is a red herring--it has nothing to do with the per se conflict of beliefs, with whether or not our beliefs in and of themselves are "absolutely wrong." I await your explanation.

- Nathan

The AntiChris

njhartsh

Excellent posts!

Chris

long winded fool

I agree that everyone has the legal and epistemic right to their morality, and that there are as many different moral codes as there are people. I agree that everyone is entitled to their opinion. If you are saying that every opinion is equally sound, then I disagree, but halfway through your post you seemed to indicate that you didn't believe this. If you can hold an opinion about another's morality, then you must have a basis for comparison. This basis is what I assume is the objective standard. I assume that logic alone ought to rule morality, but not everyone uses logic in their moral standards. I believe that those who have illogical moral standards can be proven wrong. You could theoretically take the word morality away and still have a perfect "moral" code using just logic. Under this system, any immoral action must necessarily be an illogical action, though you have a point that not all illogical actions are actions that most would consider immoral. (Making a right on Sixth, for example.)

It's true that examining only certain limited variables can make a thing seem logical. "I desire food. I see bread. I should eat the bread." It is logical to eat the bread, so long as you ignore the variables which state, "The bread is not mine. If I eat it, I'll go to jail. I desire freedom more than food at the moment." Not eating the bread is now logical. This system demands critical analysis of actions and desires. It doesn't provide a black and white picture of what you can and can't do, it shows you how to figure out for yourself without a black and white picture what you should and shouldn't do. Every situation will obviously be different, and because no one is in possession of all the variables, it is necessary to reserve judgment. Granted, it is impractical to use this to force your morality on another person, but given enough variables you can certainly help someone else realize what they really ought to do in a given situation with given desires.

It seems to me that I don't necessarily fall under what you would call a moral objectivist and you don't fall under what I would call a moral subjectivist. Subjective IMO generally means open to personal interpretation. Subjective morality, I would assume, means that not only are personal ideas about the morality open to individual interpretation, but the value of an action resulting from this morality is as well. Therefore it becomes meaningless to say that Hitler was bad or Mother Teresa was good. Both were simply engaging in subjective, valueless behavior. Once you place value judgments, to me, you lose your ability to logically claim that all values should be accepted as subjective. Once you call something good and another thing bad, you show some basic objective reference. It doesn't have to be the Ten Commandments, or any other man-made thing. Logic alone has the power to show exactly what one ought to do in any given situation by examining desires and the probable outcome of actions. I agree that we all should be tolerant of other moral systems. I don't think that all moral systems can be correct. Being tolerant of illogical moralities is very different that failing to discriminate between the logical and illogical.

njhartsh

Gee, thanks, AntiChris.

Okay, LWF. In my exchange with you, I've had three, er, goals:
(1) To demonstrate that there is no reason to believe that the "objective" moral theory you espouse is in fact objective.
(2) To demonstrate that said moral theory you espouse yields results (e.g., regarding cuckold murder and wrong turns) that I find absurd or frightening; I suspect that even you don't actually accept these results.
(3) To try to clear up your misconceptions about subjectivism and its alleged hypocrisy.

I think I'm making a little headway on (1) and (2), though (3) is a bit tougher. Objectivist presuppositions are tough to dislodge.

Not unless you've changed your mind since your most recent post, you don't. You believe that some people's moralities are objectively, provably false. If that is so, then those people do not have an epistemic right to their moralities. Civil ("legal") rights are something quite different. I'm glad we agree about the freedom of conscience. (I now suspect that you're not John Ashcroft.)

Sure I do: my own principles. I find Humanist morality commendable (it generally concurs with my principles) and Nazi morality abhorrent (it vastly contradicts my principles). Not very difficult.

Nope--it's subjective. I fail to see any a priori reason for picking the principles I did--or for picking any others, for that matter.

Great! Now, are you going to jettison the "logic alone ought to rule morality" premise, or are you going to bite the (IMO absurd) bullet and conclude that it's immoral to make a right on Sixth when your goal lies to the left?

(We can raise the stakes, of course: immediately after you take the illogical right turn, a pedestrian jumps out from the sidewalk on Sixth. You hit the brakes, but too late--the pedestrian is under your front wheels, dead. In a previous post, you stated that "Morality comes into play when human beings are hurt by illogical actions"; this appears to be exactly what has happened here. So: was it immoral for you to turn right on Sixth?)

The only way you're getting reasonable-sounding results from your all-hail-logic algorithm is by baselessly presuming desires like this. Unquestionably there are people who desire food (or vengeance, or a roll in the hay, or money, or whatever) more than freedom--or, even more likely, they desire those often-troubling things more than they fear getting caught, because they presume that they won't. If I know the cops won't catch me, then my mere desire for freedom won't prevent me from breaking the law.

Once again, your allegedly all-logic-all-the-time test yields results that I suspect you yourself find unacceptable.

To make point (1) again, however: even if it weren't for these absurd or scary results, you still haven't demonstrated anything that shows that illogical courses of action are objectively morally wrong. Your argument requires the premise "Illogical = objectively wrong," and you haven't even tried to support that. Your premise looks entirely subjective to me.

Actually, that's not such a bad definition. I would invert this slightly: Subjectivism is the belief that moral statements are based entirely upon the beliefs, feelings, desires and urges of sentient moral actors, and that there appear to exist no bases for moral statements independent of such actors. Not a lot different from your definition, really. Now let's look at the inferences you draw from those premises:

No, this clearly does not follow from the premise that the "value of an action resulting from" "personal ideas about ... morality" is "open to individual interpretation."

Once again, let's compare taste. I think chocolate ice cream tastes terrible. I think banana ice cream is delicious. You will agree, I hope, that the "value of a statement resulting from personal ideas about taste is open to individual interpretation," right? Taste is subjective, yes?

Good. Now, does it therefore "become[ ] meaningless" for me to say that chocolate ice cream tastes terrible, while banana ice cream is delicious? Not in the slightest. When I say "banana ice cream is delicious," you understand that to mean "in Nathan's judgment, banana ice cream is delicious," right? Not meaningless--to the contrary, it makes obvious sense. (And does "delicious" not exist? Is it meaningless? Of course not; it's just subjectively defined.)

A subjectivist's response to a moral statement that I make (e.g., "Capital punishment is wrong") is exactly the same: she understands that to mean "In Nathan's judgment, capital punishment is wrong." It's no harder than in the ice cream example.

So, what then? Maybe she agrees with me. Maybe she doesn't. If we have basic moral principles in common, we can debate the point. And life goes on.

By the way (and you can take this as a "workbook example" to practice understanding subjectivism), Mother Teresa was not good.

This is why I constantly reference taste in food in discussions like these. (Other examples are taste in music or art--or, thank you, DRFseven, "cuteness of kittens.") Whenever you talk about foods you do or do not like, you are stating a "value judgment"--and yet it's self-evident that that action does not forfeit your "ability to logically claim that all tastes should be accepted as subjective." Surely you recognize that by saying "Pepperoni pizza [or whatever] is delicious," you're not "show[ing] some basic objective reference"! Morality is, epistemologically, no different.

Like many objectivists, you have accepted your primary conclusion--"value judgments require an objective reference"--so utterly that you have a difficult time even imagining how a value judgment could exist without an objective reference. You see me stating a moral judgment and, further, stating that I'm ready to enforce it. You immediately presume--per your ingrained presupposition but directly contrary to the philosophical position I'm defending--that I therefore must have an objective reference. This is a sure-fire recipe for confusion. I bring up taste to show that you do accept certain "value judgments" even while recognizing that they are subjective. You're almost there!

No. Banana ice cream isn't "tasteless" just because my "delicious" reaction (as well as whatever reaction you have) is subjective. Your use of "valueless" again displays that intractable presupposition of yours.

Hitler and Teresa engaged in behavior that any sentient being can find morally relevant. Indeed, billions of such beings (including Hitler and Teresa themselves) have made moral judgments of the two's actions. Ergo the actions were not "valueless": they were alternately judged great, good, lukewarm, bad and horrible, depending enormously upon the person doing the judging. Any verdict on Hitler's and Teresa's actions necessarily depends upon the subjective ethical premises of whomever is doing the judging.

I am not aware of anywhere we can look to find an objective answer about those two people's life work, or indeed about any action at all. ("God" is a common citation here, but it's a big loser.) Subjective value judgments appear to be the only kind in town.

So, to sum up:
(1) No matter how "logical" the thought processes involved, it appears that every moral theory necessarily rests upon premises (such as "It's immoral to do illogical things") which are themselves arbitrary, not demonstrably and absolutely true.
(2) I continue to fear that the algorithm you suggest yields results that are alternately absurd and frightening.
(3) Subjectivism does not make all actions "valueless," nor does it prevent moral actors from enforcing their moral ideas on other people. Some subjectivists hold (subjective) moral principles such as "It is immoral to impose moral rules on people who do not agree with them," but subjectivism per se requires no such beliefs. Moreover, I find that kind of full-blown relativism entirely untenable. (See my post responding to "Tom Sawyer," above, for an explanation.)

- Nathan

long winded fool

I think you might be losing me here, or else I've lost you. According to my system, if hitting the pedestrian resulted from an illogical action, and this caused you some kind of pain, then it was immoral. Since there was no way of predicting that this would happen by turning onto Sixth Street, then it was not illogical and therefore not immoral. If I have a goal not to hit pedestrians, and I take my eyes off the road and hit a pedestrian, taking my eyes off the road was illogical because it didn't achieve my goal and was immoral because a person was hurt. In order for an action to be immoral, it must be illogical. Turning onto Sixth Street was not illogical. If turning onto Sixth Street is an illogical action, then hitting the pedestrian is not necessarily immoral, since turning onto Sixth Street is not what caused you to hit the pedestrian. Either you took your eyes off the road, (immoral) or he jumped out right in front of you, (not immoral.)

The only way you're getting reasonable-sounding results from your all-hail-logic algorithm is by baselessly presuming desires like this. Unquestionably there are people who desire food (or vengeance, or a roll in the hay, or money, or whatever) more than freedom--or, even more likely, they desire those often-troubling things more than they fear getting caught, because they presume that they won't. If I know the cops won't catch me, then my mere desire for freedom won't prevent me from breaking the law.

This must be where we are having difficulty. I don't think presuming desires is baseless at all. I think intent is required for an action to be moral or immoral. Acts themselves have no inherent moral value. A boulder falling on my head is neither moral nor immoral. A boulder being pushed onto my head is either moral or immoral if the intent can be assumed to either be to kill me or not to kill anyone. Intent is what makes an action either moral or immoral. You ask why, and assume that there is no correct answer. While we might never know the correct answer, there is one. If the act was logical and accomplished it's goal without undermining another, it was either moral or just logical. If it was illogical and resulted in some kind of pain, it was immoral. (Again, immoral is just a description of an illogical behavior that offends or hurts the actor in some way.)

To make point (1) again, however: even if it weren't for these absurd or scary results, you still haven't demonstrated anything that shows that illogical courses of action are objectively morally wrong. Your argument requires the premise "Illogical = objectively wrong," and you haven't even tried to support that. Your premise looks entirely subjective to me.

This is where we are having trouble. Not all illogical actions are objectively morally wrong. All objectively morally wrong actions are illogical. This is not after the fact, because, as you point out, morality is a personal opinion. Is it immoral to put your dog to sleep? I don't know. First find out if it logically fulfills the desire that you intend for it to, and if engaging in the act doesn't undermine any other desires you may have. If it fails to do these things it is an illogical action. If this failure personally offends you or causes any kind of pain, (usually guilt) then it is immoral, if you want to call it that.

Actually, that's not such a bad definition. I would invert this slightly: Subjectivism is the belief that moral statements are based entirely upon the beliefs, feelings, desires and urges of sentient moral actors, and that there appear to exist no bases for moral statements independent of such actors.

I suppose I agree. Human thought is required for morality to exist, since morality is a label applied to the logic of an action. Where I take this is: If the action is logical, it cannot be immoral. If an action is logical, it could be moral or just logical. If an action is illogical, it cannot be moral. If the action is illogical, it could be immoral, or it could just be illogical. If an action is immoral, it must be illogical. If an action is moral, it must be logical. (whew!) Now, logic could be thought of as subjective in the sense that no one is in possession of all of the logical variables of a given action, and an action one thinks is logical may one day be discovered to be illogical. At this point I suppose one could call me a moral subjectivist, since my actions reflect the understanding that my logic could be wrong. In theory, logic is not subjective in the same sense that mathematics is not subjective. In practice, no one is perfect.

Morality can be thought of as subjective, I suppose, because one can label an illogical action immoral according to how they personally feel about the results of the action and a logical action moral for the same reasons. Putting my dog to sleep may seem immoral for me, but for you to engage in the act there may be no moral opinion, or it may even be moral. Morality can be thought of as objective because all immoral actions must be illogical, and all moral actions must be logical. Vice versa, this doesn't apply. Not all logical actions are moral... etc. We are entitled to our opinions about what is and is not moral, however, things we consider immoral will always be illogical and things we consider moral will always be logical for as long as we consider them moral. This enables us to analyze and judge another's morality with logic, even though they have the right to their feelings about an action. If their actions are illogical, then their behavior cannot be moral for them, regardless of what they claim. If they think it is, they are failing to take into account the variable which makes the behavior illogical. It must either be immoral, or just plain illogical. It cannot be moral.

Once again, let's compare taste. I think chocolate ice cream tastes terrible. I think banana ice cream is delicious. You will agree, I hope, that the "value of a statement resulting from personal ideas about taste is open to individual interpretation," right? Taste is subjective, yes?

Good. Now, does it therefore "become[ ] meaningless" for me to say that chocolate ice cream tastes terrible, while banana ice cream is delicious? Not in the slightest. When I say "banana ice cream is delicious," you understand that to mean "in Nathan's judgment, banana ice cream is delicious," right? Not meaningless--to the contrary, it makes obvious sense. (And does "delicious" not exist? Is it meaningless? Of course not; it's just subjectively defined.)

A subjectivist's response to a moral statement that I make (e.g., "Capital punishment is wrong") is exactly the same: she understands that to mean "In Nathan's judgment, capital punishment is wrong." It's no harder than in the ice cream example.

So, what then? Maybe she agrees with me. Maybe she doesn't. If we have basic moral principles in common, we can debate the point. And life goes on.

But what would be the point of debating in this case? Comparing morality to taste is no good because differing tastes rarely result in conflict. Subjective morality, (or should I say relative morality?) necessarily implicates that war is as equal a decider on moral issues as discussion, since there is no objective authority which states otherwise. If everyone is entitled to consider themselves right, how can cooperation have any collective value? How can it be any more valuable than war? It can be in opinion, but to claim this should apply to all without any basis besides "it's my personal opinion" is not an argument.

This is why I constantly reference taste in food in discussions like these. (Other examples are taste in music or art--or, thank you, DRFseven, "cuteness of kittens.") Whenever you talk about foods you do or do not like, you are stating a "value judgment"--and yet it's self-evident that that action does not forfeit your "ability to logically claim that all tastes should be accepted as subjective." Surely you recognize that by saying "Pepperoni pizza [or whatever] is delicious," you're not "show[ing] some basic objective reference"! Morality is, epistemologically, no different.

But saying that "all people should eat pepperoni pizza and not sausage" does imply some objective authority. You can subjectively say that "all people should believe that killing my sister is wrong," but how can you say that "All people should be prevented from killing my sister" and still claim moral subjectivity? You have declared an absolute.

Like many objectivists, you have accepted your primary conclusion--"value judgments require an objective reference"--so utterly that you have a difficult time even imagining how a value judgment could exist without an objective reference. You see me stating a moral judgment and, further, stating that I'm ready to enforce it. You immediately presume--per your ingrained presupposition but directly contrary to the philosophical position I'm defending--that I therefore must have an objective reference. This is a sure-fire recipe for confusion. I bring up taste to show that you do accept certain "value judgments" even while recognizing that they are subjective. You're almost there!

You're absolutely right there! (no pun intended) I am confused. I still don't understand how there can be no difference between allowing someone to believe what they want and forcing them to act a certain way. How can everyone be entitled to their religion, as long as their religion doesn't conflict with mine? Isn't this an absolute decree masked by a hypocritical appeal to its opposite?

No. Banana ice cream isn't "tasteless" just because my "delicious" reaction (as well as whatever reaction you have) is subjective. Your use of "valueless" again displays that intractable presupposition of yours.

Maybe I can clear up my stance and we can work from here: I value my hamster's right to its opinion that 2+2=green pellet, but I objectively label this as false. This mathematical equation has subjective value to my hamster. He believes it with all his heart. It is wrong.

So, to sum up:
(1) No matter how "logical" the thought processes involved, it appears that every moral theory necessarily rests upon premises (such as "It's immoral to do illogical things") which are themselves arbitrary, not demonstrably and absolutely true.

I agree here. However I think it is true that it is illogical to do immoral things. With this as an axiom, I am lead to the conclusion that, because all immoral things are illogical, "immoral" is just a label we attach to certain illogical behaviors because of the way they make us feel. Hence, when we feel bad about something, all we have to do is examine the logic of the act to determine whether or not it is immoral. When someone else feels bad about something, we can technically do the same thing, regardless of whether they do it or not.

(2) I continue to fear that the algorithm you suggest yields results that are alternately absurd and frightening.

That's okay. Morality is subjective. We're both right!

(3) Subjectivism does not make all actions "valueless," nor does it prevent moral actors from enforcing their moral ideas on other people. Some subjectivists hold (subjective) moral principles such as "It is immoral to impose moral rules on people who do not agree with them," but subjectivism per se requires no such beliefs. Moreover, I find that kind of full-blown relativism entirely untenable. (See my post responding to "Tom Sawyer," above, for an explanation.)

Well, I think you are pointing out that a person's own moral code is entirely dependent on their personal opinions. I agree with this. From this point of view, morality is subjective. Morality is "absolute" in the sense that person A can be mistaken about his own morality if he fails to critically analyze his behavior, and person B can theoretically be a better judge of his morality than he is by being aware of both the consequences of his actions and his personal opinion. Someone may think they are acting morally, wind up in a huge mess, and then reexamine their behavior and find out in retrospect that they were actually acting immorally the whole time. When they do this, they realize that actions that resulted in the fulfillment of one goal actually undermined another that they failed to take into account. In this case, their morality was wrong. They thought a thing was moral when it was immoral. In addition, an outside party can theoretically see this "objectively" before they do and accurately (and objectively) label it immoral before the actor knows that it is immoral. Does this still fit with your version of moral subjectivism?